

THE METAPHYSICS OF EVOLUTION

WITH OTHER ESSAYS
[NEW AND REPUBLISHED]

BY
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CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1928

First published by Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1922

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LIMITED,
BUNGAY, SUFFOLK

PROLOGUE

ALTHOUGH the title given to these two series of Essays may seem to apply directly only to the last essay of the Second Series, a little thought will show that it indicates a general direction already marked in the author's earliest contribution to *Mind*, reprinted, with slight revisions, at the beginning of the First Series. Preoccupation with historical representatives of the same way of thinking is indicated by the two essays on Giordano Bruno; and not less by the stimulus received from the great creationist thinker Charles Renouvier, whose critical or (as he called it in discipleship of Kant) "criticist" position in relation to all doctrines of evolutionary pantheism has had a profoundly modifying influence on both the metaphysical and the ethical ideas developed later.

The studies in philosophy of history and history of philosophy spring obviously from a continuation of the same interest; for of course man, whatever his ultimate essence may be, has his part in the process of the world. The consideration of man further leads to a consideration of the nature of his knowledge of himself and of things; and on this fundamental question there is a certain development of view from the earlier to the later essays. A brief statement in personal form will here not be out of place.

My aim was directed from the first towards an ontology on the double basis of science and idealism. This vaguely dates back to the early time when I was intensely interested in the divergent views of Mill, Hamilton and Spencer on the Absolute. My obligatory studies at Oxford from 1877 to 1881 were scientific, but my predominant interest always remained philosophical. I was not, however, much impressed by the Kantian or Hegelian movement that there prevailed, but had come to regard Berkeley and Hume as in metaphysics unique and the necessary beginning of everything hopeful for its future. The subsequent modification of the English experientialism with which I began has been gradual, and was effected more by the direct study of Neo-Platonism (to which Berkeley was attracted in his second period) than of the great Germans. Reading the Greeks when prepared for them, I found them in some respects ultra-modern; free, in their rationalism, from what even the Kantian Renouvier has

called the "scholastic bonds" of Kant, and therefore best fitted to correct what needed correction in the English reform of philosophy with its watchword of Experience. Some of Hume's ambiguous results may, in his own opinion, have led to puzzles insoluble by any further development of experiential method; and Berkeley, in the hints of *Siris*, vaguely prefigured a possible reunion of the exclusively experientialist with the older rationalist point of view. In any case, I find that for the constitution of knowledge certain elements of philosophical rationalism, of "the *a priori*," must be admitted which the great English experientialists from Locke to Mill and Spencer failed to resolve into anything else. As a natural consequence, my ontology has become less "hylozoic" and more Platonising than it tended to be in the beginning. For this reason, I can accept what seems to me the most important and most hopeful position of the New Realists (slightly adumbrated indeed in the extension I proposed to give to Clifford's ontology of "mind-stuff"); namely, the coequal reality of relations and of the things related (whatever these may be or mean ultimately). And, with some of the modern Realists, I have no scruple in accepting "Platonic Ideas" as real in a certain sense. At this point Realism (modern or ancient) becomes one with Idealism.

At the same time, I must proclaim my continued adhesion to the form of idealism that issues in the phenomenist theory of science. Here the antithesis between empirical and rationalist views on the principles of human knowledge makes little difference. The Berkeleyan Immaterialism is to be found in express terms in John Scotus Erigena, who reduced it from the Neo-Platonic philosophy that had come down to him in a rationalist form which he did not modify; and, apart from a few laxities of terminology (as when he roughly expresses his view by saying that the world of phenomena is "in the brain"), it is equally distinct in Schopenhauer, who, although profoundly influenced by English thought, was primarily in his theory of knowledge a Kantian. Essentially it was already present in Plotinus; but for an ancient thinker the problem of "the external world" was not yet such a separately interesting question as it became for British thought, of which John Scotus Erigena (like Berkeley, born in Ireland) was in this aspect a true precursor.

For a generalised statement of phenomenism as thus understood the reader may be referred to the Preface to the First Series. This was written for the collection entitled *Essays and Notices*,

Philosophical and Psychological, which appeared in 1895 and is now republished (with revisions) in a considerably reduced form. A single later review, from *Mind*, July, 1908, has been added, under the title "Science and Idealism." This is included because it seemed to bring the phenomenist view of the early essays to its clearest expression.

Any one reading these will easily observe that the phenomenism was never of the kind that excludes ontology as the ultimate quest. It only means that there is no ontology given already in physics. This I still maintain against Neo-Realism. The mode in which the transition may be made from the sciences, physical or natural, to ontology is partly stated in "A Compendious Classification of the Sciences," which appears in the Second Series. That series is a largely augmented new edition of *Apollonius of Tyana and other Essays*, first published in 1906. The second edition completes the circle by "A New Metaphysic of Evolution." This, with the other essays that were unpublished, I have submitted to my friend Prof. Carveth Read, by the keenness of whose scepticism it ought to have much benefited.

Of course I do not put forward this essay, simply because it is the last, as definitive dogma. I am quite aware of the imaginative and hypothetical elements it contains; but my deliberate opinion is that for further progress the modern mind must cease to be afraid of hypothesis and imagination as aids in the search for truth not only in science but in philosophy. A remote effect of such a development might be a synthesis of Eastern pantheism with Western evolution, which, far from bringing the practical evil of ethical indifference feared by Renouvier, would, by subordinating the life of action to the theoretic life in the widest sense, tend to the peace of the world.

By way of reply to those who would have philosophy give up a quest apparently so hopeless and so remote from human life as an attempt to carry over cosmogony into metaphysics or metaphysics into cosmogony, I cite one of Swinburne's later poems, which might very well have been written as the answer of the metaphysician at once to the orthodox theologian and to the austere agnostic. For Swinburne, like Matthew Arnold among his contemporaries, was a thinker as well as a poet, and a thinker in the properly philosophical sense, not merely as interested in a rationalised theology and a generalised science like Tennyson, or as a "subtle-souled psychologist" like Browning. If, like Arnold, he had a way of occasionally gibing at the metaphysicians, this

PREFACE TO THE FIRST PART

(1895)

THESE Essays and Notices, with the exception of the first of the series, which was published separately in 1893, are all reprinted from the pages of periodicals. There has been a little re-writing, but on the whole the amount of alteration is not great. For permission to republish the articles and reviews I have to thank Messrs. Macmillan and Co. and the editors and proprietors of *Mind* and of *The Monist*. I must also specially thank M. Renouvier for the permission, at once accorded, to reproduce his own as well as my share of a correspondence which appeared in the *Critique Philosophique* in 1887.

The common motive of both essays and reviews, as it seems to me, is an effort to arrive at something positive through criticism. Of the success with which this has been attempted I leave the reader to judge. There is only one part of the book on which I propose to say anything more by way of preface—namely, the part which is distinctively metaphysical. So far as this is concerned, I freely admit that I have not attained any result capable of being summed up in a completed formula. Even here, however, it seems to me that something can be said with certainty, and something with a high degree of intellectual assurance.

First, as to the certainty attainable in metaphysics. The only absolute certainty seems to me to be, not in anything that can be called Ontology, but only in what is called Theory of Knowledge. All that is demonstrable in metaphysics is Idealism in the strict philosophical sense. That is to say, the external world, not only as it offers itself to ordinary apprehension, but also as understood by science, consists of nothing but phenomena. And phenomenon is to be understood literally, in the sense of that which appears. Some science has even less truth than is implied in this; for it has only the truth of a convenient formula, useful to work out results, but in the stages of its working out corresponding only to fictions. Scientific men undoubtedly claim for some of their theories a fuller truth than that of a delicate intellectual instrument for

getting at total results; but, even when scientific truth is at its greatest, it amounts only to a law of phenomena, that is, of actual or possible perceptions. When a physicist or a chemist, for example, asserts the existence of atoms, the meaning is that our perceptions, if immensely magnified, would appear as actually discontinuous in certain definable ways. But perception and its elements are wholly of mental nature. It is as elements, actual or possible, of a consciousness, that they have reality.

Can any theory be attained of this mental reality as a whole, or must we be satisfied with the assertion that the universe as understood by science is not metaphysically real, and that a true metaphysical theory, if such there were, would be in terms of mind? Another step, as it seems to me, can be taken by the aid of a postulate, though no one can be compelled to take it. In pure formal logic, it is thinkable that portions of mental reality simply come into and go out of existence. But to suppose this of the reality, though it is formally thinkable, does not promise congruity with the most precise knowledge attained of phenomena. To try to think thus in metaphysics would be entirely to desert the path that has been found to lead to truth in science. For the best established truths of science are propositions that assert constancy beneath change. The quantities that remain scientifically constant are indeed quantities that have a purely phenomenal value. Atoms and energy, considered philosophically, are names for actual or possible perceptions and relations among perceptions. But by postulating the absolute permanence of these phenomenal values—whatever they may mean for metaphysics—coherent scientific doctrines have been reached of which the calculated results are exactly verified, and by which the inner processes of nature are rendered physically intelligible. Since this is the path that has led to the deepest truth in the explanation of phenomena, does not a similar path seem most hopeful in the explanation of reality? In Ontology, indeed, we cannot look for such precision as has been attained by chemists and physicists in their assertions of the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy. We must be content to postulate about the reality as idealism conceives it, what was postulated long before the days of modern science about all reality, whether conceived as physical or as metaphysical. Nothing which really is, we must say, either begins to exist absolutely or ceases to exist. Reality neither comes from nothing nor returns to nothing. And we know part of the reality in consciousness.

Thus one step is taken towards an Ontology, as distinguished from a mere Theory of Knowledge. And the possibility can be shown of taking further steps. We may go on to proposi-

tions about universal being or about individual beings, affirming one or other as the primary reality. That is, we may take the direction either of Spinoza or of Leibniz. For either direction still remains possible after all that scepticism and criticism have done. What has been proved against either type of thinking is merely this: that it cannot be deduced as a system from self-evident axioms. With revision in view of modern criticism, it still seems possible to make theoretically consistent either a doctrine proceeding from the assertion of permanent individual beings, of mental nature, which we may call monads, or a doctrine proceeding from the assertion of a permanent universal being, which we may call *intellectus infinitus*. The difficulty is that there does not seem to be any means of reducing the many theoretical possibilities to one. More than one type of metaphysical thinking, so far as can yet be seen, might be made consistent with itself and with facts. We may place our hope either in conciliating apparent opposites or in eliminating alternatives till the true one is approached. In either case our immediate aim must be greater precision both of philosophic and of scientific thought. A doctrine that seems at first consistent, and does not obviously contradict experience, may yet, when brought to more precise expression and confronted with more exact knowledge, disappear of itself. Because this is necessarily a gradual process, and may not in the end give us more than an imperfectly determined belief, it does not therefore follow that we ought to abandon the pursuit of philosophic truth and content ourselves with science and its applications to practice, even when science is conceived in its widest sense.

If science is the theoretic explanation of phenomena as such, it seems to require as its complement a theory of reality—that is, a metaphysic. On behalf of Metaphysic as thus understood, I have desired to put in a plea against the puritans of Agnosticism. There may be no means of demonstrating that a particular metaphysical theory is true, and yet we may have a perfect right to speculate. Till we are quite sure that we have no such right, we ought to resist all attempts, whether in the interests of a positive or of a negative creed, to fetter the speculative impulse which is inherent in the higher races of mankind.

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A CRITICAL ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

O genus infelix humanum, talia divis
Cum tribuit facta atque iras adiunxit acerbas !
Quantos tum gemitus ipsi sibi, quantaque nobis
Volnera, quas lacrimas peperere minoribu' nostris !

LUCRETIVS, v. 1194-7.

And of these twain, the black seed and the white,
All things come forth, endured of men and done;
And still the day is great with child of night,
And still the black night labours with the sun.

SWINBURNE, *Genesis*.

CHAPTER I

PROGRESS OR CYCLE ?

To ask whether European history is a progress or a cycle will seem to many the re-opening of a question long since settled. By those who hold that there is, at least in possibility, a philosophy of history, it is generally supposed that the aim of this philosophy is to discover a law of progress. In spite of the supposition, no law of progress that has yet been formulated is generally received. And there is, on the surface of history, an enormous obstacle to the view that the historical series of events is a continuously progressive series. Whatever formula we adopt, how are we to bring within it at once pre-Christian antiquity, the Middle Ages, and modern times? While to one type of mind the system that governed mediæval life may seem a "Kingdom of Darkness," to another no doubt it presents itself as a "*Civitas Dei*;" but from the second point of view, as much as from the first, it would appear natural to suppose a kind of circular movement in human affairs. At the opening of the modern period, and for some time afterwards, this was the supposition generally made by those who were most disposed to regard history as an object of philosophy or science. Europe, they held, had been civilised in classical antiquity. By a catastrophe, civilisation was destroyed. Then, after a long interval, and in consequence of the re-discovery of ancient literature and institutions, it had been restored. Since about the beginning of the nineteenth century, this view has been more

and more displaced by the notion of a continuously progressive historical development. The Middle Age, we are often told, is intermediate in character as in chronological position. It is the inheritor of Græco-Roman civilisation, and is an advance on it; just as, in turn, modern civilisation is the inheritor of mediæval civilisation, and is an advance on that. This doctrine, as compared with the earlier one, bases itself on a more systematic and extensive knowledge of the facts, especially of mediæval history; and if, by means of the new facts, a law of progress had been established, embracing all the three periods, the older view might be regarded as finally overthrown. But, as has been said, no law of progress has met with general assent. Those who speculate about the movement of history still take quite different views as to its predominant factor; and, when they agree about this, do not agree about the order of stages in the particular kind of progression—intellectual or other—to which they assign the predominance. This seems sufficient to justify a re-examination of the doctrine of historical progress. No doubt the older view by itself was too simple, and cannot be adopted in the form that was first given to it; but it is so obvious a view that we may expect it to contain some part of the truth. For, after all, the most important facts were known to the older as well as to the newer theorists. Those philosophers who have done most to bring the theory of continuous progress into favour have themselves said that it is the broad facts of history, and not minute details brought to light by curious research, that must serve as the basis for the supreme generalisations.

As a preliminary to the inquiry itself, it may be interesting to compare two views of human character that go naturally with the two theories of the historical movement. According to the notion that is now common, there is, for European society, a single progressive movement, which has been going on from the beginning of history. The most important thing about any man, whether of thought or action, is his attitude towards this movement. If he goes with the movement, he is progressive; if he goes against it, he is conservative or reactionary: and this is the essential difference between types of character for all time. It may be that the greatest minds after those that lead the progressive movement are the great reactionists. The opposition does not mean a difference of degree in intellectual or moral force. What it means is that, of the leading minds, those that understand the movement of their time and go with it, to whatever age they belong, are to be classed together as progressive minds; those that oppose the movement of their time, as reactionary minds. Transferred to any other age, a mind of progressive type would always be progressive, and a mind of reactionary type always reactionary. Thus, for example, the Christian Fathers were

the "radical reformers" of their own age. So also were the French Encyclopædists. The Encyclopædists and the Fathers, therefore, if they could have changed ^{ages}, might easily have taken one another's places. The last defenders of the Roman Republic were the political conservatives of their time; the last Neo-Platonist opponents of Christianity were the religious reactionists of theirs. As conservatives and reactionists, they are to be placed in the same class with the modern champions of Catholicism and Absolutism. At the same time, the movement, being continuously progressive, carries us all along with it. Hence the most extreme opponents in the same period have more actual resemblance to one another than those who are really contending for the same cause in distant periods. The most devout of modern religious thinkers, being placed in an atmosphere of questioning, cannot realise the "implicit" mediæval submission to authority. Essentially, all contemporaries who have acquired the ordinary knowledge of their time are at about the same stage of thought, some a little before and some a little behind. It is only accidentally that they either differ from one another, or resemble the men of distant periods.

The initiators of the modern doctrine of continuous progress do not, of course, put their theory quite in this way; but it will be acknowledged that such a view is "in the air;" and it is sufficiently logical. Let us contrast with it a theory that has the same kind of logical connexion with the doctrine of historical cycles. We meet with a theory of the kind in Machiavelli, who put forth a doctrine of cycles in political history, and, as may easily be inferred from what he directly says, regarded the Middle Ages as the result of an overthrow of civilisation by the Christians and the Barbarians. According to Machiavelli's theory of human character, there are certain fixed types, alike in all ages, determined by nature, and made unmodifiable by habit. Men of a particular type of character, once formed, never cease to act in accordance with that character. If circumstances are favourable, they succeed; if circumstances are unfavourable, they fail. Half depends on us, and half on fortune. To take his favourite examples: The Consul Fabius did not adopt a policy of caution because he saw that such a policy was best for the time, but because he was naturally a cautious man. He was successful because caution then met the occasion; but, under any circumstances, he would have acted in the same manner. Pope Julius II. was a man of impetuous character, and succeeded because in his time the occasion was favourable to audacity; but, if the times had changed, he would not have been able to proceed with circumspection, and would have failed. "Hence it arises," says Machiavelli, "that a republic has longer life, and has good fortune for a longer time, than a principality; for it can better

accommodate itself to the diversity of the times, through the diversity of the citizens that are in it, than a prince." ¹

If we detach this theory from its special political application, and apply it to the fortune of ideas as well as of modes of action, we seem to obtain a rather deeper view than is given by the doctrine of absolutely continuous progress. In intellectual things, we may say, half depends on the ideas of the individual man of genius, and half on the particular currents of the age. The mind of the community is in a manner passive, and yet is not indifferently receptive of all great ideas alike. It has movements that make it now receptive of one set of intellectual influences, and now of another and opposite one. The leading minds, again, are not primarily distinguished as preferring conservation or innovation, but as preferring one state of things or another. According as the movement seems to be towards the state of things they desire or away from it, they are classed as innovators or conservatives; but this distinction is secondary. The movement of human affairs being subject to reversals, the conservatives and innovators of one age, if transferred to another, would not seldom change places. Those who, during the dissolution of the ancient world, sought to preserve what remained of its characteristic civilisation, if they could have changed ages, might have taken part in the characteristic modern movement; while the great modern reactionists, if transferred to antiquity, would probably have been a revolutionary and dissolvent influence.

Reasonable as this general conception must seem, so far as it applies to individual character, intellectual or practical, it must be rejected if we accept the ordinary theory of progress. That theory, it is clear, needs revision.

CHAPTER II

ANTICIPATORY SOLUTION

IF justice is to be done to the modern doctrine that historical progress is strictly continuous, it must be considered as it presents itself in the work of those who have given to their historical generalisations most of a scientific or philosophical character. These are undoubtedly Comte and Hegel. In their theory of the relations of man to society, the two thinkers have much in common. Both have definitely advanced beyond the conception of the individual man as existing first in isolation, and then entering into the social union in consequence of

¹ *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio*, bk. iii. chap. 9.

an agreement arrived at for mutual advantage. The mind of the individual man, as both hold, could not exist at all as a human mind unless formed under social conditions. Both, again, regard continuity in human history as essentially a mental continuity. For a continuously progressive civilisation, it is not necessary that there should be identity of race, or even continuity of political structure. When a new race or a new state takes up the ideas of another, and carries them higher by its own efforts, it is spiritually the successor of the former, and represents the next term in historical progress. The special problem of "Philosophy of History" also is conceived by both in the same way. Its object is the history of European civilisation; the Asiatic civilisations being regarded, so far as they have properly historical interest, as preliminary to this. Regarded apart from European history, as Comte especially sees, they have simply the interest of social types; and their (more or less remote) future depends on their receiving an impress from the single progressive movement. Both philosophers also have the idea of a *consensus* of social factors as existing at each stage of political society; so that to a certain extent one part of its structure could be inferred from another. As the counterpart of this idea, both insist on the conception of the social movement as a whole, and thus avoid the error of making any subsidiary order of facts, however fundamental, stand for all the rest.

Neither to Comte nor to Hegel did it seem, as it does to some recent writers, that progress could be taken as something known in itself; that ethical and political ends could be defined in terms of "progress," itself undefined. Unless they could have pointed to a law of historical evolution towards an end conceived with sufficient definiteness, they would have held the existence of progress unproved. For Hegel, the end to which history necessarily moves is the consciousness the human spirit has of its freedom, and, with this consciousness, the reality of freedom itself.¹ This end can be realised only by men living in organised States. The conception that the State exists for the sake of the spiritual freedom of its members, in the sense that this is what ought to be consciously aimed at by men living in political society, is found already in Spinoza: what Hegel really added to Spinoza's conception is the idea of history as necessarily bringing with it the greater and greater realisation of that which ought to exist. Comte, on his side, defines progress, not in terms of freedom, but in terms of the intellectual doctrine held socially. The human mind passes successively through three stages of philosophical thought. First it explains occurrences theologically, that is, by quasi-human volitions projected into things; then metaphysically,

¹ *Philosophie der Geschichte* (Einleitung).

that is, by "entities," or realised abstractions; finally, it refuses all explanations except such as enter into positive science. These reduce themselves to simple statements of what invariably occurs. Each of these successive "philosophies," the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive, in turn is socially supreme; the triumph of the last being reserved for the future. Since the positive philosophy is alone true, intellectual progress is the gradual passage to the social acceptance of a true philosophy. With intellectual progress all other kinds of progress, and especially moral progress, are correlated.

In Comte's law there are two points to be considered: one is, whether it accurately sums up the historical stages of human thought; the other, whether it is, rationally, a "law of progress," and to what extent. That it is not the supreme law of intellectual progress becomes obvious when we find that there are unquestionable cases of advance in the highest philosophical ideas which cannot be brought under it. Whenever in any subject a point of view has been attained that enables us to incorporate or to reject earlier theories with full insight, we have direct evidence of intellectual progress. It is, at last, only by proceeding from this kind of evidence that we can learn whether there has really been progress of thought or not. Now the two great examples, thus verified, of progress in philosophic as distinguished from merely scientific thought, are the idealistic theory of the external world, associated with the name of Berkeley, and the theory of inductive logic, associated with the name of Mill. These are cases of definite philosophical advance beyond anything actually attained by the ancients. Of the two, the first could only be brought under Comte's law with difficulty, and with modification of what he himself meant by it; and the second could not be brought under it at all; for material logic, to which the advance made by Mill belongs, does not supersede the Aristotelian formal logic, but is simply an addition to it.

But further, if we understand by intellectual progress advance in the highest ideas attained at any time, this may be shown to depend on intellectual freedom. That the greatest possible advance may be made, the individual thinker must be always free to go to the grounds of belief, and to accept or reject all or any part of the system that prevails socially. And on this kind of progress, made by individual minds, progress in the ideas that are socially effective depends; for "the general mind" invents nothing, but only takes up by degrees as much of the insight of individual minds as it can turn to account. Thus, if we still suppose that a supreme law of intellectual progress is discoverable, it appears that advance in freedom must be placed socially before advance in thought considered apart from freedom. Only in so far as there is freedom can

an intrinsic law of intellectual development manifest itself. Hegel's formula, therefore, seems preferable to Comte's as an indication of what we are to look for when we are trying to ascertain the meaning of history. Instead of taking the formula as a law of history to be assumed from the beginning, we must, however, take it at first only as a test by which to learn whether in the whole or in any section of history there has actually been progress.

Tried by this test, the passage from antiquity to the Middle Ages can scarcely be regarded as a progressive stage of history.

During the whole period from the origin of Greek philosophy to the victory of the Christian Church, there was practically complete freedom for the expression of individual thought. This was secured by the acknowledged supremacy of the State in all relations of life where there is any question of applying force; and by the absence of any corporation having for its office the authoritative preservation in its purity of a doctrine which all are to accept. The ancient European civilisation had religions indeed, but it had no churches. Nor was the State itself at the same time a Church. Essentially the State aimed at its own preservation or extension first, and then, in its best manifestations, at certain æsthetic and ethical ends to be realised in the lives of its citizens. Religion was so little a social creed that it could even be supposed to have been created by the poets, who, though they had not really created it, had given it æsthetic form under the law of their own imagination, and under no external discipline imposed socially. Politically, indeed, the State assumed the right to repress teachings or modes of worship that were contrary to the public good; but, whether the political authorities made mistakes or not, it was always the public good that they professed to have in view, and not the purity of a speculative creed. There was no thought of repressing speculation, or even of prohibiting worships, except so far as these might be thought to have for their natural and direct consequences the dissolution or weakening of the State. Thus there was no religious persecution in the proper sense of the term.

This social condition is precisely the opposite of that which was established during the Middle Ages. Here the freedom of the individual mind, when the most is conceded to it that the mediæval system ever did concede, is reduced to an activity within the limits of a received doctrine, more and more definitely formulated. The whole speculative class is brought within a separate corporation, and placed under a centralised intellectual discipline, having for its supreme end the preservation of a common doctrine. While in antiquity any checks that were deliberately imposed on the expression of opinion, or on modes of worshipping the gods, were understood to be

On the principles of those who have put forward the doctrine of continuous progress, we find, therefore, that in European history there are really two reversals of the directing ideas. A social system involving the practical supremacy of the State, and intellectual liberty for the theorising class, is succeeded by a system in which a Church is supreme and all speculative minds are subject, in their thinking, to a coercive discipline; and this second system, again, has to give place to a system which in essentials is a return to the first. Or, looking at the process from the point of view of theoretical doctrine, an age in which metaphysical if not positive ideas rule, gives place to an age dominated by theology, and this again to an age marked by a constantly increasing intellectual influence from metaphysics and science.

Wherever, therefore, continuous progress may be, it is not hitherto, at least for the whole history of Europe, in the directing ideas, whether we seek for these in the theoretical beliefs of the ruling minds, or in the principle of the social system. Yet, though in this respect there may not be continuous progress, there is at least continuity. This idea of philosophers like Comte and Hegel has now passed into the consciousness of historians who are not philosophers. And, where there is continuity, the analogy of development in the individual mind leads us to expect continuous progress in some things by mere accumulation and elaboration of experience.

In the search for real laws of social continuity, Comte is a better guide than Hegel. Whereas Hegel, when he comes to details, simply puts down the facts and tries to connect them by a "dialectic" which, though it has profoundly modified the way of writing the history of thought, does not strictly "prove anything," Comte not only has the general conception of a social science, but has discovered the scientific method of determining its laws. For Comte, Philosophy of History is a special problem of the science of Sociology; and this is based on a series of lower sciences arranged above one another in order. What is probably a more definitive achievement than either his "hierarchy of the sciences" or his "law of the three states," Comte has discovered the method called by himself "historical," and placed by Mill, under the name of the "inverse deductive method," in relation to the supreme scientific principle of the uniformity of nature. Laws are first to be obtained by provisional generalisation from historical facts, and are then to be verified by deduction from laws of mind, that is, from psychological—or, as Comte says, biological—laws. Now, although no supreme law of social development may yet have been arrived at by this method, changes of an important though subsidiary kind are already seen to follow one another according to laws that are in process of formulation. Domestic and indus-

trial changes are becoming scientifically intelligible.¹ And the laws that it is possible to formulate seem here to be laws of progress. The merit of Comte's own historical construction is to a great extent in his grasp of the subordinate and sub-conscious processes that make up so large a part of human history. The slow changes of the military and industrial systems in Europe, and the gradual modifications of feeling that correspond to these changes, are especially the object of his interest. These he has dealt with in such a way as to show frequently how progress was constantly going on underneath the surface. Progress of this kind, as contrasted with progress in directing ideas, may be called "instrumental." Comte himself, in considering the directing ideas, almost admits sometimes that there are breaks or reactions. The ordinary believers in continuous progress could, of course, find in him support for their notion of an ever-enduring fundamental struggle between "the spirit of conservation" and "the spirit of amelioration," which, indeed, follows from his general doctrine; but, for all that, his insight makes him see that ancient civilisation was really more "organic" than mediæval civilisation. He finds that the whole period from the beginning of the Middle Age till now has been only "an immense transition."² The really "organic" states are the typical civilisation of classical antiquity and the definitive social state of the future. Thus Comte, whether in spite of himself or not, supplies us with a basis for allowing progress in one respect while denying it in another. The continuous progress, as it now appears, we are likely to find in the sub-conscious and instrumental part of social life; the discontinuity, so far as it exists, in the directing ideas.

Comte has remarked that progress in the Middle Ages was chiefly political; and this remark might be justified by pointing to the two modifications which are the principal grounds of the superiority—at least potential—of modern political life to the best that could be attained in antiquity. These two modifications are the disappearance of slavery in Europe as a legal status, and the introduction of the system of representation as a means of government. The first makes "the freedom of all," as Hegel expresses it, and not merely of "some," henceforth the ideal; the second has made compatible with political freedom the organisation of nations, and not merely of cities, into single States. Both modifications appeared as the result of slowly

¹ It may be noted that additional precision has been given to Comte's and Mill's historical or inverse deductive method by Dr. Tylor, who, by an application of the mathematical theory of probabilities, has shown how to obtain proof that there is some causal connexion between social phenomena, before proceeding to the verification by deduction. (See a short notice in *Mind*, April, 1889, p. 310.)

² *Philosophie Positive*, t. v. p. 115.

acting social causes in the interval between the two transitions, from the ancient to the mediæval, and from the mediæval to the modern world. At the beginning of the Middle Ages neither of the two could have been consciously effected; at the end both were ready to be seized upon by those who were sufficiently inspired with the ideal of liberty.

Both these modifications, in a manner, are instrumental. They are not the end, but are subordinate to it. Little would have been gained by the disappearance of slavery if it had merely given place, for example, to the definitive organisation of a system of caste, as it might easily have done under the guidance of the Church.¹ And in fact, as has often been remarked, slavery could appear again in modern times under new conditions. The action of social forces unguided by ideas was not sufficient to dispose of it finally; it had to be abolished consciously in the end, not without a long-continued influence from the "revolutionary metaphysics" of the eighteenth century. The case of representative assemblies is similar. Without the consciously formed determination to make these an instrument for preserving or acquiring freedom, the mere emergence of the device of delegation would have been of little worth. When this is admitted, however, it is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of the two changes. Directing ideas, on their side, must inevitably fail to effect anything for the whole of society unless social modifications of the right kind occur; and these are not to be produced merely by "taking thought."

This, then, suggests itself as a provisional solution of the question that was put. European history is continuous, and beneath the surface there have always been going on changes that may be called progressive; but European civilisation, if we take its highest points in successive ages, has not been continuously progressive. The mediæval period, in its distinctive character, is an enormous reaction, and the modern period is in essence a return to an older state of things. It is not a simple return, because there have been continuously progressive changes underneath; it is a return to the directing ideas of antiquity enlarged and modified by these progressive changes. If in some respects it still seems inferior to the great age of ancient civilisation, we must always remember that, as Comte says, the modern transition is not yet terminated.

¹ Neo-Scholastic moralists still regret that some more stringent social division than that of the modern classes cannot be restored. See *Moral-philosophie*, by Father Victor Cathrein, S.J. (1890-91). Of course, the passage from one caste to another, admitted by Plato in his outline of the system (*Republic*, bk. iii.), would have been indispensable in the case of the priesthood.

CHAPTER III

CAUSES OF THE TWO GREAT TRANSITIONS

THE causes of the apparent discontinuity in European history have been set forth from many different points of view; and the elements of a sufficient explanation have to be sought in many different quarters. The two recent writers, however, who have conceived the problem in its greatest generality seem to me to be M. Renouvier, in his remarkable book *Uchronie*,¹ and Dr. H. von Eicken, in his thorough and elaborate *Geschichte und System der Mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung*.² Still proceeding by the critical method so far adopted, we may take these two books as the starting-point of an attempt to make the two transitions intelligible.

M. Renouvier's book is not directly a theory of the actual course of European history, but a series of pictures of the way in which things might have gone if, at certain crucial points, the men who had the practical direction of affairs had taken resolutions different from those which they really did take. His explanation of the transition from antiquity to the Middle Ages, indicated by this means and partly set forth in an introduction, is that the whole series of events, culminating in the victory of the Christian Church over the Roman Empire, was the result of a prolonged reaction of the East upon the West. During the period of the great conquests, from Alexander to Cæsar, the Western world was gradually Orientalised. The first stage in the process was marked by the passage from political freedom to despotism. The ethical effect of this political change was that for the ideal of equal justice there was substituted, on one side, the self-will of the despot and the submission of his slaves, on the other side the absolute renunciation of ascetics and mystics fleeing from the world. With this contrast between "anti-morality" and "supra-morality"—a contrast characteristic of Eastern despotisms—go certain metaphysical characters of Eastern creeds. The ground having been prepared in Europe, Oriental religions began to fascinate the Western mind. Among these was the doctrine of the Christian Church—a doctrine which was essentially Orientalism adapted to Europe. It soon became clear that the spread of the Orientalising sects, if unopposed, would destroy

¹ *Uchronie* (L'Utopie dans l'Histoire). Esquisse historique apocryphe du développement de la civilisation européenne, tel qu'il n'a pas été, tel qu'il aurait pu être. Paris: Bureau de la Critique Philosophique, 1876.

² *Geschichte und System der Mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung*. Von Dr. Heinrich von Eicken, Staatsarchivar in Aurich. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1887.

Western civilisation; but it was also clear that, without a return of Western civilisation to its original principles, all opposition would be unsuccessful. This return (in *Uchronie*) was made at a date corresponding to the end of our second century. A succession of emperors, acting under the inspiration of the Stoic philosophy, aims at gradual limitation of the autocracy and final restoration of the republic. The new sectaries are banished to the East, which at last has to be wholly abandoned to them. In this way Greece, Italy, Spain, and Southern Gaul are rescued for civilisation. After a time, when it has undergone certain internal changes, and has become capable of taking its place within a system of mutual toleration, Christianity is re-admitted on equal terms with the teachings of the ancient philosophic schools. Under the direction of those schools, and in particular of Stoicism, political and ethical progress has, in the meantime, been continuous. The development of European civilisation has thus been greatly accelerated.

To the underlying conception of the book the objection may be taken that it attributes to the actual course of events too much of a casual character. M. Renouvier is an indeterminist, and holds that events might really have been different; not merely that if, at some point, they had been slightly different, which was really impossible, the course of things from that point would have been greatly modified. Still his conception may, for the use of determinists, be corrected in this sense. It might be said that the second century was a period when, if slightly different resolutions (really impossible) could have been taken, the world's history would have been fundamentally changed. Even in this form, however, the hypothesis will probably still fail to commend itself. The causes that were at work, it may be maintained, were too widespread and too deep to be much affected by any conceivable decision on the part of individuals. We may sympathise with those who, even in the fourth century—when, as M. Renouvier admits, the contest was really hopeless—still struggled with the conquering darkness, and yet hold that the dark ages were inevitable, that they were a fatality and in no sense an accident.

What remains of permanent value in M. Renouvier's imaginative construction is the conception of the new religion and of the Church in which it was embodied as the final expression, not wholly of an intrinsic European development, but in part at least of a development set going in Europe by external causes. Thus a real correction is made in the idea of those who think that Europe, of itself, and without contact with Asia, would in some way have given birth to Catholic monotheism. On the other hand, the too exclusive view of the causes as consisting in an external contagion, partly explains why an almost accidental character is attributed to the Catholic

transformation. It has to be modified in its turn by the conception of a more intrinsic "Orientalising" process in Europe itself.

A conception of this kind is common in German historical speculation. In Dr. von Eicken's book it is conceived with great definiteness, and applied with special power to the whole system of mediæval thought and life, which the author has widely and carefully studied in original sources. The whole process of European history is conceived as the intrinsic development of one state of things into its opposite, and the return of this to the former state modified by consciousness of the opposition. At first human life, without any self-conscious affirmation, was held to be desirable, and spontaneously unfolded itself in accordance with the genius of each race. In Greece intellectual development predominated, taking the forms of art and philosophy; in Rome, political development, taking the form of conquest. Both evolutions ended in the contradiction of their original impulse. Conquest, with organisation of the conquered into a single political system, destroyed the nationality and expansive impulse in which it had its origin. Philosophy, from its first conception of the immanence of deity in the world, passed over to the conception of a dualism of matter and spirit. Profound dissatisfaction with the present world, and desire to escape into a transcendent world, was the feeling that inevitably accompanied such a close of both developments. The Jewish race, in a somewhat different way, had gone through the same process. Although their Deity was from the first "transcendent," yet the Jews originally had the feeling of the "joy of life" like the Greeks; but, in the subjugation of their nationality, which they had affirmed more strongly than any other people, this was lost, and the idea of a transcendent world and of redemption came in at the close. Thus the representative races of the East and of the West were alike prepared to find satisfaction in ascetic morality practised for the sake of happiness in another life. The Christian creed, at length formulated by the series of Councils, emerged as the consistent and definite doctrine that could give a basis for the new ethical feeling. The dualistic opposition of deity and nature, spirit and matter, the transcendent life and the human life which for its sake was to be self-suppressed, found its analogue in the opposition between the Church and the World. The Church, concentrated in its hierarchy, began by preaching renunciation of the world, and ended by subjugating the world which it had renounced. Asceticism had become a world-conquering idea. And this was the natural and logical consequence of the morality of renunciation. Hostility to the world inevitably passed into the effort to subdue the world. Thus was founded the system of the Christian theocracy. The first conquest of the hierarchy was gained over

the ancient civilisation; but the imperfect theocratic system then established went to pieces in the Germanic invasions, and had to be rebuilt. The task of the Church was now to subdue new and more vigorous races. This was a harder task than the subjugation of the decadent Greeks and Romans, but it was at length achieved, and a more complete European theocracy established than the first. But this system also was of brief duration. It does not in its perfection extend beyond the twelfth and thirteenth centuries—"the classic Middle Age." In conquering the world the Church had itself become a portion of the world. It gave ground to opponents by falling off from its own ideal; and, by the nature of its own ideal, it had stirred up hostility from every element of human life that it sought to compress. The State, the Family, Industry, Jurisprudence, Science, Poetry, Art, all strove to break through the limits assigned by the theocratic system; and, in spite of temporary victories of the Church, and compromises that lasted for a time, the system of European civilisation had again, by its own development, passed into its opposite. The affirmations on which modern civilisation rests are the spontaneous affirmations of the ancient world made self-conscious, and the result to which we are at last tending is a synthesis of the two opposite views of life.

When the result is said to be a synthesis of ancient and mediæval ideas, we must remember that the word "synthesis" is used in a peculiar sense. The function of the theocratic system in the whole of European history, according to Dr. von Eicken's conception, is to make explicit principles that were only implicit at the origin of civilisation; and it does this by opposition. This being here the meaning of "synthesis," the attempt to represent the whole process as in its directing ideas continually progressive is in substance given up.

When the whole system of life is said to pass into its opposite, what we must understand is, of course, this: that elements which are at first repressed gradually gain the mastery. Thus what is dominant in the Middle Age is continuous with what was kept under in antiquity; and, again, what is tending to become dominant in the modern world is continuous with what was kept under in the Middle Age. The growing political life of the new nations and of the towns, the development of new languages and literatures, and of renewed philosophy, science, and art, and generally all the forms of growth to which modern students have had their attention drawn, are not organic parts of the theocratic system, but are the forces which were to break through it. They may for a time be brought under control and into an appearance of unity, but essentially they are hostile to the theocracy; and, when growing civilisation has gained force enough, the theocracy

is shattered. This is what Dr. von Eicken has made evident, even though he sometimes speaks of the system as if it had really been an organic whole.

But what was it in ancient civilisation that made possible the victory of the Catholic creed and hierarchy, and of nothing else? The causes set forth by von Eicken and Renouvier explain the result in part; but, it may still be asked, why did not a system like Neo-Platonism, which, as well as Catholicism, had a dualistic metaphysic¹ and an ascetic morality, serve as the centre for some new organisation? Neo-Platonism, though not truly "reactionary" in its opposition to the Christian Church, but rather in what it had in common with it, was a reaction within ancient thought. How was it that this reaction was not sufficient, and that a creed and organisation, not simply modified by Asiatic influences, but proceeding from Asia itself, gained the victory? The answer to this question is to be found in ancient religion; as has been seen more or less clearly by writers whose theological or anti-theological belief was sufficiently intense to direct their vision to the phenomenon. The theological spirit in the ancient European world was unextinct. Though Greek religion in its practical manifestations was controlled by State-policy, and though myths, intrinsically beautiful, were freely brought under the æsthetic and ethical form they chose by the poets, it had also a darker side. This was still more the case with the religion of other races. Ancient philosophy was indeed free; but in its physics it could only throw out conjectures, and these were not sufficient, outside the philosophic schools, to subdue the "terror of mind" that was produced by the ascription of arbitrary volitions and human passions to the gods. There was always the thought of expiation in its primitive modes, and the search for objects of sacrifice. Hence the following that the orgiastic Eastern worships, with their more powerful stimulus to devotion, constantly gained in spite of discouragements from the political rulers. Now, Christianity, as soon as it begins to appear historically, is provided with supernatural terrors far beyond those of the other ancient religions. Opposition to it on the ground of verified science is impossible. Its chief philosophic opponents themselves take to thaumaturgy. The political opposition is the opposition of mere material force. Religious opposition founded on custom is easily overcome, for many reasons, and especially for this, that Christianity was represented by a hierarchy formed on the Asiatic model. Such a hierarchy, more potent than those of the East, because detached from the State, is now brought into action for the first time in Europe—unless the Druids,

¹ When I wrote this I had not studied Neo-Platonism at first hand. The passage that follows is tinged with some traditional error about the system, but I have preferred to leave it as it was written.

whom Joseph de Maistre perhaps rightly regarded as the European precursors of Catholicism, are an exception. The Druidic organisation was of course only rudimentary, and it had been in part at least crushed by the Roman government; so that, while it might aid the new religion, it could not oppose it.

Thus the classical world has nothing that can in the long run offer an effective opposition to the organisation of supernatural terror by the Church. Where, as in Persia, the new religion was met on its own ground by a pre-existing theocratic State, it did not make way. Christianity had not yet developed the military fanaticism by which Islam afterwards conquered Western Asia. What it needed was the spiritual preparation of the Orientalising process—called by Christian Fathers *præparatio evangelica*, together with the absence of effective barriers; and both these conditions were found. To consolidate its creed and organisation, as modern investigators have so convincingly shown, the hierarchy at the same time made use of European instruments—Greek philosophy and Roman policy. But for its principle of life it had first to attach itself to the darker side of "natural religion."

This religious point of attachment it of course found also among the unsubdued barbarians; and if these had not been politically prepared by long subjection to an autocracy, they were on the other hand much more subject to the intellectual prestige that Catholicism exercised from the time when it became the religion of the Empire. They had to receive their education at the hands of the hierarchy, which had now brought all the elements of culture under the form imposed by itself.

A hierarchy inheriting the Jewish exclusiveness, and at the same time aiming at universality, was necessarily intolerant in a way that merely national theocracies of the olden type could not be. The similar intolerance of the Mohammedan Church may no doubt be traced to the same origin. Fixation from the very first of "intolerant uniformity" as the ideal of Catholicism is well brought out in Dr. von Eicken's work. He ascribes it to the resistance the Church met with from ancient philosophy. As the Roman State sought to suppress the Church politically, so Greek philosophy threatened to destroy its unity by introducing heresies. Hence its double effort, from that time traditional, to subdue all States and to repress all independent activity of mind. The force of the State, when this could be commanded, was directed unremittingly against heretics. When it could not, the State itself was broken up by the calling in of other tribes to subdue those that had revolted from the Catholic faith. The interests of doctrine and discipline were, to those who really represented the spirit of the ecclesiastical organisation, before all others. This is seen in the struggle with the civil power that went on in various forms all through

the Middle Ages. The plea was always "the liberty of the Church." This watchword, as Dr. von Eicken shows, did duty through every phase of the Church's history, alike when it was struggling for independent existence, when it was aiming at mastery, and when its proclaimed purpose was nothing less than to substitute a universal theocratic State, with the supreme power in ecclesiastical hands, for all the "temporal" governments of the world.

It was only for a moment that this last aim was possible. In the political as in other spheres of mundane life, the Church had to content itself, even in the time of its greatest power, with a compromise. To the State were assigned the lower, to the Church the higher interests. One point brought out by Dr. von Eicken is especially noteworthy; and that is the resemblance between the authorised mediæval view of the State and the modern doctrines that would limit State-functions as much as possible. The mediæval view found the origin of political society in a contract,¹ and assigned to it merely such ends as "the protection of life and property." All the higher interests of civilisation were exclusively in the province of the "spiritual power." Towards the Church the function of the State was simply to act as the "secular arm."

In the end, then, the Middle Ages had as their ruling power a well-compacted logical system, assigning its place somehow to every relation of life, and compromising with human nature when it could not suppress it. Beneath there were all kinds of forces tending to get loose; but in the meantime the system was so logical that it could only be broken through intellectually by an inconsequence. At the centre of the system was the doctrine of a supernatural revelation. When the philosophic doctrine of the Church was formulated by Aquinas, this was drawn out as a necessary consequence of the dualistic separation of God and the universe. And the supernatural Christian revelation—the deduction proceeded—being above rational knowledge, required the Church as mediating between the Deity and human reason.² From these positions everything else could be obtained. The system being thus logically constructed, and once made dominant in theory and practice, how was it ever broken through? The answer is already clear. It was essentially by the irrepressible reaction of the European mind, to which this system was after all external. Leaving the complex growth, in practical life, of the forces which on that side were to contribute to its overthrow, I may here select for special examination the gradual restoration in Europe of the ideal of intellectual liberty. The disparate phases of this process, though they have

¹ *Geschichte und System*, etc., p. 367.

² Von Eicken, *Geschichte und System*, etc., pp. 609-10.

religious faith, but to contest the doctrines of the faith as philosophically false.

The first assertion of this right appears in the doctrine of the "double truth," borrowed by some of the Scholastics of the second period from Averroes and other Arabian philosophers. According to this doctrine, the same opinion may be true in theology and false in philosophy, or true in philosophy and false in theology. The Averroistic doctrine of the "active intellect," one and identical in all men, and enduring immortally while individual personalities appear and disappear, was said to be true philosophically, though false theologically; as, on the other hand, the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* was true theologically, though false philosophically. The distinction was, of course, condemned both by the Mohammedan and by the Catholic theologians. To the modern mind, it is not at first very comprehensible; but it had for its inventors a perfectly intelligible meaning. They desired to be philosophers to the full extent, and not to be theologians at all. At the same time, they saw that permission to philosophise quite freely could only be obtained—if it could be obtained even then—by some recognition of the claims of theology. The recognition could be given on this ground. Philosophising must always be confined to a few. Only the few can, for example, attain to understanding of ethical precepts, and practise them out of insight. The majority must accept them as commands. For the many, the commands of morality need not only the sanctions of human law, but something beyond. They have this in the "supernatural sanction" provided by the theologians. Theology may therefore be admitted to be useful; and its utility may be described as a sort of "truth" relative to practice.

The distinction between two contradictory kinds of truth, thus developed, was the only possible formulation against dominant theology of the claim to absolute philosophical freedom. But how did the Arabian philosophers, and afterwards the Western Scholastics, come to make a claim of the kind at all? It was really incompatible with the logic of either theocracy, and it was not thought of in the first period of Christian Scholasticism, though minds were already very active in that period. How was it that it came to be, as Renan expresses it, "from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century, the breastplate of incredulity"?¹ The solution seems to be this. The Arabian commentators had in their hands works of Greek philosophy in sufficient abundance to find there the record of a state of things in which philosophical thought could go on undisturbed by the authorised expositors of a religious creed. Desiring to follow the ancient philosophers, they saw in their way the claims of theology. Islam, like Christendom, claimed for itself the pos-

¹ *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, deuxième partie, ch. ii. p. 258.

session of absolute truth, and was prepared to enforce its claim. The ideal of "intolerant uniformity" could not be directly brought in question. It was therefore put aside by the assertion that there are mutually incompatible "truths," and the position assigned to it justified by a first sketch of a philosophy of religion. The doctrine of the two truths, finding exactly the same conditions on Christian ground, was afterwards easily accepted among the freer thinking Scholastics. That this is the right solution is confirmed by the way in which the distinction was prolonged during the period between mediæval and modern philosophy. As put forward again at the Renaissance, it was not simply a continuation of the Averroistic tradition; being met with also among opponents of Averroism. It had an independent source in the increased knowledge of the conditions under which thought had gone on in antiquity. The liberty of philosophising is now explicitly traced back to the Hellenic tradition.

The first conscious assertion of philosophical freedom by mediæval philosophers was, according to this view, a Hellenic revival. Not only was it in spirit a return to antiquity, but it was directly suggested by study of the translations of Greek philosophers. The peculiar form it took at first exhibits more clearly than anything else the profoundly inorganic character of the Middle Age. This mode of distinguishing between philosophical and theological truth, as has been remarked, has become almost unintelligible to moderns; and there was no distinction of the kind in antiquity. "Exoteric" and "esoteric" were merely terms applied to less and more abstruse philosophical teaching. The many and the few were substantially on the same ground of a human life approximately at one with itself. Europe could not recover this kind of unity till, by the spontaneous development of the northern races, and by the return of all to ancient sources of life, it could throw off the yoke of a spiritual domination foreign to its genius. And just as the theocracy could not permanently retain its power in Europe, so, under Islam, the philosophers who followed in the footsteps of the Greeks left no trace of themselves. Their memory as philosophers has been preserved in the West, but not in the East. There the Hellenising movement in thought could find no support in the surrounding life. The natural impulse of the Mohammedan Church to get rid of all philosophy that had its source anywhere but in the Koran met with no obstinate resistance either in the ranks of the theologians or outside. After the twelfth century the Aristotelian philosophy disappeared.¹

In the European Renaissance, the distinction of the two truths is not only continued, in spite of ecclesiastical condem-

¹ Renan, *Averroës et l'Averroïsme*.

or, if possible, social. In fact, intellectual freedom depends as much on the general spirit of a society as on the laws of the State. The thing that has been secured by law is toleration for "free churches"; and this is merely a special application of the principle of freedom to peculiar circumstances. And there must always be this reservation where religions are concerned, that if their corporate action becomes pernicious to the State, the civil government has the right to restrain it. The precise advance made by the modern over the ancient way of dealing with religions seems to be this. The ancient tolerance—a tolerance found equally, as Sir Alfred Lyall has pointed out, in European antiquity and in those parts of Asia that have not come under the yoke of the Mohammedan or Christian theocracy—always sought to combine with political unity some kind of religious syncretism. The worshippers of different deities were not allowed to contradict one another explicitly. This restriction of ancient tolerance was the source of difficulties with the Jews and the Christians. It was, of course, maintained for the sake of internal peace. Among polytheists the peace was not very difficult to preserve in this way, since they had no disposition to contest the existence of each other's divinities; and those who ascribed conflicting attributes to the same divinity did not live side by side. When sects arose that claimed to have exclusive possession of the truth and contradicted all others, the conditions were altered. These were the conditions that appeared again at the Reformation after the long episode of intolerant unity. The sects now had sharply defined doctrines, like philosophic schools, and at the same time held to them with a religious passion beyond that of ancient devotees. Yet, if they could be brought to live in peace side by side, governments had no longer a pretext for enforcing external uniformity; at least where the Catholic ideal had been given up. And the definite legal basis at length given to diversity of worship was of some advantage to freedom of individual thought, opposed as this was equally to the Catholic tradition in which uniformity of worship now had its roots. The really important thing since has been to get rid of the idea that mere toleration of creeds held in common by numbers is an equivalent for intellectual liberty in the higher sense.

It would be interesting to determine how far the struggles of religious sects have promoted modern freedom generally. That they have done so to a considerable extent seems undeniable. The new theocracies which Calvin and the Puritans tried to set up were doubtless serpents from the blood of the "stranger and more horrible Medusa" of Bruno's allegory.¹ Yet, without the severing of Catholic unity, independent national States would have been much more difficult to maintain; and

¹ *Opere di Giordano Bruno*, ed. Wagner, ii. 191.

without the aid of the personal religious feeling that could not, after all, be kept within the limits of the new ecclesiastical bodies, political freedom would not so soon have been won. All that we have to bear in mind is that freedom, in the full sense, is the true end of the whole movement, the "form" of the spiritual unity at which we ought to aim. Religious Protestantism, therefore, must be looked upon as a means rather than as any part of the end. As a means it was probably indispensable.

CHAPTER IV

RESULT

THE general result of the foregoing outline seems to me to be that the return of Europe to light has much more the character of an intrinsic process than the descent into the dark ages. The causes of both transitions are discoverable. In the first, an extrinsic cause gives its character to the movement, whereas in the second the movement is correctly described as a return. There is no sufficient reason for thinking that Greek civilisation had arisen otherwise than as an ascent, unchecked by any great obstacle, from a barbaric state, such as persisted in the northern parts of Europe. The elements of culture derived from Egypt and the East were borrowed, not inherited. Greek civilisation in essentials was indigenous. In quality it reached its highest point during the great age of Athenian history. Thenceforward, along with the enormous expansion that issued at last in what we call the Græco-Roman civilisation, there was a decline in quality. This was clearly perceived by the ancients themselves. The first stage of the decline ended in loss of all the political freedom there was in the civilised world by transformation of the Roman Republic into the Cæsarean monarchy; the second, in loss of intellectual freedom by the adoption of Christianity as the religion of the State. The influx of the barbarians brought the destructive process to a conclusion; but it was at the same time one chief source of the later regeneration. The other chief source was the constantly renewed effort to return to older thoughts. It was in vain that the Church tried to reduce the study of ancient literature and philosophy to a merely formal and grammatical training. In Italy, above all, the new domination did not efface the sense that there had been a freer and greater political past. And, as the political tradition could be traced back to ancient Rome, so the intellectual tradition could be traced back

to Athens.¹ While the movement of descent had been essentially Orientalising, the movement of re-ascent was a renewal of forms of life and thought native to the West. The science and philosophy that came from the Arabians was mainly Hellenic science and philosophy transmitted through a series of translations. The humanistic movement was a further stage of the same process. After this, modern science takes a development beyond anything known in antiquity; but it still has its roots there. And if this is true even of the physical sciences, it is still more true of the sciences of human nature.

The decline in later antiquity was, of course, not purely a decline. Advances of detail were made both in science and philosophy. Through the mixture of nationalities, ethics took a cosmopolitan tone, which in part compensated for exclusion of the more æsthetically disinterested elements that had found a place in the systems of those who theorised before the life of the city had lost its independence. And the decline itself and the destruction of ancient life in its typical form were no doubt indispensable stages in a process that was to give greater extension to its ideal. For it was precisely the highest expression of the life of earlier antiquity that could not be extended by the cosmopolitan mixture that was going on. Ancient freedom was essentially limited to the city. Thus it came about that the defenders of freedom were, after a rather early stage, for the most part conservatives. The prevailing movement did not consist in the extension of freedom, because no way of extending it was then visible. Other kinds of diffusion of the Hellenic spirit were possible, but not this. In what has been called the Orientalising process, some of the men of greatest genius took part. According to an opinion that has often found utterance, Plato's practical ideal, for example, was essentially of the Orientalising type. Particular features in his ideal State were derived from Greek cities; but it is Oriental in spirit, and is in some respects an anticipation of the hierarchy of the Middle Age. At the same time, Plato has a critical side; and in Greek life his criticism was of the nature of a dissolvent. Thus may be explained, apart from metaphysical preferences, the attraction he has exercised on minds of opposite types. Minds of one class have seen in him the revolutionary critic, who in later life fell off from his own spirit of free inquiry; minds of another class, the precursor of a more authoritative system of religion and society, who was by accident a dialectician. A similar explanation would render intelligible many other sympathies and antipathies displayed by students of the practical

¹ La villa,
Del cui nome fra i Dei fu tanta lite,
Ed onde ogni scienza disfavilla.

DANTE, *Purgatorio*, xv. 97-99.

as well as intellectual struggles of antiquity. The comment that suggests itself is, that we ought at least to do full justice to those who, at any time, defended the political or intellectual freedom that remained in the world. An Athenian or Roman patriot, or even a philosophic emperor, could not be expected to foresee and prepare for a period thousands of years distant, when, after enormous changes, the destruction of what was best in the world he knew would have led to the possibility of something better.

The Hellenising movement in the Middle Age, which is the counterpart of the Orientalising movement in antiquity, was, as is known, partly brought into the service of the power that was then dominant. If it had been able to get free at the start, we should probably date the beginning of modern civilisation from the twelfth or thirteenth instead of from the fifteenth or sixteenth century. That which gives its character to the typical civilisation of the Middle Age is the reduction of the arts, of science and of philosophy under the form of the dominant religious ideal. In themselves, however, the elements of civilisation on its intellectual as well as on its political side were not only something apart from the religious tradition, but were understood to be so. The religious tradition was quite clearly conceived as having its origin in the Jewish Church. The idea of "progress" that some students find in this conception is one thing; ideas of progress in the arts and sciences are quite another. These, when they appear—or, rather, reappear, for they were not unfamiliar to the ancients—are accompanied by the idea of a break in history, a destruction and a new growth.

The decisive contest between the two ideals—the ideal of ancient or modern Europe and the ideal of the Middle Ages or the East—concerns less the "matter" than the "form" of the final view of life and structure of society. To desire a return to classical antiquity that should exclude all new material elements, ethical and other, would be in more than name reactionary. The essential question, in ethics for example, is whether the supreme rule of life shall be a supernatural code from which deductions are to be made, or regard to the good of the whole, guided by reflection upon human experience. The question whether, in the working out of a system, Hellenic or Hebraic elements of thought or feeling shall preponderate, is subsidiary, and can only be determined when the principle is fixed. Perhaps this is in part a question of personal preference. A strictly philosophical system of ethics, worked out in complete independence of any supposed revelation, might, according to the individual temperament of the philosopher, take one or the other complexion with respect to its material elements. When a Father of the Church calls the virtues of the heathen "splendid vices," this indicates temperament, and is not a simple conse-

quence even of the theological system. The retort might be made by men of another type that the holiness of the Christian saint is "an exquisite malady"; but the better way seems to be to admit, as some have done, that there may be disparate types of moral excellence, each equally admirable in its kind. In both cases they are, in their perfection, results of nature, and not of system. Reconciliation need not be despaired of where details are concerned. The only point where there can be no reconciliation is whether "the light of nature," in its form of human reason or experience, or both, shall be a mere introduction to a higher point of view given by "supernatural" light, or shall be the supreme judge of all ethical commands from whatever source they are said to proceed—whether, in short, ethics, as a system and on principle, shall be theological or philosophical.

It may be allowed that as yet there is no philosophical system of ethics that can be as much to the modern world as Stoicism, for example, was to later antiquity. For one thing, the ground will have to be cleared more completely of pre-existing systems before this can be hoped for. A social atmosphere of free reflection on ethical questions, and a general sense that the rule of life is to be seriously determined by philosophy, appear to be necessary conditions. Yet there is a promise of compensation if the modern intellectual movement, in spite of all temporary depressions, is steadily ascending. The ethical spirit of the great age of Greek life did not find its expression in a philosophical doctrine that was active during the period. The philosophical systems that had most practical influence were thought out when civilisation had begun to decline. Aristotle's system, which pre-supposed the free life of the city, came in at the end of the period of freedom. For this reason its influence has always been rather scientific than practical. Now, an ethical system fully elaborated during our present phase of still unorganised material progress, if it really answered the needs of the time, could scarcely be acceptable permanently. It would be too strongly coloured by its relation to existing industrialism, whether that relation was sympathetic or hostile, and would not at a later date have the advantage of presenting scientifically an ideal social type. Thus any surviving influence from a powerful system of to-day would only prolong a phase that has already lasted long enough. Perhaps the working out of an ethical system identical in spirit with the life of the best age of civilisation, and active in that age, is reserved for the future of the modern world.

“MIND-STUFF” FROM THE HISTORICAL POINT OF VIEW

“ALL things the world which fill of but one stuff are spun.” Out of that stuff, minds also are formed; and, in its inner reality, it is itself of the nature of mind. This is essentially the metaphysical doctrine set forth by Clifford in his essay “On the Nature of Things-in-themselves.”¹ “Mind-stuff” is not, as some critics have supposed, “a substance combining physical and psychical properties.” Matter, according to Clifford, is purely a phenomenon. The external world is a kind of “dream” of each of us. Our dreams of this kind resemble one another in certain respects; hence we are able to use a common language about them. Corresponding to the “dream,” or phenomenon, is an inner reality. In our own minds we know a portion of this reality. The reality of the individual mind corresponds to the phenomenon we call the body. To animal bodies correspond minds more or less resembling ours. To inorganic things correspond elements of “mind-stuff” not ordered in such a way as to enter into a consciousness. Consciousness depends on the assumption of form by elements of mind-stuff; and, though all elements of mind-stuff have the possibility of assuming the form of consciousness, not all have actually attained that form. The entirely unformed elements, though in themselves of mental nature, must be called unconscious.

This doctrine of Mind-stuff, as Clifford himself held, is one to which speculation has been tending for some time. Regarded from the historical point of view, it appears as the final expression of a metaphysical doctrine which has been developed under the influence of science. Yet, unlike some theories that are scientific in their origin, it can maintain itself against philosophical scepticism. For, in seeking to give a metaphysical meaning to the newer results of physical and psychological science, it takes idealism as its presupposition. It has, accordingly, strong claims on the attention of those who desire to arrive at a consistent view of things, and who regard a metaphysical doctrine as the end to which scientific research is only a means.

¹ Included in *Lectures, and Essays*.

I

The disciples of Kant and Hegel are fond of remarking that since the time of Hume those who belong to the same school of thought as Hume and his predecessors have given up all attempt at pure philosophy, and have confined themselves to psychology and the classification of the sciences. But, they say, the result of Hume's philosophy was not a result that ought to have been taken as final. It was only by concessions to "common-sense" that the philosophy of Hume could be made to seem as if it left room for science. Philosophers ought to have attempted a new construction which should be proof against scepticism, and not to have given up metaphysics as impossible; for a metaphysical doctrine is necessary as a basis even for physical science, and empirical psychology is not sufficient as a substitute for metaphysics. The reply that is usually made by the modern empirical school is, that the philosophy of those who declared experience to be the only source of knowledge was incomplete till the true way of meeting the difficulties pointed out by Kant had been suggested by the theory of Evolution. This answer is to a certain extent satisfactory, but that it is not entirely so is shown by the fact that those who have seen the importance of the theory of Evolution in psychology have not found idealism or scepticism sufficient as a metaphysical doctrine. The "transfigured realism" of Spencer and the "reasoned realism" of Lewes, for example, have been put forth in opposition to idealism and scepticism. But neither of these views has been generally accepted by those who are disposed to accept as a whole the system of philosophy founded on Evolution. "Transfigured realism" and "reasoned realism" are not able to maintain themselves against idealistic and sceptical criticism, and therefore many admirers of the philosophers who advocate these theories are content to go without a metaphysical doctrine altogether. On the other hand, the Hegelians say they have a system which contains in itself an answer to all scepticism as to the possibility of metaphysics. But their system has not had its form determined by scientific method, and consequently does not serve to explain the generalisations of science, but seems something quite apart from them. For this reason Hegelianism does not commend itself to those who wish to see unity introduced among the conceptions of modern science. Now if it can be shown that the theory of "mind-stuff," while it is founded on a scientific view of things like the theories of "transfigured realism" and "reasoned realism," at the same time does not make any attempt to escape from the necessity that is imposed on modern metaphysics of giving up all pretence of restoring the forms of ontology that were destroyed by Hume and Berkeley, then

something will have been done towards proving that the system of Hegel was a premature attempt at reconstruction in metaphysics, and that the only way to arrive at a new point of view capable of superseding dualism was to study psychology and physical science for the sake of their suggestions, until a sufficient number of suggestions for a general theory of knowledge had been accumulated to make it possible to select from them those that are appropriate.

Up to the present time it has not been noticed that Clifford's theory reduced to its simplest form is identical with Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the Will. When the two theories are compared, it is obvious that Clifford's mind-stuff made up of "elementary feelings" corresponds to Schopenhauer's "will as thing-in-itself." Schopenhauer explains that by "will" he does not mean actual volition, but a kind of fundamental feeling for which "will" is a better term than any other, since it suggests to the mind the element in actual consciousness that is most opposed to distinct cognition, and since this is the element that must be regarded as primitive. More recently the distinction here pointed out by Schopenhauer has been expressed in Mr. Spencer's classification of states of consciousness into "feelings" and "relations between feelings." Mr. Spencer himself has suggested the theory of mind-stuff as a possible view in the chapter in his *Principles of Psychology* on the "Substance of Mind," but has not developed it. Still it is clear that his classification of states of consciousness has led to an improved statement of the theory, for the term "feeling" is less open to objection than the term "will" as the name of that which is primitive in mind.

The importance of Schopenhauer's anticipation of the theory of mind-stuff will be seen when it is considered that Schopenhauer professed to found his metaphysics on science, and that at the same time he was, like Clifford, an idealist; his idealism having however been arrived at by the study of Kant rather than of Berkeley and Hume. As to his metaphysical theory of the Will, he asserted that it was a translation into philosophical terms of the physiological doctrines of Cabanis and Bichat. According to a French critic who wrote on the subject not very long since,¹ all the characteristic doctrines of English and German physiological psychology are implicit in the works of these physiologists. Even if we admit that some of the conclusions of modern schools may have been read into the statements of the earlier writers, yet in order that such a position as that of M. Paul Janet can be taken up, there must be many things in Cabanis and Bichat capable of having suggested to Schopenhauer the ideas possessed by the modern schools of psychology. Since Clifford undoubtedly found suggestions in

¹ M. Paul Janet in the *Revue des deux Mondes*.

these ideas, the historical parallelism between his theory and Schopenhauer's is very close. Not only have both theories their origin in science, but also in the same group of scientific ideas.

The ideas that have done most to make contemporary psychology different from the psychology of the older empirical school are: (1) the distinction that has been drawn between consciousness, sub-consciousness, and unconsciousness as modes of sensibility differing only in degree, the older psychologists having taken into account only those elements of mind that emerge into full consciousness; (2) the application of the biological theory of Evolution to psychology; (3) the discovery by some German psychologists that the methods of experimental physiology may be applied to the psychology of the senses.

Schopenhauer's system was suggested by the first of these ideas. He set out with a theory of the external world held in common by himself and all idealists since Berkeley. In explaining this view he uses the terminology of Kant and distinguishes between the "representation" and the "thing-in-itself." The external world belongs to the representation and is often spoken of by Schopenhauer as "Maya" or illusion. Clifford makes use of the same term—representation—in setting forth the idealistic part of his theory. Sometimes the objection is made to this term that "it implies something representing and something represented." But the same answer may be given to this as to similar criticisms on Berkeley's "ideas" and Hume's "ideas and impressions." These philosophers had to explain that they used such terms merely as descriptive terms; they requested their readers to get rid as far as possible of all associations of the words "idea" and "impression" with the metaphors from which they are derived, and with physical hypotheses. The word "representation" has similar associations, and this must be borne in mind when it is employed as a philosophical term. After selecting from previous systems his metaphysics of the external world, Schopenhauer, like Clifford, put the further question, What is the nature of the thing-in-itself? and he answered it in the same way. The criticism of Hume had made it impossible to accept Berkeley's view that "the substance of mind" is the thing-in-itself; and the empirical psychology by which all consciousness is resolved into impressions and ideas derived from impressions, was not found adequate as an explanation of things, for the "impressions" of Hume are merely portions of the "representation." The problem that demanded solution was to find something having the nature of mind but deeper than definite consciousness. If this could be found, and could be shown to be capable of explaining actual consciousness so far as explanation is possible, then the problem might be considered as solved.

The facts of physiology have at length led psychologists to see that the series of states of consciousness which it is possible to observe and classify by means of the introspective method alone forms only a portion of the mental life; that definite consciousness has a background of sub-consciousness and unconsciousness. At first it seems like a contradiction to speak of facts of unconsciousness as belonging to psychology; but when it is considered that the same changes in the nervous system may be accompanied according to circumstances by vivid changes in consciousness or by some sub-conscious change or may have no mental concomitant that can be detected by introspection, then it becomes evident that mind must be regarded as consisting of other elements besides those that appear in distinct consciousness; for it is absurd to suppose that the same nervous change taken by itself has different mental concomitants at different times. This conception, suggested by physiology, that mind is made up of elements which may be combined into what is called consciousness, but which, taken alone, are "unconscious," is really implied in the ordinary introspective psychology. The elements into which complex states of consciousness are resolved by analysis are not immediately perceptible in those states; the laws of association must be understood before the elements of actual consciousness can be detached; hence these elements may be called "unconscious." But the study of physiology was necessary to bring out clearly the conception of "unconscious feelings" as factors in mental phenomena. These elements of mind disclosed by physiology were regarded by Schopenhauer as the reality underlying all phenomenal existence, and the fundamental element in mind was called by him the Will. This term was selected because of the antithesis that there is between "will" and "intelligence"; intelligence—definite cognition—constitutes mind as we know it in its highest form; the term "will" is applied to what is regarded as the irrational element in mind—that which is irrational because it is more fundamental than reason. Now if the term "unconsciousness" as applied to mind is once admitted, it is impossible to stop short of admitting that every change in the brain has a subjective aspect; from this admission it follows that every portion of the "representation" has a portion of "will" corresponding to it. Thus, according to Schopenhauer, the reality outside us is "will." The body is "the will objectified." When we have that consciousness of resistance to effort which is the basis of our conception of external things, we are conscious of the presence of will as the external reality. The Representation is an illusion we construct for ourselves. It is derivative while the Will is fundamental.

Many of the ideas connected with the general conception of "unconsciousness" have acquired new importance lately, and

of phenomenal uniformity, a "law of identity" may be stated for things-in-themselves. All that it is necessary to assert is that units of mind-stuff exist and that they never cease to exist, though they are always forming new combinations.

II

The arguments that are most frequently brought against the doctrine of the empirical school in general amount in effect to this—that it is an attempt to explain thought by sense, to show that the consciousness of personal identity and the consciousness of the distinction between subject and object are illusions depending on certain collocations of feelings in experience, and hence that feeling is the only reality; and that in trying to prove this position it takes for granted what ought to be explained. For, it is said, unless there is already in the simplest feeling some power of combining with other feelings, how are we to explain the first appearance of consciousness? And unless even the highest kind of self-consciousness is implicit in feeling, how is its appearance to be accounted for at all? It is the perception of the difficulties pointed out by such criticism that has made the system of Hegel seem more plausible to some than that of the English school of philosophy. Hegel and those who agree with him, finding in the psychology of the empirical school the antithesis between "thought" and "sense," observing further that the philosophers of that school give their readers the impression that it is demonstrated that all but "sense" is an illusion, and having decided that this view is inadequate, try what can be made of the opposite view that thought is identical with being, that the "thing-in-itself"—that on which all phenomenal existence depends—is "self-consciousness," that the illusion is sense and not thought, the flux of feeling and not the consciousness they say we have of unity beneath the perpetual change in things and in ourselves. The fact that this view has been elaborated into a system shows that there is some defect in the ordinary statement of the empirical doctrine, and it seems at first as if this difficulty were inherent in the theory of mind-stuff also. For this theory has for its psychological basis the Spencerian classification of states of consciousness into feelings and relations between feelings, which is an accurate expression of the antithesis between "sense" and "thought," just as it is of the antithesis between "will" and "intelligence." The criticism from the Hegelian point of view of all empirical psychology may therefore be applied to

changes of collocation, and not as a law of succession of events. The untenable part of Lewes's view seems to be the deduction of his material "law of identity" from the formal law of the same name. See the review of Dr. E. Koenig's *Entwicklung des Causalproblems*, p. 136 below.

the theory of mind-stuff under the form of such a question as this—If in the beginning only feelings exist, if the “elementary feeling” is the thing-in-itself, how do relations between feelings come into existence?

The answer is that in the final statement of empiricism “relations” are just as fundamental as “feelings.” All that afterwards becomes thought is implicit not in mere feeling, but in the primitive relations between feelings; out of the combination of elementary feelings having at first simple relations to one another, all the complexity of actual consciousness arises. Thus the self-consciousness which the Hegelians say must always be present is implicit at first as some simple relation between feelings, while the “unity” they say exists beneath superficial multiplicity is found in the stuff out of which actual consciousness is made; for this remains always identical with itself, though the forms of feeling constantly fluctuate and though no particular phase of existence is permanent.

But it may be said, if relations are as fundamental as feelings, why should the elementary feeling be called the thing-in-itself? For does not the term “thing-in-itself” mean something that exists out of relation? The reason for saying that “the elementary feeling is the thing-in-itself” may be made clear by the analogy of a mathematical limit. In passing from the higher to the lower forms of consciousness, feelings constantly become more prominent and relations less prominent, and this is true whether we arrive at the lower forms of consciousness by passing down the scale of mental evolution or by analysis of consciousness in its higher forms; hence it is possible to approach as near as we like to the conception of pure feeling existing by itself though never actually to reach it. But, as in mathematics, we may give a name to this ideal limit and say that pure feeling is the thing-in-itself.

It is true that, proceeding in the other direction, that is, passing from the lower to the higher forms of consciousness, we may approach as near as we like to the conception of pure thought entirely independent of concrete feeling. And this is how the Hegelian doctrine of the identity of thought and being has been arrived at. Fixing their attention on those forms of consciousness that are the last result of evolution, the Hegelians observe that the element of “relation,” of “thought,” becomes indefinitely more prominent than that of feeling. Thus they seem to arrive at pure thought just as the empirical school seems to arrive at pure feeling as the ultimate reality. It may, accordingly, be argued that “pure thought” should be called a thing-in-itself just as much as pure feeling, for it also is an ideal limit; the difference consisting in this—that while the Hegelian conception expresses the tendency of evolution by which “form” gradually becomes more important than

that a similar account might be given of the growth of science. It might be said that, setting out from the "subjective" stage of thought and feeling in which things are regarded merely as useful or hurtful, pleasant or painful, we may reach the "objective" stage in two ways: that on the scientific side we at length attain to the conception of observation and experiment as a means of learning the causes of things, just as on the æsthetic side we attain by disinterested contemplation to the conception of the beautiful. Now the argument against Schopenhauer's metaphysics quoted above might have been founded on his own theory of art. It might be said that his metaphysical theory of the will is "subjective" and not "objective," and therefore belongs to the primitive stage of speculation. This shows that there is some defect either in his metaphysics of the Will or in his view of æsthetic development. It will be found that the defect is in his view of æsthetic development, which is true as far as it goes but incomplete. For there is a third stage of art (and also of scientific thought) which may be called "subjective," though it is in reality most remote from the subjectivity that Schopenhauer seems to have regarded as typical.

The "subjectivity" described by Schopenhauer is found in those speculations that had their origin in the period before science and poetry were completely differentiated. In mythologies, for example, an attempt is made to explain the causes of things, and at the same time things are regarded chiefly in their relation to the welfare of men. This period may therefore be called in a sense the period of the subjective stage of speculation. But the speculations of this early period seem to be subjective in character because the objective and subjective points of view have not yet been distinguished. The stage of speculation that is distinctively subjective comes last. Before it is arrived at an attempt is made in the various sciences to look at things entirely as portions of the object-world. Afterwards the introspective point of view is reached; it is seen that to think we can have a purely objective conception of things is to be under the influence of an illusion; we learn that all phenomena are phenomena of some consciousness. The introspective point of view is that which is distinctively subjective, and it is undoubtedly the last to be attained, as is shown, when we refer to the history of modern speculation, by the fact that Hume and Berkeley came after Bacon and Descartes. But though this subjective stage of speculation is the most remote from that of the primitive thinkers who made mythologies, it has a superficial resemblance to it; for in metaphysics and psychology as distinguished from physical science and cosmical speculation there is the element of self-consciousness, and the introspective method looks at first very much like the habit of seeing things merely as they affect the emotions.

Returning to Schopenhauer's theory of æsthetics, by which this view of the evolution of scientific thought was suggested, it remains to show that there is, as has been said, a final stage of the evolution of the æsthetic sense corresponding to the introspective stage of the evolution of the speculative faculty.

This final stage of æsthetic evolution is seen best in the case of poetry. One feature of the most characteristic modern poetry—that is, lyric poetry—is its subjectivity; and there is a certain resemblance between this subjectivity and that of the early ages, though they are really extremes having between them the “objectivity” described by Schopenhauer. Sometimes in reading lyric verse the impression is produced that the poet is expressing directly and simply and spontaneously the emotion that is present to him; but it is known that this is an illusion. Elaboration of rhythm, careful selection of epithets, the intention to produce a definite effect that has been distinctly conceived beforehand, are recognised by criticism as essential to a lyric poem of the highest kind. Yet the result of all this is to give lyric poetry a superficial resemblance to those kinds of primitive poetry in which there is really direct and simple and spontaneous expression of the emotions. The difference is that early poetry is a product of emotion which has not been analysed, that is, of crude subjectivity, while modern poetry of the most typical kind is a product of self-consciousness, that is, of developed subjectivity. A process of analysis is necessary to bring into distinct consciousness the real effect of things on the mind, and it is the characteristic of the highest kinds of art to describe the effects of things rather than the things themselves. Thus it happens that expressions which seem the most direct are often the most artificial, and that poetry which seems the most passionate is often the most intellectualised.

This passage from the crude subjectivity of the early ages to the self-consciousness of the later ages is seen on the imaginative side of poetry as well as on its emotional side. One of the critics of Shelley has remarked that the images called up by some of his lyrics remind us of the sun-myths and dawn-myths of the primitive Aryans. To put it generally, there is a return in modern poetry from complex descriptions to simplicity of imagery. And this is one aspect of the change from the “objective” attitude which has substituted itself for the primitive mode of regarding nature to that of self-consciousness; for the simplicity of the early myths is the simplicity of vagueness, while that of the modern poetry that seems to resemble these myths in the character of its imagery is the simplicity of abstraction.

The apparent return to simplicity that is noticed in modern poetry may be observed in its form as well as in its imagery and its emotional basis. But the laws of lyric verse are, in reality, more complex than those of the “objective” poetry

that attempts to describe nature and human life from the outside. The simplicity of the lyric is therefore artificial, and is distinguished by this character from the simplicity of the ballad for example. The same character of artificial simplicity is seen in the products of other arts when they reach their final stage as well as in the art of expression in verse; but it is sufficient to have illustrated from literature in its highest form as poetry the view that has been taken of the development of the æsthetic sense, literature being the art in which the greatest number of conditions are fulfilled.

A transition similar to that which we observe in passing from the earliest to the latest results of speculation and of art may be seen in the growth of society also. More than one political theorist has found it necessary to suppose a transition from the anarchy of early ages through a period of authority, of law, of complex regulation, to a state of freedom. Perfect freedom, of course, only exists as an ideal limit, but a state of perfect freedom is conceivable in which law has disappeared except so far as it has become organic in the individual, and the description of such a state has a superficial resemblance to a description of "the state of nature."

All this goes to show that the apparent resemblance of the theory of Mind-stuff to the half-poetical, half-philosophical views of early speculators must be regarded as an argument in its favour, since this resemblance is a proof that the theory belongs to the last stage of thought that can at present be imagined. The early speculators had really the advantage of not being too much oppressed with the material of thought, and were therefore able to give a sort of answer to the most general questions that can present themselves. But the answers they gave did not satisfy those who afterwards studied nature in its complexity as a group of objective phenomena. It was necessary that the results of scientific investigation should become organic in thought before such problems as that of the thing-in-itself could present themselves clearly. In the meantime there was a movement away from metaphysics. Then at length it became possible to think out from the point of view of self-consciousness a theory that should be really metaphysical and not an attempt to substitute science for metaphysics, but in which at the same time the results of scientific study should be implicit. Clifford's theory has the characters just described; and it has also the character that belongs to every final intellectual product, of appearing perfectly simple when it has once taken distinct form.

GIORDANO BRUNO

THE interest excited by the personality of Giordano Bruno must always have prevented his name from being quite forgotten. For above two centuries after his death, however, his writings were scarcely at all known. It was not until 1830 that the Italian works were collected, and the complete edition of the Latin works, published at the expense of the Italian Government, is much more recent. Since Wagner's edition of 1830, not only have the events of Bruno's life formed the subject of more than one investigation, but his philosophy also has attracted new attention. This renewed interest in Bruno may be ascribed in part, but not wholly, to the historical spirit of the age. The study of his works, besides confirming the impression which his intellectual power and philosophical genius produced at first throughout Europe, and which has perpetuated itself in the history of philosophy, will in the end make it clear that his ideas have still a direct bearing on thought.

Recent biographical investigations have added considerably to our knowledge of the life of Bruno. The materials for his biography were till lately, besides the letter of Scioppius written from Rome on the 17th of February, 1600 (the day when Bruno was burned in the Campo dei Fiori), chiefly the occasional references to events of his life that are to be found in his works. All that could be known at the time was embodied by Bartholmæss in the first volume of his monograph on Bruno, published in 1846. Since then, documents have been discovered at Venice, containing the records of his examination by the Inquisition there, and have been published along with a new biography by Prof. Berti (1868). The same writer has published more recently (1880) copies with which he had been furnished of the Protocols of the Inquisition at Rome relating to the last year of Bruno's imprisonment. These were obtained by a research in the archives of the Vatican which the Roman revolution of 1848 made it possible to begin but not to finish. The principal facts that have been established by these and other documents are given by Prof. Sigwart in an essay included in his *Kleine Schriften* (1881).¹

¹ A full account of later discoveries, making clearer some episodes in Bruno's career, is incorporated in the first chapter of Prof. J. Lewis McIntyre's *Giordano Bruno* (1903), up to its time the most comprehensive work in English on his life and philosophy. The still later work of Dr. W. Boulting (*Giordano Bruno: His Life, Thought, and Martyrdom*, 1916) adds further detail, and gives a vivid impression of Bruno's untiring activity and all but complete lack of caution.

The exact year of Bruno's birth was fixed for the first time by the Venetian documents. He was born in 1548 at Nola in the kingdom of Naples, then under Spanish rule. His baptismal name was Filippo. The name of Giordano was assumed by him when he became a monk of the Dominican order at Naples. His noviciate began in 1562 or 1563. He received full orders in 1572. In 1576 he ceased to wear the Dominican habit. He had already been accused of heresy during his noviciate. He was now charged with holding heretical views on the Trinity. To avoid this charge he fled to Rome. At Rome the charge against him was to have been proceeded with; but he was informed of this, and escaped to Noli in the Genoese territory. After residing for a short time in various cities of the north, he at length decided to leave Italy. He went first to Geneva, where there were many Italian exiles; but finding that to live there it would be necessary for him to profess Calvinism, and having got into a quarrel with the ministers, whom he called "pedants" and "pedagogues," he left Geneva after a residence of about five months. In 1579 began his two years' residence at Toulouse. At the University of Toulouse he obtained the degree of doctor, and was appointed to an ordinary professorship of philosophy. In 1581 he left Toulouse for Paris. There he published several Latin works, including the *De Umbris Idearum*, besides an Italian comedy, *Il Candelaio*. He refused an ordinary professorship which was offered him at the University of Paris, because in order to hold it he would have had to attend mass, and this he could not do as he was unreconciled to the Church. An extraordinary professorship not having this obligation attached to it was conferred on him by Henry III., to whom he had dedicated the *De Umbris Idearum*. Towards the end of 1583 he set out from France with letters from Henry to his ambassador at the court of Queen Elizabeth, Michel de Castelnau, who received him into his house. In London he frequented the society of Sir Philip Sidney, Fulke Greville and other distinguished men. He lectured and held disputations at Oxford. He did not find the academical teachers very receptive of new ideas; and he did not enjoy the rough humour of the London populace, with its antipathy to "foreigners"; but, long after he had left England, he acclaimed enthusiastically, in the verse of his chief philosophical poem, the triumph of English seamen over the Spanish Crusade. During his residence in England he published the most important of his works, the Italian dialogues; of these the *Cena delle Ceneri*, *Della Causa* and *Dell' Infinito* are dedicated to Castelnau, the *Spaccio della Bestia trionfante* and the *Eroici Furori* to Sidney. In 1585 he returned to Paris, where he drew up theses against the Aristotelian physics, which were afterwards published at Wittenberg. These theses were defended by a disciple of his named Hennequin in a public disputation held on the 25th of May, 1586.

Soon after this he left France for Germany. From August, 1586, to May, 1588, he resided at Wittenberg, lecturing at the University and teaching privately. In his valedictory address to the University he praised the tolerance that was practised there and the courteous manner in which he had been treated. The next place he visited was Prague. In return for the dedication of one of his books he received a subsidy from the Emperor Rudolf II., afterwards the patron of Kepler. From Prague he went to Helmstädt. He composed there the three philosophical poems, *De triplici Minimo et Mensura*, *De Monade, Numero et Figura*, and *De Immenso et Innumerabilibus*, and dedicated them to Henry Julius, Duke of Brunswick. In order to get these books printed he went to Frankfort, where he remained from June, 1590, to February, 1591. At Frankfort he received letters from a young Venetian noble named Giovanni Mocenigo, asking him to visit him at his house in Venice and instruct him in the art of memory set forth in the *De Umbris Idearum* and other books devoted to the *Ars magna* of Raymond Lully. This was the cause of Bruno's return to Italy. Before his return he spent an interval at Zürich, during which he dictated his *Summa Terminorum metaphysicorum*, first printed, with a preface by Raphael Eglinus, in 1595. After his arrival in Italy in September or October, 1591, he lived alternately at Venice and at Padua. In March, 1592, he began to reside permanently in the house of Mocenigo. Two months later Mocenigo, constrained "by obligation of conscience and by order of his confessor," denounced him to the Inquisition as a teacher of impious doctrines. He was arrested and brought before the tribunal of the Inquisition at Venice. After his examination it was decided by the Grand Inquisitor San Severina, on the report of the tribunal, that he must be sent to Rome to be judged. The Venetian government was at first unwilling to grant his extradition, but at length yielded; and at the beginning of 1593 he was taken to Rome, where he remained in the prisons of the Inquisition till 1600. Of the first six years of this imprisonment nothing is even yet known; but we now know from the documents found in the Vatican that early in 1599, at a session of the Congregation held under the presidency of the Pope (Clement VIII.), it was decided that Bruno should be required to abjure eight heretical propositions selected from his writings and from the statements that had been submitted to the Inquisitors. Only one answer of Bruno's is recorded, and this is a declaration that he has seen no reason to change his opinions. On the 9th of February, 1600, he was condemned and delivered over to the secular power, with the usual request, "*ut quam clementissime et citra sanguinis effusionem puniretur.*" When the sentence was read to him he answered, as Scioppius says, "threateningly"—"*Majori forsan cum timore sententiam in me fertis quam ego accipiam.*" Eight days later he was burned in the presence of

a multitude of people who were assembled in Rome for the Jubilee.¹

More than one passage might be quoted from Bruno's works showing that he had anticipated for himself some such fate as this. When he was interrogated by the Venetian tribunal he admitted that his doctrines were indirectly opposed to the faith. His defence was that he was not an innovator in religion, but in philosophy. He declared that he had never attached himself to any heretical sect; that, on the contrary, he preferred the religion of the Catholics to that of the Lutherans and Calvinists, because it laid more stress on good works; and that he was willing to submit to the Church in matters of theology. This last position was, as Berti says, a traditional position adopted by Bruno from the heterodox philosophers of the Middle Ages, who had tried to obtain toleration by means of it, first under Islam and then in the Christian West. In several passages of his works, and not merely in his answers to the Inquisitors, he says that in matters of faith he submits to the theologians. Sometimes this submission is merely ironical; it is in part, as has been said, the traditional means of defence of philosophers against persecution; but it is also expressive of Bruno's philosophy of religion, as will be seen. If it had been possible for Catholicism to grant philosophical freedom, he would have regarded it almost as the philosophers of antiquity regarded the religion of the State. It was philosophical freedom that he claimed, not freedom to found a new religious sect. But philosophical freedom was the kind of freedom that was least of all likely to be conceded by the Catholic reaction. Only an unqualified submission would have satisfied the Church, and this Bruno was incapable of making.

A few months before Bruno's extradition by the Venetian government, Galileo had begun to lecture at Padua. As is well known, Bruno accepted the Copernican astronomy before Galileo had made his discoveries with the telescope. Kepler, who lived in Prague fifteen years later than Bruno and was acquainted with some of his works, expressed admiration for him and regret that Galileo had not made some reference to his predecessor in the advocacy of the new astronomical doctrines. The fact that Bruno has a place in the history of astronomy as well as in the history of philosophy is expressive of the change that was taking place in the direction of the enthusiasm of discovery that characterised the Renaissance. This enthusiasm had been in part transferred from the remains of classical antiquity to physical science. From Italy to the rest of Europe the schoolmaster-pedant, with his "piebald dialect," had become a stock-subject of ridicule; as we may see by our own stage. Prof. Adamson once put forward a suggestion that the topic was imported into England

¹ On the 9th of June, 1889, a statue to Bruno was unveiled in the Campo dei Fiori.

through Bruno's comedy and the figure of the pedant in his Dialogues.¹ The type, he thought, was still distinctively Italian. After he had seen the chief countries of Europe and their universities, Bruno expressed most admiration for the spirit of free intellectual activity that was making itself felt in the universities of Germany. He praised Luther as the liberator of the human intellect, as a new Alcides greater than the first in that with the pen instead of the club he had subdued a more dangerous and a more powerful Cerberus. All that the German mind still needed, Bruno thought, was emancipation from theological interests. This once attained, there was no limit to what it might accomplish.

Notwithstanding the admiration which he so often expresses for Copernicus, Bruno was of opinion that he showed too much regard for "mathematical" and too little for "physical" considerations, that he had in view facility of calculation rather than the nature of things. In his reformed astronomy, Copernicus retained the eighth sphere of the Ptolemaic system, the sphere which was supposed to carry round the fixed stars by its revolution. Bruno abolished the whole system of spheres and substituted for it the idea of an infinite space in which there are innumerable systems like the solar system, having the so-called fixed stars for their centres. But, however Copernicus might himself have hesitated to break the last barriers of the received cosmology, Bruno still saw in him the thinker who had set himself free from the opinions of the multitude, and had first made possible the more complete emancipation of the intellect that is the consequence of the substitution of the conception of an infinite for that of a finite universe. This new philosophical conception seemed to him to bring with it far greater good than the discovery of new continents. To Copernicus he applies in a larger sense the verses of Seneca—often in that age quoted as a prophecy—about a Tiphys who is to remove all terrestrial bounds to knowledge.² Those who have discovered new continents, he says, have found out the way to disturb the peace of nations, to multiply vices, to propagate tyrannies, while the new philosophy, instead of carrying over to other lands "the poisons of perverse laws and religions,"

¹ That Shakespeare in *Love's Labour's Lost* was directly influenced by Bruno is extremely improbable; but it is quite certain that the figure of Holofernes cannot, as some have thought, point to Chapman; for Chapman himself introduces a variant of the same conventional type in the Sarpago of *The Gentleman Usher*; and in his notes to Homer he speaks as contemptuously of pedagogic erudition as Bruno himself. For his spirited ridicule of the classicist dialect in *Le Pédant Joué*, Cyrano de Bergerac undoubtedly drew inspiration from Bruno.

² Venient annis saccula seris
Quibus Oceanus vincula rerum
Laxet, et ingens pateat tellus,
Tiphysque novos detegat orbes,
Nec sit terris ultima Thule.

liberates the mind from chimeras and shows it how to ascend to the stars.

Though Bruno satirised the humanists as "pedagogues" and "pedants," he had himself abundance of classical learning. He had studied with special interest the records of the teachings of the pre-Socratic philosophers. He was of opinion that Pythagoras and other early speculators had formed a truer view of the universe than that which triumphed through the authority of Aristotle.¹ This earlier and truer philosophy he claimed to have revived.

Another branch of learning to which Bruno had given special attention was the study of mythology; not only the mythology of the Greeks but also that of the Egyptians and of the ancient nations of the East so far as knowledge of it was accessible to him. He had, as Bartholmæss points out, the idea of a science of comparative mythology.

The polemic of Bruno against Aristotle is chiefly directed against his cosmology. His pre-eminence in rhetoric, in politics, in logic, he acknowledges; and he often quotes his opinions with approval even in physics and in metaphysics; though here he accuses him of misrepresenting the opinions of the earlier philosophers who were superior to him. In opposing the established cosmological system, he brings against those who appeal to authority the argument that the modern is really older than the ancient world, having more experience behind it. Much as he had been influenced by the Platonising current of his own and the preceding age, as well as by the ancient Neo-Platonists, he was not himself properly a Platonist any more than he was an Aristotelian. That Plato was more acceptable than Aristotle to Bruno and other philosophic thinkers of the time is in great part due to his never having been constituted the official philosopher of Church and School.

Bruno's principal aversions were the official representatives of Scholasticism and the humanistic "pedants," with the theological zealots of all kinds; but, above all, the Reformers of Calvin's following. His antipathy to the humanists is explicable by a certain contempt which he often expresses for knowledge that is merely "instrumental." So far as philosophy was concerned, Humanism had for the time done its work. To bestow the very wide familiarity with the matter of the classics that we see in Bruno himself, for example, minute philological studies were no longer necessary. In Bruno's hostility to Scholasticism there was nothing accidental. To the whole method and doctrine of the School his way of thinking was fundamentally opposed.

¹ A favourite saying of Bruno, that the earth is one of the stars, was originally Pythagorean. The Neo-Platonists adopted it; but Bruno, no doubt, took it directly from Aristotle, *De Caelo*, ii. 13, 293 a 22, where it is ascribed to the Pythagoreans.

He was, nevertheless, wide-minded enough to express the highest admiration for the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. Along with Jewish and Christian theologians, it is worthy of note, Bruno attacks the philosophical Pyrrhonists. The alliance between philosophical Pyrrhonism and theological faith was not even then altogether unheard of.

A more directly metaphysical impulse was received by Bruno from Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) than from any other modern thinker. Cusa has been described as the first German who, in the fifteenth century, attached himself to the study of Grecian antiquity.¹ He was known as a reformer within the limits of Catholicism, took part in the Council of Basel, and was made a Cardinal. In cast of philosophical thought he belongs wholly to the transition-period, and not to the later Scholasticism. His doctrine of "the coincidence of contraries" is distinctly pantheistic. Bruno definitely says that "the divine Cusanus," as he sometimes calls him, would have been still greater as a philosopher if he had not been restricted through his position in the Church.²

Bruno ascribed some of the ideas of the Cardinal of Cusa to the influence of Raymond Lully (1235-1315), famous in tradition as an alchemist. Lully was the author of a system of logic by which the Mohammedans were to be converted to Christianity. His disciples claimed for his logical system that it was a method of discovering all truth by a kind of mechanical shifting about of subjects and predicates till the right proposition turned up. It is worthy of remark that he had not in theory subordinated philosophy to theology; the doctrines of Catholic theology were to emerge as the result of a logical process. Bruno made additions to Lully's system, and during the whole period of his philosophical activity spent much time in writing expositions of it and in teaching it both publicly and privately. That which attracted him in it was probably the conception of the unity of knowledge, expressed in the doctrine that the mind may pass from any one idea to any other idea. No relation except this very general one can be traced between the logical and mnemonic art of Lully and Bruno's own philosophical doctrines.

If the exposition of the mnemonic art in the *De Umbris Idearum* may be taken as an example, Bruno's treatment of the details of the system founded by him on that of Lully is extremely obscure.³ Passages in his Latin poems are affected with an obscurity similar to that of the "Lullian jargon," but this

¹ He has also a place in the history of Latin scholarship as having successfully impugned the authority of the False Decretals: see F. W. Hall, *A Companion to Classical Texts* (Oxford, 1913), p. 110.

² See Part ii. for an account of the chief work of Cusanus, the *De Docta Ignorantia*.

³ For a full account of the Lullian works the reader must be referred to Bartholmæss.

occasional obscurity does not affect the general character of Bruno's writings. As in the *De Umbris Idearum*, the passages that are of philosophical interest are always essentially clear. And in the obscure passages themselves there is nothing of the nature of imperfect articulation. It is difficult to believe that they were intended to be understood. They are, as Berti calls them, "sibylline and unintelligible"; and as he goes on to say, they do not seem to be of any importance so far as their meaning can be conjectured.

The Italian works are free from passages of this kind, and on the whole they are of more interest and importance than the Latin works. There are, however, many passages in the three Latin poems that are scarcely inferior to anything in the Italian works, and an account of Bruno's philosophy would be incomplete without reference to them.

Bruno's mode of exposition, both in the Latin and in the Italian, is literary rather than scientific. He did not, indeed, make any attempt at that elegance of Latin style which was the chief object of the "Ciceronians." And in writing Italian, he thought it an absurdity to reject a word merely because it had not been used by any classical Italian author. He is, in fact, decidedly an "incorrect" writer. On the other hand, he did not make his style repellent by a rigid terminology. He says expressly, in the introduction to the earliest of his works, that he does not refuse to make use of the terminology of any school, if only it is that by which he can best convey his idea;¹ and in his latest work he protests against the minute method of interpreting philosophical terms practised by the "Grammarians."² In order to convey his metaphysical ideas in an imaginative form, he uses quite freely both the poetical and the philosophical conceptions he has met with in his reading. He takes pleasure in paradoxes, in ingenious combinations of ideas, so far as they help to bring out more clearly his own thought. He does not attempt to construct a system of which every detail shall be logically connected with all the rest; but his thought is none the less genuinely organic. And the vivid colouring that is given to his expositions by the use of illustrations from all sources only makes more evident the originality of his philosophy as a whole.

Bruno's essential originality is in philosophy in the strict sense of the term. He had, however, as has been seen, given special attention to physical science. Some of the scientific speculations that are met with incidentally in his works are interesting as anticipations of modern ideas. He would probably not have laid much stress on them as parts of his contribution to thought; for just as learning was to him material for the expression of his metaphysical ideas, so science was a means of

¹ *De Umbris Idearum*, ed. Tugini, pp. 20-3.

² *Summa Terminorum metaphysicorum*, ed. Gfrörer, p. 455.

arriving at a true philosophical conception of nature. In order to illustrate his mode of thought in dealing with properly scientific questions, his theory of the causes of the present distribution of life on the earth may be referred to.

He holds that the earth, under the influence of the light and heat of the sun, has the power of producing all forms of life from any part of itself, provided that the proper kinds of matter are present there. It is not necessary, he says, to suppose that all men are descended from the same ancestor; nor is each of the other races of animals descended from a common ancestor; all kinds of animals were produced in all parts of the earth. But in different places different kinds of animals have been destroyed and different kinds have remained; as in England, for example, certain kinds of wild animals have been destroyed through the cultivation of the country by men, and in other islands all men have perished through the predominance of the more powerful animals or through lack of food.¹

The mode of thinking that has since given origin to the theory of natural selection is obviously expressing itself here under the limitations imposed by the state of the sciences of life in the sixteenth century. Bruno has speculated in the same spirit on the reason of the distances maintained by the different planetary systems from one another.² He has himself indicated the relation of this speculation to the ancient speculations as to the survival of certain combinations of atoms. For Lucretius he displays his admiration by using Lucretian forms in his Latin poems. He himself sometimes applies to atoms the name of "first bodies," the only solid parts of the world.

Atomic speculations, however, are subordinate in Bruno's philosophy, and interest him chiefly in relation to an incipient metaphysical monadism. In the passage just referred to and in other places he distinguishes his doctrine from that of Democritus. He points out that while Democritus regarded life and mind as accidental products of certain combinations of atoms, he on the contrary regards them as equally eternal with atoms. As an expression of the doctrine he opposes to that of the Epicurean school he often quotes the lines of Virgil:—

Principio coelum ac terras camposque liquentes,
Lucentemque globum lunæ, Titaniaque astra,
Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.

¹ *De Immenso*, vii, c. 18

² *Ibid.*, v., c. 3. Anticipations somewhat similar to the foregoing (as others have pointed out) occur in Empedocles and Lucretius, but with a shade of difference in each case. Empedocles supposes the parts of organisms to arise separately, and fit combinations of parts to survive. According to Lucretius, organisms arise as wholes directly from earth, and the fittest wholes survive. Bruno, starting from a general conception like that of Lucretius, applies it to solve the problem of "geographical distribution."

The doctrine of universal animation expressed in these lines is made the philosophical basis of the theory of the origin of life described above. The power of the earth to produce all forms of life from all parts of itself is inferred from the presence of the soul of the world in the whole and in every part.

In Bruno's system God—the absolute intellect—is at once the beginning of things and the end to which they aspire according to the degree of their perfection. The divine intellect manifested in nature is "the soul of the world"; in the human mind it expresses itself as the desire to comprehend all things in relation to the unity from which they proceed. All particular things, so far as they are outside the divine intellect, are in truth vanity, nothingness; they have being only so far as they participate in the being of God.

It has been disputed whether this doctrine is theistic or pantheistic. Prof. Carrière, in his book on the philosophers of the Renaissance, takes the view that there is a transition in Bruno's writings from pantheism to theism; that the Italian dialogues are more pantheistic, the later Latin works more theistic. Dr. E. B. Hartung, in an exposition of Bruno's ethical ideas and of their relation to his metaphysics, admits to a certain extent the truth of this view; but, he points out, Bruno's definitions exclude the ideas of the personality of God and of his separateness from the world; since these ideas must be regarded as essential to theism, Bruno's doctrine is, strictly speaking, pantheistic. Now both these ideas are just as much excluded from Bruno's later as from his earlier works. It might even be maintained that some definitions in the later works are more distinctly pantheistic than those of the earlier works.

The ground of Carrière's view seems to be this. In the dialogues *Della Causa* and *Dell' Infinito* the unity in which all things have their origin is described as manifesting itself in Nature. The other aspect of this unity, its aspect as an end which the human intellect seeks to attain, is indicated and is placed in relation with the first. In *Della Causa*, for example, it is said that the process by which Nature descends to the production of things and the process by which the intellect ascends to the knowledge of them are one and the same, that both the intellect and Nature proceed from unity to unity through multiplicity. This other side of Bruno's doctrine, however, is more obvious in the later Latin works than in these particular dialogues. These dialogues, therefore, appear more "pantheistic," in one sense of the term, and the Latin poems more "theistic." But the view that has been supposed to be characteristic of the earlier works is found in the later works also. Here, for example, is an expression of it from the *Summa Terminorum metaphysicorum*—"Natura aut est Deus ipse, aut divina virtus in rebus ipsis manifestata." It is alluded to in the poem *De Immenso* as a doctrine that has constantly been held by

the author. And the dialogues *Degli eroici Furori*, which belong to the London and not to the Frankfort period, are devoted chiefly to the expression of the other side of Bruno's doctrine. In these dialogues the aspiration of the mind towards absolute unity is described. The contemplation of this unity, Bruno remarks, is what the Peripatetics have in view when they say that the highest happiness of man consists in perfection by the speculative sciences. The opinion of Plotinus is quoted with approval to the effect that "the mind" (as distinguished from "the soul") "either is God or is in God." Thus the contrast between the earlier and the later works again disappears. The explanation of its having been supposed to exist is probably that the poems of the Frankfort period, because of the resemblance of their subject-matter to that of the two best-known Italian works, have been compared with these to the exclusion of the others. When they are compared with the Italian works generally, it is seen that the less orderly mode of exposition adopted in them has made it possible to include elements that do not receive full expression in *Della Causa* and *Dell' Infinito*, but which are more completely expressed in the *Eroici Furori* than anywhere else in Bruno's writings.

The two sides of Bruno's doctrine are brought into relation by means of the idea of perpetual transformation, of a descent of beings from unity on the one hand and an ascent towards it on the other. This idea is already present in the first of his philosophical works, *De Umbris Idearum* (1582). In this book, indeed, most of his characteristic ideas are put forward quite distinctly, though without the development which they afterwards received.

The influence of Platonism is evident in the title—"Of the Shadows of Ideas." Bruno, however, distinguishes his own doctrine of transformation from the doctrine of emanation or the production of the lower by the higher, taken in an exclusive sense. As there is a continual passage from light to darkness by which the higher beings become lower, so also, he says, there is a continual passage in the opposite direction by which the lowest beings may gradually return to the highest state. Light is here the symbol of the region of ideas, of the absolute unity which alone truly exists. Darkness is merely the negation of light; the symbol of not-being. The vestiges of ideas are things in nature and their shadows are thoughts in the mind. These partake of the nature of light and of darkness. Any natural thing can change its form and (within certain limits) assume any other form. Similarly the intellect can pass from any particular thought to any other thought, if it has thoughts that can serve as means between the extremes. The end that the intellect ought to propose to itself is ascent to the region of Ideas, to the knowledge of the One as distinguished from the Many, of the permanent

because they appear so. The repugnancy of the Peripatetic doctrine of the motion of the heavenly bodies in perfect circles to all that is observed of Nature is frequently dwelt on. According to Bruno, though all natural processes are in a sense circular, nothing ever returns precisely to its former state. He ridicules the ancient fancy of the Great Year, regarding it as a kind of symbol of the opinion that mathematical exactness is observed by Nature. No mathematical circle exists in Nature, any more than a mathematical point or straight line. Each of the planets has one motion which may be resolved into a number of approximately circular motions, but which is itself neither motion in a circle nor in any combination of circles. The heavenly bodies move freely in infinite space; they are not carried round by spheres. With the system of the planetary and other spheres the concentric arrangement of the four elements disappears also. In opposition to the Aristotelian doctrine, Bruno argues that the elements have no fixed order of position with respect to one another. They are, besides, never found in Nature pure or unmixed. All substances in Nature are mixed, and their composition is perpetually changing.

There is no fifth element or "quintessence." The stars and planets are not simple bodies, but are of mixed composition like the earth. All the bodies in the universe are made of the same elements or proximate principles as well as of the same primordial matter. In the sun and the stars fire predominates in the earth and the planets (in which class the comets are included) water predominates. Bodies of the first class shine with their own light, bodies of the second class with a reflected light. But the element of fire is not absent from the earth. And water, being, as Thales taught,¹ the basis of all substances, the common element that binds together their parts, cannot be absent from the sun. Heat and light, besides, are not sensible in themselves. Light, for example, is itself invisible; it is visible only by means of the body in which it inheres. What we call flame or fire is light or heat inherent in a moist body. Hence the sun is not without opacity and coldness as the earth is not without heat and light. The name of "ether" is given by Bruno not to the "quintessence" of which the stars were supposed to be made, but to space as distinguished from matter. The "immense ethereal space" of his cosmology he identifies with the "vacuum" of the Epicureans. Of this vacuum he says, "God is the fulness." The "ether," or "heaven," or "space," as distinguished from

¹ Bruno ascribes this doctrine not only to Thales, but also to "Moses and the Babylonians." Water, being an element in which coldness and darkness predominate, is, he argues, the representative of matter in the Mosaic and Babylonian cosmogonies; light or fire, of spirit. He himself often makes the sun the symbol of spirit or form or the active principle in Nature; the earth, of matter or the passive principle.

the bodies it contains, is ingenerable, incorruptible and immovable. Being infinite it has properly no figure; but we may describe it, following Xenophanes,¹ by the similitude of a sphere, the centre of which is everywhere and the circumference nowhere.²

Since every point of space may in turn be regarded as the centre, all motions may be said to be up or down, towards the centre or towards the circumference, according to the point with respect to which they are considered. There is no difference of up and down, central and circumferential, with respect to the infinite universe. Moving bodies may be called light or heavy according as they are in motion to or from any particular point. There is no absolute difference of "gravity" and "levity," as there is no absolute difference of central and circumferential positions. Bodies on the earth are said to have gravity with respect to the earth, because it is the system of which they are parts. The parts of the earth are related to the centre of the earth as the parts of an animal are related to the organic centre of that animal. If any part of the earth be removed to a great distance from the centre, it will not tend to return to its own place with a force proportional to its distance from that place (as the Peripatetics are obliged to maintain), any more than a part of an animal, being removed, will tend to return to its place. When it is at an indefinite distance from the system of which it has formed part, a body has no tendency to return to that system; for it is now neither light nor heavy with respect to it. Its motion will be determined by the general law that all bodies seek "the place of their preservation." When a body is in "its own place," that is, the place of its preservation, it is again neither light nor heavy.

Neither the material nor the spiritual substance of things seeks to preserve itself or fears to be destroyed, for substance is eternal. But all particular things, being subject to vicissitude, are moved by the desire to preserve themselves in their present state of being (*il desiderio di conservarsi nell'esser presente*). Contraries are found together in Nature, and the desire of self-preservation expresses itself in general as love of that which is similar and hate of that which is dissimilar. But things may seek that which is unlike them in kind, instead of fleeing from it, if

¹ The ascription of antinomies on the finite and the infinite to Xenophanes comes from the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia*: see the account of that treatise in Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, I., 5th ed., pp. 499-521.

² Dr. Boulting resists the glamour of Bruno's "infinetism." While recognising his anticipation, in general terms, of something like modern "relativity" as following from the nature of the "actual infinite," he adds the acute remark that "Modern Metaphysics, in trying to apply this analysis of the nature of Infinity, has fallen into an ancient, hopeless blunder—that of explaining Metaphysics by Mathematics" (*Giordano Bruno*, p. 143).

it tends to their preservation. The motion of the earth, which is called circular to distinguish it from the rectilinear motion of the parts of the earth (though not one of the four motions of which the earth's total motion is composed is in a perfect circle), is determined by the need which the earth has of the light and heat of the sun. Not only is the earth the source of life to the animals on its surface; it is itself an animal. The sun and all planets and stars in the universe are also animals, which, like the earth, though divine and perhaps not destined to perish, are yet generable and corruptible. They differ from the animals on their surface in that they have all the substance that is necessary for their preservation in themselves, and have not to seek it outside; but they resemble them in this, that they too preserve their life by retaining a certain constancy of form during all changes of the position of their parts. In order that they may remain alive it is necessary that their internal parts should by degrees become external and their external parts internal, that the sea should become land and the land sea; that in short, all parts of them should experience all changes of position.¹ Hence the hot and cold bodies of the universe have need of one another. The earth needs the alternations of light and darkness and of heat and cold that are caused by its diurnal and its annual revolutions, as well as those that take place during longer cycles, in order that all its parts may have all temperatures in turn and that the circulation of matter may be maintained. Thus self-preservation is the final cause of the motion, both rectilinear and circular, of all particular bodies in the universe.

All things are perfect with respect to the order of the universe, but not with respect to the desire of self-preservation that is inherent in each particular thing. Nothing in the universe is in itself either absolutely perfect or absolutely imperfect. God and the universe alone are perfect simply and absolutely. For finite things can only have different modes of being successively; God and the universe have all modes of being at the same time, or rather, without reference to time. As the infinity of God differs from that of the universe, so also the perfection. The perfection of God is in the whole and in every part; the perfection of the universe is in the whole but not in the parts of it taken separately. Things are said to be perfect, not simply and absolutely and in themselves, but in their kind, so far as they attain particular ends. For example, they may be said to be more or less perfect according to the degree of their success in attaining the end of self-preservation. Animals on the earth attain this end imperfectly; for the influx of matter fit to promote their preservation, which is at first greater than the efflux and afterwards becomes equal to it, is at length surpassed by it,

¹ Bruno finds suggestions of this theory of the "local motion" of the earth in Aristotle. See *Italian Works*, ed. Wagner, i. pp. 192-4.

and then death of the individual takes place. The heavenly bodies (among which the earth must be numbered) attain the end of self-preservation more perfectly than any other finite things.

The divine will is one with fate. But God acts by the necessity of his own nature, not by a necessity external to himself in the manner of things that are said to be subject to necessity. In God, therefore, necessity is one with freedom. God always acts in the best possible manner because he has perfect knowledge. If men knew all things perfectly they also would always act in the best way, and therefore all would act in the same way. But the wills of men are everywhere perturbed by passion and by the hidden causes of things (*affectu atque rerum latentia*). Hence they must often hesitate before choosing one of two opposite courses. For this reason the liberty of man must be classed among those things that are subject to uncertainty. It is not fitting that this kind of liberty should be ascribed to God.

In one place Bruno distinguishes between divine necessity or fate and the necessity of Nature. Knowledge and will are declared to be identical both in God and in Nature. The order that is in natural things is a kind of knowledge—the knowledge that each thing has of that which is similar and of that which is dissimilar. This knowledge is identical with the will to seek the one and to escape from the other. Now in Nature different effects are never the effects of the same will or knowledge, but particular effects are not always produced when the will to produce them is present, because they may be prevented by the action of other things. Thus “the necessity of Nature” is the necessity which we ascribe to particular laws of Nature; “divine necessity” is the necessity by which the whole could not be other than it is.¹

This doctrine of necessity, and that of the coincidence of will, power and act in God, by which it is connected with the doctrine of the infinity of the universe, are not to be taught to the multitude; for although they are not really dangerous to morals, yet they are sure to be misunderstood by the unlearned. This has been considered by those theologians who ascribe to God a free-will resembling that of man. They have seen that the multitude will never be able to reconcile merit and demerit in the choice of justice or injustice by men with necessity in God. But philosophers in teaching the doctrine of divine necessity do not wish to deny the merit of right actions or the moral freedom of man; and therefore “the not less learned than religious theologians” have always been willing to grant freedom of philosophising, and true philosophers for their part have always been favourable to religions.²

¹ *Summa Terminorum metaphysicorum*, Gfrörer, p. 512.

² *Dell' Infinito*, Wagner, ii. pp. 26–7.

In defending himself against those who bring arguments from the Bible against the Copernican astronomy, Bruno takes up the position that the Bible is a moral revelation, not a revelation of speculative truth. The object which a wise legislator has in view is, he says, to teach the multitude to choose the good and to avoid the evil. In aiming at this object he speaks in the manner of the vulgar about things that have nothing to do with practice, leaving the further consideration of them to "contemplative men." If he were to use terms understood only by himself and a few others, and to make great case of things that are indifferent to the ends for which laws are ordained, he would be thought to address himself not to the multitude but to "wise and generous spirits," to those who "without law do what they ought." But for these demonstration is required; faith suffices only for the many, for those who cannot act rightly without external law.

The sacred writers, then, must not serve for authorities when they speak as "presupposing in natural things the sense commonly received," "but rather when they speak indifferently," that is, without reference to practice. Regard must be had not only to the words of "divine men" speaking thus, but also "to the enthusiasms of the poets, who with superior light have spoken to us." In accordance with this principle Bruno finds in the *Book of Job* suggestions of some of his physical theories; he often quotes passages from *Ecclesiastes* in support of his doctrine of the permanence of substance; and in the Mosaic cosmogony (as in other cosmogonies) he finds the distinction of matter and form. The speculative parts of all religious systems are for him an exoteric philosophy. In one place he says that the veil which covered the face of Moses, and which signified, according to the Cabbalists, a veil that was over the law, was not for deception, but to prepare the eyes of men for the light, which would cause blindness if they were suddenly to pass into it from darkness.¹

The essential end of all religions being practice, it follows that they are good in proportion as they encourage right action. This view is developed in the *Spaccio della Bestia trionfante*, a book which, as Bruno explains in the dedication, has for its chief object to lay the foundation of his moral philosophy. It is only in this book and in its sequel, the *Cabala del Cavallo pegaseo*, that he makes an attack which is direct and at the same time more than incidental on the religion of his age; and this attack is on ethical grounds. The Christianity of the sixteenth century came very far short of his ideal of a religion that should always have ethical ends in view and should not discountenance intellectual liberty. Catholicism seemed to him to exalt credulity and ignorance to the rank of virtues and to discourage scientific curiosity as being in itself evil rather than

¹ *De Umbris Idearum*, ed. Tugini, pp. 33-4.

good; and to Protestantism as a religious system he was less favourable than to Catholicism, for the doctrine of justification by faith seemed to him directly opposed to the true object of a religion. The gods, it is frequently said in the *Spaccio*, ought to be thought of as rewarding the good and punishing the bad actions of men, not for their own sakes, as if they could receive any benefit or injury from their worshippers, but for the sake of men. Laws have been ordained for the good of human society; and because some men do not see the fruit of their merits in this life, there have been placed before their eyes in another life rewards and punishments according to their works.

The *Spaccio della Bestia trionfante* ("Expulsion of the triumphant Beast") is an allegory of which the chief personages are the Greek gods and goddesses. The interlocutors in the dialogues are Saulino—the representative of the philosopher—Wisdom (Sofia), and Mercury. At the beginning of the first dialogue Wisdom relates to Saulino that the gods, finding themselves to have grown old, are offering up prayer to the Fates (knowing that Fate is inexorable, but desiring to set themselves in tune with the universe), that they may either maintain their present state of being, or, if this is not permitted, then that they may enter into a better and not into a worse state. For Jove and the other gods are subject to change; it may be that they too have to pass the shores of Acheron. And they are afraid that the next great revolution of the world will be quite different from those that have gone before, and will not end in a mere change of dynasty. In order to preserve their existence, they have resolved to put away their vices, and, as a symbol of this change in themselves, to expel from heaven the records of the misdeeds of their youth, and to substitute the moral virtues for the monsters and deified human beings they had formerly placed in the constellations.

The "expulsion of the triumphant beast" from heaven and the assigning of a constellation to each virtue is effected by a council of the gods which is called by Jupiter. The mythological monsters and the heroes who had places in the constellations along with them are disposed of in various ways. Hercules and Perseus are sent down to the earth to slay or expel certain new monsters that trouble it. By these the spirit of superstition and religious persecution is signified; and this expulsion of monsters from the earth is a second meaning of the title of the allegory.

The virtues to which the gods assign the chief places in heaven are, in order of dignity, Truth, Providence or Prudence, Wisdom, Law, and Judgment. Truth is explained in the dialogues to be, in the highest sense, identical with the first Principle of things, with the One and with the Good. This first and highest Truth is superior to Jupiter. Besides the truth that is said to be "before things" as being their cause and principle, there is a truth that

is "in things" and a truth that is "after things." The truth that is in things is that by participation in which they have being. The truth that is after things is the knowledge of them as it is in the human mind. Providence is "the companion of Truth," and is identical with liberty and with necessity. In its lower form it is called Prudence, and is the discursive knowledge which the mind has of the order of the universe. Wisdom, like Truth and Providence, has a higher and a lower form. Its higher form is identical with Truth and with Providence. Its lower form is not truth itself but participates in truth, as the moon shines by the light of the sun. The first Wisdom is above all things, the second is "communicated by words, elaborated by the arts, polished by discussions, delineated by writing." Law is the daughter of Wisdom. It is by Law that states are maintained. No law is to be accepted that has not for its end to direct the actions of men in such a way that they may be useful to human society. Next to Law has been placed Judgment, into whose hands Jove has put the sword and the crown, for the punishment of the bad and the reward of the good. By the representative of this virtue services and injuries done to the commonwealth are to be judged greater than all others; internal sins are to be judged sins only so far as they are capable of having an external effect; repentance is to be approved but not to be esteemed equal to innocence.

That which is brought out most clearly in this distribution of the chief virtues is the importance that Bruno attaches to knowledge as an essential condition of right action. The distribution of the virtues that follow judgment has less purely philosophical interest; but the discussions of particular virtues help to show us what was Bruno's moral ideal. They display his admiration for the illustrious characters of Greece and Rome and his preference of the antique type of the hero to the mediæval type of the saint.

It has already been seen that Bruno regarded the supernatural sanction of morality as having some value for those whose actions must be regulated by external law. Since the fear of human justice is not sufficient to repress wrong-doers, it has been necessary, he says, that the fear of divine justice should be added. The anthropomorphic gods may preserve their existence by doing reverence to the Truth that is above them and by making themselves the guardians of morality.

An episode of the *Spaccio* which has much interest in relation to Bruno's philosophy of religion is the discussion of Greek and Egyptian polytheism in the third dialogue. It is contended that both the Greeks and the Egyptians worshipped under many forms the one divinity that is latent in all things; the Egyptians chiefly under the forms of animals, the Greeks chiefly under the forms of men. Jupiter was once a king of Crete and a mortal man;

the name of Jupiter was given to the divinity seen under a certain aspect, not because it was supposed that the mortal Jupiter was a god, but because it was held that the divinity was in Jupiter as in all things, and because in the extraordinary magnanimity or justice of Jupiter was seen the magnanimity or justice of the divinity. As the Greeks gave the names of men who had once lived on earth, and in whom more than in others certain divine qualities had been present, to particular aspects of the divinity, so the Egyptians gave the names of various animals to aspects of the same divinity manifested in its descent to the production of natural things. It is maintained by Isis in the assembly of the gods that the wisdom of the Egyptians consisted in knowledge of the processes by which the life that is manifested in the multiplicity of things returns to its source, and that this knowledge was embodied in the Egyptian religion. The Greek and Egyptian deities complain that the Jews and the Christians, having really fallen into the errors from which their own worshippers have been proved to be exempt, and being besides open to every accusation they can bring against others, yet reproach with idolatry those whose knowledge of the divinity was far greater than theirs. Isis declares that the followers of new religions have triumphed, not by their own merits, but because fate, in the vicissitudes of things, gives its time to darkness. The prophecy is cited from Hermes Trismegistus, that after the ancient religions have fallen there shall come a time when darkness shall be preferred to light and death to life, when those who attach themselves to "the religion of the mind" shall not be permitted to live; but after these things have happened the world shall by some new revolution be restored to its ancient countenance.¹

¹ This extremely remarkable prophecy is contained in the dialogue *Asclepius*, included in editions of the works of Apuleius, though wrongly attributed to him. The prophetic passage dates from the time of triumphant Christianity, and no doubt has been preserved only through its cryptic form. Shelley might have made our mother Earth say of it:—

We meditate
In secret joy and hope those dreadful words,
But dare not speak them.

"Nam et tenebrae praeponentur lumini et mors vita utilior iudicabitur. . . . Et capitale periculum constituetur in eum, qui se mentis religioni dederit. . . . Fit deorum ab hominibus dolenda secessio, soli nocentes angeli remanent, qui humanitati commixti ad omnia audaciae mala miseros manu iniecta compellunt, in bella, in rapinas, in fraudes et in omnia, quae sunt animarum naturae contraria. . . . Cum haec cuncta contigerint, o Asclepi, tunc ille dominus et pater . . . errorem revocans, malignitatem omnem vel inluvione diluens vel igne consumens vel morbis pestilentibusisque per diversa loca dispersis finiens ad antiquam faciem mundum revocabit, ut et mundus ipse adorandus videatur atque mirandus et tanti operis effector et restitutor deus ab hominibus, qui tunc erunt, frequentibus laudum praeconiis benedictionibusque celebretur." (*Asclepius*, cc. 25, 26.)

In all this it is clear that Bruno regarded those religions from which the pantheistic view of nature had not disappeared as more favourable to the true philosophy than the monotheistic religions; but these passages must not be understood as a direct attack on Judaism or Christianity. To aim directly at the subversion of the popular religion because it was unfavourable to the true philosophy would have been inconsistent with his view that the end of all religions is properly ethical. The difference between the positions he takes up when he is considering religions from the point of view of ethics and when he is considering them from the point of view of his philosophy of nature is seen in this: that the goddess of Wisdom is represented as expecting the return of light in Europe after a long period of darkness, but as not having control over the vicissitudes by which the alternation of light and darkness is caused, while Judgment on the other hand is directly charged by the gods to destroy those forms of opinion that represent them as indifferent to the actions of men and caring only for their beliefs.

Some have found in the *Eroici Furori* an expression of Bruno's "esoteric religion." This term, however, does not seem to be strictly applicable here; for Bruno always associates religion with ethics, and he distinguishes the "infinite aspiration" which is the subject of the *Eroici Furori* from "virtue" as defined by him in the same book.¹ His definition of virtue is founded on his theory of pleasure and pain. According to this theory all pleasure consists in a certain transition, and is pleasure only by contrast with a state of pain that has preceded it. Since in this transition, as in all motion, contraries coincide, since the end of one of two contrary states is the beginning of the other, there can be no pleasure without mixture of pain. At the highest point of pain or of pleasure the wise man always expects a reversal of his state. By considering the mutability of things he may at length arrive at indifference to all pleasures and pains. It is in this indifference that perfect virtue consists.² As the wise man is set free from subjection to pleasures and pains by the knowledge that in the vicissitudes of things all states are at length reversed,³ so he is set free from subjection to the desire of self-preservation by the knowledge that nothing which is substantial can truly perish. This liberation from "the fear of fortune and death" is described by Bruno as one of the chief results of his philosophy. It is conceived as an ethical state, since the disposition of the wise

¹ Part i., Dialogue 2.

² Bruno does not deduce the particular virtues from his definition of the ideal virtue which is the result of the contemplation of philosophic truth. It has been shown by Hartung that Aristotle's doctrine of the mean has had more influence on the definitions of particular virtues in the *Spaccio* than any other general principle.

³ Cf. Seneca, *Naturales Quaestiones*, iii. Praef. 7: "itaque secundis nemo confidat, adversis nemo deficiat: alternae sunt vices rerum."

man with respect to mutable things is identified with virtue. At the same time it is not regarded as attainable by the mere practice of morality, but only by the contemplation of philosophic truth; and this is accessible only to the few.¹ To this outcome of Bruno's philosophy the name of an esoteric religion may properly be given. He himself contrasts it with the "vain fear and desperation" caused in "stupid and ignorant souls" by "foolish faith and blind credulity."²

In the *Eroici Furori* it is not the ethical effect of the contemplation of truth, but the pursuit of truth in itself that is described. The *eroico furore* is first of all the desire of absolute truth. It is said to be different from other *furori* not as a virtue from a defect, but as a defect that is in a more divine subject or that is present in a more divine manner. The *eroico furioso* resembles the ideally wise or virtuous man in having escaped from subjection to the desire of self-preservation and to common pleasures and pains; but he differs from him in this, that in the pursuit of his object he never attains the point of indifference. He has no sooner perceived truth under any one form than he perceives the limits of that form. Thus he is constantly impelled to go beyond that which he possesses; for the mind cannot rest satisfied with a knowledge that is limited and therefore imperfect. Since knowledge is impossible except under limits, he is always in motion between the extremes of pleasure and pain.

The *eroico furore* is sometimes described as an "intellectual love." It includes not only the desire of absolute truth, but also the desire of absolute beauty. This desire is excited by the beauty which is perceived in particular forms, and which is one of the manifestations of the soul of the world. But beauty, like truth, can only be perceived under limits beyond which the mind is impelled to pass; and therefore the pursuit of beauty also is a pursuit of which the end can never be attained.³

It is to be observed that the use of the word "matter" in the dialogues that have just been considered differs from the use of the same word in *Della Causa*. Matter, in the *Eroici Furori*, instead of being described as that which produces from itself forms which it contains implicitly, is described in the manner

¹ See for example the opening of the seventh book of *De Immenso*.

² *Spaccio della Bestia trionfante*, Wagner, ii. p. 241.

³ In this theory of the divine or heroic madness, some advance may be noted on the doctrine of Plato from which it is derived. Bruno, finding in his essentially stoical ethics no place marked out for the intellectual aspiration that was so characteristic an element of his own temperament, is led to draw a clear distinction between the intellectual or æsthetic and the properly ethical impulse. With Plato they are usually presented in a kind of fusion, but where the good in the sense of moral virtue is distinguished from the beautiful (as in *Phædrus*, 250 B), it is placed above as more remote in its nature from human sight; so that, after all, the formal difference between the philosophers is not great.

of the later Platonists, as that which impedes the ascent of the spirit. Bruno was not unconscious of this difference. In the dedication of the *Eroici Furori*, and in other places, he suggests an explanation of it. It is a difference of expression that is explained by his doctrine of "the circle of ascent and descent." The forms that are emerging from "all-productive matter" seem to themselves to be impeded by it, because of the necessity they are under of passing through intermediate forms before reaching those that are highest; and the forms that are descending in the scale of being seem to themselves to be obeying an attraction towards "a less good," when they lose in the multiplicity of "the imagination" the unity of "the mind." If, on the other hand, the process of change is looked at as it were from the outside, it is seen that both the ascent and the descent of beings are determined by "the necessity of an internal law."

Not only does the idea of two kinds of change undergone in perpetual alternation by all forms of things supply the explanation of differences of expression as regards "matter" that are met with in Bruno's works, but, as has been already indicated, the doctrines of the "soul of the world" and of the absolute mind or intellect, which have been supposed by some to belong to different stages of his thought, are united by this idea. The theory of metempsychosis which is developed chiefly in the *Eroici Furori*, but which appears also in the *Spaccio* and in the *Cabala del Cavallo pegaseo*, is in part an expression of this idea in the form of a kind of philosophic myth. At the same time a concrete form is given to other ideas by means of it, and in particular to the doctrine of the permanence of mind.

Bruno finds the elements of his theory of metempsychosis in the traditions as to the teachings of the Druids, the Chaldæans, and the Magians, in the opinions ascribed to Pythagoras, and in the doctrines of the Cabbalistic Jewish sects and of some of the Platonic schools. He represents the souls of men, of animals, and even of things commonly called lifeless, as alike in substance and differing only as to the kind of body they have last received. According to the nature of their deeds and aspirations when dwelling in one body will be the nature of their next embodiment. Each soul modifies the shape of the material substance of its own body as it becomes itself better or worse. Thus from the outward forms of men it may be known whether their next embodiment will be of a higher or of a lower kind. In the eternal metamorphoses of matter all souls receive all corporeal forms. No soul ever reaches a final state; all alternately approach and recede from the unity of the absolute intellect, become subject to matter and escape from it. This is figured in mythologies by the legends of gods that have assumed the shapes of beasts and at length by their innate nobility resumed their own forms. Those who aspire to the divinity by intellectual love may be described as

changing themselves into gods. That metamorphosis is of all things and is eternal, and that all souls must return from the highest to the lowest and again from the lowest to the highest state, has been taught by all the great philosophers except Plotinus. All the great theologians, with the exception of Origen, have taught that metamorphosis is neither of all things nor eternal, but that those changes which are undergone by a certain number of souls have a period.¹ The doctrine of the theologians is fit to be taught to those who, being now with difficulty restrained from evil, would be restrained with still more difficulty if they came to believe themselves subject to some lighter conditions of reward and punishment.² But that doctrine is to be esteemed true which is taught by "those who speak according to natural reason among the few, the good and the wise."

It is clear from many incidental expressions that, as Bartholmæss says, Bruno does not advance the theory of metempsychosis as a positive doctrine. His statement of it is quite indeterminate, and his applications are often only half serious. Yet, as has been seen, he conveys under the imaginative form of this theory some of the principal ideas of his philosophy. From his mode of combining the idea of metempsychosis with that of metamorphosis it may be inferred that his doctrine of "the immortality of the soul" is not a doctrine of personal immortality in the ordinary sense. He holds, perhaps, that a higher immortality than that of metempsychosis is attained by some souls but not by all.³ In accordance with what he supposed to be the Pythagorean doctrine, handed down by Plato and by later poets and philosophers, he speaks of the souls as drinking of Lethe before passing into a new state.

Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos,
Lethæum ad fluvium Deus evocat agmine magno,
Scilicet immemores supera ut convexa revisant
Rursus et incipiant in corpora velle reverti.

Or as Bruno expresses it in the language of his own philosophy, the transmigrating souls, by the compassion of Fate, are caused to drink of the waters of Lethe before receiving new forms, in order that they may suffer as little pain as possible from the inevitable contradiction of their desire to maintain their states, and that after every change of embodiment they may remain equally desirous of preserving themselves in their new state of being.

¹ See Part ii., "Origen as Philosopher."

² Wagner, ii. p. 309. Bruno, however, does not always admit even the utility of the theological dogma in question here. See *De Immenso*, vii. c. 11.

³ *De Minimo*, i. c. 3.* The expressions here as regards immortality are derived, directly or indirectly, from the often-quoted saying of Heraclitus: *ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν τεθνάναι καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν τεθάρθαι, ὅτε δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀποθνήσκαμεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναβιῶν καὶ ζῆν.*

NOTE

In the foregoing pages, the aim of which was to expound Bruno's ideas in their relation to each other, very little is said about a question touched upon in an interesting manner in the *Life of Giordano Bruno*, by I. Frith (Mrs. Oppenheim), published in 1887. It has been suggested more than once, and is again suggested in the valuable biography just referred to, that Bruno may have had an influence on contemporary English literature. This seems not unlikely; though it is often difficult to decide between a possible influence from Bruno and the influence of Renaissance Platonism on Bruno and his English contemporaries alike. A definite influence from Bruno, I am inclined to think, may be traced at least in Spenser's Cantos on Mutability. The figure of the Titaness Mutability corresponds to the Fortune of the *Spaccio*, and the claim to rule over all things, including the gods, is the same. Some further discussion of Bruno's philosophy will be found in the review, below, of the second edition of Carrière's *Philosophische Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit*. In that review the position as regards the general character of Bruno's philosophy taken up both by Carrière and by the author of the English *Life* is critically examined.

A re-reading of *The Faery Queen* (of which I do not think the Cantos on Mutability were intended to form part) has brought to view one or two other things that suggest influence from Bruno. This could not be due to personal contact, for Spenser was in Ireland when Bruno was in England; but Sidney was the friend of both; and it seems to me a pretty safe conjecture that he would think the dialogues that Bruno had dedicated to him likely to interest the Platonising and extremely learned Spenser.

THE MUSICAL AND THE PICTURESQUE ELEMENTS IN POETRY

Ἀπὸ δὲ πάσης τῆς ποιήσεως ἐν μέρει ἀφορισθὲν τὸ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῷ τοῦ ὅλου ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται. ποίησις γὰρ τοῦτο μόνον καλεῖται, καὶ οἱ ἔχοντες τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ποιήσεως ποιηταί.—PLATO.

WHEN it is said that the basis of poetry is imagination, much depends on what is meant by the term. Does it mean the creative faculty—that is, above all, the power of representing character in action; or does it mean simply the power of visualising? In the first sense, it truly defines the material of the greatest poetry; in the second sense, it describes one of the formal elements in poetic art generally. The question may be asked about imagination in the first sense, whether it is sufficient, apart from all formal qualities, to constitute a poem; and, about imagination in the second sense, whether it comes first among formal qualities, or whether there is another, namely, metrical quality, that takes a higher place. My present object is to discuss the second of these questions.

Upon the first question, the opinion may be hazarded that if a work of creative imagination in prose is ever to be regarded as properly a poem, it must be by suffusion with a kind of feeling that would naturally find its expression in metre. The perception of fatality in the development of interacting characters to an inevitable event, for example, brings with it the unity of feeling that is characteristic of tragedy. Accidentally, such a work may be in prose and not in verse; but it is in verse that the dominant feelings of "terror and pity" tend to express themselves. Now, at a first glance, that element in poetic form which is the natural and primary expression of poetic matter seems to be the essential element.

By considering the formal qualities of poetry directly, we shall be led to the same conclusion. Some, indeed, seem to think that imagination in the second sense, or the power of visualising, is the supreme poetic quality. It has a certain objectivity that seems to make it less personal, more disinterested, than the "passion" that finds its natural expression in music of verse. Hence the view, once prevalent, that all art, poetic art included, can be defined as "imitation of nature." And this view, it must be allowed, is one that its defenders might maintain while

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conceding that there is an indefinable personal quality present in all poetical work, and indeed in all art, whether specifically personal or impersonal in its attitude towards nature and man. Taking this quality—which, they might point out, is exactly the element that eludes analysis—as “a constant,” as something always present in anything that can be called poetry, they might insist that an impartially objective view of the world is that which characterises the highest poetry; and that poets are to be placed higher or lower according to the degree in which they succeed in being objective and impartial. This objective character, they might say, is best described as a character of “the poetic imagination.”

To this it may be replied that insight into the reality of things is rather a part of the meaning conveyed by poetry than an element of its form, imaginative or other. But the first question for criticism is, in which of the elements that can be detected by analysis does the indefinable, unanalysable quality of poetry most of all reside?

In order to get rid of the ambiguity in the word “imagination,” let us substitute for imagination in the second sense, or the power of visualising, the term “picturesque quality.” This is commonly opposed to musical quality. Both terms refer entirely to form; and they divide between them all the formal qualities of poetical work. For the term “picturesque,” though strictly it ought only to be applied to those characters of the imagery of a poem that recall the effects of a picture, has come to be applied to the whole of the qualities that depend on visual imagination. The explanation of this extension of meaning is that, just as the imagery of ancient poetry has most affinity with sculpture, so the imagery of modern poetry has most affinity with painting. Its meaning being thus extended, the term “picturesque” describes half the formal qualities of a poem. The term “musical” describes the other half. Thus the antithesis of musical and picturesque is at once clear, having reference exclusively to form, and at the same time perfectly general.

Are the two elements distinguished by these terms of equal value? Or is one of them the essential poetic quality, and the other a subordinate element to be taken into account by criticism in an estimate of the total artistic value of poetical work, but not directly affecting its value merely as poetry?

Examination will make it clear that the essential element in poetry is that which is described by the term “musical” when properly interpreted. The true interpretation of both terms may be arrived at by developing the consequences of Lessing’s theory of the limits of poetry and painting.

Lessing proved in the *Laocoon* that the method of the poet must be different from that of the painter (or of the sculptor); that the poet cannot imitate the painter in his treatment of the

subjects they have in common, and that the painter cannot imitate the poet. He shows by examples what difference of treatment actually exists, and deduces it from the necessary conditions of the arts of expression in words and in colours. There is this difference of treatment, because in poetry images are represented in their relations in time, while in painting objects are represented in their relations in space. In detailed descriptions of beautiful objects the poet cannot equal the painter; but he is not confined, like the painter, to a single moment of time. The poet describes the effects of things, not merely the things themselves; and thus he can convey ideas of beautiful objects by methods of his own which the painter cannot employ. But to produce a "poetic picture," that is, a picture not of an object but of an action or event, which consists of successive phases related in time, not of coexistent parts related in space, is the true aim of the poet.

Now Lessing's conception of a poetic picture—a picture in words of a series of images related in time—is not a perfectly simple conception. We may discover in it by analysis those suggestions of distinct pictures which, as Lessing admits, are made incidentally by the poet without attempting anything beyond the limits of his own art. The words of the poet call up images of what existed at those particular moments which the painter might select if he were working on the same subject. Is it, then, the mere relation of these images in time, or is it some remaining thing, that makes the picture poetic? That it is some remaining thing, and that this is the "musical element," will become clear from an example. We will select one from Milton—

Down a while
He sat and round about him saw unseen.
At last, as from a cloud, his fulgent head
And shape star-bright appeared or brighter, clad
With what permissive glory since his fall
Was left him or false glitter.

This passage is a perfect example of a "poetic picture" in Lessing's sense; and there is no difficulty here in detecting the presence of the two elements. The poetic effect does not proceed merely from the vivid objective representation of the phases of an action or event as they follow one another in time. A particular image out of the series—that which is contained in the italicised lines—rises before the imagination. The movement in which the mind is really absorbed is not the external movement, but the musical movement of the verse; and on the stream of this musical movement there is the single image appearing. But since Milton is especially a musical poet, we will also take an example from a picturesque and objective poet;

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let us take Homer's description of the march of the Grecian army :—

ἥντε πῦρ αἰδηλον ἐπιφλέγει ἄσπετον ὕλην
οὐρεὺς ἐν κορυφῇς, ἔκαθεν δέ τε φαίνεται ἀνθή,
ὥς τῶν ἐρχομένων ἀπὸ χαλκοῦ θεσπεσίου
αἰγλή παμφανώσα δι' αἰθέρος οὐρανὸν ἴκεν.¹

Do we not here perceive as separate images, first, the blaze of the forest, and then the gleam that is compared with it, of the armour? We are at the same time conscious of the march of the army; but this movement is, as it were, identified with the rhythmical movement of the verse. Here, as before, a particular image rather than the whole objective movement is realised in imagination. To this realisation of definite pictures is added the rhythmical movement, in other words, the musical element, of the verse. This alone is the element in poetry that has time for its condition; and time, not space, is, as we have seen, the fundamental condition of poetic representations. Of the two formal elements of poetic effects, therefore—musical movement and separate suggestions of picturesque imagery—it is clear that the first, since that alone depends on the fundamental condition of poetic representations, must be regarded as the essential element.

Thus, by considering the nature of the formal conditions of poetic expression, we find that the effects which recall those of painting (and sculpture) are subordinate to the musical element. But in order to meet a possible objection, it is necessary to point out that the effects of music itself and of poetry are not, as is implied in some criticisms, identical. Sometimes the remark is made about verse that possesses musical quality in a very high degree that it "almost succeeds in producing the effect of music." Such criticisms convey the idea that the effort after intensity of musical effect in verse is an attempt to pass beyond the limits of verbal expression, and therefore that it does not properly belong to poetry. But the musical effect of verse is of its own kind, and is produced by methods peculiar to the poet. The resemblance that there is between musical verse and music is due to resemblance in the general conditions of their production; music, like poetry, has time for its formal condition, and in music as in poetry the effect depends immediately on sequences of sound; but there need not be any imitation either on the part of the poet or of the musician. This becomes evident from the observation that many people who are very susceptible to music care little for metrical effects in poetry; while, on the other hand, those who care most for lyric poetry have often no peculiar susceptibility to music.

¹ "Like as destroying fire kindles some vast forest on a mountain's peak, and the blaze is seen from afar; so, as they marched, the dazzling gleam of their awful armour reached through the sky even unto the heavens."—*Il.* ii. 455-8.

For those who can accept provisionally the conclusion that the musical element is the essential element in poetry, an examination of the characteristics of the poets in whose work musical quality becomes most manifest, as a quality distinct from all others, will not be without interest. In the first place it may be asked, is there any mode of dealing with life and with external nature that is characteristic of those poets who display this quality pre-eminently? Admitting that all material is of equal value to the artist, we may still find that some particular mode of treatment of that which is the material of all art is spontaneously adopted by poets who manifest the essential poetic quality both in its highest degree and in such a manner that it is perceived to be distinct from all others.

Artistic qualities generally become most distinct, most separable in thought from other qualities, in lyric poetry. If, then, there should be any discoverable relation between mode of treatment of material and mode of manifestation of poetic quality, this will be found most easily by studying the work of poets whose genius is of the lyric order. It is even possible that such a relation may exist in lyric poetry only. We may see reason for concluding that a certain mode of treatment of life is characteristic of the greatest lyric poets, but this conclusion may have no further application.

The general condition of the manifestation of lyrical power may be found without much difficulty. This condition is expressed in the remark so frequently made that lyric poetry is "subjective." As it is used in criticism the term is sometimes rather vague; but it really describes very well the change that all actual experience undergoes in becoming material for lyric poetry. The lyric poet resolves all human emotion and all external nature into their elements, and creates new worlds out of these elements. Now this process has a certain resemblance to the resolution of things into their elements by philosophical analysis. The method of the poet of course does not end in analysis; but that resolution of emotion into a few typical poetic motives, and of nature into ideas of elementary forces and forms, which is the first condition of the creation of the new poetic world of the lyrist, resembles the analytical process of the philosopher taken by itself in that it is subjective. The term has therefore not been misapplied in this case in being transferred from philosophy to literary criticism.

The subjective character of lyric poetry is so obvious that it has been noticed as a fact even by those who have not seen the reason that determines it. The reason why the lyric poet must be "subjective," is this: in order to produce a distinct impression by the form of his work, he must have the material perfectly under his control. Now the material cannot be under the control of the poet unless he selects from that which he finds

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in life, accentuating some features of experience, and suppressing others. To make this selection possible analysis is necessary; and then, the more complete the transformation of human emotion with all its circumstances into a new "subjective" world, the more complete is also the detachment of form from matter, the more intense is the impression given by the form alone.

This transformation may be brought about in two different ways. One of these consists in contemplating from the point of view of a peculiar personality the few typical emotions and ideas to which analysis reduces all the rest. A new world is created in which some effect of strangeness is given to everything. After the treatment of earlier artists has been studied, an effort is made to express what has been left by them incompletely expressed—all those remoter effects of things which they have only suggested. Baudelaire, who has carried this method to its limits, has also given the theory of it. He called it the research for "the artificial," and regarded it as the typical method of modern art. The other method is to give to the mood that is selected as the motive of a poem a special imaginative character by associating with it some typical episode of life, colouring this brilliantly, and isolating it from a background that is vaguely thought of as made up of commonplace experience. This mode of treatment of life is to a certain extent that of all poets; but some lyrists—Burns and Heine, for example—have carried it to greater perfection as a poetic method than the rest.¹ Lyrics such as Heine's have for their distinctive character an intensity of emotional expression which has led some critics to praise them as not being "artificial." But they are really quite as artificial, in a sense, as those with which they are contrasted. For nothing in them is taken directly from life. The episode that is selected has a certain typical character by which it is removed from real experience; in being emphasised by intensity of expression and by contrast it is of course equally removed from the world of abstractions. Thus it is true here, as everywhere else, that "art is art because it is not nature."²

¹ With the love-lyric I think the religious lyric proper must be classed. But, while it certainly cannot be said that those who have written best on love have themselves been insusceptible to the passion, it is remarkable that the most consummate expressions of the most excited religious emotion are the work of poets who did not desire to share it, or desired not to share it. If any personal feeling is to be divined in the *Bacchae* of Euripides and the *Attus* of Catullus, it is the sense of something strange and terrible in the pitilessness of the devotees for themselves and others.

² This dictum is Goethe's. According to Kant, the æsthetic mode of contemplating nature is to view it imaginatively as having an end while conscious that of its end we really know nothing. In the late Greek pastoral romance, *Daphnis and Chloe*, where we should hardly have looked for it, there is an interesting anticipation of this. Of the trees in a garden, it is said that their topmost branches naturally came in contact with one another and intermixed their foliage; but, the author adds by way of praise, here nature itself seemed to be art: ἐδόκει μέντοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φύσις εἶναι τέχνη (iv. 2).

But among the lyric poets themselves there are some in whose verse the musical quality becomes more distinct than it does in the verse of those who may be characterised by their use of one of the two methods described. The musical quality in the verse of the poets referred to above is of course unmistakable, but it is not the quality which we select to characterise them. In the one case intensity in the expression of a mood is most characteristic, in the other strangeness in the colouring. But there are some poets who are pre-eminently "musical," whom the musical quality of their verse would be selected to characterise. Is there any peculiarity in their mode of treating the material of all poetry, by which this still greater detachment of form from matter can be explained?

In order to determine this, the best way of proceeding seems to be to compare the poets of lyrical genius of some one literature, and to try to discover what those poets have in common who, in musical quality of verse, are distinguished above the rest. For this purpose we may be allowed to choose English literature.

The first great English poet who is above all things musical is Milton. The distinction of musical from picturesque qualities has indeed been used as a means of defending Milton's claim to be placed in the first order of poets against those critics who have complained that he does not suggest many subjects for pictures. And we must place Milton among poets whose genius is of the lyrical kind, though most of his work is not technically lyrical—especially if we accept as universal among the greater poets the distinction of lyric from dramatic genius.¹ Spenser's verse is, of course, extremely musical; but we do not think of the music of his verse as that which is most characteristic of him. His distinction consists rather in what Coleridge describes as the dream-like character of his imagery. After Milton, the next great poet who is eminently musical is Shelley. It will be said that Coleridge and Keats are, equally with Shelley, poets whose verse has the finest qualities of rhythm. But in Keats, what Arnold has called his "natural magic," and in Coleridge certain other imaginative qualities, are what we think of as characteristic; for these qualities are scarcely distinguishable from the medium of expression; the music of the verse is not felt as something that produces an effect of its own apart from the effect of other artistic qualities. Now in some of Shelley's lyrics no formal quality seems to exist except the music; a clear intellectual meaning is always present, but often there is scarcely any suggestion of distinct imagery. The power that he shows in these lyrics of giving music of verse an existence apart from all other formal qualities is what makes Shelley more of a musical poet than Coleridge or Keats; and no other poet of the same period can be compared with these in this quality of verse. From the

¹ Epic or narrative poetry is partly dramatic in spirit and partly lyric, sometimes inclining more to the one side and sometimes to the other.

period of Shelley to the present time the poet who is distinguished above the rest by the musical quality of his verse is Swinburne. And he has, in common with Milton and Shelley, the power, which Shelley perhaps manifests most of all, of detaching musical quality from all other formal qualities. If the same poets have also something in common in their selection of material, then it is probable that this will be found to have some relation to their attaining the last limit of detachment of the essentially poetic quality from all others.

A ground of comparison is found in the power these poets have of expressing what may be called impersonal passion. Like all other poets of lyrical genius, they often express personal emotions; but they also give peculiarly distinct expression to emotions that have an impersonal character—emotions that are associated with a certain class of abstract ideas. What, then, is the nature of these abstract ideas?

They are ideas that may be found by analysis in all poetry. By some poets they are distinctly realised, but oftener they make their influence felt unconsciously; and when they are distinctly realised they may or may not be the objects of emotion. They represent the different ways in which the contrast is conceived between the movement of external things on the one hand, and the desires and aspirations of man on the other. The opposition of man and things outside is implicit in Greek tragedy, for example, as the idea of fate. And both in ancient and modern lyric poetry the conception of the dark background of necessity gives by contrast an intenser colouring to the expression of particular moods. There can be no finer example of this than the fifth ode of Catullus, where the peculiar intensity of effect is given by the reflection that is interposed:—

Soles occidere et redire possunt;
Nobis, cum semel occidit brevis lux,
Nox est perpetua una dormienda.¹

But this contrast may not be employed merely to give emphasis to personal moods; it may become independently the object of an emotion. Now the three English poets whom we have seen grounds for comparing, all express an aspiration towards a certain ideal of freedom. This aspiration is, on the emotional side, sympathy with the human race, or with the individual soul, in its struggle against necessity, against external things whose "strength detains and deforms," and against the oppression of custom and arbitrary force; on the intellectual side it is belief in the ultimate triumph of the individual soul over the circumstances that oppose its development, or of man over destiny. But with fundamental identity, both of ideas and of

¹ "Suns may set and rise again; we, when once our brief light has set, must sleep for ever in perpetual night."

sentiments, there is difference in the form they assume. The exact difference can only be made clear by a comparison of particular poems.

In his essay on Matthew Arnold's poems, Swinburne has said that the *Thyrsis* of Arnold makes a third with *Lycidas* and *Adonais*, and that these are the three greatest elegiac poems, not only in the English language, but in the whole of literature. Some readers may be inclined to add, or even to substitute for *Thyrsis* (a beautiful poem, but in a minor key), Swinburne's own *Ave atque Vale*.¹ If we compare his elegy with the elegies of Milton and Shelley, the difference in the form assumed by the idea the three poets have in common becomes distinct. For Milton the constraint that is exercised by things, their indifference to man, is embodied in "the blind fury with the abhorred shears"; with Shelley the mutability of all the forms in which life manifests itself is the intellectual motive of this as of many other poems; while Swinburne brings the permanent background of silence and unconsciousness into contrast with the individual spirit, and represents it as absorbing all things into itself. Though in all three poems the idea of future fame as a compensation for the temporary victory of blind forces is suggested, there is nevertheless a difference in the form in which confidence in the final victory of the soul over destiny expresses itself; but this is seen more clearly in other poems than in these, which are partly personal in motive. The triumph of the human soul is conceived by Milton as a supremacy of the individual will over circumstance. This conception is above all that of *Samson Agonistes*.² Shelley

¹ I am afraid Swinburne's deprecation, in his correspondence, of views similar to this, tends to confirm Plato's opinion that the poets write all sorts of fine things without knowing what they are doing. Landor, about whose opinion he would have cared more, expresses for once the same thought as his own particular aversion Plato; giving it, however, a slightly different turn. The thought is ascribed to Petrarca (*Pentameron*, First Day): "A poet often does more and better than he is aware at the time, and seems at last to know as little about it as a silkworm knows about the fineness of her thread." Shelley on the other hand, though in general less of a conscious critic, knew what he had achieved in his *Elegy* on Keats.

² Read with conventional presuppositions about Milton's religion, *Samson Agonistes* is very imperfectly understood. It is instructive to contrast it with Racine's *Athalie*, which is really permeated with the spirit of theocracy in its priestly form. Here the whole aim of the action, presented with complete artistic consistency, is restoration of the Temple-ritual, the legitimate priesthood, and the legitimate king, against usurpers. For Milton the hero's aim, from first to last, is the freedom of his people from alien rule. God is the God of "abstract monotheism," acting by inspiration of chosen persons; there is barely an allusion to any Israelite cult. Elaborate cult and hierarchy is the appanage of the Philistines. No Israelite priest is mentioned, and every reference to priesthood in the drama is anti-clerical. "The priest" is foremost in counselling private treachery for the sake of "religion" (857-861). Gods who are unjust, Samson is made to declare—

Gods cannot be—

Less therefore to be pleased, obeyed or feared,

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expresses the belief in the permanence of certain ideas, such as that of "intellectual beauty," under all changes of superficial appearance. With Swinburne, just as the opposition of man and destiny is represented in its most general form—

Fate is a sea without shore, and the soul is a rock that abides;
But her ears are vexed with the roar and her face with the foam of the
tides :

—so the triumph of man over destiny is represented in its most general form as the conquest of external things by "the spirit of man."

It is through this power they have of representing an ideal as triumphant that poetic form becomes more separate in the work of these than of other poets. The general relation between manifestation of lyrical power and mode of treatment of the material presented by life was found at first to be that the more completely experience has been resolved into its elements and transformed into a new subjective world, the more distinct must formal poetical qualities become. It was said that this transformation may be brought about either by the interpreting power of a peculiar personality, or by a heightening of the colours of some typical episode of human experience. But, as we have seen, there is a further stage of this transformation. By a kind of insight that belongs to the highest class of poetic minds of the lyrical order, certain tendencies for ideals to be realised are selected from among all actual tendencies of things, and then become the objects of emotion which embodies itself in poetic form. Now to associate emotion in this way with abstract ideas is a means of making the "criticism of life" that is contained in poetry still more remote from life itself. The power of expressing impersonal passion is, therefore, on its intellectual side, merely the most complete development of the way of looking at life that was found to be characteristic of the lyricist.

The connexion that actually exists between the highest qualities of rhythmical expression and a certain way of viewing the world, is thus seen to have grounds in the nature of things. But when the detachment of poetic form as a thing existing by itself is said to be the effect that is characteristic of a particular group of poets, it must not be understood that these poets are limited to effects of one kind. They are able to deal with subjects and to produce effects that are outside the sphere of other lyric poets ;

—a point, it may be remarked, made by Satan in *Paradise Lost* (ix. 701). Those among the Philistines who are most implacable to the imprisoned Samson are of the religious party (1463). The contempt for "fat regorged of bulls and goats" belongs of course entirely to prophetic Hebraism and would have been as applicable to the actual worship of Jehovah as to that of Dagon. It ought to be unnecessary to point out how completely Greek are the discussions on temperance, and such maxims as the need of more wisdom as a guide to greater strength, which unguided is only a danger to its possessor.

but this does not prevent them from having equal powers with the rest within that sphere. Hence there are differences in the effect of their work as a whole, depending on differences in the combination of other artistic qualities with the essentially poetic quality, besides the differences already discussed. This will be seen if we carry the parallel a little further.

There is, for example, a difference between Milton's treatment of external nature under its imaginative aspect and that of the two later poets. In reading Milton, the peculiar imaginative effect experienced is that which is produced by the contemplation of enormous spaces. The later poets, on the other hand, give a characteristic quality to their imaginative representations of nature by endowing the elementary forces and forms of the world with a kind of life. Objects are not described as portions of a mechanism, but are identified with a spirit that gives them motion. Two equally perfect examples of this are the description of dawn at the opening of the fourth act of *Prometheus Unbound* and the description in one of the choruses of *Erechtheus* (in the passage beginning "But what light is it now leaps forth on the land . . .") of the sudden reappearance of the sun after having been obscured. There is nothing in Milton corresponding to this mode of conceiving nature. The spheres, with him, are guided by spirits that act on them from outside; they are themselves lifeless.

In some respects, however, Swinburne resembles Milton and is unlike Shelley. This is the case as regards specially picturesque effects. Shelley suggests a greater number of distinct pictures corresponding to particular moments; with Milton and with Swinburne the picturesque effect is not so easily distinguished at first from the musical effect, but there is a stronger suggestion of a background that remains permanent while individual objects disappear. As has been already said, Shelley does not always attempt picturesque effects; the imagery in some of his lyrics is of the faintest possible kind; it is something that is vaguely suggested by the idea that gives shape to the poem and the emotion that animates it, rather than something that exists for its own sake. But when he does attempt picturesque effects he becomes one of the most picturesque of the poets who can be compared with him as regards music of verse. It is the peculiar character of the effects he produces that prevents this from being always recognised. Many of Shelley's descriptions are exact representations of the more indistinct impressions that are got from natural things; as it has been put by some critics, he describes temporary forms of things rather than permanent objects. His pictures have the effect of a combination of form and colour that has only existed once and will never exist again; of a phase in a series of transformations in the clouds, for example. That is, in describing those changes that are the material of

"poetic pictures," he does not select for most vivid representation the moments that convey the strongest suggestion of permanence, but rather those that convey an idea of fluctuation. When this is considered, the want of suggestions of permanent backgrounds, of solid objects, cannot be regarded as a defect; for the presence of these would be inconsistent with the production of a picture of the kind described. It is possible, however, that a relation might be discovered between Shelley's power of producing pictures of this kind and a certain want of artistic completeness that is noticed in some of his work. Whatever may be the cause of it, much of Shelley's work appears to have been less elaborated than that of Milton or of Swinburne. There is less "form" in the more restricted sense—that is, less purely literary quality. In Milton there are always present certain qualities of style that could not be imagined by a critic to be the result of anything but the most complete artistic consciousness. A similar quality of style is perceived in Swinburne's work. As an example of the extent to which he manifests this quality, it is sufficient to refer again to *Ave atque Vale*.

The difference between the picturesque qualities of Shelley's work and of Swinburne's may be illustrated by comparing their mode of treatment of such a conception as that of a procession of divine forms. There is in one of the best known lyrical passages of *Hellas* a description of "the Powers of earth and air" disappearing from the eyes of their worshippers—

Swift as the radiant shapes of sleep
From one whose dreams are Paradise.

If we compare this with the passage in *The Last Oracle* beginning—

Old and younger gods are buried or begotten, . . .

the difference that has been pointed out becomes quite clear. Shelley's imagery is in itself more consistent: although the images that are suggested are vague and fluctuating, yet they call up a picture that can be realised as a whole by the imagination. The passage in Swinburne's poem does not suggest imagery that can be realised so distinctly merely as imagery; but the forms that go out "discrowned and disanointed" give the impression of being more concrete than those described by Shelley: a more vivid sense is also conveyed of something that remains while all forms perish one after the other; the "divers births of godheads" are contrasted with "the soul that gave them shape and speech." An idea similar to this is indeed suggested in the chorus of *Hellas*, but it is not brought out so distinctly. Shelley makes the idea of the changing phases of the perpetual flux of forms most vivid; Swinburne, on the other hand, makes most vivid the idea of that which is contrasted with all temporary forms of things. Thus he often employs

conceptions like those of the avatars in Hindu mythologies. In the poems of *Dolores* and *Faustine*, for example, there are conceptions of this kind. The ideal figures in these poems are not ghosts like Heine's "gods in exile," but embodiments of a spirit that is conceived as having remained always the same while changing its superficial attributes in passing from one age to another.

Returning from this attempt to characterise some of the resemblances and differences in the work of those poets who have more in common than any other of the greater English poets, we come upon the question whether the general idea that has been partially developed can be applied to dramatic as well as to lyric poetry. In its application to dramatic poetry (supposing this to be possible), it could not, of course, receive the development of which it is capable when applied to the work of poets whose genius is of the lyrical order. The dramatic is more dependent than the lyric genius on the unanalysed material that life presents to it directly; and the conditions of the drama prevent that almost complete detachment of the essentially poetic element which we perceive in some lyrics. On the other hand, this element is intrinsically the same in the drama and in the lyric, though it differs in its mode of manifestation. While it seems in the lyric to assume an existence apart, in the drama it emerges at particular moments in the progress of the action. From the poetic point of view all other parts of the drama exist for the sake of these. And this poetic effect, being produced, like the effect of lyric verse, by the rhythmical expression of emotion, is best described as "musical." No difficulty is presented by dramatic poetry, therefore, as to the central part of the view that has been taken. And if, as has been said, the particular conclusions arrived at in considering lyric poetry are not applicable to the drama, it must at the same time be remembered that the conditions of success in dramatic and in lyric poetry cannot be (as is sometimes thought) altogether unlike. For a lyric element is perceptible in most dramatic poets; and the greatest among those poets who are usually thought of as lyrists have written dramas that rank next to those of the greatest dramatists.

NOTE

If some readers object that there is a certain formalism in the attempt to explain poetic effects by the abstract idea of liberty I quite agree; but to people of an analytic turn of mind such points of view quicken the æsthetic pleasure in art: and I think this formula can be carried through better than most.

The transition from subjective feeling, not bound down by any personal self-interest, to aspiration for liberty, and at its highest

point to self-consciousness of the ideal of liberty, seems obvious. To test it by the facts it has occurred to me to apply the general formula to a case which at first sight appeared difficult. How can the spirit of Hebrew prophecy, lyrical if anything ever was, be made a particular instance of the aspiration after freedom? Is it not precisely the most violent opposite, the spirit of dominant theocracy? My reply is that it might have been simply that if, as the leaders of Biblical criticism in the nineteenth century supposed, the dogmas of Hebrew religion were formed by its lyric poets and afterwards set in order by its priestly lawgivers; but that this was not the way in which, on any reasonable conjecture, things actually took place. The prophets were the voices, though from within a pre-formed authoritative religion, of insurgent subjectivity. In reality, the central object of the hostility of Ezekiel and Isaiah in their most powerful declamations, is the traditionally deified King of the ancient East. And the transcendent God of monotheism, who will dethrone the ruler of Egypt or Babylon and cast him down to Sheol, could easily become, for a modern poet of revolution, the depersonalised "God, the spirit of man." Thus it was more than a mere instinct for style that drew Swinburne to the Prophets and Psalmists. How far from accidental the relation is, may be seen if we consider the earlier union of the old Hebraic spirit with the anti-papalism of Dante and the republicanism of Milton. On the other side we must always remember that not only Milton but also Dante was classically inspired like later republican poets.

To show that the formula has a really general character I note that it can be applied to the purely imaginative as well as the impassioned lyric (to use Swinburne's distinction). This is typically illustrated in Coleridge's finest work, of which I take *Kubla Khan* to be the supreme example. Here we have the nearest possible approach to merely "floating" phantasy—to imagery wholly detached from any volition or even desire. Now this is a meaning in which the word "freedom," as applied to ideas or mental representations, has been actually used by psychologists. For the rise of what he calls "freely-ascending presentations," Volkman, in his great treatise on Psychology,¹ assigns, as one cause, simply the "cessation of an act of voluntary attention." The reflection is inevitable, how exactly here the poetic power corresponds to the typical weakness of Coleridge in practical life! Without Coleridge's peculiar temperament and its consequences, we should never have had the most purely "inspired," in the sense of non-volitional, poetic work that exists.

¹ The exposition of this treatise, included in the first edition of the present series of Essays, has been omitted from the second on account of its length and the absence of the element of criticism.

ON THE NATURE OF THOUGHT

DOES human thought take its origin wholly from practical needs, or is there in it from the first a disinterested element?

Some modern psychologists would say, not only that it takes its origin from needs and is posterior to action, but that it always remains in its whole structure subservient to practical ends. Just as some ancient thinkers held that virtue was simply a kind of knowledge, so for these moderns thought is nothing more than a kind of will; will itself being assumed to be primarily directed to practice. What distinguishes thought from mere trains of associated ideas is that the passive states of consciousness that enter into it are seized upon by an active "apperception," and, by being thus seized upon, are turned into connected "thought-series." The device of these psychologists might be: "*Pro ratione voluntas.*"

If, in opposition, we were to point to the Aristotelian ideal of the self-contained contemplative life, they might admit this to be a possible ideal and still maintain the essential part of their view. Perhaps they would not admit its possibility; but if they did, it would be open to them to insist that the contemplative life is still in a manner active. It is certainly not without volition. At most the volition may be supposed to become in the end unimpeded. And it is undoubtedly an ideal that in more than one way presupposes strictly practical activity in some kind of relation to it. Neither a society wholly devoted to contemplation, nor an individual human life filled with it from beginning to end, is imagined by Aristotle as possible. To decide for psychology the question as to the nature of thought, we must consider its origin rather than its consummation.

But first of all, whence comes the notion itself that thought is merely a kind of volition? It is derived, in reality, from a great philosopher; but it seems to imply either a misunderstanding or an exaggeration of his view. Descartes, in the *Principia Philosophiæ*, seeking to explain the causes of error, drew attention very forcibly to the volitional character of some thought. But he does not say that all thought is volitional. The passage where the doctrine may be found is Part i. of the *Principia*, sections 31-36. The doctrine is this. Our errors depend on the will rather than on the intellect. All our modes of thinking (*modi cogitandi*) may be referred to two general ones:

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perception, or the operation of the intellect; volition, or the operation of the will. Feeling, imagination, and pure understanding, are modes of perception; desire, aversion, affirmation, negation, doubt, are modes of will. (*Nam sentire, imaginari, et pure intelligere, sunt tantum diversi modi percipiendi; ut et cupere, aversari, affirmare, negare, dubitare, sunt diversi modi volendi.*) When we affirm or deny of a thing that which we clearly and distinctly perceive must be affirmed or denied of it, we do not err. But, in order that assent may be given, not only perception but also will is required. Now the perception of the intellect extends only to a few things. It is always finite, while the will is in a manner infinite. There is no possible object of any will that cannot become the object of our will, even though we do not clearly and distinctly perceive it. From extending the will involved in judgment to things that we do not rightly perceive, arises error.

It is evident that Descartes here does not attempt to explain thought in general as a form of volition, but only judgment in the special sense. From judgment, implying assent or denial (modes of volition), is distinguished pure understanding or pure intelligence which is wholly a "mode of perception," and to volition perception is opposed as another "mode of thought." "Perception" was of course to the older psychologists a vaguer term than it is now. It did not mean simply perception of particular objects. We may take Descartes' "pure intelligence" as meaning very much what we mean by "conception," as distinguished from judgment.

Judgment itself is usually admitted to be volitional,¹ but the element of conception within it seems to require another explanation. This has been partly furnished by modern psychological nominalism. The English nominalists, beginning with Hobbes, set themselves to explain what is distinctive in thought as a whole, not simply in its recognised volitional form, and attained what seems a true psychological solution. They took the essential element in thought to be generality; and the possibility of generalising they explained by the existence of language. To rise from mere trains of association to general conceptions,

¹ It is with extreme pleasure that I quote the recent excellent work of Prof. C. Spearman, *The Nature of "Intelligence" and the Principles of Cognition* (1923) in support of a view which, at the time when this essay was written, I did not venture to defend in full against what appeared to be the consensus of modern psychologists. Prof. Spearman's view is that judgment itself is purely cognitive; that the volition by which knowledge is adopted for practical purposes is "an additional event tacked on to the cognitive one." The acuteness of the schoolmen, he remarks, preserved them from the error of many Cartesians, already to be found to some extent in Stoicism, of taking the volition to characterise the cognitive process itself. "Even Duns Scotus, with all his zeal for the primacy of the will over the intellect, avoids stumbling into the trap." (See Part ii. chap. 6, p. 89)

what is necessary is a system of signs; and this is given by articulate speech. "Speech created thought." One particular perception or image—the sound or memory of a word—can be made to stand for a whole class of other images and perceptions. Man is distinguished from the lower animals by the capacity of evolving such a system. The distinctively human faculty is the power of speech and thought.

But, it may be said, is not language itself essentially a product of will? There is, undoubtedly, in all choice of speech, an element of volition; as, in fully formed thought, volition enters into judging. But is volition, in the origin of language, the essential thing? To hold that it is, does not seem to be in agreement with the best view of modern psychologists on the subject, which may be briefly stated thus. Language presupposes society. Given a group of social animals, as soon as uttered sounds aroused by certain ideas call up similar ideas in the minds of those to whom they are addressed, there is the germ of language. This germ consists in understanding, not in intention. Sounds, once understood, can become words. What is needed is the intellectual power that can develop them.

In the case of some languages, this intellectual power seems to have consisted mainly in volition. The suggestion that the Chinese language was essentially volitional in its origin is an obvious one. Leibniz, discussing the old question whether languages are by institution or by nature (*Nouveaux Essais*, bk. iii. ch. 2) remarks that the language of China has been thought to be "entirely arbitrary." This, he proceeds, may be so; but the artificial languages of which we know the origin contain a "natural" as well as an "arbitrary" element. Modern philologists would say that there is something of Leibniz's "natural" element everywhere. Signs, in the beginning, cannot be quite arbitrary, but, to be taken up by others, suppose some kind of correspondence to the thing signified, though not of course a uniform correspondence alike for all men at all stages. In the end, for ordinary speech, words become arbitrary signs, though in the evolution of language they were not so. The reason why the Chinese language seems most of all arbitrary or volitional is its extreme poverty both of vocabulary and of grammatical system. Out of about five hundred monosyllables, by changes of tone and of syntactical arrangement, the whole spoken language is constructed. The share of arbitrary choice in the structure becomes conspicuous from the limitation of its material. Yet we perceive that even here the linguistic material cannot have been created by volition aiming at practical ends, but springs originally from the play of feeling and imagination. Such as it is, an eminently volitional language is in conformity with the intensely positive and practical Chinese character. It is the language of a race with little poetry or metaphysics. The copious languages are

the languages of races with less native sobriety of intellect, but with a larger primitive endowment of imagination and feeling.

Still, this does not settle the question with which we began. Whatever may be the peculiar endowments of different races, is it not always practical need that gives the first stimulus to expression, and so ends by creating thought? That practical needs count for much in the development of thought and language is of course unquestionable. It does not follow, however, that they gave the first impulse. Animals also have "reason" in the sense that they can intelligently adapt means to ends; but in animals the disinterested emotion aroused, for example, by novelty, though not entirely absent, is merely sporadic. In the history of human life, on the other hand, there is, as is shown by the taste for ornamentation among the rudest savages, a search for the æsthetic before the useful is sought for.¹ Is it likely that language is here an exception? The question is not as to the external occasion on which language arose. As has been pointed out in recent discussion of the subject, the occasion may not always have been the same. The fundamental question is this: What is the internal psychological cause by which it is first determined that there shall be articulate expression at all?

To find a clear solution of this question, we must return to the first of the modern nominalists, to Hobbes. In the treatise commonly known as the *Human Nature*, but recently published by Dr. Tönnies as part of the whole to which it originally belonged, namely, *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, there occurs a paragraph (ch. ix., § 18; ed. Tönnies, pp. 45-46) in which the problem is incidentally solved. Hobbes is treating of the passions he calls "admiration and curiosity," by which, as also by "the faculty of imposing names," man is distinguished from beasts. "For when a beast seeth anything new or strange to him, he considereth it so far only as to discern whether it be likely to serve his turn, or hurt him, and accordingly approacheth nearer it, or flieth from it; whereas man, who in most events remembereth in what manner they were caused and begun, looketh for the cause and beginning of everything that ariseth new unto him. And from this passion of admiration and curiosity, have arisen not only the invention of names, but also the supposition

¹ I know that the very remarkable drawings of palæolithic artists are now ascribed to the practical purpose of working by magic on the animals hunted. To represent them with accuracy was supposed to be an aid to success in the chase, just as knowing the true name of an enemy is supposed by savages to give power over him. No doubt this was the practical purpose of the tribe; but with the artists themselves pleasure in representing things seen must have been a living impulse. Is it too paradoxical a suggestion that sometimes primitive artists or men of science, without full consciousness, wrought upon the tribal ideas of biological utility by sophisms in order to be allowed leisure to realise their dawning taste for something more truly human but in itself less intelligible to the more animal majority?

of such causes of all things as they thought might produce them. And from this beginning is derived all philosophy : as astronomy from the admiration of the course of heaven ; natural philosophy from the strange effects of the elements and other bodies."

The luminous suggestion that " the invention of names " has arisen from " admiration and curiosity " is in perfect agreement with the view that derives theoretical science from the same origin. That it is essentially these two passions, that set science going and keep it in movement is sufficiently clear from experience. Practical needs lead to applications of the science that exists, and these applications again determine new theoretical problems ; but they are not the central cause of the pursuit of science. From this pursuit, the usual effect of practical needs is to draw men away. They may direct the attention of societies to the importance of science, but they will not determine individuals to follow it. To work at science strictly in view of practice keeps it stationary. We see this in the cases of Egypt and Chaldæa, where geometry was kept to the purpose of land-measuring and building, and the stars were observed chiefly with a view to predicting events that had a bearing on national or individual prosperity. The same thing holds of language. Its beginnings were theoretical, æsthetic, disinterested. To a great extent its development depends on persistence of the original impulse ; on the leaving of men's minds in some measure free from subjugation to external ends and motives. Literature has a larger vocabulary than daily life. The vocabularies of the imaginative Aryan and of the practical Mongolian are at opposite extremes ; those of the emotional Semite coming between.¹ To develop a utilitarian civilisation too early was to lose possibilities both of scientific and linguistic growth. Language, as Hobbes saw, like the search for causes, springs from what is distinctively human in human nature ; and this is not direction of the mind to the material interests of life. The large part interests play in Hobbes's practical philosophy only makes his position on this point the stronger.

With the question about language, the question about thought, from which we started, is solved.

¹ I hazard these speculations on race, but do not lay much stress on them.

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTINOMIES ¹

THE historical view of systems that makes up the larger part of these volumes, itself the outcome of some of M. Renouvier's most original ideas, has enabled him, in his return from history to criticism and construction, to express these ideas with renewed force. Both as a history of philosophy from a clearly defined point of view, and as the latest statement of M. Renouvier's own philosophical position, the whole work is of the highest importance and interest.

The history of thought is viewed not as a series of approximations to a final doctrine which includes all truth in itself, but as a process in which antagonisms become more and more definite; till at length the theses and antitheses of the chief antinomies of philosophy are marked out into two coherent systems, opposed to one another in detail and as wholes. From the beginning of his philosophical studies, M. Renouvier tells us, he was struck with the inward presence of antinomies in the greater philosophical systems. He found that in a small number of systems, as in those of Nicholas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno and Hegel, the attempt was openly made to solve all antinomies by a denial of the applicability of the law of contradiction to real being; and for some time he was under the fascination of this idea, and himself tried to construct a philosophy that should reconcile all doctrines by combining their contradictory positions. With this view he was never able quite to satisfy himself; and at last he decisively rejected it. The result of this decision was the conviction that from the beginning of philosophic thought truth has been on one side of each of the great philosophic controversies and error on the other, and that the chief philosophical directions remain always the same. There has been progress in accuracy of view of details, in understanding of opposing positions, and in the statement of these positions and their logical grouping; but none of the chief directions has ever succeeded, during a period of philosophical freedom, in excluding the others; and since differences of personality become accentuated

¹ *Esquisse d'une Classification systématique des Doctrines Philosophiques.* Par CH. RENOUVIER. 2 Tomes. Paris: Au Bureau de la *Critique Philosophique*, 1885, 1886. Pp. 490, 420.

instead of disappearing, it is not likely that by free consent at least any of them will ever finally gain the mastery. For it is personality that determines the character of every philosopher's view of the world as a whole. Each view, the true view as much as the false, is a belief, determined partly by the "passive factors" of circumstances and temperament, but ultimately by an act of choice. The great opposing systems which combine in logical order the theses and antitheses of the historical antinomies, and are now in process of being definitely formed, are, on the one side, a pantheism based on the larger hypotheses of science carried beyond scientific limits, and laying claim to the certainty of "evidence"; on the other side, a theism based on Kant's postulates of the practical reason, and professing "belief" not "evidence" as its ultimate ground of certainty. To the latter system the author proclaims his own adhesion.

By thus making plain to the reader which side he takes, M. Renouvier has hoped to gain in impartiality, and he has succeeded. A writer who is attracted by strong and decided affirmations and negations, and who sees in the history of philosophy the tendency of systems to become more individualised rather than the tendency to compromise and conciliation, is, besides, under no temptation to tone down his opponents' views, and can do justice to them without finding in them resemblances to his own. M. Renouvier's treatment of views opposed to his own is frequently even more than impartial. The intellectual sympathy which he displays with the pantheistic ideas of the early philosophers of Greece does not disappear when he comes to deal with modern philosophers; but what has struck him especially is the far-reaching character of the ideas thrown out at the opening of each period of speculation, and in times of revolutionary change of thought. We are wrong, he remarks, in thinking the height of abstraction reserved for an advanced and complex state of intellectual culture. Except in morals, the true initiators, and often the most profound, in that their views were more exclusive and more absolute, were the philosophers of the first period of Greek thought. And in this period, as M. Renouvier fully admits, the predominating speculative tendency was pantheistic.

The pantheistic doctrine which was predominant in the earliest Greek speculations, which has found its most rigorous expression in Spinoza, and which is equally the doctrine of Hegel and of the contemporary philosophy that claims to be based on physical science, is, when quite consistently developed, a doctrine of the Thing or permanent substance of which all personality is a passing mode, as opposed to the Idea or phenomenon which has no reality except as part of a consciousness; of the Infinite as opposed to the Finite; of

Evolution as opposed to Creation; of Necessity as opposed to Liberty; of Happiness as opposed to Duty; and of Evidence as opposed to Belief. This sixth antinomy was the last to receive clear expression. Till Kant, with hardly any exception, the only positions as to the criterion of certitude were those of "evidence" and "scepticism." This last doctrine left the practical choice to be determined, not, as it must be according to the true doctrine of belief, by reasons which although not purely intellectual are valid for all men, but by custom and authority. According to the temperament of the sceptic the attitude finally assumed may be—to take typical examples—either that of Montaigne or of Pascal. Once the doctrine of a belief determined by active as well as passive factors of the personality and finally not on intellectual but on moral grounds—in its distinction equally from sceptical suspension of judgment and from a supposed "evidence" or "vision" that gives assent in spite of the will—has been clearly disengaged, all the other theses and antitheses are seen to depend on the position taken up with regard to this antinomy. Hitherto they have always, even in the most rigorous systems, been combined with more or less inconsequence. Till quite recent times Idealism, for example, had not received accurate expression; there always remained a mixture of realism, of the doctrine of the Thing or "subject" as it is in itself apart from consciousness. And the progress to true idealism has been accomplished chiefly by means of the works of the modern empirical school, more favourable to the intellectualist doctrine than to the doctrine of belief, and by mediæval Nominalism, the scholastic form of empiricism. Again, the doctrine of "the realised infinite" has always formed part of Christian theology, having got there by a confusion of the idea of infinity in the sense of moral perfection with the infinite of quantity in space and time. Yet logically this leads to the pantheistic doctrine of the infinite and eternal substance, and to the denial of an absolute beginning of action, that is, of real creation and of free-will. By another inconsequence, the ethical doctrine of the Stoics and of Spinoza was a doctrine of Duty, an "ethics of Reason," essentially identical with the Kantian ethics, and not a doctrine of happiness such as ought to have followed from their system of pantheistic evolution. The definite statement of the antinomy of "intellectualism" and of the "practical reason" removes these and other inconsequences, and makes the constituent propositions of the two systems arrange themselves at last in perfectly logical order.

Regarded metaphysically, M. Renouvier's doctrine is a phenomenonism like that of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson. The difference between the two doctrines consists chiefly in this, that Mr. Hodgson follows more the tradition of the English experiential

school, M. Renouvier that of the school of Continental rationalism. At the same time Hume, as represented by the *Treatise*, has had an influence on M. Renouvier comparable to the influence of Kant on Mr. Hodgson. In their practical outcome the two doctrines are not unlike, both philosophers having accepted from Kant the distinction of the "practical" and the "speculative" reason. Neglecting minor differences, then, let us ask: What is phenomenism as distinguished from other doctrines that also claim to be idealistic?

According to M. Renouvier, the ancient idealistic doctrines, such as that of Pythagoras, which tried to account for experience by the limiting mind, as opposed to unlimited matter, which was in various forms the principle of the Ionians, failed for this reason, that they took one particular formal element in mind and "hypostasised" it. "Number," the principle of the Pythagoreans, although a formal mental principle, became, when viewed in isolation, a "thing," just as much as the atom of Democritus, the most purely material of all the "physical" principles. On the other hand, the atom, although regarded from the first as an element in things, was not a datum of sense, but the result of an abstraction, and thus had a sort of mental character of its own. The two conceptions, therefore, opposite as they seem, differed little in effect. And instead of giving their ultimate explanation of things in terms of personality, the Pythagoreans, and the idealist schools of antiquity generally, fell back into a system of pantheism. With the Pythagoreans, for example, all phenomena became parts of a "mathematical evolution of the multiple and the one." In modern times the doctrine of Hegel—described by M. Renouvier as "a Platonism with Eleatic basis, joined to an attempt to trace the history of the Idea confounded with the history of the world of phenomena"—illustrates the same tendency. The "thought" of Hegel is an element in mind hypostasised; and, when the bias of the orthodox disciples of Hegel is got rid of, thought becomes a "thing" figured as evolving itself necessarily and as having personality for a mere temporary phase. Hegelianism thus comes not to differ intrinsically from a materialistic doctrine of evolution.

From these criticisms of other forms of idealism, it appears that what distinguishes the phenomenist doctrine is the refusal to regard any one element in mind, however capable of distinction by analysis, as having a real existence by itself apart from the rest. That is, the distinguishing feature of phenomenism is its principle of "the relativity of representations" to one another. It pushes this principle to the extent of affirming that, since actually every phenomenon appears under the form of personality, there can be no ultimate philosophical explanation of things otherwise than in terms of personality.

A doctrine such as that of Lotze and his disciples, which makes personality ultimate in its explanation of things, and is idealistic as regards the external world, would nevertheless be rejected by a phenomenist because it retains "the substance of mind"; its monads being miniatures of the individual mind hypostasised. The doctrine that speaks of "elementary feelings" as things-in-themselves does not, like monadism, assume a substance of mind under the name of "the soul"; but from the phenomenist point of view it is realistic as the Hegelian doctrine of "thought" is realistic, because it hypostasises the material element in mind as Hegelianism hypostasises the formal element; and of course it does not place personality at the beginning of things.

Except on one point, M. Renouvier concedes that the pantheistic system, although incapable of demonstration, is theoretically impregnable. The one point where it can be assailed on grounds of pure logic is its assertion of a real infinite of quantity, which follows from "the doctrine of the thing" as opposed to "the doctrine of consciousness." "The actual infinite number" required by the existence of an infinity of distinguishable phenomena in space or time is self-contradictory. The law of contradiction, however, in its application to realities, has been denied by consistent partisans of the infinite; and to assert it as universally true is, like any other proposition of the kind, an act of belief. Even in this case, therefore, it is in the end moral considerations that must determine the choice of the thesis or the antithesis. From the point of view of the doctrine of consciousness there can be no question of any actual existence that is other than finite. This truth was expressed by the Pythagoreans in their theory of the limit; but they in part destroyed its effect by retaining "the unlimited" as a kind of matter upon which form is imposed. The doctrine of the infinite and absolute, as it has asserted itself in Christian theology, is, however, a falling-off from what we may regard as the typical Greek conception of reality as belonging to a limited, ordered universe, and of the unlimited as essentially unreal. The "realised infinite," M. Renouvier shows, has no place in mathematics. And it is there, if anywhere, that we should expect to find it; since mathematicians use a terminology that seems to imply infinities of all orders. The notion of a real infinity, however, is not only not employed by mathematicians; it is no more required for the philosophical explanation of any mathematical or other scientific conception. Everything that can be expressed in terms of consciousness, that is, everything that can be thought as real, is finite. Consciousness itself, personality, is essentially finite. The "doctrine of consciousness" requires that phenomena should have a beginning, but not necessarily that they should have an end; for the absence of a beginning implies a

past eternity filled with events, that is, a "completed infinite"; but future eternity is supposed never to be completed; the series of phenomena, even if it should never have an end, will always be capable of expression by a finite number. Phenomena have had their beginning in a personality, which, like other personalities, is necessarily finite. The universality of law—the resemblance of the order of phenomena in different persons—requires that there should be one supreme Deity: M. Renouvier now regards this argument as conclusive against the possibility he had formerly left open for polytheism. The Deity must be held to be limited in knowledge by "the real contingency of futures." For, corresponding to creation in the universe as a whole, there is a real beginning of a new series of phenomena, a cause that is not also an effect, in certain decisions of the human will. Thus the doctrines of the finite, of creation and of indeterminism form a connected group opposed to the doctrines of the infinite, of evolution and of the absolute determination of all phenomena as parts of an eternal series; and these groups of doctrines attach themselves on the one side to "the doctrine of consciousness," on the other side to "the doctrine of the thing."

By "evolution" M. Renouvier understands here "philosophical" as distinguished from "scientific" evolution. The special evolution-theories of the sciences, like other special scientific theories, cannot logically, he holds, be extended under the name of "science" to the whole order of the world. "Science," when it is anything more than a collective name for "the sciences," means one of the two opposing philosophies; and this philosophy has no right to claim for itself, as it does by assuming the name of "science," the certainty that each of the special sciences has within its own limits. Of the philosophical doctrine of evolution there are two forms—the "statical" and the "dynamical." Spinoza's doctrine of modes is a real evolution-theory of the first kind, although it makes no attempt to express in a single formula the law of the series, which it assumes, of absolutely determined and eternally changing phenomena. Theories that are evolutionist in the more special "dynamical" sense, such as that of Leibniz—which was the first to combine the ideas of physical evolution and of progress—introduce the conception of an end towards which the evolution of the world is the necessary movement. They are less consequent than Spinozism; since they have to borrow the idea of end from the doctrine of consciousness.

Immediately connected with the antinomy of necessity and liberty is that of happiness and duty. No doctrine of necessity, M. Renouvier contends, is consistent with a morality that makes the correlative conceptions of "duty" and "right" fundamental. For there can be no "obligation" to do that

which, by the mere fact of its not being done, is shown, according to the doctrine of necessity, to have been impossible. Determinism reduces all moral questions to questions of selecting the right means for attaining ends fixed by personal taste. The end is not necessarily egoistic; but if happiness is the only conceivable end, man has, so to speak, "the right to egoism." The sentiment of altruism can only be appealed to so far as it exists; and it can never acquire the character of an imperative. Eudæmonists, therefore, for the most part, aim at producing by education artificial associations of ideas of the good of society with ideas of personal good. This supposes control of public opinion and of the machinery of education by those in whom the idea of good happens to have taken the altruistic form; and this control must be exercised with a view to forming all minds according to a single type. The eudæmonist morality of "benevolence" or "sentiment" thus lends itself naturally to theories of political and social despotism. And that the putting of some "good," however elevated, in place of the conceptions of duty and right, has actually had such theories for its consequence, is seen in the history of speculations that make the idea of good supreme, from Plato's Republic to the political system of Comte. J. S. Mill perceived this tendency of "benevolent utilitarianism" and tried to avoid it, but without success so far as he argues from his own theoretical point of view. He perceived also the unsatisfactoriness of a morality that depends on artificial associations dissoluble by analysis. In Mr. Spencer's ethical doctrine there is a falling back on the idea of an inevitable progress of the human race, as the means of bringing about a spontaneity of benevolent sentiment; but in the meantime there is no foundation for really ethical "injunction." As in other utilitarian systems, when there is no question of enforced obedience to external standards all depends ultimately on personal taste. It is the same with the morality of pessimism. Schopenhauer, for example, who makes "pity" take the place of the "sympathy" of optimistic utilitarianism, entirely rejects the idea of duty. Essentially, contemporary optimism and pessimism are at one as to the ethical standard. The opposite ethical doctrine is to be found in the Stoics and Spinoza; but it received for the first time perfectly accurate expression in Kant's *Practical Reason*. The idea of duty is implicit in Stoicism as "conformity to the order of the universe"; that of liberty as "independence of external things." On the one side, however, there is as yet no true idea of obligation, and on the other side there is theoretical determinism. So far as Kant retains the idea of absolute determinism in the phenomenal world there is an inconsequence in his system also; but in his ethical formula, the categorical imperative, he has corrected both the principal defects of Stoicism. Kant's great achievement was to make

ethics independent of every system of metaphysics. In consequence of this he was able to found his metaphysical doctrine on his ethics, substituting practical "postulates" for theoretical "dogmas." The relative positions of practice and speculation are thus reversed. There is no longer any apparent dependence of morality on cosmical physics and the law of evolution of the world; "conformity to nature" has become explicitly what it always really meant, conformity to the nature of reason. Duty has been rigorously defined, and the doctrine of happiness placed in its true dependence on the morality of duty.

For a doctrine of happiness is after all necessary. The question of optimism and pessimism is not indifferent to philosophy, but is a question which, once it has been raised, requires a decisive answer. Now the Kantian doctrine enables us to view happiness as dependent on our own attitude towards the world, not on a previous determination of the nature of the world. There are two beliefs that it is theoretically possible to hold: the belief that duty and happiness are in the end brought into harmony; and the belief that the idea of justice has no application in the universe as a whole. We are under the moral obligation to choose that belief which will enable us to act best. This position is fundamentally that of Pascal's "argument of the wager." The necessity of acting renders it impossible to refrain from choosing; and we must choose the alternative on the side of which our highest interests are placed. There is this defect in Pascal's argument—that one particular doctrine, the doctrine of the Catholic Church, is arbitrarily taken as the subject of the wager. An opponent can object against Pascal the merely local and temporary character of this doctrine; and then there is the scientific test of historical evidence. The argument of Pascal, however, can be thrown into a universally valid form. It has been "reduced to good sense" by Locke, and cleared of even the appearance of making an appeal to "the lower interests" by Rousseau. The principle of its reduction to a valid form is that we must seek "the maximum of security in the minimum of determination of doctrine." Kant's postulates of the practical reason—God, Freedom and Immortality—are found to be at once necessary and sufficient. Freedom is required in order to make moral obligation possible; immortality—or at least continuation of life after death—to make possible the realisation of the ideal of justice in the universe; theism, inferred, as we have already seen, from the necessity of a creative act and the universality of law, is required as a security for the final ordering of the universe in accordance with the principle of justice. A necessary part of the system of the postulates is that physical evil should be traced to moral evil. This is made conceivable by the doctrine of free-will as "a gift" which could not be conferred without the power being left to the creature to choose

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wrong as well as right. By the existence of a real free-will the sense of sin and its reality are also explained.

We come at last to the antinomy of evidence and belief, on which, according to M. Renouvier, everything else depends. Real indetermination of actions, he maintains, requires real indetermination of judgments. This doctrine of the indetermination of judgments is traced to Rousseau. Rousseau's ethical doctrine, although superficially it looks like a "doctrine of sentiment," is really, M. Renouvier contends, a "doctrine of the practical reason." The admiration of Kant for Rousseau is well known; and M. Renouvier traces Kant's optimism—in viewing the history of the world as determined in accordance with the postulates—to Rousseau, as he finds in Voltaire the literary inspiration of Schopenhauer's pessimism. That belief—the free choice of a judgment as to the ultimate nature of things—is something more profound than "evidence," must be the view of those who hold to the doctrine of consciousness. To affirm the existence of other personalities and of the uniformity of nature is to go beyond what is given in the actual phenomena. We are not, indeed, without motives for believing; there is evidence that suggests belief; but there is also an active factor. The mind in part creates the truth to which it gives its assent, as it is creative in volition. Those, on the other hand, who decide for the pantheistic system of the eternal evolution of an infinite substance, always hold in some way, even when, like Mr. Spencer, they speak of ultimate "beliefs," that they are asserting a truth forced on the mind from without, or given in a sort of intellectual "vision," a truth of which denial is impossible. But to anyone who speaks of universal beliefs, of propositions the negation of which is inconceivable, the history of philosophy is a sufficient reply. There is no proposition, not even the law of contradiction, of which the application to real being has not been denied by some philosopher. The appeal to "evidence" is therefore only a statement of the belief of a particular person that he possesses a certain kind of insight which, it must be supposed, he has by necessity, while others are necessarily in error.

Since M. Renouvier makes everything depend on his doctrine of belief, we must examine this doctrine closely before proceeding to criticise any other part of his system. The choice of an ultimate belief, in M. Renouvier's view, is an act of free-will; but he does not represent the doctrine of belief as absolutely bound up with indeterminism. Indeed he shows, in more than one passage, how a determinist may recognise the active factor in judging. Indeterminism being excluded, there seems to be no reason why an opponent on ultimate philosophical questions should not admit the essential part of M. Renouvier's contention, *viz.*, that there is a personal element in all systems of meta-

physics; that in this element there are active as well as passive factors of belief; and that whenever we go beyond the mere present phenomenon there is a "wish to believe" one proposition rather than another, determined either by intellectual or practical interests. All beliefs are of course subject to the tests of verification and of consistency. Beliefs that cannot bear these tests must disappear sooner or later, whether we wish it or not. M. Renouvier does not deny this; but to anyone who should insist that for these reasons "evidence" is more profound than "belief," he would reply that there is more in the great philosophical systems than can be completely submitted to either test. The pantheistic doctrine which is the final outcome of the set of positions opposed to his own is, he admits, as consistent with itself as the doctrine of the practical reason. To the positivist or agnostic objection that there is no need to choose between opposing systems of metaphysics at all, he replies that not to choose would be to take custom instead of reason for the guide of life; but that those who use this argument have really made their choice, and that they imagine themselves to have "evidence" sufficient for the refutation of the view they practically reject.

To the belief at which M. Renouvier arrives on the ground of the Kantian postulates, it may be objected, from the practical point of view, that the construction is too "problematical" to have any real influence on conduct. The objection he himself makes to Pascal's argument might also be brought against it. This type of theism, it might be said, is after all only the ghost of a particular historical religion, not really, as is contended, "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus." Its special affinities are seen by M. Renouvier's regarding as possible an alliance between "the Criticist philosophy of consciousness" and a Christianity cleared of the dogmas of "absolutist" and "infinitist" theologians. A religious creed going beyond the "necessary and sufficient" postulates of the practical reason, he allows to be legitimate in its own sphere. Although it may not be confounded with philosophy, it may be held as a kind of "philosophic faith." But—not to pursue these considerations of detail—there is a fundamental objection to the whole method of "the practical reason."

M. Renouvier, it must be remembered, contends for an element of active desire in the affirmations of *both* the great philosophic parties. In the case of the party opposed to his own, he often speaks of this desire as having its motive in intellectual as distinguished from practical interests. Yet, rather strangely, he never definitely asks whether the desire that expresses itself here may not be that by which exclusively we ought to be influenced in the decision of the last questions of metaphysics as of the first questions suggested by scientific curiosity. He

never seems to conceive it to be possible that anyone who has seen that there is active choice of belief should still maintain the primacy in metaphysics of the theoretical reason; should regard the introduction of ethical considerations at the point where the highest speculative questions are reached as being just as irrelevant as it would be in physical science. The exact omission that is made is seen most clearly in M. Renouvier's view of Spinoza. An "inconsequence" is detected in Spinoza's passage from his pantheistic metaphysics to an ethical doctrine of an elevated kind. The moral emotion that finds expression in the ethics, it is implied, ought not to have been excluded from the determination of the metaphysical doctrine; since it has been excluded, however, its coming in afterwards is unjustifiable. But, according to M. Renouvier's view, Spinoza's theoretical doctrine must have been in part emotionally and actively determined; for no doctrine escapes this necessity. If it was not determined by an ethical emotion, by what kind of emotion, then, was it determined? Clearly an incomplete enumeration has been made of the elements of Spinoza's philosophy. Account has been taken of the high moral emotion as well as of the passionless analysis; what has been omitted is the "amor intellectualis"—the desire for perfect completeness of explanation by purely theoretical and "immanent" principles. But is not this the properly philosophical emotion? And does not its dominance in what M. Renouvier calls the "intellectualist" systems furnish a presumption that these, and not the "practical" systems, have given the right answers to the perennial questions of philosophy? The emotion directed to practice has its scope in the discrimination of right and wrong actions or dispositions. The philosophical emotion is an impulse towards what M. Renouvier himself calls "the ideal of science." Can any reason be given why, when we are approaching this ideal, we should be turned back from it by views of practical utility? It is not as if there were no positive impulse conflicting with affirmations made in the name of the practical reason. If this were so, we should have remained for ever absolutely under the dominion of practical considerations; the idea of a disinterested view of the universe would never have occurred to us. But, when this idea has once presented itself, has not "the practical reason" the appearance of being in intellectual things something of an interloper?

Of course philosophy, if it is to be worthy of the name, must somewhere make a return on practice, so as not to abandon life to the guidance of custom and unreasoned opinion. But M. Renouvier shows that it was exactly in antiquity, when the primacy of the theoretical reason was unquestioned, that philosophy applied itself most to practice and had most practical influence. After remarking on the comparative weakness of

modern philosophy, beginning with Descartes, on the practical side—the *Ethics* of Spinoza being mentioned as an exception—he explains the “intellectualism” (in this sense) of modern philosophy by the circumstance that the practical field was preoccupied, and that for a long time philosophers were warned off from it. The doctrine of “the practical reason,” however, seems to be anything rather than the correction of this kind of intellectualism in modern philosophy. If philosophy, instead of moving away from practice and viewing life impartially in order to return afterwards more effectively to its practical regulation, is to keep practical considerations in view in its metaphysical constructions, of two indemonstrable assumptions to take not the one that fits in best with the ideal already suggested by science, but the one that seems most likely to encourage action, this means that action, just as with the Pyrrhonists, will fall under the dominion of custom. For practical considerations introduced not merely as a stimulus but as a guide, prior to the final theoretical construction, can only be considerations depending on those unanalysed aims of which it is a function of philosophy to ascertain the comparative value; considerations, therefore, which from the first invalidate the critical function of philosophy with regard to practice.

This is the effect that a doctrine of the practical reason would seem likely to produce. Yet it must be acknowledged that there is no trace of this kind of effect on M. Renouvier's own practical philosophy. He applies an equally severe analysis to all the phrases that have been proposed as solutions of the problems of the ethical end and of the worth of life; keeping always in view the essential question of the aim of the individual. In the case of so consistent a thinker as M. Renouvier, it would be absurd to say that this is in spite of his theory, not because of it. We must try to find an element of truth in the doctrine of the practical reason that may be recognised by those who cannot in any sense accept that doctrine as a whole.

M. Renouvier, as has been seen, claims for Kant the merit of having been the first to make explicit the independence of the ethical end on particular systems of metaphysics. This truth is already present, he admits, so far as its effective application to conduct is concerned, in the “independence” of the Stoics, and in Spinoza's doctrine of freedom as action from within; but this “independence” or “freedom” is represented at the same time as a harmony with external nature, or even sometimes as “obedience” to nature, and is not defined strictly in terms of personality. M. Renouvier's analysis certainly enables us to understand better the fascination which Kant's formula has exercised. The truth of “the autonomy of ethics,” we may be disposed to think, is expressed most clearly by M. Renouvier when he states it without reference to “the

practical reason"; but that it should appear as if bound up with the Kantian doctrine is explicable. As soon as it is seen that ethics, although dependent for its working out on theoretical knowledge, is independent of any theory of the universe so far as the determination of its essential end is concerned, the pre-conceived idea of a subordination instead of a co-ordination between metaphysics and ethics takes effect in a simple reversal of their previous order. The doctrine of the practical reason, therefore, may be regarded as an exaggeration of the truth of "the independence of ethics."

The process that has just been described is aided by a certain incompatibility, not intellectual but emotional, of the theoretical and the ethical view of things. The ethical view of external nature must always be somewhat Manichæan. M. Renouvier has illustrated this by quotation of the celebrated passages from Mill's *Essay on Nature*. Those, on the other hand, who take by preference the pantheistic or intellectualist view, tend to pass from admiring contemplation of the order of the universe to assertion of its ethical perfection. This tendency is found, often unaccompanied by pantheism, in men of science. M. Renouvier contrasts, for example, Darwin's admiration of the law of survival of the fittest, regarded hypothetically as imposed by a creator, with Mill's reprobation of laws of conflict and mutual destruction among living beings. And more than once he shows the ethical superiority of Spinoza's system—attained, as he thinks, by the inconsequence of practically detaching ethics from metaphysics, when, according to Spinoza's principles, ethics should be subordinate—over the optimistic doctrines of Leibniz and Hegel. This last comparison may furnish a suggestion for solving the difficulty. Is not the remedy to distinguish clearly the ethical from the theoretical point of view, neither subordinating nor suppressing either; to avoid, on the one hand, affirming an ethical end of the universe, and on the other hand to refrain from all attempts to find a moral justification of anything in the mere fact of its necessary determination according to universal laws? The refusal to compromise between points of view, each maintained as separately valid, is not really an inconsequence.

A distinction of points of view may help to clear up the antinomy of happiness and duty. We may admit that the conceptions of obligation, of duty and of right are not ultimate in ethics, without denying them all relative validity; without declaring them to be mere illusions, and proposing to substitute direct seeking of the good of others under the impulse of sympathy or pity for the idea of justice as foundation of the social order. There is no doubt that the systematic working out of some doctrines of "happiness," or of a "good" as the ethical end, has led to the theoretical suppression of personal freedom. This, how-

ever, is due to the special character of the good that is aimed at; in these cases some social good is regarded as superior to the good of all individuals. Those who recognise, with M. Renouvier, that the highest good, while attained socially, must be a good for the individual, and that personal freedom is a condition of its attainment, are entirely at one with him practically, although they may make rights and duties deductions from the conception of good, not ultimate conceptions. To the making of obligation ultimate it may be objected that the word "obligation" implies command from some source; and that a command, as M. Renouvier fully recognises, cannot be the ultimate reason in ethics. The empirical doctrines that trace ethical precepts to commands, of which he acknowledges the merit as attempts to account for obligation on egoistic grounds, justify the commands finally as means to a good that can only be attained by social action according to definite rules. But to these doctrines, and equally to those that make more use of sympathy, it is objected that everything depends on the individual taste and disposition. Suppose that anyone is not sufficiently sympathetic; or that, having recognised that the existence of the social order and (as part of it) his own action in accordance with justice, is on the whole to his personal advantage, he should nevertheless decide to evade the requirements of justice and gain a greater advantage, whenever he can escape detection: how is the moralist to convince him that he ought to act rightly? To this it can only be replied that voluntary acceptance of an ethical code does after all depend on the empirical fact of the social nature of man; and the degree in which men act according to the principles they accept, on the degree in which certain dispositions are present. The admission of this, with all its consequences, no doubt supposes a different conception of personal merit from that of Kant. On the whole, however, M. Renouvier's ethical antinomy, although some irreducible differences are left, does not seem to be quite so absolute as he contends.

Of the remaining antinomies there is at least one—that of finite and infinite—where those who are in general agreement with M. Renouvier would select the antithesis. The opposition of evolution and creation, which, when they are considered as philosophical doctrines, seems at first irreducible, can be solved by an evolutionist without absolute denial of creation. For creation, in the sense in which M. Renouvier attributes it to the human mind (with exclusion of indeterminism) may be perfectly well regarded as the outcome of a universal process of evolution. This explanation goes naturally with the admission in a certain sense of M. Renouvier's doctrine of belief. He himself is the first to admit that as regards the antinomy of "Thing" and "Idea" that heads the series, all schools of philo-

sophy are now in a sense idealist, as at the beginning all were in a sense realist. To the contemporary "school of the ideal," represented in different ways by M. Vacherot and M. Fouillée, he takes up an attitude of opposition, on the ground that it denies in effect the existence of the ideal outside the human mind; yet he has affinities with that school. There is much resemblance, for example, between his view of the infinite and M. Vacherot's, although their affirmations about the reality of the infinite are quite opposed. Both philosophers bring out with great distinctness the opposition of the idea of perfection, which, as they see, must be that of the highest degree of definite order and clear consciousness, and therefore essentially finite, to the idea of unlimited extension or force, the *ἀπειρον* of Greek philosophy, chaos as opposed to cosmos. Again, M. Renouvier's re-statement of Pascal's "argument of the wager" has something in common with M. Fouillée's doctrine of "risk" in action and speculation. It is true he does not end with doubt but with belief; yet belief, in distinction from knowledge, implies at least the possibility of doubt.

But although two types of thought may not be quite so clearly marked out as they ought to be according to the theory embodied in M. Renouvier's classification, it is only with the aid of a classification such as this that an adequate account can be given of the whole movement of philosophy. The idea of a perennial opposition of philosophic doctrines, and of increasing distinctions among them, is not that which historians of philosophy like best to dwell on; but now that it has been not merely stated and defended but made the central idea of a systematic classification, it ought to be recognised as at least as important an aspect of the truth as the more common idea of philosophic progress. And M. Renouvier does not, by a movement of reaction, deny the portion of truth that is in the conception of progress as continuous and in the same direction. He recognises the limitations it imposes on his own view, as well as those that are due to what he considers illogical mixtures of doctrines. One ground that a critic might take here is to contend that these mixtures are not all illogical, and that the divergence is really towards several types instead of only two. This would be a criticism in the sense of M. Renouvier's own doctrine. But whatever may be the view taken of the outcome of the classification, there cannot be any difference of opinion as to the value of M. Renouvier's work in detail. Every page of it is full of instruction. To its merits as history this is to be added, that it will compel readers who may have arrived at any fragmentary philosophic view of their own to consider carefully the bearings of this view with regard to the whole, and the direction in which it ought to be developed if they wish to be consistent.

It will be remembered that M. Renouvier finds one logical defect in the system of pantheism to which, as he holds, modern "scientific philosophy" is tending. From the contradiction that is said to be implied in the assertion of infinity, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, in the first of his two articles on M. Renouvier's philosophy in *Mind*, vol. vi., has pointed out a way of escape. "The realised infinite," Mr. Hodgson admits, is a contradiction; but the contradiction comes from taking "representation" as coextensive with phenomena, and assuming categories that are "forms of thought, not perception." "If we take the forms of perception, time and spatial extension, as our ultimates, then we shall find that infinity is involved in all perception. Every perceived thing, which is a portion of time or of space, has time or space beyond it. The perception that this happens always, wherever you have a perception, *this* is the infinity of time and space" (*Mind*, vi. 56). It is remarkable that this restoration of an "unexplored remainder," as the necessary background of all knowledge, is made from the point of view of what we may call the experiential as opposed to the rationalistic phenomenism. Although not made in the interests of a pantheistic view, it serves to rescue pantheism, as formulated by M. Renouvier, from the contradiction he finds in it. M. Renouvier, however, according to Mr. Hodgson, is right in everything but neglecting the background of knowledge, of which the necessary existence is revealed only in perception. The infinite, in Mr. Hodgson's sense, has no place in mathematical or any other science, but forms the inevitable background of all definite knowledge; practically, the infinite, when dealt with by thought, becomes what M. Renouvier wishes to substitute for it in all cases—an indefinite possibility. The section in which M. Renouvier discusses the antinomy of infinite and finite is, it may be added, one of the most valuable parts of his book. The real matter in dispute is disentangled from the complications of scientific hypotheses, and is shown to be a rational question, which, if it is to be solved at all, will not be solved by the mere "progress of science" independently of philosophic reflection. It is above all in making clear the true character of questions of philosophic criticism such as this, their fundamental position with regard to the sciences, their persistence throughout all stages of scientific development, and their insolubility except by criticism applied directly to consciousness, that the merit and distinction of M. Renouvier's method consists. Whether we are able to accept his solution of any particular philosophic problem or not, his statement of it may always be taken to be, as far as it goes, perfectly logical, and an indispensable basis for further study.¹

¹ See Correspondence printed in the Appendix.

GIORDANO BRUNO AND HIS TIME¹

EVEN more now than when it was first published, forty years since, Prof. Carrière's classical work on the philosophical ideas of the Renaissance or "Reformation-time" appeals to the need that is felt for the kind of renewal which he has himself described, by a phrase adapted from Machiavelli, as a "bringing back of philosophy towards its origin." Along with the increasing specialisation of the nineteenth century there has been a rising desire, as Prof. Carrière shows, to attain again that largeness of outlook which has characterised the beginning of each intellectual epoch and which specialisation by itself tends to destroy. The philosophical ideas that within the properly modern period have been developed in different and sometimes conflicting directions, are all present, he contends, "in germinal totality," in the philosophy of the transitional period from the middle of the fifteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century. In Giordano Bruno, the supreme philosophical expression of that period, we may rediscover a view of the world as a whole which was lost in the dispersion of thought during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but which could not have been fully understood till the various elements combined in its original unity had been worked out in their separateness. The systems of Spinoza, of Leibniz and of Hegel are all developments of that which is contained implicitly in Bruno. With the theory of things that Bruno attained by poetic vision, but left to others to develop dialectically, the mystical doctrine of Jacob Böhme—who represents the freer spirit of the German Reformation as Bruno sums up the Italian Renaissance on its philosophical side—is in essential agreement.

It is not necessary to go as far as Prof. Carrière in seeking at the opening of the history of modern philosophy an anticipation of a final doctrine, in order to recognise the justification of his point of view. Whether Bruno's writings in particular have had any positive influence or not, they have undoubtedly the character that is claimed for them of anticipating many theories of later science and philosophy. And Bruno is most important in relation to the present where he is the representative of the

¹ *Die philosophische Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit in ihren Beziehungen zur Gegenwart.* VON MORIZ CARRIÈRE. Zweite vermehrte Auflage. 2 Theile. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1887. Pp. xi, 419; vii, 319.

most daring aspirations of his age. Penetrated, as Prof. Carrière says, with the spirit of the classical writers and thinkers, he sought to form out of the fragments of ancient thought and the beginnings of modern science a system opposed at all points to Scholasticism or philosophy within the limits of faith. He represents at once the "return to nature," that is, to the direct vision of things apart from all external authority, the rejection of the "*consuetudo credendi*"—"impedimentum maximum cognitionis," as he calls it—and the "return to antiquity," that is, to the study of what had already been achieved by free speculation and free artistic impulse. Now this intellectual and spiritual detachment from the Middle Age, in spite of the progress that has since been made in the practical sphere and in every field of science, has in some respects never been so complete as it was during the Renaissance. What was at first gained by the insight of the few has had to affirm itself in its application to details of life and thought and to diffuse itself by degrees downwards from the sphere of higher speculation. During this process the "*consuetudo credendi*" has reaffirmed itself in innumerable reactions, and has often made the systems even of great philosophers other than they would have been had they been determined simply by free speculative activity. If then we are to make a new effort at speculative construction, the philosophers of the Renaissance may be of more importance to us than some later and more celebrated thinkers. It is true that a more exact knowledge of ancient thought, the principal material of the men of the Renaissance, has since become possible; but this does not by any means destroy the interest of Renaissance speculation. Ideas derived from ancient philosophy were not merely reaffirmed, but gained at once in generality and concentration through the necessity of opposing them to the concentrated and generalised positions of an authoritative system of received doctrine. Thus it is that in the period of transition before the real beginning of modern philosophy with Descartes, we see better than at any later period what is the permanent character and tendency of the higher speculation of modern times. A new way of thinking as regards the whole is already clearly defined against the mediæval way of thinking; and the influence of the resisting intellectual medium in which the modern spirit is to move has not yet been felt in its full complexity.

Some readers will find in Prof. Carrière himself, so far as he aims at a new philosophical synthesis, a certain falling-off from the Italian philosopher for whom he expresses most admiration. Whether we call it a falling-off or an advance, it is certain that he is not so nearly at one with Bruno in his answers to the highest questions as he thinks. To this we shall have to return; but first an attempt must be made to give to English readers some idea of the distinctive features of Prof. Carrière's book as a history of

the whole period of intellectual transition from the Middle Age. What is especially worthy of note is the wide range of his sympathies. Revivers of ancient philosophy, scientific investigators, magicians and alchemists, political thinkers, mystics and original philosophers, are successively passed in review, and everywhere we feel that the author has more than a mere external interest in his subjects, that he has himself seen things in turn from all the points of view that he is describing. Every chapter is drawn from original sources; and while there is no want of detailed information, a clear general idea is conveyed of the meaning of each movement and the purport of the doctrines of each individual thinker. The minor figures of the Renaissance and the Reformation are not neglected, and indications are given of the nature of the preparation for both movements in the later Middle Age; the German mystics of the fourteenth century in particular being dealt with at considerable length. The biographies and the general historical background make the book full of human interest.

The general introduction and conclusion being counted separately, the first four chapters deal with movements, the rest, except the sixth—which is a short introduction on “Religion and Philosophy in Italy,” placed at the beginning of the second volume—with individual thinkers. The movements dealt with are (1) the revival of Greek philosophy, (2) the scientific movement and the occupation with “magic,” (3) the effort after social and political reform and the speculative ideas in which it found expression, (4) German Mysticism and the Reformation. The writers who are considered to be of sufficient philosophical importance to demand treatment in separate chapters are Böhme, Cardan, Telesio, Bruno, Vanini, and Campanella. The short sixth chapter (ii. 1-6) is chiefly a study of Savonarola.

The chapter on Giordano Bruno is the longest in the book, and for the author Bruno is the centre of interest. These reasons might suffice to justify a critic in devoting special attention to that chapter. There is, however, the additional reason that the writer of the present notice will thus be discharging an old engagement. Prof. Carrière's general view of Bruno has been adopted by the author of the English *Life of Giordano Bruno*, recently published by Messrs. Trübner, for the appearance of which the continuation of a former article on Bruno in *Mind* (see above) was reserved. Such a critical estimate of Bruno's philosophical position as was promised in the postscript to that article must necessarily be stated or implied in any detailed judgment on Prof. Carrière's chapter. The present review, in dealing with this chapter, will accordingly be at the same time a fulfilment of the promise then given. In making the chapter on Bruno the main subject of criticism, we shall not lose from sight Prof. Carrière's general purpose, which, as has been explained, is

more than merely historical, being to treat the philosophers of the Renaissance and Bruno in particular in their relations to the present time. His treatment of Bruno is, besides, more open to criticism than his treatment of philosophers for whom his admiration is less; for this admiration causes him to see in Bruno greater agreement with his own philosophico-religious ideas, and with those of the mystics whom he equally admires, than really exists.

As Prof. Carrière would have us return to Giordano Bruno in order to recover a totality of view that the moderns have lost, so he would have us return to Jacob Böhme and to the German mystics of the fourteenth century, Böhme's predecessors, in order to set reformed Christianity free from the dogmatic fetters imposed by Luther and Calvin. Now, of course, he cannot help recognising the differences between Bruno's poetical philosophy and Böhme's mystical theology; yet he tries to show that in spite of all differences the Italian philosopher and the German mystic are in agreement "in their highest ideas." Above all, there is in both alike a final "reconciliation of Theism and Pantheism." This reconciliation, he contends, is to be found in Christianity rightly understood. Already in the fourteenth century Eckhart, Suso and Tauler had caught sight of it as by inspiration. Marsilio Ficino and other Platonists of the early Italian Renaissance also had glimpses of it. Towards the clearer vision of this reconciliation the whole of modern philosophy has been tending. Opposite ideals of life, too, are approaching their reconciliation. Protestantism, favourable as it was in the end to exact learning notwithstanding the dogmatic formulas by which its growth was long checked, has brought about a new revival of Hellenism in Germany; and "this reawakened Hellenism is no other than what the Christian Jacob Böhme has depicted as the life of the new birth."

Of the manner in which "philosophical Mysticism" overcomes and reconciles the opposition of "Deism" and "ordinary Pantheism" two different accounts are given. Sometimes it is represented as combining in a single conception the ideas of the universe or of the Infinite, and of God as "self-conscious Spirit"; sometimes as a union of the ideas of the "transcendence" and the "immanence" of God. If, however, theism and pantheism are to be combined in a single conception, it is the last contrast that is all-important. God may be identified with self-conscious spirit to the entire exclusion of nature, which may be regarded as an illusion or a mere negation, and the doctrine may still remain pure pantheism. Theism, in any intelligible sense, means the idea of God, in Spinoza's phrase, as "princeps et legislator," as a personal being ruling the course of things and judging the actions of men. This is what seems to be meant by the doctrine of "transcendence." On the other hand, what is

common to all forms of pantheism is the doctrine of "immanence." The ultimate explanation that deism and monotheistic theology seek outside and above the universe, pantheistic philosophy seeks within the universe. But for pantheism itself there remains the opposition of nature and mind, an opposition which is expressed with perfect clearness by Euripides (*Troades*, 886) in the alternative—*Ζεὺς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν*, and therefore was not first revealed to consciousness by Christianity, as Prof. Carrière almost seems to hold. According as it takes one or the other side of this alternative, pantheistic philosophy may assume the form either of what Prof. Carrière calls "naturalistic pantheism" or of what may be called spiritualistic or intellectualistic pantheism; or it may seek to unite the two opposites in a single conception. Now this opposition of nature and mind is that on which Prof. Carrière principally dwells. When he speaks of "ordinary pantheism," it is naturalistic pantheism that he means; and in most cases when he speaks of the union of pantheism and theism he means the union of the ideas of nature and mind. As he does not clearly distinguish this opposition from that of immanence and transcendence, but rather seems to regard them as the same, identifying the idea of a transcendent and personal God with the idea of God as intellect or spirit, it is necessary to consider separately how far there is an effort at reconciliation of either pair of opposites on the part of Bruno and of the Christian mystics.

Now there is no doubt that Christian Mysticism really affirms a Deity who is at once immanent and transcendent, or in the universe and above the universe. The mystics identify the transcendent and personal God of theology with an internal divine principle manifested in nature and in the human mind. Thus they may be said to combine, if they do not reconcile, the theistic with the pantheistic position. The pantheistic element of their doctrine, however, tends to gain the mastery; hence accusations of heterodoxy against the mystics. Prof. Carrière himself sometimes seems to reject altogether the idea of an extra-mundane Deity, and in one place he ascribes this rejection to Böhme; yet in other places he affirms it as the necessary complement of the pantheistic element of his doctrine. The consistent pantheism of Spinoza rejects the idea of a transcendent God altogether, but at the same time seeks to unite the conceptions of nature and mind by making thought and extension attributes of the same substance. Is Bruno to be classed with Spinoza, or, as Prof. Carrière contends, with the Christian mystics?

According to Prof. Carrière there is evidence of development in Bruno's writings. In the *De Umbris Idearum* he is a Platonic Idealist; afterwards, in the Italian works composed in England, he gives clear expression to naturalistic Pantheism; finally, in

the Frankfort books, and especially in the *De Immenso*, the theistic element becomes distinct. If then in the *De Immenso* Bruno not merely leaves aside but positively rejects the doctrine of transcendence, this is conclusive against Prof. Carrière's contention for the theistic character of his doctrine.

That there are passages in the *De Immenso* obviously directed against the New Testament miracles and the doctrine of the Incarnation, as well as the mysteries special to Catholicism, may not by itself be sufficient to prove that Bruno does not hold the doctrine of transcendence in common with the Christian mystics. Even a passage such as this is perhaps not decisive, though the very idea of miracle in the sense in which its possibility at least must be admitted by a theist, is rejected precisely in the spirit of Spinoza. Referring to comets, of which he gives a naturalistic explanation correct in principle, Bruno says :—

"Some fly to a virtue above and beyond the natural, saying that a God who is above nature creates those appearances in heaven in order to signify something to us : as if those things are not better and the best signs of the divinity which come to pass in the ordinary course, among which those appearances also are not disorderly ; although their order may be concealed from us : but with prophets of this kind do not speak, nor shall we be careful to answer them where it is not necessary to speak without sense and reason." (*De Immenso*, iv. 9.)

In the last book of the *De Immenso*, however, there is still more unambiguous evidence of Bruno's position. For a great part of this book is a polemic against the doctrine of transcendence as it was held by Palingenius and other Platonists. There is no "supernal," "intelligible," "immaterial" light, Bruno tells the Platonists, such as they imagine outside the world, no light except that which shines within the mind and outside us in nature—

Quæ importunissima pulsat
Pectora, quæque intus nobis splendet et extra.

"Nature" is the name for a principle that is within things ; and the law by which all things accomplish their course (*lex qua peragunt proprium cuncta entia cursum*) is nothing but a logical abstraction (*abstractum quiddam logica ratione*). The whole is summed up thus :—

"God is infinite in the infinite, everywhere in all things, not above, not without, but most present, as entity is not outside and above beings, as nature is not outside natural things, as there is no goodness outside that which is good. But essence is distinguished from being only logically, and as reason from that of which it is the reason."

Passages such as these throw light on the distinction, which in various forms is sufficiently frequent in Bruno, between God as absolute intellect and the manifestation of God in nature and in the human mind. When, for example, he distinguishes truth "before things," "in things" and "after things," he is applying

in the sense of his own philosophy a traditional logical distinction recognised by him as no more than logical. By the distinction of God as absolute from the knowledge of God is expressed the imperfection of all actual conceptions of the divinity as compared with their ideal completion. Thus in the *Eroici Furori* the mind is represented as striving to identify itself with the absolute unity of the divine intellect, and as constantly baffled in this desire of unattainable knowledge. Nature or the infinite universe as distinguished from the divinity itself is variously called the "image," the "shadow," the "simulacrum" or the "attribute" of the primal intellect, which may manifest itself by other attributes, all of which must be infinite and eternal. The possible existence of unknown attributes (on which, for the rest, Bruno does not dwell) again necessitates the distinction of God as absolute from the manifestation or "reflexion" of God in things.

This may perhaps in one sense be called a doctrine of "transcendence," but it is not to be confounded with the theistic "transcendence," which implies a possible supernatural or miraculous. When Bruno speaks of a God who is known by supernatural light (as, for example, in *Della Causa*, ed. Wagner, i. 275) it is as an object of faith, with which philosophy is not concerned; and he sufficiently explains his attitude towards faith elsewhere. Although, however, there is no distinctively theistic element in Bruno, Prof. Carrière is right in insisting that his doctrine is not simply a naturalistic pantheism. Just as much as Spinoza, though in a different way, he seeks to overcome the dualism of nature and mind. And the conjecture that there is a development in his writings from a more naturalistic to a more spiritualistic doctrine is in itself plausible; for, in a passage of *Della Causa*, "Teofilo," the representative of Bruno, declares that he once inclined to the opinion of "Democritus and the Epicureans," who say that that which is not body is nothing, and who consequently will have it that matter alone is the substance of things and is also the divine nature, as was said by Avicembron in the *Fons Vitæ*; but that, having more maturely considered, he had found that it is necessary to recognise two kinds of substance—"matter" and "form" (Wagner, i. 251). Nevertheless there seems to be no evidence in Bruno's existing writings of such a development. Both sides of his doctrine are already clearly present in the *De Umbris Idearum*. The *Eroici Furori*, published in London, is chiefly expressive of its spiritualistic or Platonist side. And in the Frankfort books there are expressions of its naturalistic side identical with those of *Della Causa*.

The truth seems to be that before writing anything philosophical Bruno had arrived at the pantheistic doctrine of which an expression, as of something already familiar to him, is found in the dedication of his Italian comedy *Il Candelaio* and in some

elegiacs at the end of the *De Umbris Idearum*. In these condensed expressions the stress is laid on the unity and permanence of substance and the eternity of vicissitude. Vicissitude, according to Bruno's philosophy, is possible only by the coincidence of contraries in the one Principle of things. The one Principle, the identity of unity and infinite number, becomes explicit in the productive energies and varied forms of nature. Nature produces the human mind, and the mind seeks to return, by intellectual concentration, to the unity of its principle. Thus the source of things and the end to which they aspire are one and the same.

A more correct interpretation of the doctrine of which this is an outline has been arrived at by M. Renouvier in his *Classification systématique des Doctrines philosophiques* when he describes Bruno as the most consistent of all pantheists in so far as he most explicitly makes the contrast of good and evil vanish with all other contrasts in the Absolute, than by Prof. Carrière when he sees in it theistic elements. That this consistent pantheism does not lead to a moral indifference such as M. Renouvier thinks ought to be its consequence, is evident, however, from the passages in which Bruno touches upon ethical questions. In the *Spaccio* he pronounces a strong condemnation on all that in modern times has been called "Machiavellism," with obvious reference to some positions of Machiavelli himself (Wagner, ii. 217). Like Lucretius, he has in view the ethical applications of his philosophy; showing how it "takes away the dark veil of the mad opinion concerning Orcus and the greedy Charon," how it destroys the fables that are related of maleficent gods, "the dogmas of the sycophants"—

Absona quæ ingenio, et sensu constantia nullo,
Humanam turbant pacem seclique quietem,
Extinguunt mentis lucem neque moribu' prosunt.

His attacks on historical Christianity are above all on ethical grounds, and it is especially the practical accompaniments of the creed in his own day that move his indignation. His *Bestia Trionfante*, in one of its significations, has precisely the meaning that modern criticism finds in Voltaire's *Infâme*. Among the manifestations of the monster, the chiefs of the Catholic Reaction are not obscurely indicated.

The general nature of Bruno's treatment of theological mysteries in the *Spaccio* and of his "Euhemeristic" theory of mythology is very well brought out by Prof. Carrière, though he does not perhaps quite see that intellectually Bruno was specially hostile to the three monotheistic Semitic religions, for the reason that he found more easily in polytheism an exoteric expression of one side of his philosophy. In his attitude towards theology, to judge from one passage (ii. 99), Prof. Carrière supposes that there was a development—his later books being

less contrary to the faith than his earlier—and that this development is established by Bruno's own words before the Inquisition at Venice. Prof. Carrière's interpretation, however, is not borne out by the passage in the documents that seems to be referred to (Berti, *Vita di Giordano Bruno*, p. 353). And, as a matter of fact, the Latin poems, while they contain fewer passages directed against theological doctrines than the *Spaccio* and the *Cabala*, contain more than *Della Causa* and *Dell' Infinito*, to which in their general subject-matter they closely correspond.

There are, no doubt, variations of mood in Bruno's attitude towards Christianity; but not such as indicate any real change of mind. When he speaks favourably of "the theologians" it is on the supposition that they are willing to tolerate philosophy and even to recognise it as superior to theology. The religion of philosophy is for the few, the religion of faith for the many, who are unable to rise to philosophic virtue or have not sufficient natural goodness to act rightly without external law. By those who are only capable of faith and not of reason, the moral precepts of religion must be accepted as commands, and the theologians, having practice alone in view, may attach to them as sanctions doctrines which the philosophers from the point of view of free speculation may reject. But when false leaders arise who, seeking their own gain under the pretext of promoting religion, teach that the gods care only for the beliefs of men, when they extol ignorance and credulity as superior to knowledge and reason, and persecute those who hold other opinions, they are to be regarded as Hydras and Chimæras worse than those of old time; and to overcome them is the task of the heroes of the present world. "True fathers and shepherds of the people" have never prejudiced the liberty of philosophers.

This attitude of Bruno explains perfectly his partial submission to the Church before the Venetian tribunal. As Prof. Carrière says, he had no intention of recanting his philosophical ideas. "He recanted his ecclesiastical heresies, not his philosophy." And in return for this purely formal submission in matters of theology, he wished to be free to pursue his philosophical career, not merely as a student but as a writer, without molestation. His hope was that the fury of the Catholic reaction had abated, and that the new Pope, who was said to be favourable to learning, might accept the dedication of a book he had just composed. Some have found a difficulty in reconciling with this submission his subsequent refusal to recant certain propositions drawn from his writings. The difference, however, from Bruno's point of view, between a submission to the Church in theology, implying only that he had no intention of directly attacking the popular faith and was not an adherent of any new sect, and the unconditional recantation of propositions of his own philosophy, seems sufficiently obvious.

At the end of his exposition Prof. Carrière makes some interesting and instructive comparisons of Bruno with later philosophers. The analogy with Spinoza has always been the first to suggest itself. This analogy Prof. Carrière draws out in the manner already indicated. In Bruno he finds the original harmony of the doctrines of the unity of the world and the individuality of its parts that were developed in a one-sided manner by Spinoza and Leibniz; and he further contends that to the Spinozistic notion of substance Bruno added the conception of a divine "self-consciousness." This last contention, although not admissible in the precise form in which Prof. Carrière defends it, has yet an element of truth. Bruno, like Spinoza, calls the extended world an "attribute" of God; but with Bruno thought is not simply an attribute parallel with extension, but, as absolute, is identified with God himself. The idea of personality, or of "self-consciousness" in the special sense, is no more present, however, in Bruno's doctrine than in Spinoza's. The doctrine of absolute thought as the unity from which all things proceed and to which they aspire according to the degree of their perfection, is the spiritualistic side of Bruno's pantheism. On the other side, he also identifies Nature, in one of its meanings, with God. "*Natura est Deus in rebus.*" Nature, again, is sometimes identified with matter, and from matter all forms of things are said to proceed; nature, as an "internal artist," producing the more perfect from the less perfect. By "matter" is not to be understood here the matter of the Epicureans, but matter as coinciding in the absolute with "form," or matter to each element of which is joined an element of spirit, so that the world is animated as a whole and in every part. It is to express this side of his doctrine and not the properly spiritualistic or intellectualistic side that he quotes the well-known lines of Virgil, ending—"*Mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet.*" By the substitution of "toto" for "magno"—a variation which always occurs in his quotation of this line—the idea of the universal animation of the world, rather than of its direction by intelligence, is still more accentuated. The notion of intelligence as directing things finds its expression in the identification of Fate with Providence; but the perfection of the world which is said to be its final cause is not an ultimate state, but is the actualisation of all possibilities. In the theory of particular things, of the life of animals, for example, this doctrine becomes what is now known as the doctrine of "internal teleology." All things seek their own preservation according to the knowledge they have of that which is conformable or opposed to their nature. The actions of ants and spiders, for example, are not directed from without by "unerring divine intelligences," but from within "by their own prudence and artifice." What seems extraordinary in the actions of some animals, Bruno suggests, may be explained by supposing that

they have senses which man has not. In what relates to the souls of individual things, Prof. Carrière has noticed especially resemblances to Leibniz. As the terms "mode" and "attribute" are used incidentally by Bruno in the Spinozistic sense, so the term "*monas*" is used by him in the Leibnizian sense. There is indeed considerable development of the notion that real things are minima of animated being, each minimum containing implicitly the universe, but each from an aspect of its own. For, as with Leibniz, no two real individual things in the universe are absolutely alike. The principle of "the coincidence of contraries," derived immediately from Nicholas of Cusa, by which he combines the opposite terms of his pantheism—the indivisible intellectual unity to which the mind aspires and the infinite multiplicity of a universally animated nature, has obvious, if perhaps superficial, resemblances to the dialectic of Hegel. When individual things are represented as all in perpetual mutation, some approaching and some receding from the absolute unity, every soul or central monad occupying in turn all positions in "the wheel of metamorphosis," we may better see in this an imaginative prevision of modern science, metaphysically interpreted, than of Hegel's timeless "dialectical" evolution.

In his attitude towards science, as Prof. Carrière says, Giordano Bruno is a guiding star for philosophers. The confidence with which he took up the Copernican astronomy into his system has been entirely justified by the succeeding centuries. That theory, in his day, was in the position of the theory of organic evolution before Darwin; and it ought to be remembered that he not only accepted the theory of Copernicus but made an extension of it which has also become a permanent scientific possession. Isolated suggestions of ideas that have since become important or celebrated have frequently been pointed out. The saying, for example, that the moderns are in reality older than the ancients, occurs in Bruno. The preference he expressed for the earlier philosophers of Greece in physics and metaphysics, while allowing the supremacy of Aristotle in "the humanistic sciences," has been shared by many later students. He in a manner anticipated "the Cartesian doubt," as is pointed out by Prof. Carrière, though he did not make it the beginning of a systematic theory of knowledge. In all that relates to "theory of knowledge," indeed, it must be admitted that Bruno remains outside the specifically modern philosophic movement. The modern distinction of subject and object, dating from Descartes, could not of course be present to him. This makes it difficult to compare his philosophy with any system that starts from Cartesianism. His general doctrine, when compared with Spinoza's parallelism of the attributes of extension and thought, appears to be predominatingly idealistic; and this brings him nearer in some respects to later philosophy; but his idealism cannot be identified with

any form of post-Cartesian idealism. At the same time it is not mere Platonism. Bruno's doctrine of matter in *Della Causa* is alone sufficient to distinguish him from the ordinary Platonists. The ideas of his philosophy, like those of the pantheistic philosophy of the Renaissance in general, are of course largely drawn from Neo-Platonist sources. And his mediæval precursors in the theory of matter—Avicenna and David of Dinant—had started also from Platonism. Bruno, however, does not suppose himself to be simply passing on their theory, as has sometimes been assumed, but, while commending them for what they affirm as to the permanence of the material principle of things, finds their mode of expression inadequate, as not taking account of the formal principle which is eternally conjoined with matter, but only of accidental forms. With Bruno's doctrine of matter goes the predominant direction of his thought to the ascending rather than the descending movement of things. Here he was probably influenced by the Stoics, and by the earlier philosophers of Greece, whom he constantly cites. Indeed there was no form of speculative thought known to his age by which he was entirely uninfluenced. This receptiveness is joined with an equally remarkable freedom. Of the submission of the spirit to external authority not a trace remains. His laudatory citations from all sources—philosophical and poetical, orthodox and heterodox, classical and biblical—are above all the expression of an intellectual or æsthetic admiration. This is characteristic of the freer spirits of the time. The reactionary return of the past is illustrated when, in the next age, we find Campanella, some of whose speculations have so much affinity with Bruno's, laboriously establishing his points by quotations from the Fathers. We moderns, Prof. Carrière says in commenting on this, have no longer any conception of the despotism of authority that then reigned. It ought to be added that for a brief interval and by a small number of minds this despotism had been thrown off, though long efforts were required before the more widely extended emancipation of modern times could be attained and made practically secure.

Whatever criticisms it may have been necessary to make on Prof. Carrière's general view of Bruno's doctrine, the great merits of his exposition are beyond dispute; and much of the spirit of Bruno has passed into the translations of verse from the Frankfort books and the *Eroici Furori*. The life has of course been re-written so as to include the results of all the documents published since 1846. For illustration of the sources and historical relations of Bruno's single ideas Bartholmæss must still be read; while Prof. Carrière's treatment of the whole philosophical history of the age supplies fuller information as to his intellectual surroundings and immediate antecedents. The only fault of the chapter on Bruno as a literary and philosophical study

is the tendency that has already been remarked to tone down some of his distinctive ideas. That this is not entirely without effect on the details may be briefly shown by comparison of the last pages of Prof. Carrière's systematic exposition of the philosophy (ii. 160-2) with the passage in the dedication of *Dell' Infinito* of which it is for the most part a somewhat condensed translation.

Here is a portion of the passage as given by Prof. Carrière :—

" We fear not, therefore, that the multiplicity of things on this earth should by the power of some black wandering demon, or by the anger of a thundering Jupiter, be hurled out of this dome and shattered and dispersed beyond this vault of heaven or crumble to dust outside the starry mantle above us; for nature cannot perish in essence, and vanishes only in appearance, like the air in a burst bubble. *There is no succession of things without an eternal ground, a first and a last.* There are no limits and walls that should confine the infinite and bound its fulness."

The sentences to which these correspond in Bruno are as follows :—

" We fear not that that which is accumulated in this world, should by the vehemence of some wandering spirit, or by the anger of some thundering Jupiter, be dispersed out of this vault or dome of heaven, or shaken and scattered as in dust out of this starry mantle, and the nature of things not otherwise become void in substance than to the appearance of our eyes that air which was comprised within the concavity of a bubble is dissipated; *for there is known to us a world in which for ever thing succeeds thing, neither is there any ultimate profound, from whence, as from the hand of the smith, they should irreparably vanish into nothingness.* There are no limits, terms, margins, walls, that should defraud us or withdraw from us the infinite fulness of things."

The remainder of the passage concludes from the infinite power of God that the universe, or eternal image of God, must be infinite also, on the ground that in God will and power, act and possibility, coincide. The last sentences are thus expounded by Prof. Carrière :—

" Not vain is the power of the understanding to add space to space, unity to unity, mass to mass, number to number; thereby it breaks the chain of the finite and raises itself to the freedom of the infinite; thereby it is loosed from the poverty and exults in the riches of life, and no Pluto can hold it imprisoned, no sphere bound it. Nature is an all-fertile mother, *and God is not envious but is love itself.*"

In Bruno they are as follows :—

" So that not vain is this power of intellect which ever will and can add space to space, mass to mass, unity to unity, number to number, by that science that unbinds us from the chains of a most narrow and promotes us to the liberty of a most august empire; that takes us from the believed poverty and narrowness to the innumerable riches of so great a space, of so worthy a field, of so many cultivated worlds; and lets not circle of horizon counterfeited by the eye on earth and feigned by fantasy in the spacious ether imprison our spirit under the wardship of a Pluto and the compassion of a Jove. We are exempt from the care of so rich a possessor and then so parsimonious, sordid and avaricious a giver, and from the nurture of a so fertile and all-pregnant and then so meanly and miserably parturient Nature."

Now, of course, as Prof. Carrière is not ostensibly translating from *Dell' Infinito*, but is using it as material for his own interpretation, he has a right to make alterations. The words omitted from the passages just quoted, and a sentence praising "Democritus and Epicurus," which is omitted from the intermediate passage, may seem to Prof. Carrière incongruous or not characteristic; as, perhaps, according to his theistic interpretation of Bruno, they are. And he could find support for the words substituted. The reason why his variations in this particular case have been cited is to indicate exactly where he may seem to readers who do not approach the subject with his pre-suppositions to fall short of perfect appreciation of Bruno's way of thinking. Within the limits imposed by the desire to approximate the philosopher of Nola to the Christian mystics, neither his general interpretation nor his detailed exposition could be better.

THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY¹

THESE substantial volumes form a piece of work that was well worth doing, and is very well done. In the shape of studies of particular thinkers, they include both a history, in effect continuous, of modern theories of Cause, and an independent discussion of the scientific validity of the conception and its philosophical basis. The author, it may be noted at the outset, proclaims himself a Kantian; and being, as nearly as possible, a pure Kantian, he finds much to agree with in English experiential philosophy both before and after Kant. It is on the experiential side of Kant that he especially dwells, one of his principal results being the rejection—in reference to the conception of Cause—of philosophic rationalism. Not merely the particular phenomena that are thought of as causally connected, but the causal relation itself, is given in experience. A mental "activity" is required to turn the "given" order into a necessary connexion; but the criteria by which we know that the relation is one of cause and effect are wholly experiential. The rationalistic view of the causal sequence, the notion of the effect as *deducible* from its cause apart from previous experience, though not yet wholly banished from scientific thought so far as it is uninformed by philosophy, can no longer have any place in the philosophical theory of science.

The rationalistic notion of Cause, as the author begins by showing, was the predominant one at the opening of modern philosophy. By Descartes it was expressly formulated, and over English philosophy down to Locke it retained a powerful influence. Cause was defined as that from which the effect follows with necessity; the conception of the effect being necessarily involved in the conception of the cause. The starting-point was here given by certain scholastic definitions; but the notion of Cause took its distinctively modern character first from its combination with the monistic doctrine of the unity of composition of all things, and then from its expression in

¹ *Die Entwicklung des Causalproblems von Cartesius bis Kant. Studien zur Orientierung über die Aufgaben der Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre.* Von Dr. EDMUND KOENIG. Leipzig: O. Wigand, 1888. Pp. vi., 340.

Die Entwicklung des Causalproblems in der Philosophie seit Kant. Studien zur Orientierung, &c. (Zweiter Theil) Von Dr. EDMUND KOENIG. Leipzig: O. Wigand, 1890. Pp. xii., 488.

terms of the mechanical philosophy." That it could be made use of for the actual explanation of nature was owing to the employment along with experiment, by the men of genius who founded modern physics, of the method of analysis. Galileo's foundation of dynamics, for example, was the result of the application of analytical thought to experiences of motion. Such elements in the phenomenon were distinguished as could be experimented upon in sufficient isolation. Whatever discoveries might be made by experiment thus directed, it was nevertheless a long time before science attained the conception of an observed uniformity as constituting a natural "law." For Galileo, as for Descartes, no proposition was entitled to rank as a "law" unless it could be deduced rationally from some immediately evident axiom. The art, it is true, was in analysing complex relations into simple relations that could be established or disproved by experiment; but to the completed process the form of a deduction had to be given. So long as the relations were those involved in the communication of motion by contact, they appeared so obvious that the method of pure deduction could be taken almost without question as the ideal method. The "mechanical philosophy" could look forward to a complete demonstration of all natural processes from the definition of matter as having figure and impenetrability, together with like simple definitions of motion and so forth. Newton's employment of the principle of "action at a distance" was regarded by the philosophical mechanicians as a falling off from this view; such action not being deducible from their definition of matter: and even Newton did not venture at once to reject the conception of a physical axiom as an immediately evident principle, and of a scientific "law" as to be deduced from axioms. Gravitation was asserted as something really occurring, though not in itself immediately intelligible, that might in the future receive deductive explanation. The Newtonian principle, in the meantime, was found to furnish a thoroughgoing scientific interpretation of the planetary motions such as the rigorous "mechanical" doctrine could not give, and so tended to bring into vogue an experiential philosophy for which ultimate natural laws were neither deducible from mere general axioms nor immediately evident. Then, as scientific research made its way more and more into details, there went on an accumulation of observed uniformities that could not be deduced from any recognised principles. Such uniformities also came to be called "laws," and the conception of a scientific law as a uniformity, whether deducible or not, at length became the prevalent one.

Partly promoting and partly promoted by the scientific movement towards experientialism, there was a properly philosophical movement. The Occasionalist school, anticipating later "Positivism," denied that there is any rationally deducible or imme-

diately evident connexion among natural events; nature, so far as accessible to science, being regarded as "phenomenal," or as consisting of appearances without real "intelligible" relations to one another. To natural science is refused the rational character that Descartes strove to impress upon it. The only recognised "cause," in the older sense, is the will of God. All relations discovered by science are, therefore, arbitrary connexions. It is not to be judged apart from experience what connexions exist or do not exist in nature. There is a fixed order in things, but no real efficiency. The efficient cause is "meta-physical." A rationalistic metaphysic is thus combined with an empirical and phenomenist view of natural law. Independently, the English experiential movement made way. From the ground of Locke's psychological criticism of knowledge, Berkeley proceeded to a completely phenomenist view of nature, and Hume to a phenomenism (in combination with scepticism) extended universally. The conception of the causal relation as a necessary connexion, involving an intelligible "power" of the cause to produce its effect, became untenable as far as the phenomenist view extended. With Berkeley it disappeared for corporeal things, but not for "spirits"; with Hume it disappeared altogether. Scientifically, no causal connexions—not even the most "obvious" mechanical ones—could now be asserted prior to experience. Influenced or not by this movement, the scientific rationalism of Descartes, while it was carried forward, was also made less rigorous. In Spinoza, indeed, it reached its consummation; but Leibniz, by his principle of "sufficient reason," prepared the way for an experiential view of natural law, combined with an *a priori* theory of knowledge. Kant, as the author maintains, brought the double development to a conclusion which is, in essentials, definitive. Later thought, while it has not failed to be penetrated to some extent by the Kantian criticism, and has made great advances in detail, has yet recurred, more or less, on one side to rationalistic doctrines of the pre-Kantian type, and on the other side to pure experientialism. A return to the Kantian criticism is still necessary, in order to correct the results of thinkers like Comte or Mill on the one side, and Herbart or Lotze on the other.

This is a general outline of what the author aims at showing historically. Let us now try to follow him in more detail, bringing out his most interesting points in relation to particular topics.

First, it may be useful to recapitulate the names of the thinkers discussed. They are, in the first volume: Descartes, Malebranche (as representing Occasionalism), Spinoza, Leibniz, Wolff, Crusius, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, the Scottish School (Reid), Kant; in the second volume: Maine de Biran, Schopenhauer, Trendelenburg, Herbart, Lotze, Comte (omitted in the table of contents), Mill, Ernst Laas and Carl

Goering ("German Empiricists"), Spencer, Riehl, Hartmann and Volkelt ("Transcendental Realists"), Wundt. The work is rounded off by a general "Introduction," a special introduction (to the first volume) on "The Causal Conception in the Natural Science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries," and conclusions (to the second volume) on "The Causal Conception in the Natural Science of to-day" and "The Causal Conception in the Psychology of to-day."

The maxim of Causality—or, more generally, of Uniformity of Nature—whether it is explained according to rationalistic or experiential principles, may be stated either as a law of persistence or as a law of constant sequence. With the rationalists of the seventeenth century, it tended to take the form of a law of persistence of matter and "motion." Simultaneity of cause and effect, and the implication of effect in cause, result from the purely *logical* view of the relation. To this view the ancient position that nothing is created or destroyed was taken as equivalent, and was asserted for the whole history of the world, so far as accessible to science. Revived Atomism asserted it for matter; and by Descartes and Leibniz it was applied in different ways to motion. Here, what the great speculative thinkers really did was to "postulate" that in motion there is something quantitatively constant. By purely rational deduction no approximatively accurate formulation of that which is constant was arrived at except by accident. Leibniz's view that motion, when there is question of its constancy, ought to be measured by *vis viva* and not by momentum, could not be established deductively against any other view. Yet it was the constant affirmation of such extremely general principles, supposed to be axiomatic, that pointed out the way to special investigators. The atomic hypothesis has been taken up into exact science. So also the assertion of constancy in "motion" got accurate formulation and proof, when in recent times the law of Conservation of Energy was experimentally established. A law of a certain type, or a very general hypothesis, had all along been in view as a possible means of co-ordinating phenomena. Scientific insight had only to detect the right moment for recurring to the hypothesis, or for seeking accurate experimental verification of a precise formula.

With the theories based on Gravitation and Natural Selection, as might have been shown at length, the case is somewhat different. Here an observed process, which had only been taken into account within a small range, or had been incidentally generalised in a more or less conjectural manner by some isolated thinker, was all at once taken up and made the principle of a system of scientific explanation of the highest generality. For this reason the achievements of Newton and Darwin are rightly looked upon as the supreme expressions of scientific genius.

Philosophic thought had not so distinctly prepared for them as for the achievements of Dalton and Joule.

The *method* of the rationalist thinkers, we may say in general agreement with Dr. Koenig, is to a large extent justified. A large part of science owes its origin to philosophic thought ascending very rapidly to the most general principles; and even where philosophic thought has had less part in the origination of scientific theories, bold speculation and hypothesis are just as necessary as experiment. It was the conditions of *proof*, as distinguished from discovery, that remained to be established by the philosophic experientialists. The rationalistic error was not in inventing theories before finding out all that can be known of the facts, but in supposing that there can be any valid deduction of a natural process from principles of knowledge apart from the constant appeal to experience.

This error, as Dr. Koenig shows, assumed two forms. One of its forms was the supposition that effects can be deduced from causes by the logical law of Identity. The other was the attempt to construct natural laws by pure mathematics. In the thinkers of the seventeenth century the two forms are not clearly distinguishable. Among the post-Kantians Herbart illustrates the attempt to reduce all science—mathematics included—to formal logic; while the idea of a mathematical construction of effects from causes is illustrated in its purity by Trendelenburg. The Herbartian view, looked at from one side, is an extreme rationalism. Yet when the Kantian distinction between “analytic” and “synthetic” judgments disappears in complete vagueness, so that no *a priori* is recognised but the laws of formal logic, an approach is made to experientialism.

The first advance beyond pure rationalism on its own lines was the introduction by Leibniz of the principle of “sufficient reason,” or of “ground and consequent,” as a scientific principle. Theoretically it was still held that all laws ought to be deduced from immediately evident principles of knowledge; but, when deduction was impossible, the actual existence of an experimental sequence under proper conditions was held to indicate that one phenomenon is the “cause” of another which constantly follows it. That is to say, if we knew its nature thoroughly we should be able to think it as the intelligible “ground” of the “effect,” or succeeding phenomenon, which accordingly is to be regarded as its “consequent.” The appeal to experience was admitted more explicitly by Wolff, who expressly asserted the distinction between the “ideal” and the “real” ground, left vague by Leibniz; and still more explicitly by Crusius, who made the real co-ordinate with the ideal ground, to which it had hitherto been subordinated. Thus the Leibnizian rationalism, even before Kant, was still further weakened.

In the meantime the rationalistic view, consistently worked out, had led to the assertion of a stringent determinism. Spinoza had here developed the doctrine to its legitimate conclusion. He also, first of the moderns, had found a reconciliation of determinism with the "moral freedom" of man. This was not a new problem taken up by Leibniz, as it is sometimes made to appear; nor did Leibniz, in his solution of it, succeed in attenuating the Spinozistic determinism to the smallest extent. His "moral" or "teleological" determination is no less really "necessary" than the logical or mathematical determination of Spinoza.

On the ground of experientialism Hobbes had already asserted a deterministic doctrine as rigorous as Spinoza's. By Hobbes and Spinoza, whether determinism was strictly demonstrated or not, the proof of "metaphysical freedom" drawn from the declaration of self-consciousness had been rendered once for all impossible. This is henceforth a "classical truth."

The further transformation of rationalism by Kant consisted, so far as causation is concerned, in assigning not only all particular causal sequences, but the form itself of the causal relation, to experience; the thinking mind being held to contribute simply the affirmation of the causal relation as "necessary." This affirmation is *a priori* because it is added to the "given" experience. And nothing in it is *a priori* but the "intrinsic constraint" by which the given causal order is turned into a necessary connexion. Thus rationalism in its older form has entirely disappeared. The results of the English critical movement have been incorporated in the Kantian doctrine. The doctrine is now, as the author expresses it, "Positivism"—but with "Apriorism" superposed.

More exactly, while upholding "Positivism" against "Rationalism," and "Phenomenalism" against "Realism," Dr. Koenig at the same time places himself on the side of "Apriorism" against "Empiricism," and of "Intellectualism" (as he says) against "Sensualism." To understand his theory of Kant's view of causation we must therefore follow out separately his history of the *a priori* doctrine in modern philosophy.

The "*a priori*" is not the "innate." Locke's polemic against "innate ideas" present as such before "perceptions," was fully justified. Even in the Cartesian school, innate ideas have a "logical" rather than a "psychological" significance, though Descartes did not always make the distinction sufficiently clear. Leibniz, in his polemic against Locke, insisted more expressly on this distinction, and, by his insistence on it, was the first to put forward "theory of knowledge" as a philosophical doctrine independent of psychology. Both Descartes and Leibniz had at the same time attempted a psychological defence of their common doctrine. Ideas, it was said, are present in the mind

before experience "potentially" though not actually. Leibniz therefore professed, along with logical "apriorism," a form of psychological "nativism." Kant went beyond this point and effectually established "apriorism" as a theory of knowledge without mixture of psychology. Knowledge, he held, can only be explained in virtue of *a priori* elements, "logical" and not "psychological." What philosophy needs is an "epistemological hypothesis" showing how certain "transcendental" elements, as they may be called, since they are not discoverable in experience, but are necessary to constitute it, can explain knowledge, which cannot be explained without them. Such an epistemological hypothesis is furnished by the Kantian system.

The distinction between psychology and logic, it may be at once conceded to Dr. Koenig, is a very important one. But is it applicable in the particular way he here contends for? Are not all elements in "knowledge" elements in mind, and, as such, part of the subject-matter of psychological science? It may be said that "psychological" elements become "logical" when they are either naturally in conformity with, or are voluntarily brought into conformity with, a certain intellectual "norm": but they do not for that cease to be psychological; and the bringing of them into conformity with a norm is itself a psychological process. Dr. Koenig even is disposed to find in Prof. Wundt's "apperception" the intellectual "activity" that contributes the *a priori* element in knowledge. This, he supposes, may turn merely "associative" into "logical" processes. But "apperception," if, as Prof. Wundt holds, it is a kind of volition, is a psychological event just as much as the mere associative process to which it is supposed to add itself.

These remarks have reference to Thought in general rather than to the special question of Cause. When we turn to this, the point becomes still clearer. Every *a priori* theory of Cause consists essentially in the attempt to show that there is some mental (that is, psychological) element in the conception, to the mere nature of which belongs the conferring of logical validity. That this is the case with an *a priori* theory such as that of Maine de Biran—"the French Kant"—Dr. Koenig admits. Here the causal conception is derived from experiences of volition; in these experiences causal efficiency is supposed to be known directly. Dr. Koenig's criticism is that, although this theory of the causal conception may be true as a theory of its psychological origin, the validity of the law of causation is not thereby proved. But, in Kant's own theory, is it otherwise than by leaving the conception of mental "activity" quite vague that the appearance comes of introducing into the mental life something that is not "psychological" at all, but purely "logical"? If an accurate expression is desired for the

"*a priori* elements in knowledge," where can this be looked for but in a determination of them by psychological analysis?

"Apriorism," it is clear, needs a psychological basis as much as experientialism. Experientialism, on the other side, can employ the distinction between logic and psychology for the vindication of scientific knowledge just as much as "apriorism." It was in part the mixture of psychological with logical points of view which, in Hume's theory of Cause, gave the experiential doctrine its sceptical colouring. To have shown this, according to Dr. Koenig, was a considerable portion of Kant's service. Now if, in reference to the conception of cause, Kant had simply pointed out this distinction, and for the rest accepted Hume's doctrine, his position would have been pure experientialism. Unless his "apriorism" can deal more effectively with the sceptical view of Cause than by a distinction which the experientialist can also make, it seems, from the logical point of view, a superfluous addition.

While taking from Hume the conception of causation as a particular kind of sequence, Kant, in Dr. Koenig's view, made it possible, as it is not for the pure experientialist, to regard causation as "necessary"; and this he was enabled to do by his philosophical "hypothesis." In this hypothesis consisted his material advance on Leibniz. While Leibniz had assumed a merely "analytic" function of the mind, Kant assumed an original "synthetic" function. "Synthetic knowledge *a priori*," made possible by this function, is found first of all in mathematical axioms; but the synthetic function of the mind contributes also an element to the conception of Cause. Into the question of mathematical axioms and its solution on experiential grounds it is not necessary to enter. The question of Cause is what we have specially to deal with; and it can be treated separately. It may be admitted that the clear distinction of mathematical axioms, under the provisional designation of "synthetic judgments *a priori*," from formal inferences on the one side and from *a posteriori* knowledge of natural processes on the other, was a very important step in theory of knowledge, and constituted a definite problem for experientialism¹; and yet it may be contended that the special Kantian apparatus has done nothing for the problem of Cause. To decide upon its

¹ This problem is dealt with by Croom Robertson in the article "Axiom," *Philosophical Remains*, pp. 119-132. The general position as regards mathematics is that "acting constructively in our experience both of number and form, we, in a manner, *make* the ultimate relations of both to be what for us they must be in all circumstances" (p. 129). The shade of difference here from Kant's position is only that an attempt is made to find a basis for our constructive power in experiences of "active sense" correlated with muscular movement. If this attempt is set aside (and later psychology has not confirmed it) the doctrine becomes pure Kantianism as now accepted for their science by some mathematicians.

value here, let us see first more precisely what can be done by experientialism. Dr. Koenig himself provides us with material for the decision.

The causal axiom, in his view, is essentially an assertion of "invariable and unconditional sequence." This view he finds with greater or less perfection in Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Mill. To Hume he ascribes the first quite definite determination of the causal problem; to Kant the banishment of Hume's scepticism by means of the *a priori* doctrine; to Mill the statement of accurate criteria by which causal connexions may be distinguished from connexions that are not causal; and to Schopenhauer an anticipation of the special form taken by phenomenism in Mill's view of Cause. Against Mr. Spencer and others, he urges that the causal axiom, as applying to sequences, cannot be deduced from any law of "persistence" or "conservation." The law of conservation of energy does not tell us what other form of energy will emerge as the result of the disappearance of energy in one form; it only tells us that the quantity will remain unchanged. Phenomena may involve the presence of the same quantity of energy and yet be qualitatively different. The law of conservation, therefore, does not necessarily imply that the same cause has always the same (qualitative) effect. But this is required by science, and is asserted by the causal law in its ordinary form.

In recent times, the establishment of the principle of conservation of energy has helped to bring back the view that cause and effect are "identical." A "law of identity" of cause and effect, in the sense of quantitative equivalence, might perhaps be allowed if it were not for the tendency to regard it as deducible from the logical law of the same name. Dr. Koenig, in complete accordance with experiential principles, shows the impossibility of any such deduction. The Heraclitean doctrine of "absolute becoming," as it is well said in a quotation he makes from Lotze (ii. 167), cannot be refuted by the logical law of Identity; "for this only asserts that *m* is *m* in case it is, and so long as it is, but whether it is, and whether it must always be if it is once, upon those points the law decides nothing." A physical "law of identity," in short, is an assertion about real existence, and no one can be forced to admit it by the mere requirement of intellectual consistency. In this respect—that is to say, in being a material and not a purely formal principle—it is entirely on the same ground as the law of causation of successive events.

This view in its general sense, an experientialist must accept. Yet perhaps rather more significance ought to be assigned to laws of Conservation than Dr. Koenig allows. It may be conceded that such laws are not by themselves sufficient to express the Uniformity of Nature in its full meaning; yet they are the

most stringent expressions of that principle. A physical "law of identity" has even a certain special force against the sceptical view of causation. The scientific statement of it is more easily detached from any psychological account of the way in which it was arrived at than is the law of successive events. To show how we come to believe that "every event has a cause," and how our belief might be determined even if the proposition were not true, seems to throw doubt on the truth of the proposition itself. The causation of successive events is undoubtedly capable of scientific interpretation as Mill has shown; and it is indispensable scientifically; but the popular origin of the belief in causation clings to it. A law of conservation is not only more easily viewed with regard simply to its truth or falsehood, but also, if we seek for its origin, we find it in the first impulses of speculation rather than in the "customary conjunctions" of common sense.

Up to this point, what Dr. Koenig lays down, and what has been said by way of objection or supplement, is all on the ground of experientialism. The position that can now be stated is this. Psychologically, either the view of Hume or of Maine de Biran as to the origin of the belief in causation might be accepted, and the truth of the causal law would neither be proved nor disproved. The belief may have its root in experiences of volition, or it may spring simply from observations of external sequences. In either case, the law of causation is to be affirmed not because of its origin, but because it is an indispensable postulate of scientific investigation, and is constantly verified and never contradicted by duly tested experience. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that there remains always for the experientialist the logical possibility of an exception to it. This is much insisted on by Dr. Koenig; and he apparently regards it as the great logical difficulty passed on from Hume to Kant, and not to be solved except by the Kantian "apriorism."

There is, of course, no absolute inconsistency between this view and the admission, which Dr. Koenig makes, that the form of temporal succession, asserted by Kant as the "schema" of Cause, cannot be deduced on Kantian principles; or at least that the deduction of it is a gap which no Kantian has yet filled up. For "apriorism," in Dr. Koenig's interpretation, does not profess to assign even the *form* of the causal connexion without an appeal to experience. By this interpretation, one great difficulty of Kantianism is undoubtedly avoided. A more serious difficulty, however, remains. For it seems as if, when the "synthetic unity of apperception" has once conferred "necessity" of thought, no scepticism as to the strict universality of the causal connexion ought to be any longer possible. Yet, for Dr. Koenig, it is not only possible but legitimate. The position of Lotze, that absolutely "new" causes are from time

value here, let us see first more precisely what can be done by experientialism. Dr. Koenig himself provides us with material for the decision.

The causal axiom, in his view, is essentially an assertion of "invariable and unconditional sequence." This view he finds with greater or less perfection in Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Mill. To Hume he ascribes the first quite definite determination of the causal problem; to Kant the banishment of Hume's scepticism by means of the *a priori* doctrine; to Mill the statement of accurate criteria by which causal connexions may be distinguished from connexions that are not causal; and to Schopenhauer an anticipation of the special form taken by phenomenalism in Mill's view of Cause. Against Mr. Spencer and others, he urges that the causal axiom, as applying to sequences, cannot be deduced from any law of "persistence" or "conservation." The law of conservation of energy does not tell us what other form of energy will emerge as the result of the disappearance of energy in one form; it only tells us that the quantity will remain unchanged. Phenomena may involve the presence of the same quantity of energy and yet be qualitatively different. The law of conservation, therefore, does not necessarily imply that the same cause has always the same (qualitative) effect. But this is required by science, and is asserted by the causal law in its ordinary form.

In recent times, the establishment of the principle of conservation of energy has helped to bring back the view that cause and effect are "identical." A "law of identity" of cause and effect, in the sense of quantitative equivalence, might perhaps be allowed if it were not for the tendency to regard it as deducible from the logical law of the same name. Dr. Koenig, in complete accordance with experiential principles, shows the impossibility of any such deduction. The Heraclitean doctrine of "absolute becoming," as it is well said in a quotation he makes from Lotze (ii. 167), cannot be refuted by the logical law of Identity; "for this only asserts that *m* is *m* in case it is, and so long as it is, but *whether* it is, and whether it must *always* be if it is once, upon those points the law decides nothing." A physical "law of identity," in short, is an assertion about real existence, and no one can be forced to admit it by the mere requirement of intellectual consistency. In this respect—that is to say, in being a material and not a purely formal principle—it is entirely on the same ground as the law of causation of successive events.

This view in its general sense, an experientialist must accept. Yet perhaps rather more significance ought to be assigned to laws of Conservation than Dr. Koenig allows. It may be conceded that such laws are not by themselves sufficient to express the Uniformity of Nature in its full meaning; yet they are the

most stringent expressions of that principle. A physical "law of identity" has even a certain special force against the sceptical view of causation. The scientific statement of it is more easily detached from any psychological account of the way in which it was arrived at than is the law of successive events. To show how we come to believe that "every event has a cause," and how our belief might be determined even if the proposition were not true, seems to throw doubt on the truth of the proposition itself. The causation of successive events is undoubtedly capable of scientific interpretation as Mill has shown; and it is indispensable scientifically; but the popular origin of the belief in causation clings to it. A law of conservation is not only more easily viewed with regard simply to its truth or falsehood, but also, if we seek for its origin, we find it in the first impulses of speculation rather than in the "customary conjunctions" of common sense.

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to time introduced into the world, is, he says, for the Kantian as well as for the pure experientialist, irrefutable. Where then is the gain for the Kantian? Is the Kantian position, thus interpreted, even self-consistent?

In any attempt at solution of the logical difficulty put by the sceptic, Kantianism would have to proceed on precisely the same lines as experientialism. Even for the theoretical sceptic as to universal causation, there may, as Hume showed, be no grounds for holding the uniformity of nature to have ever actually been interrupted. Further, if we desire a consistent metaphysical doctrine, we may be impelled to an absolute determinism carrying with it uninterrupted uniformity of nature as a corollary. A metaphysic like that of Lotze may be rejected because it does not give intellectual satisfaction. The adherent of Kant's theory of knowledge has here exactly the same arguments at command as the experientialist; but he has no advantage.

Two points may now be selected where the Kantian influence seems to have made Dr. Koenig take up a more uncertain position than he would otherwise have done. The first is as to the relation of mind and body. Psychological causation and physical causation, he would feel himself obliged to hold, must be treated as unbroken and without mutual interference, if it were not for the "activity of apperception." This he takes as a fact, and finds to be the only fact inconsistent with a denial of "psycho-physical" causation, or the production of physical effects by a psychical activity that has no organic correlate. Isolated as it is, the fact cannot be denied; for it is required to explain the "intrinsic constraint" from which comes the peculiar necessity of *a priori* truths. With some other writers, he accordingly finds it an advantage in Hume's and Mill's theory of Cause that "psycho-physical" and "physico-psychical" causation are not excluded on principle. There is, it may be allowed, in the denial of any real break either in the series of mental or physical causes a reassertion of an old rationalistic position, namely, that of Spinoza and Leibniz. The experiential philosopher, however, has no difficulty in modifying Hume's or Mill's thought to this extent. The Kantian "apriorism," on the contrary, has introduced a special difficulty, as we see. To Dr. Koenig this difficulty appears so great that it leads him to reject what he admits to be otherwise the most consistent view, and the view best supported by experience.¹

The second point is as to the form of idealism to be adopted. Dr. Koenig holds firmly to the Kantian "Transcendental Ideal-

¹ It seems desirable to note here that I have myself shared in the movement of increasing dissatisfaction with the dogma of "psycho-physical parallelism." In "A New Metaphysic of Evolution" (see Part ii) I have dealt with the question in some detail.

ism." This idealism, he acknowledges, has something in common with "Transcendental Realism"—the distinctive point of which is to retain in a more or less attenuated form the belief in an existence that is nothing if not "objective," and that yet has a reality apart from its relations to all subjects. In common with this doctrine, it refuses to resolve "the object of the naïve realist" into "mere representations." It recognises the rights of "empirical realism" against "empirical idealism." In other words, Dr. Koenig, like most Kantians, stops short of the consistent idealism arrived at on experiential grounds. The connexion of "apriorism" with this inconsequence is evident when he admits that Kantianism involves a difficulty never yet solved—and which he himself does not profess to solve—in the "coincidence of the empirical (corporeal) with the transcendental subject." For a thoroughgoing idealism this difficulty does not exist. When idealism is held quite consistently, the "corporeal subject" (as it has been put) is purely phenomenal. On the common ground of an idealistic and experiential theory of knowledge, different metaphysical doctrines may be arrived at; but the particular difficulty of accounting for the manifestation of a "transcendental subject" in a material organism has disappeared. Dr. Koenig's own view, except at certain points, is consistently phenomenist. His lapses into realism are clearly due to overstrict adherence to Kant.

Generally, there is more in Dr. Koenig's book for an experientialist to agree with than to disagree with. No attempt has been made to convey an idea of his full and careful examinations of particular thinkers. It can only be said that his exposition is of sustained excellence; being everywhere clear, impartial and appreciative. The result of the whole is to display one thing especially; and that is the steady philosophical advance that has been made in the discrimination of scientific conceptions and in the interpretation of natural law. To show this, no schematic arrangement of thinkers according to a theory of the historical movement has been necessary. When, in the first volume, Dr. Koenig places the Continental rationalists in a series by themselves, then the English experientialists, and lastly Kant (with Reid interpolated), he simply follows the traditional order without intending to maintain that either series is a wholly separate movement uninfluenced by the other. Indeed, he remarks that one of the few cases of strict "continuity" that the history of philosophy presents is the discussion of mental "relations" by Hume, Kant and Herbart. The typical example of philosophical continuity is, with him, the succession from Locke, through Berkeley, to Hume. This absence of any attempt at exact historical arrangement of thinkers in a line of development makes the advance that the reader may see in the whole movement, and the continuity of the movement in a certain

sense, more impressive. Perhaps it ought to be added that—as Dr. Koenig has borne in mind—a condition of perceiving the development is to keep in view especially the philosophy that has been in some kind of contact with science. This does not seem unreasonable when that which is in question is the logic of scientific thought.

SCIENCE AND IDEALISM¹

DESCRIBED as a defence of "atomistic and kinetic realism" against the attacks of a "radically positivist" theory of knowledge, Dr. Becher's careful and excellent work suggests the beginning of a new change in the meanings of philosophical terms. For the "realism" he upholds is not incompatible with that which in English thought has been known as idealism; and the "positivism" he opposes is an extreme phenomenism in comparison with which, as he observes himself, the positivism of Comte involves a whole-hearted acceptance of traditional hypotheses. The typical representatives of the new doctrine are Ostwald and Mach. Its aim is understood to be the elimination of every assertion about anything but actual sense-perceptions. Science indeed is still allowed the equivalents of the old "hypotheses"; but they are to be regarded as no more than useful "fictions." The representation, for example, of matter as atomic in structure, and the accounts given of the transformations of energy in terms of the motion of particles, cease for the new chemistry and physics to be anything but mathematical devices to facilitate calculation. An ideal science of "energetics" would dispense with all imaginary mechanism, and simply state that one kind of "energy" (heat, light, electricity, etc.) under given perceived conditions substitutes itself for another; no attempt being made at picturing the process to which this substitution corresponds. As those who have put forward the best-known expressions of the new doctrine are men of science, their positions cannot well be ignored in relation to scientific thought. It is in a scientific rather than in a metaphysical interest that Dr. Becher has submitted them to a judicial examination.

First he contends for the theoretical validity of hypotheses in general. By hypotheses are to be understood assumptions we may justifiably look forward to proving true or probable, or at the very least, possible. With a "fiction," the question of truth does not come in. The question is only whether it serves its purpose as a device for "economising" thought. How then does the hypothesis stand that there is an external world? For it is

¹ *Philosophische Voraussetzungen der exakten Naturwissenschaften.* Von Dr. ERICH BECHER, Privatdozent der Philosophie an der Universität Bonn. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1907. Pp. vii., 244.

the admission of a real external world that the "positivists" oppose. The dialectical case in their favour is skilfully put. The modern mechanical doctrine, it is first pointed out, has its foundation in the denial that the "secondary qualities" of matter are really in things. The primary qualities, the author goes on to show, are equally subjective. Extension has no claim to a reality that is denied to colour or sound. Touch cannot maintain itself as unquestionably corresponding to reality any more than sight; for it too is liable to illusions. To what quality of sense, tangible or visible, do the supposed real extended objects correspond? Between the "spaces" of the different kinds of sense it is impossible to decide. Is not the subjectivity of extension, then, in the end fatal to the mechanical doctrine, which seems to assert a known external cause of our perceptions?

In seeking a way of return from this revolutionary outlook, as he takes it to be for science, Dr. Becher first observes that by the phenomenists the immediate certainty of the given is not contested. From this in itself, however, he does not attempt to derive anything. On the contrary, his method is to show that for effective knowledge nothing can be got from it without a series of assumptions. For knowledge, in short, "we have to assume what can be doubted" (p. 66). Beyond immediately given phenomena, it is true, we have unconditional certainty in the logical axioms (laws of thought) and in the forms of inference of analytical judgments: and this class of certainties too is not contested by the opponents of hypotheses. From what they admit to be immediately certain, however, he fully allows that nothing can be got by mere formal thinking thus regulated. Only with the next assumption do we make any real advance; and this is something that is not incontestable. We assume, but cannot deduce from anything else if it is not granted, that memory refers to an actual past. For life, knowledge of the future is even more necessary than knowledge of the past; and this requires additional presuppositions. We have to presuppose that there is a future, and that inductions are valid for it. The presupposition involved in induction cannot be demonstrated to anyone who does not accept it. Those who argue against the existence of the external world, however, agree in the recognition of inductions so far as they apply to our own past and future consciousness; and they do not stop even here. As we have filled up gaps in the series of perceived events in order to bring the succession of our own states to regularity, we try to fill up the gaps that remain by assuming consciousness that is not our own. The validity of this induction too is objected by opponents of the external world. By this hypothesis the regularity of events is made more complete; but it is not yet free from gaps. Sense-perceptions mostly break into the streams of consciousness of men and animals without apparent determination by uniform law in relation to the pre-

ceding contents of their consciousness. Now the "external world" means for us the sum of antecedents we have to assume outside these various "streams." It is only one more assumption. It fits into the system formed by the previous assumptions; all of which, though not deducible from one another, are at any rate compatible: and it is so completely verified that its worst enemy cannot do without it in daily life. If it were only a "fiction," it could fully maintain itself on the ground of adaptation to purposes; but is it not more than a fiction? Is it not the most probable hypothesis?

As Dr. Becher foresees, the objection of opponents here will be, Is there, after all, any meaning in the assertion that there are external things in the realist's sense? Is there a definable non-phenomenal reality in the external world as such? So far as the world outside means simply a kind of regularity not dependent on us, but on which we depend, all admit it. The idealist assigns the ultimate explanation of it to a metaphysic of mind, but has no quarrel with scientific physics. Against this line of reply, partially expressed in Mill's definition of matter as consisting in "permanent possibilities of sensation," Dr. Becher puts the alternative: If the "possibilities" are permanent existences, they form an external world; if they are only in our representation and not outside our consciousness, they are not antecedents, and cannot satisfy the need of regularity (p. 80 note). Now this undoubtedly points to something beyond Mill, who stopped short of a theory of reality. According to the constructive idealist, the only way of giving reality to the "possibilities" is by a doctrine for which they have themselves something of the nature of mind. What are possibilities of sensation, regarded relatively to the phenomenal sequence of events, metaphysically stand for portions of an order that is in its own nature mental. Dr. Becher reserves the metaphysical question as to the constitution of reality as a whole; but, so far as he goes beyond Mill's position, his doctrine is not a return to the realism opposed by Mill or by Berkeley. He is a "realist" in a sense different from that of Berkeley's idealism only in so far as he recognises a sum of being not to be exhausted by all that could be said about the experiences, as Berkeley would have expressed it, of "spirits," whether divine or human or those of animals. Any notion we can form regarding the essence of the external world, must be taken, he admits, from consciousness. To say of anything that it "exists" can only mean that it has so much in common with the contents of my consciousness that if it were present to it it would be designated as "conscious" (p. 86). Existence is "quality," and conscious quality; but qualities non-existent in men and animals exist no doubt in the external world, and their modes of combination must be supposed different from that of the consciousness known to us.

The type of theory will present itself more distinctly on further exposition. First of all, there are in the external world existences that are relatively perdurable; at any rate much more perdurable than our perceptions of them usually are (p. 102). Besides relatively perdurable existences, there are changes. In accordance with the presupposition of regularity, these are held to be "causal," in Hume's and Mill's sense of the term. That is to say, they are in fixed relations to antecedents. Also there are in the external world differences, both of the successive and of the simultaneous order. There is no ground for supposing the real external world to be spatial; but with the spatial differences of our manifold perceptions differences in the external world must be co-ordinated. To the different kinds of sense-groupings for sight and touch, since these associate themselves in the same order, there can be only one external world to correspond. Time, unlike space, the author would himself regard as "objective"; on the ground that to recognise "antecedents" presupposes their existence in a real order of succession. Besides difference, there is likeness between existences in the external world; and, especially in consequence of this, arithmetic is applicable to it. Perdurability and change, causality, difference and likeness are expressions of relations; hence knowledge of the external world is relative. If, however, the author's view be accepted as to the "objectivity" of time, knowledge of it, he concedes, both as concerning the external world and our own consciousness, must be called in a sense absolute (p. 114).

Bodies are to be asserted as something space-filling and perdurable; but this is said with the qualification made above in regard to space-relations. There is something corresponding to our conception, but this is not body as it appears. The result of a discussion of "substance" is that it has no intelligible sense as distinguished from all qualities, but may have one if taken to mean perdurable quality (p. 130). For the man of science, the substantial kernel is the tangible (p. 122).

From this point, we naturally proceed to the hypotheses of mechanical physics, which the author defends essentially on phenomenal grounds. To follow out any hint given of a metaphysical position is here, as he explains, no part of his object. While making it clear that the mechanical view is not necessarily a corpuscular one, he nevertheless devotes his chief care to the grounds of the corpuscular hypothesis, since this is the basis of modern physics. He has no difficulty in showing that the positions of physics and chemistry regarding hidden composition and movement are prepared for by verifiable inferences in practical life. Grained structure not at first obvious may be rendered visible and tangible; and perceptible vibrations may be made to combine and apparently pass into something that is not vibration. For the results of reasonings that are merely a prolongation of such

common-sense inferences, the name of "fictions" is not the right one. There is no doubt an element of fiction in the models by which we represent the structure of matter; but the hypothesis that it has a structure is not therefore to be regarded as wholly a fictitious imagination. Much that can be said about this structure ought to be called "probable hypothesis." The limits, indeed, of physical and chemical hypotheses have to be recognised. The mechanical doctrine works with the idea of masses in motion; but it must not be taken to assert that no qualities of elements save those that are thus expressed exist in the nature of things. The modern atomic theory does not, like the ancient, assert the absolute indivisibility of its elements. The chemical atoms have been proved to be only relatively indivisible; and the fate of the earlier atomic theory ought to warn us against supposing that we may reach a limit in the notion, for example, that the "electrons" now said to compose them are ultimate. The prospect opened out before science is an indefinite resolution of structure into something more minute. Again, the elements of matter undoubtedly fall into groups consisting of approximately like units; but it is compatible with the facts to suppose these units as much different individually as animals of the same species. Perhaps no two ultimate elements—if such exist—are absolutely alike. Empty space, the presupposition of the ancient atomic theory, is no necessary part of the new one. The discussions started on the question of "action at a distance" are still far from being scientifically resolved; and here least of all is dogmatism in place.

In all this, the exaggeration of phenomenism that would identify hypothesis with fiction seems to be fairly met. Imaginations of minute structure are within limits capable of direct verification; and even beyond these limits they are quite intelligible, and conceivably correspond to what might be seen or felt if our perceptions were magnified. This supposition, though Dr. Becher does not bring it out so distinctly as some idealists might desire, is itself purely phenomenal. Because a physical hypothesis does not give us metaphysical reality it is not therefore mere fiction. But how does it stand with the properly "realistic" part of his doctrine? Can we determine to any extent the ultimate "qualities" that make up the real external world? Do the most recent developments of physics bring us any nearer to determining them? Here the author takes a decidedly sober view. He gives a clear account of the new "kinetic-electric" as distinguished from the old "kinetic-elastic" theory of the transference of motion, following this up by discussions on ether and "action at a distance"; but has no determinate conclusion to offer. What he has to suggest in the end is a recurrence to possibilities when probabilities are no longer attainable.

A question he does not definitely raise is whether there are not

limits psychologically assignable to the explanatory power of physics. May it not be that the properly "mechanical" doctrine is less capable of being transcended on the physical side than is supposed in some recent scientific speculations? Dr. Becher himself seems inclined to admit that some formulated conception of an "electron" can supply us with an explanation of "mass." Does not the nature of our senses show the impossibility of this? The electron seems unimaginable except as a small mass with an electric charge. Its "motion" cannot be anything but the motion, in the sense of transference, of such a mass. Thus it does not bring us to anything pre-mechanical. In physics, we cannot get beyond manipulating data of sense in an imaginative form; and the conditions of imaginability depend on our actual senses. Now a particle, of whatever kind, is an imagined object of sight and touch. As we have no special electrical sense, we cannot directly imagine in terms of electricity. Fundamentally, we are not carried beyond mechanism as a scientific ideal.

To say this is to reinforce Dr. Becher's general position; for his principal aim is to insist on the element of permanent scientific truth in mechanicism. Of the limitations of this he shows himself fully aware. What he sets himself to defend is "mechanical physics" as a system of verifiable hypotheses; not a "mechanical view of the world" aiming at an ultimate explanation of life and mind. His philosophical doctrine, as has been said, presents itself as a kind of idealism. All knowledge, he perceives, has to be constructed rationally from a subjective base. There may be some interest in a concluding remark suggested by the order he gives for the series of presuppositions by which we construct it. As was seen, he finds that from the immediate data of consciousness we go on to reconstitution of our own past; then to prediction of the future on the ground of induction; then to belief in other streams of consciousness besides our own; and lastly to belief in an external world (whatever its reality may be). This is clearly the rational order from the idealistic point of view. Is not the historical order just the opposite? First, for human as no doubt also for animal consciousness, the feeling of resistance to effort suggests an external object; a little after this in development, though probably almost simultaneous, is the vague notion of other animated beings; next comes inductive inference to the future, with a practical aim; later, memories are referred to a determinate past (a more speculative problem, as Dr. Becher observes); last of all, the attempt is made to set "pure experience" free from all the assumptions and inferences involved in practical and scientific knowledge.

APPENDIX

CORRESPONDENCE

[In the *Critique Philosophique* of May 31, 1887, appeared a translation, by M. Renouvier, of the author's review of his *Esquisse d'une Classification systématique des Doctrines philosophiques* (see p. 98). This was introduced by the sentences that follow. Succeeding numbers contained M. Renouvier's reply to criticisms, a translated letter of the author, and a second reply. These are reproduced exactly as they appeared.]

UN COMPTE RENDU DU DERNIER OUVRAGE DE M. RENOUVIER.

La *Critique philosophique* n'a pas rendu compte du dernier ouvrage de M. Renouvier : *Esquisse d'une classification systématique des doctrines philosophiques*. Nous avons pensé que nos lecteurs connaissaient assez ce livre, qui avant d'être publié en volumes, a paru presque en entier dans la *Critique religieuse*, ou dans le supplément par lequel s'est terminée cette publication. Toutefois, la revue philosophique anglaise, le *Mind*, a donné, sous la signature de M. Thomas Whittaker, un compte rendu de l'*Esquisse de classification*, que son rare mérite nous engage à reproduire ici en traduction. L'esprit de l'ouvrage y est saisi, les idées dominantes y sont indiquées, quoique brièvement, avec une exactitude et une impartialité remarquables. L'indépendance de jugement de l'auteur de ce travail donne, à ce qu'il nous semble, un intérêt particulier à l'exposition d'idées qu'il paraît en somme comprendre plutôt qu'il ne les partage toutes volontiers, et à des éloges trop précisément motivés pour être dus seulement à la bienveillance et à l'aménité naturelles de l'écrivain qui les accorde. D'ailleurs les objections de M. Whittaker au système de classification adopté par M. Renouvier, et aux oppositions essentielles et permanentes de doctrines sur lesquelles ce système est fondé, sont de celles dont la discussion a le plus d'utilité et de portée. Afin d'y répondre, il convient de les rapporter dans tout leur développement. Nous remettons au prochain numéro la réponse de l'auteur de l'*Esquisse* aux remarques et aux doutes de son profond et bienveillant critique.

RÉPONSE A QUELQUES OBJECTIONS CONTRE UN SYSTÈME DE CLASSIFICATION DES DOCTRINES PHILOSOPHIQUES.¹

La principale des objections de M. Whittaker, que je vais examiner brièvement,—non pas toutefois avant d'avoir cordialement remercié mon intelligent critique pour sa grande bienveillance, et pour ses objections mêmes, qui sont sérieuses et approfondies,—concerne le rapport à définir

¹ *La Critique Philosophique*, June 30, 1887.

entre les doctrines spéculatives et la philosophie pratique, la raison pratique. Au premier abord, on peut ne pas bien voir comment la manière de comprendre ce rapport se lie à une tentative de réduire en système, pour ainsi dire, les systèmes, en procédant à une classification de tous ceux auxquels il est possible à la pensée humaine de parvenir et de s'arrêter. Cependant, ce sont là deux questions étroitement unies. Si, en effet, l'on admet la valeur absolue de la raison théorique, l'*évidence* des premiers principes, la certitude apodictique, la *démonstrativité* sans réplique d'une doctrine universelle *vraie*, rendue indubitable à tous, on pourra bien encore se proposer l'examen et une certaine coordination des systèmes passés, ou encore existants, qui s'écartent de la doctrine ainsi établie ou imaginée; mais c'est alors un traité des erreurs que l'on croira composer, un répertoire des *sophismes*; ce ne sera plus chercher et définir ce que sont et comment s'accordent ou s'opposent les conceptions par lesquelles une pensée libre, s'appliquant à l'intelligence de l'univers, résout les problèmes fondamentaux de l'existence, et prend une position, *inexpugnable en fait*, contre tous arguments contraires de logique pure. On se pose, au contraire, tout naturellement ce dernier problème, et je m'y suis moi-même trouvé conduit, en reconnaissant que la raison pratique décide au fond ou en dernier ressort de l'adhésion d'un homme à l'un des grands systèmes de la connaissance spéculative.

M. Whittaker, pour qui l'expérience est ce qu'elle devrait être pour tous, c'est-à-dire d'un grand poids, ne paraît pas, en quelques passages, éloigné de reconnaître que les systèmes peuvent se ramener par le fait à quelques oppositions fondamentales (si ce n'est précisément à deux, qui réunissent toutes les autres), entre lesquelles la raison théorique pure est impuissante à décider la question et à forcer les esprits. Il ne laisse pas de croire que cette raison théorique est un idéal juste et suffisant, et le seul légitime dans l'espèce. Et cependant, il est clair que, si les penseurs n'arrivent jamais à poursuivre et à contempler un même idéal, ou, pour parler encore plus exactement, si on les voit de tout temps en contempler d'opposés et de contradictoires, c'est qu'il doit exister pour eux d'autres raisons de détermination que la prétendue raison théorique pure. Et s'il en est ainsi, ce qu'un penseur consciencieux, succédant à la longue expérience des autres, a le mieux à faire, n'est-il pas de trouver, entre des conceptions contraires, un autre moyen d'option que celui qui s'est toujours montré impuissant à faire opter en un même sens les philosophes, et de contrôler ouvertement son propre idéal par les données d'un domaine secret et méconnu, où ceux-ci ont, au fond, et au moins en partie, puisé les raisons qui ont déterminé le leur? Ces raisons sont le désir et la volonté; il y a chance de les faire intervenir plus légitimement en se les avouant et leur cherchant des applications justes, qu'en subissant, au hasard des passions, leur empire qu'on se dissimule.

M. Whittaker ne conteste pas la présence des éléments actifs et passionnels dans les motifs des décisions doctrinales des penseurs. Mais, il voudrait qu'une doctrine procédât de l'émotion et de l'activité, seulement par le goût désintéressé de la recherche et de la connaissance, et par l'ardeur des sentiments qui nous portent au vrai purement intellectif, à une doctrine toute conforme au pur "idéal de la science." La philosophie opérerait son retour à la pratique—car il faut bien qu'elle y revienne, on est d'accord de cela—seulement après avoir épuisé la théorie. La pratique serait une application de la théorie, à peu près comme on l'entend dans les arts. Ce n'est pas à la raison pratique et aux postulats qui s'y rapportent, qu'on demanderait de fixer les premiers principes desquels doivent dépendre ou l'affirmation ou la négation de telle doctrine qui se dit la plus fidèle à l'idéal de la science; c'est à la spéculation guidée par le pur *amor intellectualis*. Mais qui ne voit que cette manière de comprendre l'organisation de la philosophie suppose alors cet idéal vraiment déterminable au point de vue purement intellectuel de science universelle, et ces principes irrè-

fragablement démontrables? Et qui ne sait que le criticisme, c'est-à-dire la subordination des doctrines transcendantes à la loi morale, est né d'une analyse qui a constaté ce que pouvait déjà faire présumer l'expérience historique des contradictions des philosophes, à savoir que cet *idéal* et ces *principes* manquent toujours à réaliser la double condition *sine qua non* d'une philosophie théorique pure : la nécessité et l'unité? Spinoza, cité avec faveur par M. Whittaker, entendait bien que tout fût ou évident de soi ou démontré apodictiquement dans sa doctrine. Et qui croit aujourd'hui que l'*amor intellectualis*, en cela, ne l'a pas trompé?

Mais on se demande s'il n'est pas à craindre que le philosophe, en se guidant dès le début par des considérations de l'ordre pratique, ne tranche par avance des questions dont l'analyse et l'examen sont précisément sa fonction, et n'invalide les conclusions à attendre d'une critique impartiale. Cette objection part d'une idée inexacte du criticisme. Le philosophe criticiste n'a, au point de départ de son étude, ni plus de postulats, ni d'autres postulats, ni plus de vues pratiques que n'en ont les penseurs dont les résultats diffèrent des siens. Il a derrière lui toutes les spéculations rationalistes du passé, il les reprend, il les examine, il a les siennes propres, il remplit la tâche des investigations et des analyses en tout ce qui concerne les formes de la pensée, les conditions du raisonnement et les motifs d'ordre logique des conclusions et des croyances. C'est seulement à ce moment que se présentent à lui les moyens de suppléer à l'insuffisance du pur intellect et de la pure expérience pour se porter à une affirmation touchant les problèmes ultimes de la philosophie et de l'ordre du monde. Il est bien vrai qu'il peut se tromper dans la balance des motifs d'espèce diverse dont dépend sa conviction finale; mais l'intellectualiste et le dogmatiste peuvent se tromper en sens inverse, et le métier du criticiste est tout spécialement de faire cette pesée des motifs.

Autre objection : "l'argument de pari" de Pascal, même après la grande rectification et la généralisation qui lui est apportée, reste impuissant à conclure, faute d'avoir pour véritable objet une croyance théiste à envisager, *semper, ubique, ab omnibus*. Cet objet n'est encore que le fantôme d'une religion historique particulière. L'alliance, regardée comme possible, du criticisme et d'un christianisme affranchi des dogmes théologiques absolutistes n'est-elle pas un aveu de ce caractère de la croyance criticiste?—Réponse : le *quod ubique et semper* est une chimère. On ne saurait lui trouver la moindre matière dans l'histoire des idées et des croyances. Mais les postulats du criticisme kantien : *divinité, immortalité, liberté*, sont tous trois antérieurs à l'ère chrétienne, et de vrais, d'incontestables produits de la philosophie de l'antiquité. Comment donc se pourrait-il qu'ils ne représentassent plus aujourd'hui que le fantôme des croyances chrétiennes? Ces dernières, si je les prends dans la religion proprement dite, dépendent entièrement de la foi dans Jésus-Christ, dont la philosophie ne s'occupe pas; et, si j'y considère ce que les théologiens y ont ajouté, elles consistent en ces dogmes métaphysiques, cet absolutisme et cet infinitisme, que précisément le criticisme rejette.

Revenons au rapport de la métaphysique et de la morale. La primauté de la métaphysique, primauté logique et hiérarchique, a été, on peut le dire, unanimement reçue chez les philosophes avant Kant. Spinoza, plus qu'aucun d'eux, à cause de la construction *more geometrico* de son système, l'a mise en relief. Si cependant il n'a pas laissé de déduire l'éthique d'un idéal emprunté directement de la nature humaine au lieu de chercher quelles idées pouvaient suggérer en morale sa conception de Dieu et de l'univers, et les lois nécessaires de la nature, c'est l'effet d'une belle inconséquence : non pas, entendons-nous bien, d'un faux raisonnement qu'on puisse spécifier, mais enfin d'une double tendance et d'un double principe chez le penseur qui ne réussit pas à réaliser, comme il s'en flatte, l'unité de la connaissance et l'accord de la théorie et de la pratique en un système unique de déductions. M. Whittaker estime qu'on peut sans inconséquence

tenir séparés les points de vue "éthique" et "théorique," n'établir entre eux ni subordination ni sacrifice d'aucun côté : cela ne se peut pourtant qu'à la condition de renoncer à la solution du problème capital du rapport de l'homme à l'univers, c'est-à-dire de professer un scepticisme limité, un certain positivisme, et de reconnaître que si, seuls, au fond, le panthéiste ou l'athée étaient dans le vrai, la théorie pure leur donnant raison quant à la nature de l'univers, alors la loi morale, tirée de la nature propre de l'homme, serait une anomalie dans l'ensemble des choses et s'imposerait arbitrairement ; que si, au contraire, la loi morale avait une valeur absolue, il semblerait bien que la nature de l'univers doit être au fond différente de ce que prétend la théorie. La position mentale qui ressort de ce doute est un pauvre idéal pour un philosophe.

M. Whittaker est frappé comme moi du contraste entre le sentiment pessimiste d'un J. St. Mill, en son célèbre *Essai sur la Nature*, et le sentiment optimiste d'un Darwin, que ravit le spectacle de la guerre universelle des êtres vivants, donnée comme loi directrice à l'univers par son créateur. Faudrait-il donc rester neutre entre ces deux sentiments, ou consentir à les éprouver, tantôt l'un, tantôt l'autre, selon le côté par où l'on regarderait les choses, et selon qu'on les rapporterait, pour les juger, à la loi de l'humanité ou à la loi universelle du fait et de la force, embellie et transfigurée par la contemplation scientifique ? La neutralité est et paraîtra de plus en plus difficile à garder, le problème total subsistant toujours, à mesure que le jugement à porter sur le monde au point de vue du bien et du mal dominera davantage dans les préoccupations des penseurs, ainsi que se marque si clairement, de notre temps, la tendance de la philosophie.

Au sujet de l'antinomie du devoir et du bonheur, M. Whittaker remarque que l'on peut bien ne point regarder l'obligation morale et son corrélatif, le droit, comme des "ultimes en éthique," et toutefois ne pas les traiter d'illusions, ne pas mettre à leur place, pour fondement de l'ordre social, quelque idée de bien commun et de bonheur, qu'on imaginerait réalisable ou par la voie de la contrainte imposée aux individus, ou par celle d'une sympathie spontanée, pour laquelle on compterait sur leurs dispositions naturelles, très gratuitement supposée. Le droit et le devoir conserveraient une "validité relative." Ici, je ne comprends pas bien la pensée de M. Whittaker. On est obligé ou on ne l'est pas. L'établissement de ce qui est juste dans les cas particuliers peut comporter une casuistique, sans doute, et une *relation* aux circonstances, par suite : mais la justice elle-même est et ne peut être qu'un *absolu*. Mais on est dans un "parfait accord pratique" avec le criticisme, dit M. Whittaker, avec la morale du devoir, quand on reconnaît, comme fait le criticisme, "que le plus haut bien, tout en étant obtenu socialement, doit être un bien pour l'individu, et que la liberté personnelle est une condition pour l'obtenir . . . *quoiqu'on puisse faire des droits et des devoirs des déductions de la conception du bien et non des conceptions ultimes.*" L'accord pratique ou, plus exactement, politique, existe, en effet, dans ce cas, mais les théories diffèrent du tout au tout, le théoricien du bien ou du bonheur ayant à définir ce bien, à prouver que le droit et le devoir s'en déduisent en effet, qu'ils en sont des moyens plutôt que des obstacles, et que la liberté, qui n'a plus rang de premier principe, ne se trouve point par là même subordonnée et, à l'occasion, sacrifiée. Le théoricien de la morale de l'obligation, lui, a son principe irréductible dans le devoir, et ne peut être conduit d'aucune manière au sophisme moral de la justification des moyens par la fin.

L'objection tirée de ce que "le mot *obligation* implique *commandement* émané de quelque source, et que le commandement ne peut pas être la raison dernière en éthique," cette objection ne repose que sur une équivoque entre la *loi externe*, de source externe, qui est le sens le plus ordinaire et courant du commandement, soit dans l'ordre civil, juridique et politique, soit même en religion, et la *loi morale*, loi interne, exclusive de contrainte, contradictoire de contrainte, impliquant liberté, qui ne tient de l'idée du

commandement que par le caractère impératif qu'une conscience autonome lui reconnaît d'elle-même sur elle-même.

Au surplus, je ne vois point que ce soit "avoir du mérite personnel une conception différente de celle de Kant" que d'accorder à l'école empirique un fait que M. Whittaker énonce en termes excellents. Je regarde, moi aussi, comme très vrai que "l'acceptation volontaire d'un code moral dépend après tout du fait empirique de la nature sociale de l'homme," et que "le degré auquel les hommes se conforment dans leurs actes aux principes admis par eux dépend du degré même où certaines dispositions existent actuellement." Mais cette vérité n'a point pour conséquence la réduction de la théorie morale à des principes tels que ceux de la sociabilité, ou de la sympathie, ou de l'intérêt bien entendu, selon le degré de force qu'ils ont chez chacun, et selon les interprétations et applications que chacun en peut faire. Il est bien clair que le principe de l'obligation lui-même ne saurait produire d'effets pratiques qu'autant qu'il est senti et reconnu par les hommes; mais ce principe a le mérite unique, en théorie, de ne dépendre en rien ni des sentiments altruistes existants plus ou moins chez les individus, ni de la manière dont ceux-ci comprennent personnellement le bonheur, ou leurs intérêts particuliers, ou l'utilité générale. L'antinomie du devoir et du bonheur demeure bien entière, malgré les réserves de M. Whittaker: elle est inévitable, par ce seul fait que l'intérêt et le sentiment sont exclus du premier principe de la théorie éthique, et qu'ils sont cependant des éléments essentiels de la nature humaine. Là est la source de grands problèmes dont nous n'avons pas à nous occuper ici.

La question de l'infini numérique a été si souvent traitée dans la *Critique philosophique*, que je n'y reviendrai pas en cette nouvelle occasion. M. Whittaker voudrait affaiblir l'opposition doctrinale entre l'infinitisme et la doctrine du fini, ainsi qu'il s'efforce de la faire pour d'autres oppositions. Il voudrait au moins lever la contradiction formelle. M. Hodgson, si ce n'est M. Vacherot, lui paraît venir à bout de cette difficulté. Le premier, avec qui j'ai eu l'honneur de rompre quelques lances, estime que la perception constate l'existence de l'infini, dans le temps et l'espace, parce qu'elle laisse toujours un "reste inexploré" partout où elle s'applique: c'est, d'après lui, la représentation qui est incapable de s'étendre sans contradiction aussi loin que les phénomènes, à l'infini. Je pense, au contraire, qu'il est illogique de conclure, de ce qu'il y a toujours un *reste* pour la perception, qu'il y en aurait toujours un à quelque point que la perception fût prolongée; et, selon moi, c'est la représentation précisément, non la perception, qui, par l'idée de la *possibilité indéfinie* d'ajouter, et de compter, de concevoir des multiples et des diviseurs, pose les prémisses de la fausse induction d'un infini numérique actuel ou réalisé. Mais quoi qu'il en soit, il y a toujours une opposition inconciliable entre la doctrine de l'infini actuel et celle qui réduit la notion d'*infini* à la notion de *possibilité*, et M. Whittaker veut bien recommander à l'attention de ses lecteurs la section de mon livre où cette opposition est étudiée dans l'histoire.

Il me reste à dire un mot de l'antinomie de l'évolution et de la création. Les deux systèmes entre lesquels je place l'opposition irréductible qui est l'un des éléments de ma classification dichotomique,—l'un des membres de la division qui, pour chacun d'eux, réclame du penseur une option logiquement forcée,—sont, d'une part, le système de la substance éternelle et nécessaire (Matière, Force, Nature) dont le développement, nécessaire comme elle, produit tous les phénomènes; d'une autre part, le système du commencement absolu du temps et des phénomènes, en un acte pur de création. Le premier a, je crois, une existence assez considérable à toutes les époques, et à la nôtre, pour qu'on ne lui marchande pas sa définition nette, intransigeante. Le second est le contradictoire du premier. L'essai de transaction dont parle M. Whittaker, la ressource des évolutionnistes

qui tentent de sauver la création en la regardant " comme le début d'un procès universel d'évolution," constitue une doctrine mixte et non point une conciliation entre les termes de la dualité doctrinale, telle que je l'ai définie. J'ai discuté récemment cette doctrine mixte, en des articles polémiques. J'ai seulement à remarquer ici que, quelque tenable qu'on jugeât celle-ci en elle-même, ma classification et l'option forcée qui en résulte sont inattaquables, dans les termes où je me suis expressément placé pour rendre la conciliation logiquement impossible.

La conclusion critique de M. Whittaker est que peut-être la divergence des philosophes se produit en réalité par rapport à plus de deux types, et qu'on pourrait soutenir que les doctrines mixtes, dont je reconnais l'existence comparativement à mes deux types définis, ne sont pas toutes aussi illogiques que je cherche à montrer qu'elles le sont. C'est m'accorder un grand point,—sans parler d'autres éloges auxquels je le prie de croire que je suis extrêmement sensible,—que de me reconnaître le mérite d'avoir introduit dans l'histoire de la pensée philosophique une méthode qui doit s'imposer désormais : la méthode contraire et complémentaire de celle du processus progressif, la méthode de l'opposition et des distinctions croissantes des doctrines. N'est-ce pas une conséquence visible de l'accueil fait à cette dernière, que la reconnaissance d'un partage dualiste des systèmes : affirmation et négation persistantes sur certains points, toujours les mêmes ? La question logique ne se pose-t-elle pas, en ce cas, très naturellement, de démêler les réelles oppositions irréductibles, d'assembler les unes avec les autres celles qui s'appellent, se soutiennent ou s'impliquent mutuellement, et de ramener ces groupes au plus petit nombre possible ? Et n'y a-t-il pas lieu de présumer, d'après la nature de l'esprit humain, que l'inconciliabilité doit au fond reposer sur une seule et même détermination capitale, où l'affirmation et la négation sont également possibles ? Et enfin la question morale ne vient-elle pas à la suite de la question logique, en sorte qu'une fois le partage avéré de la philosophie entre deux camps adverses, le penseur doit conclure au scepticisme, ou opter entre deux croyances, embrasser l'une, rejeter l'autre ?

Mais n'y a-t-il vraiment que deux partis entièrement nets entre lesquels le choix se limite, au moins pour la vue élevée des choses, ou la plus décisive ; et ces partis sont-ils bien ceux que j'ai définis ? Ici je prie mon critique de distinguer entre les deux points de vue où j'ai dû me placer : l'un historique et empirique, pour l'étude et l'interprétation des systèmes, et pour l'explication de ce qu'on peut appeler leurs conséquences ou leurs anomalies ; l'autre logique, pour la définition des solutions, formellement contradictoires, qui ont été et qui sont encore et toujours proposées, d'un petit nombre de problèmes fondamentaux dont l'étude embrasse tout le domaine de la spéculation philosophique. De là deux sujets entre lesquels se partage mon *Esquisse de classification*. Le premier ouvre, on le conçoit, une ample carrière à la discussion des thèses plus ou moins particulières des philosophes, qu'il s'agit de ranger sous des chefs généraux de doctrines. Je pense, malgré cela, avoir montré qu'en somme, une dualité suffisamment définie se dessine entre les décisions multipliées, et que cette dualité se forme le plus souvent ou approximativement, de chaque côté, par la réunion des mêmes affirmations ou des mêmes négations partielles. On ne devait pas s'attendre à ce que le domaine expérimental des opinions, naturellement exposées à tant de variations et de perturbations accidentelles, offrit plus de conformité avec une distribution régulière et systématique des vues possibles de l'esprit. Le second sujet de l'ouvrage, celui qui concerne le plan même de la classification dichotomique et la justification logique de ses membres, contradictoires deux à deux, est assez concluant par lui-même pour que, sans exiger plus de points de vérification, ou plus constants et plus absolument nets qu'ils ne ressortent de l'ensemble et de la succession des principales idées philosophiques, on se trouve conduit au but que j'ai visé. C'est de

considérer le problème général de la philosophie sous la forme d'un dilemme, posé au fond dans l'esprit, et constamment proposé, sous des termes divers, aux penseurs individuels, dans l'expérience et dans l'histoire. Et c'est de faire ressortir la nécessité morale où se trouve chacun de prendre un parti dans ce dilemme, soit qu'il se croie ou qu'il refuse de se croire invinciblement porté lui-même à sa décision par quelque chose d'extérieur à sa conscience.

C. RENOUVIER.

LETTRE.¹

Puis-je demander une petite place dans la *Critique philosophique*, afin d'offrir d'abord à M. Renouvier mes remerciements pour la traduction de mon article, et pour les remarques dont il l'a accompagnée; et puis pour éclaircir ma position sur quelques points qui sont discutés dans la réponse où il m'a fait l'honneur d'examiner mes objections?

Certaines de ces objections étaient, comme le dit M. Renouvier, de simples "doutes," que sa réponse écarte en grande partie. Tel est, par exemple, le cas pour mes remarques touchant la méthode dichotomique, dont il présente si clairement, dans ses deux derniers paragraphes, et la justification rationnelle, au point de vue où il se place, et les limitations historiques. De même, les réponses aux objections où il est allégué que la méthode de la "raison pratique" peut nuire à la fonction critique de la philosophie par rapport à la pratique, et que le type "criticiste" du théisme est associé exclusivement à une seule religion historique, me semblent écarter les difficultés. En effet, les objections ont toutes deux trait aux applications qu'on pourrait faire de la méthode en question, plutôt qu'à la doctrine criticiste de M. R. lui-même.

La différence de vue réellement fondamentale est naturellement celle que M. R. a fait passer en première ligne. Soit accordé que la classification des doctrines est logiquement faite, et que deux systèmes définis se trouvent désormais opposés l'un à l'autre, comment notre choix entre eux doit-il être déterminé? Ce que j'ai soutenu ici n'était pas, comme M. R. semble le comprendre, pour opérer un retour à la doctrine de "l'évidence." J'admets que Spinoza, par exemple, aurait prétendu que tout, dans son système, s'impose à l'esprit par sa propre évidence, ou par démonstration apodictique. J'admets aussi que la critique philosophique a rendu impossible, pour un système philosophique du type du spinosisme, la tâche de défendre sa prétention à ce genre de certitude. La position agnostique ferait naturellement de la métaphysique, pour autant qu'elle est conservée, une simple propédeutique négative au système des sciences. Supposons que cette position soit également rejetée, et que, avec M. R., nous accordions qu'un choix est nécessaire entre les deux doctrines métaphysiques opposées. Ici, la position que je défends, c'est que l'acte du choix doit être déterminé non par les émotions relatives à la pratique, mais par l'espèce d'émotion qui détermina réellement la forme de la doctrine de Spinoza, quoique lui-même ait pu regarder cette doctrine comme forcée pour l'esprit à raison de sa pure évidence. Cette position, sans aucun doute, suppose un idéal intellectuel suggéré par la science. Mais un tel idéal, si nous acceptons la dichotomie de M. R., n'est-il pas déjà donné dans le système panthéiste? Sans regarder ce système comme susceptible d'une démonstration scientifique irréfutable, nous pouvons fixer sur lui notre choix par un acte de ce qu'on peut appeler "croyance intellectuelle." On peut être intellectualiste sans être dogmatiste.

En discutant le rapport de la métaphysique à la morale, je n'ai pas entendu proposer "un scepticisme limité," une "neutralité" motivée par un doute sur la nature ultime des choses, mais seulement soutenir la

¹ *La Critique Philosophique*, August 31, 1887.

parfaite compatibilité du panthéisme le plus conséquent avec le maintien de la vue éthique, sans qualification, partout où la volonté humaine peut être conçue comme ayant de l'influence sur le cours des choses. Ne serait-il pas vraiment incompatible avec "l'autonomie de l'éthique," de dire que, parce que la loi morale n'a nulle application à l'ensemble des choses, elle cesse d'être obligatoire pour les hommes? On dira peut-être que faire du point de vue théorétique et du point de vue éthique deux points de vue coordonnés, au lieu de subordonner l'un des deux à l'autre, c'est laisser subsister une dualité que des penseurs panthéistes, tels que Spinoza et les stoïciens, ou n'ont pas aperçu ou ont cru qu'ils évitaient. Mais on peut répondre qu'afin de maintenir la position panthéiste, nous devons reconnaître des distinctions implicites que le criticisme a rendues explicites; et M. R. lui-même nous a montré comment cela se peut faire.

Relativement aux antinomies du bonheur et du devoir, de l'évolution et de la création, de l'infini et du fini, je ne veux naturellement pas entreprendre de prouver qu'il n'y a point d'incompatibilité définitive entre les doctrines philosophiques mises en opposition par M. R. Ce que j'ai tâché de montrer, c'est que la différence définitive consiste plutôt dans un renversement de l'ordre des termes, que dans la suppression absolue de l'un des termes opposés. L'évolutionniste philosophe ne nie pas la création en quelque sens que ce soit; et, de même, le créationniste philosophe ne nie pas l'évolution. M. R., par exemple, encore bien qu'il puisse critiquer des théories scientifiques particulières d'évolution, ne tient pas toute théorie scientifique d'évolution, en tant que telle, pour incompatible avec sa doctrine philosophique de la création. Pareillement, un évolutionniste philosophe peut appliquer le mot *création* à ce qu'il regarde comme le produit, en dernier lieu (*ultimately*), de l'évolution. Par exemple, nous pouvons parler de "créations" artistiques et scientifiques, et ceci en un sens qui n'est point purement métaphorique. Les tentatives de compromis dont parle M. R. sont, je l'accorde, des "théories mixtes" et, comme telles, ne sont pas des réconciliations logiques obtenues entre les deux doctrines philosophiques. Mais ce n'est point à ces théories que je pensais. La "création" dont j'ai parlé, c'est la création par l'esprit humain lui-même, et non point une création analogue à cette dernière. Ce que j'ai dit, ce n'est pas que la création pouvait être conçue par un évolutionniste comme le commencement (*le début*), mais qu'elle pouvait être conçue comme le résultat (*the outcome*) d'un procès universel d'évolution. Ainsi la question n'est pas, laquelle des conceptions doit être supprimée, mais bien de savoir si la conception de l'évolution doit être subordonnée à celle de la création, ou, au contraire, celle-ci à celle-là.

Le changement dans la manière de présenter cette antinomie peut paraître pratiquement sans importance, mais, en ce qui concerne l'antinomie du bonheur et du devoir, un semblable changement me paraît modifier considérablement la nature de l'opposition. Dans l'idée de M. R., l'alternative est entre une "doctrine du devoir" rationnelle, à laquelle une doctrine du bonheur est subordonnée, et une "doctrine du bonheur" qui peut, théoriquement, ne point reconnaître des droits et des devoirs, mais doit apprécier chaque action simplement par ses conséquences bonnes ou mauvaises, le bien et le mal n'étant point des conceptions fixes. Or, si la doctrine du bonheur peut arriver, par un procédé rationnel, à des droits et devoirs fixes, et c'est ce que certains de ses défenseurs prétendent, elle ne diffère plus de la doctrine de M. R. que par une subordination théorétique des conceptions de droit et de devoir à l'idée d'une fin, et nullement par la suppression de ces conceptions; de même, précisément, que, d'un autre côté, M. R. ne supprime pas, mais subordonne seulement la notion de bonheur. Une semblable doctrine du bonheur est une doctrine rationnelle, en tant qu'opposée à l'hédonisme empirique de ceux suivant qui toute bonne action procède immédiatement de la pitié ou de la sympathie, quoi qu'elle soit "empirique" d'ailleurs, en tant qu'opposée au rationalisme

qui fait du droit et du devoir des conceptions irréductibles. Du bonheur qui est la fin, la liberté au sens négatif, c'est-à-dire l'absence de contrainte est la condition; mais la liberté au sens positif peut être identifiée avec le bien le plus élevé. Ainsi comprise, elle garde le rang de "premier principe." La loi interne, suivant cette idée, est obligatoire, non en soi, mais par relation à certaine fin que l'individu a faite sienne. Il y a, de plus, selon M. R., un "commandement" impliqué dans "l'obligation" de la loi interne. à savoir le commandement de la "conscience autonome." Ceci s'accorde bien avec la doctrine du bonheur. D'après celle-ci, en effet, le mot "commandement" ou "obligation" implique, même ici, relation à quelque fin. Ainsi, pour la doctrine du bonheur, la difficulté de faire du commandement un premier principe est entièrement évitée, tandis que la doctrine rationaliste présente cette difficulté, de supposer une conception analogue, au moins partiellement, à celle du commandement externe, et toutefois n'admettant pas de réduction. Car la notion de l'obligation externe est réductible naturellement, et pour l'une comme pour l'autre des deux doctrines, à la fois psychologiquement et rationnellement.

Les remarques de M. R., au sujet de cette antinomie, ainsi d'ailleurs que de celle de l'infini et du fini, soulèvent, comme il le dit lui-même, des problèmes dont nous n'avons pas maintenant à nous occuper. Sur certaines de ces remarques, au surplus, alors même que je ne craindrais pas de trop allonger cette communication, j'aimerais mieux prendre le temps de nouvelles réflexions. Mais, pour ce qui est de l'antinomie éthique, j'ai tenu à bien marquer mon intention, qui n'était pas seulement d'affaiblir les différences, mais de trouver de réelles formules d'accord entre des doctrines qui sont encore, il faut le reconnaître, profondément opposées.

T. WHITTAKER.

SECONDE RÉPONSE.¹

C'est tout plaisir, comme on dit, de discuter avec M. Whittaker, tant il apporte de sincérité et d'ouverture d'esprit à l'examen des difficultés des doctrines et à la recherche des vraies différences des points de vue, au lieu de se plaire comme bien d'autres à ces chicanes qui semblent promettre des succès d'amour-propre à un polémiste et n'éclaircissent pas les questions.

Je ne reviendrai donc pas sur des points qui paraissent désormais réglés entre nous :—sur la justification rationnelle d'une division dichotomique des doctrines philosophiques;—sur la crainte, précédemment exprimée, d'une altération possible de la fonction critique de la philosophie, par l'effet du rôle accordé à la raison pratique dans la décision de certaines questions de théorie;—sur l'accord où le criticisme se rencontre avec l'une des grandes "religions historiques," quoique sans l'avoir cherché.

Reste "la différence de vue réellement fondamentale." Admettons la dichotomie et l'alternative forcée entre deux ordres de doctrines; admettons, des deux côtés, le manque de démonstration apodictique, l'impossibilité de l'irréfragable certitude: l'acte du choix doit être déterminé, dit M. W., non par les émotions relatives à la pratique, mais par l'espèce d'émotion qui déterminait réellement la forme de la doctrine de Spinoza, quoique lui-même ait pu regarder cette doctrine comme forcée pour l'esprit à raison de sa pure évidence. Mais je conteste ici à M. W. le droit de séparer, en cette affaire, l'émotion intellectuelle, la "croyance intellectuelle" qui déterminait, je n'en doute point, Spinoza, d'avec la conviction (la conviction fausse) où ce philosophe était de posséder des démonstrations

¹ *La Critique Philosophique*, September, 30, 1887.

apodictiques de ses propositions et la connaissance rigoureusement *adéquate* des objets de ses définitions et de ses axiomes. Mais quoi ! M. W. ne convient-il pas lui-même que l'espèce d'émotion à laquelle il demande qu'on se fie, " suppose un idéal intellectuel suggéré par la science ? " Et que devient cet idéal, transporté dans la philosophie, si l'on doit en même temps avouer que la philosophie est intellectuellement incertaine, n'est pas *la science* ? C'est le propre sujet de l'émotion *sui generis* qui disparaît.

Selon M. W., le système panthéiste, en dehors même de l'illusion de la démonstrativité, offre à l'intellectualiste non dogmatiste un idéal suffisant, et renferme de quoi motiver un choix, une croyance. Cela se peut en fait ; mais ce choix et cette foi ne peuvent plus alors invoquer au nom de la vérité, sous l'empire de l'émotion, de la passion du vrai, un privilège. Considérons les choses comme elles doivent réellement nous apparaître dès que nous renonçons sérieusement à la certitude du pur intellectualisme, — ce que Spinoza était si loin de faire. — La passion de la vérité n'étant plus toute en jeu du même côté, mais demeurant libre, rien n'empêche les autres passions, celles que M. W. désigne comme " relatives à la pratique " et qui sont congénitales de l'organisation psychique de l'homme, les émotions et notions intéressées, sentimentales, individualistes, finalistes, d'intervenir et de réclamer sans aucun détriment pour la raison, leur place et une juste part d'influence dans la solution du problème cosmique et la détermination de la destinée humaine. La croyance qui voudrait être purement intellectuelle est décapitée, quand on la sépare de la croyance à la démonstration pure, et l'idéal panthéiste cesse de pouvoir, de préférence à tout autre idéal, se donner pour intellectuel, du moment que d'autres sont également permis à la contemplation intellective.

En discutant le rapport de la métaphysique à la morale, en proposant de " distinguer clairement entre les deux points de vue, l'éthique et le théorique, " — sans nier ni subordonner aucun des deux, — et, dès lors, " d'éviter d'une part l'affirmation d'une fin morale de l'univers ; de s'abstenir, de l'autre, de toute tentative pour trouver une justification morale de quoi que ce soit dans le simple fait de sa détermination nécessaire suivant des lois universelles, " M. W., qui ne refuse pas, d'ailleurs, de constater un désaccord entre l'ordre de la nature selon le panthéisme et l'ordre moral de la conscience, n'entend pas, dit-il, conclure de cette double vue à " un scepticisme limité, " à une sorte de " neutralité motivée par un doute sur la nature ultime des choses. " Mais il ne suffit pas de dire qu'on n'entend point faire ce qu'on fait implicitement. La neutralité, ou le scepticisme, est au fond et s'impose, s'il y a une désharmonie reconnue et irrémédiable entre la solution qu'on admet du problème cosmique et le vœu qu'on est disposé à écouter de la morale, sans que l'on voie aucune raison pour subordonner l'une des indications à l'autre, dans le jugement que l'on porte sur la partie inconnue des choses et sur ce qui *doit être*.

Mais on peut, nous fait observer M. W., soutenir la compatibilité du panthéisme le plus conséquent avec le maintien de la vue éthique en tout ce qui dépend de la volonté humaine ; on peut regarder la loi morale comme étant sans application à l'ensemble des choses, et toutefois obligatoire pour les hommes. J'accorde, en effet, qu'il ne se trouve pas une formelle contradiction logique dans le système qui soumet l'univers et la conscience, les causes et fins des phénomènes naturels et les causes et fins des actes humains intentionnels, à des législations différentes, opposées, mutuellement irréductibles ; mais on conviendra que l'harmonie esthétique et morale de la doctrine, si ce n'est la pure logique, est alors en souffrance. Toute législation d'ordre universel, en tant que d'expérience constante et gouvernant la nature des choses, adresse à notre volonté, spontanément, quelque chose comme l'impératif stoïcien : *Naturam sequare*. Or, dans l'espèce de dualisme proposé, deux préceptes *naturels* se combattent : ce sont ceux dont Spinoza a choisi l'un pour sa théologie, l'autre pour sa morale. D'autres philosophes opineront pour l'unité de règle et pour le modèle pris exclusive-

ment dans le monde externe; car on ne voit pas pourquoi la volonté humaine s'obligerait à poursuivre un idéal de sa façon, en se conformant à un modèle interne, alors que la raison statuerait, d'accord avec Spinoza, que la finalité et les passions individuelles, éléments principaux de composition de ce dernier modèle, ont un fondement tout imaginatif et illusoire, et que le modèle externe, au contraire, s'impose à un entendement rendu adéquat à l'éternelle nécessité de l'univers. Si Spinoza lui-même a voulu néanmoins conserver un monde intérieur, un ordre moral, un règne de la liberté (sans préjudice du déterminisme absolu) et s'il a ainsi juxtaposé deux systèmes, c'est qu'il a été, et même à très haut degré, accessible à l'émotion morale. Il croyait sa théorie du grand monde absolument démonstrative ou forcée pour l'intelligence, et, la logique ne s'y opposant pas absolument, pourvu que le libre arbitre demeurât fermement nié, il cédait à ladite émotion en prenant dans le petit monde l'exemplaire de la vie raisonnable. Si donc il avait pensé pouvoir satisfaire à la vérité des choses en renonçant à regarder comme l'ordre profond, entier et définitif de la création cet ordre de l'univers et de Dieu selon sa doctrine, qu'il répudiait comme modèle de vie, il aurait probablement réglé sa croyance une fois soulagée du poids des démonstrations prétendues, de manière à obtenir la parfaite harmonie de son système en supposant un accord profond du grand monde et du petit monde, ou de la loi morale et de la loi suprême de la nature, c'est-à-dire en admettant des *postulats*.

M. W. remarque que j'ai montré moi-même comment il avait été possible de combiner la position panthéiste avec le point de vue éthique, à l'aide d'une sorte de dualisme tel que celui des stoïciens ou de Spinoza, et grâce à des distinctions que la critique a seulement rendues aujourd'hui plus explicites. Cela est vrai, et c'est encore ce que je viens de reconnaître à l'instant. Mais ces distinctions, qui servent à expliquer la juxtaposition d'une cosmologie panthéiste et d'une éthique à modèle interne, ne suffisent pas pour la justifier. A mesure qu'elles deviennent plus claires, et la dualité, le contraste plus fortement accusés, l'anomalie, la désharmonie paraissent aussi plus inexcusables, dans un système qui se condamne à concilier l'immuable nécessité des faits éternellement enchaînés dans le monde avec la loi morale et l'obligation des êtres en apparence libres; la cruelle indifférence de la nature, notre mère et souveraine à tous, avec l'amour et la pitié dans le cœur de ses plus parfaites créatures psychiques; le principe de la guerre sans fin ni trêve des vivants et l'empire de l'égoïsme, cette condition de la conservation de chaque existence, avec la notion du juste et l'ardeur du dévouement; enfin la loi du sacrifice des faibles aux forts et des individus au tout, dans l'évolution de l'univers, avec la reconnaissance des droits et l'inviolabilité de la personne, dans l'ordre social qui n'est pourtant qu'un produit et une partie de cette évolution. On a beau dire, il y a quelque chose de forcé et de violent, qui dans certaines combinaisons de doctrines hétérogènes dénote une sorte de contradiction latente. Cette contradiction, on finit toujours par la dégager en se livrant à une étude approfondie de tout système où les dispositions mentales incohérentes d'un philosophe ont dû l'introduire.

D'une façon générale, et touchant plusieurs des oppositions que j'ai formulées pour l'établissement de ma méthode de classification dichotomique, M. W. pense que "la différence définitive consiste plutôt dans un renversement de l'ordre des termes que dans la suppression absolue de l'un des termes opposés," et qu'ainsi il n'y aurait pas l'incompatibilité absolue que je prétends. Je répondrai à cela que sans doute on peut s'arranger pour présenter les questions de la sorte et construire des systèmes qui, à mon point de vue, sont de nature mixte, mais que, pour moi, j'ai défini les termes des oppositions expressément pour qu'ils fussent contradictoires: et, en fait, on ne me contestera pas que les affirmations et négations les plus tranchées, sur ces points tels que je les ai définis, n'aient joué le plus grand rôle tout le long de l'histoire de la philosophie.

Par exemple, dans le cas dont nous nous occupons tout à l'heure, ce n'est pas, d'une manière vague, entre la thèse de l'homme soumis à la loi morale, et la thèse de l'ordre de l'univers absolument étranger à cette loi, que j'ai établi l'une des oppositions radicales sur lesquelles ma classification est basée; c'est, d'une manière précise, entre le choix de la notion du devoir et le choix de la recherche du bonheur pour principe unique et propre d'activité morale. Il ne s'agit point de savoir si le bonheur et le devoir sont conciliables, ni même lequel des deux a le pas sur l'autre, selon qu'est la doctrine, mais bien si le *devoir est le principe unique*. Or, à la question ainsi posée des réponses différentes ne peuvent être que logiquement contradictoires, formulées par oui ou par non. La poursuite du bonheur, plus généralement celle du bien, sont des faits et des passions, mais ne sont pas la loi morale, et il y a une loi morale : voilà ce que pense celui qui répond par un oui à la question.

En ce qui concerne l'évolution et la création, "l'évolutionniste philosophe ne nie pas, dit M. W., la création en quelque sens que ce soit; et de même, le créationniste philosophe ne nie pas l'évolution." Peut-être que non, mais l'opposition que j'ai formulée, qui est impossible à lever et qui existe de fait entre les plus grandes et les plus célèbres doctrines historiques, comptant toutes deux des adhérents sans nombre, cette opposition est entre une affirmation et une négation qui portent sur des points identiques :—pur premier commencement du temps et des phénomènes; ou éternité du monde phénoménal;—création dans la pensée, par la volonté d'un créateur *transcendant*; ou développement spontané, continu, des propriétés d'une substance nécessaire, en laquelle tout ce qui fut, est et sera, est *immanent*. Ce sont bien là des positions contradictoires.

D'après cela, rien ne m'oblige à tenir "toute théorie scientifique d'évolution, en tant que telle, pour incompatible avec ma doctrine philosophique de la création,"—M. W. a parfaitement raison de le constater,—encore bien que je puisse "critiquer des théories scientifiques particulières d'évolution." Cela dépend de savoir si le sens donné à l'idée d'évolution par l'auteur d'une théorie est ou non celui que j'ai pris pour ce mot *évolution* en le définissant en vue de ma classification des systèmes. Les théories que j'ai combattues sont, non pas celles qu'on peut appeler "scientifiques particulières," et je ne m'attribue pas pour les juger la compétence requise, mais bien celles qui ont tort de se dire sérieusement *scientifiques*, car elles sont loin de se renfermer dans les limites des phénomènes évolutifs accessibles à l'expérience ou à des inductions précises d'un genre vérifiable. Or ce sont ces dernières seules qui sont incompatibles avec la doctrine de la création, telle aussi que je l'ai définie et qu'elle est généralement comprise.

M. W. parle, un peu après, d'un sens où "l'évolutionniste philosophe" pourrait à son tour ne pas s'interdire l'idée de création. Ce serait, dit-il, par exemple, en admettant "des créations artistiques et scientifiques," et cela non point par simple métaphore. Mais cet évolutionniste philosophe regarderait ces créations comme "le produit en dernier lieu de l'évolution." En ce cas, il faudrait, pour juger de la compatibilité ou de l'incompatibilité des notions ainsi associées, en réclamer des déterminations plus précises. J'ai tout lieu de croire que le réel caractère créateur de ces créations se trouverait sacrifié, excepté dans les mots, aux exigences de l'idée philosophique de l'évolution universelle.

La pensée propre de M. W. sur ce sujet, c'est que la création "peut être conçue comme le résultat (*the outcome*) d'un procès universel d'évolution." Je n'ai pas, dans ma première réponse, saisi exactement cette pensée. J'avais l'esprit préoccupé de nos polémiques de France touchant l'idée de l'évolution considérée comme la forme de la création du monde par Dieu, et j'ai cru qu'il s'agissait encore ici de cette conciliation prétendue de la théologie et des systèmes de la nature. Mais le mot *outcome*, néologisme anglais, quand il est ainsi pris substantivement, signifie la chose même qui provient et résulte, et non l'acte de début et de commencement de la chose

qui se produit. Ce qu'il faut comprendre, c'est donc maintenant, et sauf erreur nouvelle de ma part, que le procès universel d'évolution de la nature est le grand fait, l'éternelle donnée, et que l'ordre de la liberté et de la création est le dernier terme de ce procès, un produit de l'évolution, par conséquent. La création, comme telle, serait exclusivement l'œuvre de l'esprit humain une fois produit, mais le monde lui-même ne procéderait point d'un acte premier, divin, imaginé d'après l'analogie de cette œuvre. Cette manière de représenter les choses est, on le voit, l'inverse de ce que j'avais cru, l'inverse de la théorie de "l'évolutionisme chrétien," que M. W. paraît, ainsi que je fais, regarder comme insoutenable. Il estime qu'en se plaçant à ce point de vue, la question ne serait plus de savoir laquelle des deux conceptions, évolution ou création, doit être adoptée, laquelle rejetée, mais seulement quelle est celle des deux qui doit être subordonnée à l'autre. Je ne saurais être de cet avis. Les deux conceptions ainsi entendues divergent toujours radicalement et s'opposent sur le point essentiel : l'une affirme l'éternité des phénomènes, et l'autre, l'acte de leur premier commencement ; l'une, la procession du monde parti de l'esprit et de la liberté ; l'autre, la procession de l'esprit et de la liberté émanés de la substance aveugle et fatale.

"L'évolutionisme chrétien" nous présente le total de l'évolution comme l'effet d'un acte de création. L'espèce plus obscure d'évolutionisme que M. W. a en vue nous donne, au contraire, des actes de création pour les résultats du fait de l'évolution, à peu près, sans doute, de la manière que, dans les cosmogonies antiques, on faisait naître les dieux et les hommes, l'esprit et ses œuvres, du chaos et des forces naturelles désignées sous différents noms. C'est là prendre le parfait contre-pied non seulement de la doctrine chrétienne, mais même de la doctrine philosophique de la création à son premier degré, telle qu'elle apparut dans le *voûs* d'Anaxagore et dans le démiurge de Platon. Ce qui semble à M. W. n'être qu'un "changement dans la manière de présenter l'antinomie," un remplacement de l'option forcée entre deux conceptions contradictoires par le choix d'un ordre de subordination à établir en un sens ou dans le sens opposé, entre deux conceptions légitimes, est au contraire une décision bien nette, et même explicite, en faveur du premier principe des réelles doctrines d'évolution anciennes et modernes. Et ce changement, cette option, à vrai dire, comment M. W. s' imagine-t-il qu'elle "peut paraître pratiquement sans importance," alors que, par ses liens logiques avec les autres antinomies : de la substance et de la pensée, de l'infini et du fini, de la nécessité et de la liberté, l'antinomie de la création et de l'évolution, même telle qu'il la comprend, a une portée pratique aussi bien que théorique immense et qui s'étend à tous les problèmes de la spéculation philosophique et des croyances religieuses ?

C'est au changement qu'il propose dans l'exposition de l'antinomie du devoir et du bonheur que M. W. attribue la grande importance pratique. La nature de cette opposition lui paraît pouvoir être considérablement modifiée. Un terrain de conciliation pourrait au moins s'établir, selon lui, en ce que, d'une part, la doctrine du bonheur arriverait chez certains de ses adhérents à corriger son vice d'empirisme, à trouver un procédé rationnel pour déterminer des droits et devoirs fixes relativement à sa fin de bonheur, à poser enfin la liberté au sens positif (qu'il faut distinguer de la simple absence de contrainte) comme le bien le plus élevé à poursuivre, et par conséquent comme un premier principe ;—et c'est ce que veulent les adhérents de la doctrine du devoir ;—et que ceux-ci, de leur côté, ne suppriment pas, mais seulement subordonnent "la notion du bonheur." Ainsi tout le litige des deux doctrines se réduirait à savoir si l'obligation intimée par la loi morale se rapporte à une certaine fin et lui est subordonnée. Et cela semble au premier abord peu de chose. Mais c'est beaucoup, c'est même tout, pour qui analyse bien les termes de la question ; et comme la question se résout contradictoirement, par le oui ou le non, entre les écoles

de morale, l'antinomie que M. W. voudrait affaiblir subsiste en toute sa rigueur formelle.

Je n'examinerai pas ici, car ce serait trop long, s'il est bien vrai que la doctrine du bonheur se puisse détacher de la méthode empirique, et qu'il y ait moyen, sans en appeler à un autre principe de jugement et d'action que le bonheur, de trouver pour celui-là une définition générale indépendante des goûts et attraits particuliers que nous voyons si variables, et qui, leur donnant à la fois satisfaction à tous, permette la déduction de préceptes de conduite fixes et l'établissement de telle chose que des droits et des devoirs. Mais supposons cette merveille obtenue, il est clair que, par là même, une idée générale du bien aura été substituée, en tant que règle, au libre attrait du *bonheur*, ou des plaisirs dont le bonheur se compose, et que cette idée du bien elle-même aura revêtu le caractère d'une *notion* dont on supposera la donnée constante et l'égale détermination dans tous les esprits. C'est parce qu'il subit l'illusion de cette métamorphose de la doctrine empirique du bonheur, et qu'il se la figure possible tout en n'abandonnant pas le fondement propre de l'hédonisme, c'est pour cela qu'il emploie une expression peu usitée : "la notion du bonheur"; et "je ne supprime pas, suivant lui, je subordonne seulement la notion de bonheur," dans mes vues de morale, en contre-partie des philosophes hédonistes qui ne supprimeraient pas, qui seulement subordonneraient théoriquement à une fin les conceptions de droit et de devoir. Or, ce simple mot *notion* fait ressortir toute notre dissidence. La morale criticiste n'a pas plus à supprimer qu'à reconnaître une *notion de bonheur* attendu qu'elle n'en connaît aucune. Ce qu'elle connaît et reconnaît c'est la passion naturelle du bonheur, passion légitime sous la loi morale, pur fait, et de la détermination la plus variable, en dehors de cette loi, et duquel aucune loi ne se peut tirer. Je répète que l'opposition qu'il s'agirait de lever garde toute sa force. La morale criticiste nie que l'obligation se puisse déduire du bien et de la fin; en d'autres termes, que d'un bien et d'une fin, quelles qu'en soient les définitions, on puisse prouver à l'individu que la poursuite lui est obligatoire, s'il n'admet déjà le principe de l'obligation autonome; et la morale criticiste affirme que, de ce principe une fois admis, suit une détermination du bien moral et de la fin morale, sans qu'ait été fixée préalablement la matière du devoir. Je m'en réfère à Kant : *Fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs*.

Mais M. W. remarque que toute obligation de source externe est, tout le monde en convient, "réductible" et ne saurait passer pour un premier principe; et, comme la conception du commandement interne est, dit-il, analogue, au moins partiellement, à celle des lois externes, il conclut de là que la première non moins que la seconde, et les mots mêmes *commandement* ou *obligation* "impliquent relation à quelque fin": d'où une difficulté pour la doctrine rationaliste, qui n'accepte aucune "réduction" pour sa conception du commandement de la conscience autonome; et une supériorité de certaine doctrine du bonheur qui admettrait l'existence d'une loi interne obligatoire : obligatoire "non en soi, mais par relation à certaine fin que l'individu a faite sienne." Mais je conteste que ces concepts du devoir et de l'autonomie impliquent une fin, ou du moins une autre fin,—car il y a ici une équivoque possible et qu'il faut lever,—une autre fin que celle d'obéir à ce commandement intérieur, aux dépens même du bonheur. C'est une différence radicale, au lieu de l'analogie que M. W. invoque avec les lois externes. Ce qu'il regarde comme la difficulté de la doctrine criticiste du devoir en est l'idée mère, la grande caractéristique et le triomphe; et la faiblesse de l'hédonisme est de ne pouvoir imposer cette *certaine fin que l'individu doit faire sienne*; de ne pouvoir s'élever jusqu'à l'obligation pour aucune des fins et aucun des principes d'action auxquels il tente de conférer des caractères d'universalité et d'impérativité. "Ces caractères sont incompatibles avec la nature empirique, individuelle et variable de toutes les déterminations de sentiment et de conduite qui ont leurs racines dans les impressions agréables, quelque extension et quelque élévation que puissent

recevoir les idées d'intérêt et de plaisir chez les théoriciens de la doctrine du bonheur.

Les "réelles formules d'accord," cherchées pour la solution de l'antinomie historique des deux grands systèmes d'éthique, sont *plus réellement* des modes d'option timide, et mêlée de quelque regret, en faveur de l'un des deux principes contradictoires. Les deux doctrines sont encore, ainsi que l'avoue en terminant M. W., profondément opposées, et la logique n'autorise pas l'espérance de leur conciliation, non plus que la connaissance du passé ne permet de prévoir la victoire définitive de l'une d'elles dans l'avenir.

C. RENOUVIER.

[The "option" was more in doubt than either I myself or M. Renouvier supposed. My actual conclusions, in "A New Metaphysic of Evolution" (Part ii.), are on more than one of the antinomies nearer to his own. The new view to which I have been led on the relation between reason and experience in ethics is stated in *The Theory of Abstract Ethics* (Cambridge, 1916). As I have said in the Preface to that book, I found in M. Renouvier a great "awakener from dogmatic slumber"; and I have never been able to stop thinking about the problems, ethical and metaphysical, raised by him with such dialectical power.]

PART II

PREFACE TO THE SECOND PART

OF the following Essays, six appeared in a first edition in 1906. That which gave its title to the small volume ("Apollonius of Tyana") had already been published in *The Monist*, January, 1903. "A Compendious Classification of the Sciences" appeared in *Mind* of the same date. The others ("Celsus and Origen," "John Scotus Erigena," "Animism, Religion and Philosophy," "Teleology and the Individual") were new. Of those that are added, the essay on "Shakespeare and the World-Order" appeared in *The Hibbert Journal*, April, 1919; "A Note on the Eleatics" in *Mind*, October, 1924; "Nicholas of Cusa" in *Mind*, October, 1925. The remaining three, published now for the first time, were written some years ago: "Origen as Philosopher" in 1914; "De Aeternitate Mundi" in 1912; "A New Metaphysic of Evolution" from 1912 to 1913. The last, though not fundamentally altered, has been revised since then, and a few notes and references have been added, especially in relation to later science. These I have reduced to the smallest number possible. The contemporary movement in science, I believe, favours the kind of metaphysical view that I have attempted; but on the whole I have left the original argument to speak for itself, without trying to press into its service theories which in their present state are obviously not definitive.

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APOLLONIUS OF TYANA

A REFORMER of Greek religion from within, whose activity may have coincided with the first emergence of the Christian propaganda from Judæa, is undoubtedly an interesting historical figure. And both in ancient and in modern times Apollonius of Tyana has been made the subject of parallels which were probably never thought of by the author of his extant Life. The first of these parallels was by Hierocles, Proconsul of Bithynia under Diocletian; in which the attempt seems to have been made to show that the marvels attributed to Apollonius were better authenticated than those attributed to Christ. We do not possess this work itself; but we have the reply of Eusebius, Bishop of Cæsarea and ecclesiastical historian, written after the triumph of the new faith. The most elaborate modern parallel is that of F. C. Baur, first published in 1832.¹ Baur here attempts to show, not only that there are resemblances between the Life of Apollonius by Philostratus and the Gospels, but that Philostratus deliberately modelled his hero on the type set forth by the Evangelists. Though he was followed in this view by Zeller, it is now generally rejected; so that there is no need to enter into controversy on the subject.² It remains, however, none the less interesting to try to determine the character of the reforming activity of Apollonius himself. Was his predominant aim to conduct the world along the path of intensified supernaturalism, or was it to promote the growth of a more rational and ethical religion so far as this was possible without breaking with the past?

The materials for judging are contained in the Life of Apollonius written by Philostratus early in the third century, and in the extant letters ascribed to him, some of which Philostratus evidently knew. Whether any of these are genuine, it is impossible to be certain; and in any case the biography of Philostratus is clearly a romance. For the composition of it, the writer professes to have used the memoirs of Damis, a disciple of Apollonius; but he tells us that, as these were wanting in literary form, he has freely worked them up. Baur argues that

¹ Republished by Zeller with two essays on related subjects under the general title, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der alten Philosophie und ihres Verhältnisses zum Christenthum*, Leipzig, 1876.

² Cf. G. R. S. Mead, *Apollonius of Tyana* (1901).

the introduction of "Damis the Assyrian" is simply a literary device. The obvious anachronism by which Philostratus represents the Babylon visited by Apollonius as identical with the Babylon of Herodotus, he also holds to be intentional. It is not, he thinks, put before the reader for serious belief, but only to bring out the ideal attitude of a Greek philosopher confronted with Oriental ostentation. There is much to be said for this view. Philostratus, who was an accomplished man of letters, has nowhere the air of disclaiming credit for the skill of presentation shown in his narrative, while occasionally he disclaims belief in the stories narrated. He was, besides, an original art-critic, as is evident from the descriptions of real or imaginary pictures in another of his works; and he puts into the mouth of Apollonius æsthetic theories which he can scarcely have meant us to believe were not his own. He did not, of course, for a moment suppose that he was drawing up the documents of a new religion, and hence had no motive for concealing his methods. It was only necessary that they should not be obtruded. We have before us a highly mature work of literary art by an individual author who comes forward in his own name. If we cannot be sure in detail about the facts at the ground of the romance, we are saved from the labour of trying to extricate them from stratum on stratum of superimposed redactions. We know at least what type of reformer Philostratus conceived Apollonius to have been.

That Apollonius was a real person born at Tyana, there is no reason to doubt; nor is there any uncertainty about the general character of his life and teaching. He was in manner of life a Neo-Pythagorean ascetic, and taught what would now be described as a spiritualistic philosophy. The one mode of reforming activity ascribed to him with absolute consistency is a vigorous campaign against animal sacrifices. Superhuman powers, especially those of prophetic insight and of clairvoyance, were attributed to him by common report. Dio Cassius,¹ as well as Philostratus, relates that he saw in a vision the slaying of Domitian. The fact that he had a quarrel with a Stoic philosopher named Euphrates, who is known as a historical personage,² is clear, though its causes can only be conjectured from the account of Philostratus. For the rest, there is no ground for supposing that Philostratus deviated in the general spirit of his representation from the authentic type of his hero; and he must have had sources of information open to him for the details, with whatever freedom he may have treated them. Other Lives of Apollonius, now lost, are known to have existed.

¹ lxxvii. 18. See Baur, *Apollonius von Tyana und Christus* (Drei Abhandlungen, etc., ed. Zeller, pp. 110, 111).

² A laudatory reference to him in the Epistles of the younger Pliny (i. 10) is quoted by Baur, *loc. cit.*, p. 153n.

In the "Epistles of Apollonius," some of which, as has been mentioned, Philostratus had before him, the type is already individualised. A few points from these may be given as a preliminary to the more detailed biographical account which will follow.¹ The style of most of them, it may be observed, is of the laconic brevity attributed by Philostratus to all the genuine letters of Apollonius. Two on the subject of sacrifices, addressed to the sacerdotal bodies at Olympia and at Delphi, may be quoted in full. "The gods need not sacrifices. What then might one gratify them by doing? By obtaining wisdom, as I think, and by benefiting worthy men to the extent of one's power. These things are dear to the gods; those are of the goddess."² "Priests defile altars with blood; then some wonder whence cities are unfortunate, while they do ill in great things. Oh, folly! Heraclitus was wise, but not even he persuaded the Ephesians not to wash out mud with mud."³ The contrariety dwelt on between virtue and riches⁴ may be passed over as a well-known philosophic commonplace; but the way in which love of family and country is brought into union with the widest cosmopolitanism seems to offer something distinctive of the philosopher who, having travelled over the known world, is said to have been always pleased when addressed by the name of his birthplace. While it is well, he declares, to think all the earth a fatherland and all men brothers and friends, as being children of God, of one nature; there being the same community of reason and of passions to each and all, barbarian or Greek: yet neither men nor even irrational animals can lose the memory of their home and native seat or find anything to replace it.⁵ Men need cities next after the gods; and after the gods cities are to be honoured and their interests to be placed foremost by every rational being.⁶ While he accepts (or is made to accept) as an honour the charge that his Pythagorean philosophy seeks to attain insight into the future by revelations from the gods—only given, as he contends, to those who are pure in life—he also claims for the Pythagoreans, as Iamblichus did afterwards, the idea of a demonstrable religion.⁷ Against the credulity of the time, we find the reproach addressed

¹ The Epistles of Apollonius and the reply of Eusebius to Hierocles are appended to Kayser's edition of Philostratus, vol. 1 (Teubner). For Philostratus himself I have used Westermann's edition (Didot).

² Ep. 26: τοῖς ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ θεηκόροις.

³ Ep. 27: τοῖς ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱερεῦσιν.

⁴ See especially Ep. 35: 'Ἀρετὴ καὶ χρήματα παρ' ἡμῶν ἀλλήλοις ἐναντιώτατα, μειούμενον γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον αὖξει τὸ ἕτερον, αὐξανόμενον δὲ μειοῖ. πῶς οὖν δυνατόν ἀμφοτέρω περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι; πλην εἰ μὴ τῶ τῶν ἀνοήτων λόγῳ, παρ' οἷς καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος ἀρετῇ.

⁵ Ep. 44.

⁶ Ep. 11.

⁷ Ep. 52. Among the things received from a Pythagorean teacher, Apollonius mentions, besides mathematical and medical science, γνῶσιν θεῶν, οὐ δόξαν, εἰδησιν δαιμόνων, οὐχὶ πίστιν.

to the Milesians that, while Thales is called their father, they in their folly accuse a philosopher who predicts an earthquake of causing it.¹ A distinctive point again is the protest against the exaggerated cynical strain in Stoicism. In an imaginary dialogue, Euphrates is made to reproach Apollonius with relieving pains and sufferings of the body (which are no evil, according to the rigorists). His answer is that the same charge might be brought against the god of healing.² Of actual miracles nothing is said; and one who could utter the fine gnomic saying, "To lie is unfree (characteristic of the unfree), truth is noble (characteristic of a noble nature)," ³ cannot well have been a counterfeiter of miraculous powers. A piece of practical advice that may be regarded as a refinement upon this occurs in a letter to a sophist on literary composition: "Since the absolutely best mode of speech is hard to determine, speak in your own character rather than try to imitate what is best—or what you suppose to be best—if you have it not by nature."⁴

One letter obviously different in style from the others ⁵ is nevertheless interesting as bearing the mark of the period though not of the individual ideas of Apollonius. At the end there is an expression of Stoic pantheism, which, in the transitional phase of the time, was often presented in fusion or confusion with Platonism. Everything done or suffered in appearance by the individual is to be referred to the one first essence (*πρώτη οὐσία*) ⁶ as its cause, both active and passive. The teaching of Apollonius himself, so far as we can judge, though not without Stoic elements, laid stress rather on the transcendence of the supreme divinity. In the earlier part of the letter, what is supposed to be the Platonic or Pythagorean doctrine of immortality is asserted. Death and birth alike are only appearance. There is alternation between the visible and tangible of nature (*φύσεως*) and the invisible and intangible of essence (*οὐσίας*), but in reality nothing is created or destroyed. The process is conceived as taking place by condensation and rarefaction of matter; the former being the phenomenon of birth and growth, the latter of death. As may be seen, there is here no strictly defined immateriality of the soul, which is either identified with or very imperfectly discriminated from a fiery or ethereal influx such as the Stoics took to be the basis of life and thought. There seems to be nothing here specially

¹ Ep. 68.

² Ep. 8: *τοῦτό που καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν κοινὸν τὸ ἔγκλημα.*

³ Ep. 83: *ψεύδεσθαι ἀνελεύθερον, ἀλήθεια γενναῖον.* This may have been a repudiation of the *γενναῖον ψεύδος* permitted by Plato on occasion to his philosophic guardians of the State. For the sentiment, compare Soph. *Tr.* 453-4.

⁴ Ep. 19.

⁵ Ep. 58.

⁶ *ἢ δὴ μόνῃ ποιεῖ τε καὶ πάσχει πᾶσι γινομένη πάντα διὰ πάντων θεὸς αἰδῖος, δνόμασι καὶ προσώποις ἀφαιρουμένη τὸ ἴδιον ἀδικουμένη τε.*

characteristic of Apollonius; but it is clear that in the speculation of the time the Platonic metaphysic was in danger of being swamped in a kind of eclectic animism. The metaphysical advance to a definitely formulated immaterialism as regards the soul itself had to wait for the Neo-Platonic development. Neo-Platonism was in some respects a return from a religious to a more scientific interest in Plato; whose critique of materialism had not hitherto been carried through so rigorously in point of expression that the idea of incorporeal mind and soul could not even for spiritualistic thinkers be lost.

With this later development we are not at present concerned; and in the teaching of Apollonius himself, as presented by Philostratus, there is abundant interest on the side both of thought and of practice. For the phase to which he belongs, if unoriginal metaphysically, was in other ways marked by advances that proved the still enduring vitality of the ancient culture. It was not indeed by intrinsic decay that that culture disappeared, but by the invasion of alien forces. In the third century it still seemed possible to preserve with modifications the inherited type. The method which commended itself to the minds that were still in the ascendant was that of conservative reform. The imperial monarchy, which no one now dreamed of abolishing, was to be made the centre of institutions as republican as possible in spirit. The ancient religions were to be preserved in some form of union under the ethical direction of philosophy. Oriental cults, severely opposed in the second century, were in the third regarded with more favour if only their underlying community with those of Greece and Rome could be brought into view. The movement found its precursors, both political and religious, in philosophers of the first century; among whom, as we shall see, Philostratus makes it his special aim to assign the place of honour to Apollonius. In more than one respect the philosopher of Tyana was a hero better adapted to the needs of the time than men whose activity had been more characteristic of their own age. Speculative minds were now decisively turning away from Stoicism and seeking a more transcendental doctrine; and Apollonius had been a Pythagorean. The impracticable character of much of the Stoic resistance to monarchy during the first age of the empire was also recognised; and while no philosophy would have been listened to which did not repudiate the language of political absolutism, the need was felt of one that laid little stress on the external form of government. This need too was supplied by a Platonising Pythagoreanism which, while it had no more sympathy than the other doctrines with Oriental kingship, assigned a high place among constitutions to a monarchy according to law. To us it is visible that the facts of the situation were making for a formal despotism, a monarchy by divine

right, sanctioned by the theocratic Church, now rapidly growing under the surface of ancient life; but this at the time was seen or suspected by few. A still noble civilisation, lowered, as was confessed, in type though extended in range, but accompanied by many advances and possibilities of advance, both administrative and spiritual, seemed to thinking men worth preserving against disruptive forces whether from without or from within.

How far Philostratus was from insisting on the Oriental affinities of his hero may be seen at the opening of his first book, where he begins with an apology for them. Some, it appears, refused Apollonius a place among philosophers precisely on the ground that he was said to have put forward his doctrine and discipline as revelations from the gods. Philostratus therefore sets himself to show that, in spite of all that can be urged on that ground, he was a sane and philosophical cultivator of true wisdom as understood among the Greeks. Earlier philosophers also were believed to have been enlightened by divine revelations; and not only Pythagoras himself, but Democritus and Plato and others, had frequented Eastern and Egyptian sages and priests: yet they were not suspected of "magic." His "dæmonic sign" is not brought as an accusation against Socrates. Anaxagoras made meteorological predictions; and these are looked upon as instances of his wisdom. Why then should similar predictions of the future by Apollonius be ascribed to magical arts? Since, however, he is decried as a magician, and is not generally known in his true character, I have tried, says Philostratus, to bring together the facts from all accessible sources.

The memoirs of Damis, the disciple and companion of Apollonius, he proceeds to explain, were made known to the Empress Julia Domina (the wife of Septimius Severus) by a relation of Damis, and were committed by her to Philostratus, who was a member of her literary circle.¹ Damis, being an Assyrian by birth, was not a skilled writer; ² but Philostratus has put into shape the materials supplied by him. These, we are to suppose, furnish the groundwork of the narrative.

The story begins with some legends about the birth of Apollonius, agreeably and romantically told. Before his birth he was announced to his mother by "Proteus, the Egyptian god," as an incarnation of himself. "The country people say that he was a son of Zeus, but he calls himself the son of Apollonius."³ At the age of fourteen he was taken by his father to be instructed by a distinguished rhetorician at Tarsus. Disliking the luxury of the city, he was permitted to migrate to the neighbouring Ægæ, where there was a temple of Asclepius. He gave attention to all the philosophies, but attached himself to that of Pytha-

¹ i. 3.² i. 19.³ i. 6.

goras. His Pythagorean teacher did not live according to the principles he taught; but Apollonius, while not ceasing to love his preceptor, aimed at practising the Pythagorean life in all its austerity. Beginning, as he said, like physicians, with discipline of the body, he gave up animal food, both as impure and as coarsening to the intellect. Wine also he gave up, not indeed as impure, but because it makes turbid the æther in the soul. He wore linen garments, rejecting those made from the skins or clothing of animals; went barefoot; let his hair grow long; and took up his abode in the temple. There, Philostratus relates, the god used to appear in person. Apollonius, with his approval, blames the offering beforehand of costly sacrifices, which seem to him to be in intention bribes; and bids the priest dismiss a wealthy suppliant, who is a wrongdoer, with his gifts. The gods, he observes, are most just, and will not consent to be bought off in this way. To another evil-minded suitor, he declines the office of mediator, telling him that the gods welcome the good without intermediaries.¹ When he had come of age, he returned to Tyana, having made the temple at Ægæ, says his biographer, a Lyceum and an Academy; for it resounded with all philosophy.

At home, he reformed a debauched elder brother; and when he received his patrimony, distributed most of it among his poor relations, reserving only a small portion for himself. Going beyond the famous precept of Pythagoras, that a man should be faithful to his wife, he resolved on a life of chaste celibacy, and kept his resolution even in youth. In accordance with the Pythagorean rule, he submitted to the probation of five years' silence. During this time, which he passed partly in Pamphylia and partly in Cilicia, he was able to calm factions about games by mere signs. This, says Philostratus, was not so difficult; for people who quarrel about dancers and horses are easily made ashamed of themselves. It was less easy to quell a tumult caused by a famine. This Apollonius did at Aspendus in Pamphylia, where the people were going to burn the prefect, though he had taken refuge by a statue of the Emperor. And at that time, which was in the reign of Tiberius, the Emperor's statues were more terrible and more inviolable than those of the Olympian Zeus. The prefect, on being questioned by signs, protested his innocence, and accused certain powerful citizens, who were refusing to sell corn and keeping it back to export at a profit. To them Apollonius addressed a note threatening expulsion from Earth, who is the mother of all, for she is just, but whom they, being unjust, have made the mother of themselves alone. In fear of this threat they yielded and filled the market-place with corn.

Having completed his probation, Apollonius visited the great

¹ 1. 12 (1): "ἐυστησόν με" ἔφη "τῷ θεῷ." ὁ δ' ὑπολαβὼν "καὶ τί σοι δεῖ τοῦ εὐστήσαντος," εἶπεν "εἰ χρηστός εἶ; τοὺς γὰρ σπουδαίους οἱ θεοὶ καὶ ἀνεν τῶν προξενούντων ἀσπάζονται."

over, sages like Anaxagoras and Thales are said to have contemplated the heavens from just such elevations. "Yet," he confesses, "I, having ascended the loftiest height of all, shall go down no wiser than I was before." "Nor did they," replied Apollonius, "merely by such prospects, which display only bluer skies and larger stars and the sun rising from the night—sights visible also to shepherds and goatherds: but how the divinity cares for the human race, and how it delights in being served by it, and what is virtue and what justice and temperance, neither will Athos show those that climb it nor Olympus admired of the poets, unless the soul see through them, which, if it take hold of them pure and undefiled, darts farther than this Caucasus."

Indian nomads having furnished the wayfarers with palm-wine and honey, Damis thinks Apollonius can have no objection to tasting this wine, as it is not made from the grape. Apollonius proves to him that it is really wine, just as coins of bronze are no less money than coins of silver or gold. Moreover Bacchus, whose mountain of Nysa is close at hand, will not be angry with him for not drinking wine at all; but, if he refuses that which comes from the vine and yet drinks that which is made from dates, the god will be angry and think his gift disdained. And other wine, as well as that from grapes, intoxicates, as may be seen in the case of the Indians who drink it. This, however, has been said only to excuse himself, since he is bound by a vow. To his companions he does not wish to forbid wine, nor even flesh.¹

They meet a boy riding on an elephant, and Damis wonders at his skill in managing such a huge beast. Apollonius by questioning brings out that the credit is due not so much to the boy's skill as to the self-restraint of the animal. Philostratus goes on himself to discuss the various accounts of the elephant, one of them by the Libyan King Juba. The general conclusion is that elephants are second only to man in practical sagacity.

King Vardanes has sent a letter to the satrap placed over the Indus, requesting him to conduct Apollonius on his way. He supplies him with the means of navigating the river, and gives him a letter to his own king. Here Philostratus takes occasion to compare the Indus with the Nile, expressing scepticism in both cases as to the snow which is said to lie upon the mountains and to augment the stream by melting.² At Taxila was the king's palace. The dress of the Indians is of linen and of "byssus," which comes from a plant.

Visiting the temple before the city-walls, the travellers find representations with metallic materials on brazen tablets. These were comparable for expression to the works of the best Greek painters.³ The defeat of Porus and the clemency of Alexander were among the subjects represented. In a dialogue

¹ ii. 7.² ii. 18 (2).³ ii. 20 (2).

on painting and imitative art generally,¹ Apollonius draws the attention of Damis to the shapes seen in the clouds, which appear to us like centaurs and other forms of living things, known and unknown. He educes the conclusion that while such shapes are casual so far as external nature is concerned, there is yet an imitative faculty manifested in our seeing them. This faculty is in us. For man is naturally imitative, even when he has not acquired the power of drawing with the hand; and it is this natural imitative faculty, spontaneously exercising itself, that makes us see such shapes. Nor can the faculty be absent in those who merely view pictures, at least if they are to take pleasure in them. To make possible the pleasure in artistic representations, there must be an active power of supplying something from ourselves. This is shown in the case of paintings in black and white. Draw correctly the features of an Indian in white, and he will appear to the fancy as dark; the colour being filled in from past experience. So likewise in viewing the picture by Timomachus of the madness of Ajax: he who is to regard it with admiration must bring to it some image of Ajax and some notion of the whole sequence of events of which his madness formed part. The figures on brass seen in the temple are to be classed, Apollonius proceeds, not under the head of mere metal-working (*χαλκευτική*), but as products of some art intermediate between that and painting in the special sense. It is an art, he concludes, most like that of Hephestus in Homer's description of the shield of Achilles.

The king, whose name is Phraotes, invites Apollonius to stay for three days. Describing the construction of the city as viewed by the company, and in particular the temple of the Sun, Philostratus takes occasion to note the "symbolical manner" in which the statue of the god was fashioned,—a manner, he remarks, common to the sacred art of all the barbarians.² The Greek sage admired the modesty in the ordering of the palace as compared with the luxury of Babylon. In conversing with the king, Apollonius finds him to be a true philosopher. Phraotes, having dismissed the interpreter, requests Apollonius in Greek to let him join him at a banquet. On being asked why he puts his invitation in this form, he replies that it is because he regards wisdom as more kingly than his own rank.³ At the banquet Apollonius asks him how he acquired Greek and came to be possessed of philosophy. The king smiling returns: "As the people of old times inquired of those who came to their coasts whether they were robbers, because that mode of life, though grievous, was common, so you Greeks seem to inquire of all who come in contact with you whether they are philosophers; so much do you think philosophy, though the divinest thing that

¹ ii. 22.

² ii. 24.

³ ii. 27 (1): τὸ γὰρ βασιλικώτερον σοφία ἔχει.

can fall to the lot of men, to be the affair of everyone. And indeed I hear that most of those who profess philosophy among you are in fact robbers; the reason being that, while you have laws to punish coiners of false money and such people, you have no law for trying those who claim to be philosophers and for excluding pretenders."¹

He then proceeds to explain that in India there are few professional philosophers, and that these are carefully tested before they are allowed to enter upon the philosophic life. First their ancestors for three generations back must have done nothing disgraceful; this being ascertained from public records. In the next place the candidates, on offering themselves at the age of eighteen, are examined in respect both of their moral and intellectual fitness. The examiners² make use especially of the indications of physiognomy. For where philosophy is held in high honour, as in India, it is most necessary that those who profess it should be subjected to every kind of test. Next Phraotes relates how he himself came to receive a philosophical education. His grandfather was king before him; but his father, having been dispossessed during his minority, was sent for refuge to a foreign king. This king, who had a better realm than his own hereditary one, would have adopted him; but he preferred, as he said, not to contend with fortune, and obtained leave to devote himself to philosophy, so that he might bear his ills more easily. He afterwards married the king's daughter, and brought up his son Phraotes to follow the philosophic life. To this end, he taught him Greek. The sages in consequence readily received him as a pupil at twelve, though this was earlier than the usual age; for they regard a knowledge of Greek as a preparation for training in philosophy.³ Lastly, Phraotes relates how he came to be restored to his kingdom. Apollonius then asks him if the sages he has spoken of did not become subject to Alexander and appear before him to expound their physical philosophy. The King replies that Alexander indeed came in contact with some who profess wisdom of a kind, but who are really a race of warriors. The genuine philosophers of India are those who dwell between the Hyphasis and the Ganges, and to their country his expedition did not extend. Had he gone on, he could never have taken their tower, which, without preparation, they are able to defend by superhuman means.⁴

The next day at dawn the King comes to the chamber of Apollonius and rallies him on his water-drinking. Those who do not drink wine, he says, do not sleep well. Apollonius reply-

¹ ii. 29.

² Described (ii. 30) as σοφοί τε καὶ φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες.

³ ii. 31. Here and later the question occurs, Is it possible that anything was known or conjectured as to the affinity between Greek and Sanskrit?

⁴ ii. 33.

ing that they sleep more quietly than those who go to bed drunk, the King protests against the sophistry, and explains that his meaning was that those who drink wine in moderation sleep better than those who drink none at all. This leads to an argument in form. Apollonius contends that even moderate wine-drinkers, while not excited to hallucination, are yet liable to be affected by pleasing illusions, and that these too are troubling to the soul and sometimes prevent sleep. They that drink no wine at all remain always equable, neither elated by good fortune nor dejected by bad. Moreover, it is only to the soul untroubled with wine that true divinations come in dreams. Phraotes, having heard the argument, asks Apollonius if he will make him one of his company; but he puts the question by with the remark that it is good for kings to be conversant moderately with philosophy, but that a too exact and overstrained devotion to it would seem unbecoming and pedantic in their station.¹

At the end of the visit, Phraotes sends Apollonius and his companions on their journey with new provisions and a letter to Iarchas, "the eldest of the sages." They arrive at the plain in which Porus is said to have fought with Alexander. Beyond the Hyphasis they come upon thirty altars inscribed by the Macedonian conqueror to his father Ammon, his brother Hercules, and the other gods. There is also a stele, they record, marking the place where the expedition stopped. This, Philostratus conjectures, was erected not by Alexander himself but by those beyond the Hyphasis, pluming themselves on his not having been able to go further.

The journey to the remoter regions is accompanied by more and more marvels, zoological and other, which, however, are related not without occasional touches of scepticism. At last we reach the Tower of the Sages; whom the Indians fear more than the King, because the King himself has to consult them about everything that is to be said or done.² A young man sent to meet Apollonius addresses him in Greek; at which the travellers are not surprised, since all in the neighbouring village speak Greek. He brings a message from the sages inviting—or rather commanding³—him to come. In the form of expression Apollonius recognises something Pythagorean.

Traces were still apparent of the rout of Bacchus, who with Hercules had once made an unsuccessful assault on the tower. The images of the gods were like the most ancient of those among the Greeks, and the rites observed were Hellenic. Apollonius himself, says Philostratus, has described the Brahmins. "They dwell upon the earth and not on it, and are fortified without walls, and possess nothing save the possessions of all men."⁴

¹ ii. 37.

² iii. 10 (2).

³ iii. 12 : *κελεύουσι γὰρ αὐτοί.*

⁴ iii. 15 (1) : *εἶδον Ἰνδοὺς Βραχμῶνας οἰκοῦντας ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς κοῦκ ἐπ' αὐτῆς, καὶ ἀτειχίστως τετειχισμένους, καὶ οὐδὲν κεκτημένους ἢ τὰ πάντων.*

Out of this the biographer, on the authority of Damis, constructs an account of the Brahmins according to which they raise themselves in the air when they choose—not for the sake of vainglory, but to be nearer the Sun-god, to whom they pray—and are furnished with everything as a spontaneous gift of the earth. Perhaps the conjecture is permissible that we have here some real saying of Apollonius misapprehended by a disciple.

Iarchas addresses Apollonius in Greek, and gives proof that he has the minutest knowledge of his whole history. Going in choral procession to the temple, the Brahmins chanted an ode like the pæan of Sophocles which is sung at Athens to Asclepius. After the service of the gods, in which Apollonius had taken part, he asks Iarchas if the Brahmins, knowing all things else, "know themselves." Iarchas instantly replies that it is in consequence of knowing first themselves that they know all things. "What then," asks Apollonius, "do you think yourselves to be?" "Gods," he answered; and, being asked why, "Because," he said, "we are good men." In answer to the question, what they think about the soul, he replied, "We hold the doctrine that Pythagoras handed down to you, and we to the Egyptians." Apollonius then asks whether, as Pythagoras declared himself to have been Euphorbus, Iarchas too can say that before he came into this body he was one of the Trojans or Achæans or someone else. Iarchas thereupon makes the observation that the Greeks are too much preoccupied with the Trojan war and its heroes, and neglect the greater number of more divine men whom their own land and the land of the Egyptians and that of the Indians bore. Then he says that he too will declare who he was. He proceeds to relate the history of an ancient Indian king named Ganges, who was the son of the River-god. In that he founded cities instead of destroying them, and drove back an invasion of the Scythians from beyond Caucasus instead of bringing the yoke of slavery upon another city,¹ this king was superior to Achilles. More of his deeds would Iarchas record if he did not shrink from praising himself. For he, at the age of four, revealed his identity by discovering seven swords embedded in the earth by King Ganges, and now sought for to fulfil a command of the gods. He then asks Apollonius if he also knows who he was formerly. Apollonius replies that he does, but that his position was an inglorious one. He was the steersman of an Egyptian ship. In that capacity, however, he once performed a just deed in refusing to betray his ship to Phœnician pirates. This leads to a question about the use of the word "justice," afterwards more fully discussed when Apollonius visits Egypt. Iarchas raises the problem by his criticism that the Greeks seem to think the absence of injustice equivalent to justice, whereas a positive conception is needed.²

¹ iiii. 20 (3) : καὶ ταῦθ' ὑπὲρ γυναικὸς, ἣν εἰκὸς μὴδ' ἄκουσαν ἀνηπάσθαι.

• ² iiii. 25.

During the visit of Apollonius to the dwelling of the sages, the King entered. He was not a philosopher like Phraotes, but came arrayed more in the fashion of the Medes, and full of pomp. While the sages themselves ate sparingly, abundance was provided for the King; though it is not lawful for him to partake of the flesh of animals in their presence. He approaches with profound respect the sages who keep their seats. For the repast, self-moving tripods come in, and there are automata to serve as cup-bearers. Apollonius asks Iarchas why he sees precisely eighteen Brahmins present, since eighteen is neither a "square number" nor any other of those that are in repute. Iarchas replies: "Neither are we slaves to number nor number to us."¹ Sometimes they are more, and sometimes fewer, according as there are more or fewer of sufficient wisdom and virtue to be chosen. Then he goes on to blame the Greek democratic mode of appointing to offices by lot, and the fixing of ruling bodies in the Greek cities at a particular number. The King interrupts the conversation by asking questions about the Greeks, of whom, however, he has a mean opinion; imagining, for example, that the Athenians had been enslaved by Xerxes. Apollonius corrects this impression. Xerxes, he maintains, was unfortunate in not having died as well as been defeated at the hands of the Greeks, who in that case would have instituted games in his honour, thinking as they do that it is a praise to themselves to praise those whom they have vanquished. The King explains that he had got his false opinion from the Egyptians, who abuse the Greeks as borrowers of everything from themselves, and as a race of lawless cheats. He invites Apollonius to be his guest, but the invitation is declined.

Iarchas and his associates, questioned by Apollonius as to their views on the constitution of the world, reply that they hold it to consist of elements (ἐκ στοιχείων). These are the four elements of water and air and earth and fire, together with ether as the fifth. No element came into being before the others, but all exist together as parts of the living whole. This is at once male and female, and is held in unison by love of itself. The parts of the world are governed by the mind that is in it. As bearing an analogy to this government of the fabric by mind, Iarchas describes a merchant-ship such as the Egyptians send to India. In the vessel of the world, the first place is to be assigned to God the begetter of this animated universe (θεῷ γενέτορι τοῦδε τοῦ ζώου); the next to the gods who preside over the parts. Of such deities, following the poets, we may admit many, of sky and sea and springs and earth and under the earth. The place beneath the earth, however, since they sing of it as an abode of horror and destruction, does not, if it exists, belong properly to the world.²

¹ iii. 30 (2) : οὐθ' ἡμεῖς ἀριθμῶ δουλεύομεν οὐτ' ἀριθμὸς ἡμῖν.

² iii. 34, 35.

As an illustration of the powers of the sages, some extraordinary cures are related. A woman comes and explains how her son is possessed by a disembling and lying demon. One of the Brahmans gives her a formula of exorcism addressed to the demon.¹ A cripple, and a blind man, and a man with his hand paralysed are healed, and recipes are given to effect other cures.²

According to his report, Damis was himself present at the dialectical discussions. The study of astrology and divination and sacrifices was pursued only by Apollonius with Iarchas. Philostratus mentions works of Apollonius on these subjects; but remarks that in his own opinion astrological prediction, with all such divination, is beyond the scope of human nature: whether anyone has attained to it he does not profess to know. The work of Apollonius on Sacrifices is in so many hands, and is so well and characteristically composed, that exposition of it is unnecessary.

Since Damis has given an account of a conversation on the strange animals and so forth of India, Philostratus, while declining to commit himself to the truth of the stories, will not wholly pass the subject by.³ For the rest, the account of the Indian journey ends, as it begins, with enough of the marvellous. Philostratus was on the whole content to put into literary form the travellers' tales he knew; hinting sometimes to the less credulous his uncertainty as to what grains of truth might be found in the more extraordinary of them.

After a stay of four months, Apollonius leaves the Brahmans. A letter is given as from him in which he is made to say that he has received from them the power of going through the sky (*διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πορεύεσθαι*) and of conversing with them at a distance as if they were present.⁴ He and his companions return to the region of the Indus, then put to sea, and sail up the Euphrates to Babylon. Returning to the Roman Empire, they go to Antioch; but, finding it as insolently indifferent as ever to Hellenic culture,⁵ they put to sea again at Seleucia, and thence to Cyprus. From Cyprus they proceed to Ionia, where Apollonius is held in much honour.

When he came to Ephesus, we are told,⁶ even the artisans left their work to follow him. He delivered a discourse to the Ephesians in favour of a voluntary community of goods; teaching by the example of a sparrow that came to call the others to join him in feasting on the corn spilt by a boy carrying a basket.

¹ iii. 38.

² iii. 41 (2).

³ iii. 45 (1): *καὶ γὰρ κέρδος εἶη μήτε πιστεύειν μήτ' ἀπιστεῖν πᾶσιν.*

⁴ iii. 51.

⁵ iii. 58: *τῆς Ἀντιοχείας ξυνήθως ἰβριζούσης καὶ μηδὲν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἐσπουδακίας.*

⁶ iv. 1.

He foresaw a threatening pestilence, but, as they did not heed his warnings, he went to the other parts of Ionia; continuing everywhere his reforming activity and his salutary discourses.¹

A discourse at Smyrna is given² in which he exhorts the Smyrnæans to make themselves an object of pride even more than the beauty of their city. For although it is the fairest of all cities that are under the sun, and possesses the sea, and has the springs of the west wind, yet it is better for it to be crowned with men than with porticoes and paintings and greater abundance of gold. Buildings are seen only in that part of the earth where they are; but good men are seen everywhere and spoken of everywhere, and render the city they have sprung from as wide as the extent of land they penetrate. Cities that are fair externally are indeed like the Phidian image of Zeus at Olympia: but those that have men that reach every part of the world are like the Homeric Zeus, who is suggested to thought in various forms, and as moving through the heaven, and so is a more wonderful piece of work than the seated statue of ivory visible to the eye. Discussing politics with the Smyrnæans, he told them that a rightly ordered city has need of concord in variance.³ That is to say, each must make it his ambition to be better than the rest in something. The ancient Spartans were wrong in their exclusive devotion to military affairs. Each ought to do what he knows best and can do best. If one gains distinction by becoming a popular leader, another by wisdom, another by amassing wealth for the common good, and so forth, then the whole city will stand firm. This he illustrates by the example of a ship with its division of employment.

The plague having actually fallen upon Ephesus, the Ephesians sent an embassy to Apollonius. He was there on the instant—as Pythagoras was at Thurium and Metapontum at the same time—and stayed the plague by destroying a demon in the guise of an old beggar-man, revealed afterwards as a monstrous beast.⁴ He decided on a voyage to Greece, but first visited the tomb of Achilles in the Troad. When they were afterwards sailing the Euboic Sea, Damis questioned him about his visit, and Apollonius recounted his conversation with the shade of the hero, which disappeared with a glimmer at cock-crow.⁵ Arriving at the Piræus at the time of the Eleusinian mysteries, he was joined on his way to Athens by ten young men who were about to set sail to Ionia to see him. He offers himself for initiation in the mysteries; but the hierophant raises objection to him as an enchanter and as “not pure in respect of divine

¹ iv. 4: διορθούμενος πὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις καὶ διαλεγόμενος αἰετὶ σωτήριον τοῖς παροῦσιν.

² iv. 7.

³ iv. 8 (1): ὁμονοίας στασιαζούσης.

⁴ iv. 10.

⁵ iv. 16 (6): ἀπῆλθε ξὺν ἀστραπῇ μετρία· καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνες ἤδη ψόγῃς ἤπτοντο.

things." Made aware of the popular disapproval, he changes his tone; but Apollonius now declines initiation till another time; mentioning the name of the successor to the office, who, as he foresees, will initiate him. At Athens, in deference to the devotional spirit of the place, he first discoursed about sacrifices, thus refuting the calumnious and ignorant assertion of the hierophant.¹ A youth who interrupts a discourse of his with inane laughter he finds to be under demoniacal possession. The demon being commanded to go out of him and to give a sign of his departure, says that he will throw down a statue on his way. This he does to the astonishment of the audience. The youth afterwards followed the philosophic mode of life.² Hearing of the frivolities with which the Athenians were now accustomed to celebrate the Dionysia, Apollonius rebuked them by reminding them of the exploits of their ancestors and of their legendary connexion with Boreas, the most masculine of the winds. Another abuse which he arrested at Athens was the introduction of gladiatorial exhibitions,—which were going on, Philostratus tells us, at Corinth in his own day.

In a journey to Thessaly, Apollonius visited the tomb of Leonidas, which he all but embraced.³ When his companions were disputing which was the highest mountain in Greece, he ascended the height where the Spartans had been overwhelmed by the Persian arrows, and said that those who died there for liberty had equalled it to Ceta and raised it above many an Olympus. In the account of his residence at Corinth we come upon the original of the story of Keats's *Lamia*.⁴ This occurrence, says Philostratus, was already well known, but only in general outline, and as having taken place in central Greece. He has given the details for the first time from the record of Damis. At Olympia, receiving an invitation to Sparta from a Lacedæmonian embassy which he observed to be full of luxury, Apollonius wrote to the ephors on the subject and brought about a restoration of the ancient manners. A conceited youth submitted to him a long panegyric on Zeus. The philosopher asked him if he had ever written in praise of his own father. He replied that he should have liked to do so, but found that he could not do it adequately. "Then," replied Apollonius, irritated as he was apt to be by vulgar pretence,⁵ "if you do not think you can fitly praise your father whom you know, do you not see that

¹ iv. 19: τίς γὰρ ἔτ' ὃ ἦθη τὰ δαιμόνια μὴ καθαρὸν εἶναι τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα, ὅπως οἱ θεοὶ θεραπευτέοι;

² iv. 20.

³ iv. 23: μονοῦ περιέβαλεν.

⁴ iv. 25. The serpent-woman in the story of Philostratus is malign, but Apollonius saves her lover from death. In Keats's poem she has become ambiguous; we do not know whether she was first serpent or woman; and she dies with her lover, the intervention of Apollonius being in vain.

⁵ iv. 30 (3): δυσχεράνας οὖν ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος (τοῦτ' δὲ πρὸς τοὺς φορτικὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔπασχεν).

in undertaking to praise the father of gods and men and the fashioner of all that is around us and above us, you have entered upon a task beyond human powers? "

One incident of his visit to Sparta may be quoted for the light it throws on his general attitude as a reformer. A young man who was a descendant of Callicratidas, the Spartan admiral at Arginusæ, had an action brought against him because he had adopted a sea-faring life for gain, and because he took no part in public affairs. Apollonius succeeded in convincing him that in this he was derogating both from his ancestral traditions and from those of Sparta. He accordingly gave up his mercantile pursuits, and at the intercession of Apollonius was acquitted by the ephors. Superficially this may seem inconsistent with the discourse at Smyrna, but in reality it is part of the same general ideal. In that ideal, local diversity is included. Thus at Athens, as we shall afterwards find, Apollonius will allow no disrespect towards the sea-faring tradition; whereas here he reminds the descendant of Callicratidas that the Spartans lost their military power when they took to the sea.¹

The humanitarian tendency which the reforming movement combined with its regard for antique ideals becomes evident when we are told expressly that Apollonius treated the slaves of his companions as a part of his philosophic community.² Passing over some intermediate incidents, we may follow him westward to Rome, where at this time Nero was persecuting philosophy.

The philosophic cloak, says Philostratus, was proceeded against in the law-courts as a disguise of diviners. Not to mention other cases, Musonius, a man second only to Apollonius, was imprisoned on account of his philosophy and came near losing his life. Before Apollonius and his company reach the gates, a certain Philolaus of Citium tries to deter them from proceeding. To Apollonius this seems a divinely-ordained test to separate the stronger disciples from the weaker (whom, however, he does not blame); and, in fact, out of thirty-four, only eight remain with him, the rest making various excuses for their flight at once from Nero and from philosophy. Of those who remained was the young man whom he had rescued from the transformed serpent.

He stigmatises the reigning tyranny as one so grievous that under it men are not permitted to be wise.³ His discourses being all public, no accusations were made against him for a time. He did not seek out men of position, but welcomed them if they came, and discoursed to them exactly as to the common people.⁴

¹ iv. 32. Cf. v. 20.

² iv. 34 (2): κοινόν δ' ἐκάλει τοὺς θ' ἐταίρους καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἐταίρων δούλους· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνους παρέώρα.

³ iv. 38. (2): τυραννίδος . . . καθεστηκυίας οὕτω χαλεπῆς, ὥς μὴ ἐξεῖναι σοφοῖς εἶναι.

⁴ iv. 41.

At Corinth a Cynic philosopher named Demetrius had attached himself to him as Antisthenes did to Socrates. This man now came to Rome and brought suspicion on him of responsibility for the violent attacks he himself proceeded to make on Nero. A public protest against luxury delivered on a feast-day in a gymnasium which the Emperor was opening in person led to his expulsion from Rome by Nero's minister Tigellinus, who henceforth kept a close watch on Apollonius. His opportunity came at last when there was an epidemic of colds and the temples were full of people making supplication for the Emperor because he had a sore throat and the "divine voice" was hoarse. Apollonius, bursting with indignation though he was at the folly of the multitude, did not chide anyone, but tried to calm a disciple by telling him to "pardon the gods, if they delight in buffoons." This saying being reported to Tigellinus, he had him arrested under the *Lex majestatis*. On bringing him to trial, however, he found himself baffled, and in fear of his superhuman powers, let him go.¹

An incident at Rome is recorded that was thought to be an illustration of those powers. A maiden who was about to be married had died or appeared to have died, and was being carried to the grave amid the lamentations of all Rome; for she was of a consular family. Apollonius, meeting the funeral procession, commanded them to set down the bier, and, saying something inaudible, restored the maiden to life; who then, like Alcestis brought back by Hercules, returned to her father's house. Whether he detected a spark of vitality that had escaped the notice of the physicians, or renewed the life that was extinct, Philostratus acknowledges to be beyond his own judgment, as it was beyond the judgment of those who were present.²

The next voyage of Apollonius was to the region of the Bætis in Spain. Philostratus here tells some anecdotes to illustrate the greater or less civilisation of the surrounding country. When a courier came to Gades to announce the triple victory of Nero at Olympia, the people there understood what was meant; but those of the neighbouring cities, who knew nothing about the Greek games, got the notion that the Emperor had been victorious in war and had taken captive certain "Olympians."³ A tragic actor came to Hispalis. Where the people retained less of the antique barbarism in their manners, they were pleased with tragedy as a new thing; but here the mask, and the lofty elevation of the actor, and the portentous robes, and the resonant voice, terrified them till they fled as from a demon.⁴ Apollonius was sought out by the prefect of the province. The subject of their conversations is unknown; but Damis conjectures that they plotted against Nero; for, when the prefect took his leave, the last words of Apollonius were, "Farewell, and remember Vindex." Philo-

¹ iv. 44 (4) : "χώρει," ἔφη "οἱ βούλει· σὺ γὰρ κρείττων ἢ ἐμὸν ἀρχεσθαι."

² v. 45. ³ v. 8. ⁴ v. 9.

stratus reminds the reader that it was Vindex who first stirred up the peoples of the West against the Emperor when he was making his progress through Achaia; and mentions that he addressed to his soldiers an oration such as one inspired by the noblest philosophy might breathe forth against a tyrant.¹

Apollonius and his companions proceed by way of Africa to Sicily. Hearing of the flight of Nero and the death of Vindex, Apollonius in an oracular utterance predicts the brevity of the reigns of the next three emperors (Galba, Otho, and Vitellius). Such predictions Apollonius made, his biographer insists, not as an enchanter, but so moved by a divine impulsion as to know what the fates had in store. Enchanters or magicians (*οἱ γόητες*), "whom," says Philostratus, "I regard as the most wretched of men," proclaim that by juggling artifice and by barbarian sacrifices they can change the purpose of the fates; and many of them, when judicially accused, have confessed that this is the nature of their wisdom. Apollonius, on the other hand, followed the decrees of the fates, and foretold what would come to pass of necessity. So far was he from all juggling that when he saw the automata in India he praised the ingenuity of the contrivances but did not care to learn the details of their mechanism.²

At Catana, the story is told that Typho is bound there, and that from him arises the fire of Ætna. Apollonius takes this occasion to lead his disciples to a more "physical" view of volcanic eruptions. He begins with a paradox on the fables of Æsop; that they are to be preferred to those of the poets, in respect of wisdom, precisely because they are not told with such colouring as to give the impression that they are literally true. The didactic purpose in them is thus made obvious; whereas the poets leave it to the intelligence of their readers to discover the truth. He himself relates a story about Æsop and Hermes, told to him as a child by his mother; the point of the story being that the god had suggested to Æsop a line of invention that was at least his own, if it was humble. As for the myth about the contention of giants with gods for the possession of heaven, this is madness to say or to think.³ The cause of these outbursts of flame from volcanoes is in reality a mixture of bitumen and sulphur blown upon by subterranean winds in the crevices of the earth.

Revisiting Athens, Apollonius is initiated into the mysteries as he had foreseen. The winter he spends in visiting the Greek temples. He projects a voyage to Egypt in the spring, and, going down to the Piræus, finds a ship. The owner refuses to let him go on board, because, as he is conveying a cargo of images of the gods, he is afraid to admit sea-faring company, which is usually

¹ v. 10 (2): λόγον. . . . ὃν ἐκ πανυ γενναίας φιλοσοφίας ἐπὶ τύραννον ἂν τις πνεύσειεν.

² v. 12.

³ v. 16.

bad. Apollonius reminds him—since he appears to be an Athenian—that the gods themselves when they went on board the ships and took part with Athens against the barbarians, had no fear of contamination from disorderly sailors. He also censures the traffic in images.¹

At Rhodes he tells a newly-rich and uneducated youth who is building a fine house and collecting paintings and statues for it that he does not seem to possess the house, but the house to possess him.² Coming to Alexandria, he is treated with great reverence. Here an example was seen of his marvellous powers. Twelve men condemned for robbery were being led to execution. He perceived that one of them was innocent, and told the executioners to place this man last; meanwhile prolonging his speech so as to gain time, contrary to his custom of brief utterance. When eight had been decapitated, a horseman rode up with a reprieve for the prisoner on whose behalf Apollonius had interceded; his innocence having been since established.³

We are told of a dispute in the temple with an Egyptian priest regarding animal sacrifices, and of a discourse reproving the Alexandrians for the sanguinary quarrels that arose from their devotion to the contests of the hippodrome. At this point of the narrative, Vespasian arrives in Alexandria from Judæa, aiming now at the Empire. The philosophers Dion and Euphrates bid the people rejoice. For, says Philostratus, the last fifty years had been a period of tyrannies so harsh that even the reign of Claudius, though he was better than the emperors before and after, had seemed to give no respite.⁴ Apollonius was equally glad, but did not care to obtrude himself. Vespasian, however, sought him out, and first set forth to him alone his reasons for seeking the empire; though he had commended to him his fellow-philosophers also as advisers. Apollonius heartily approves of his purpose; and, to his astonishment, tells him that he is destined to rebuild the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus at Rome. He did not yet know that the temple had been burned down; but it was afterwards found that this was the case, and that the conflagration had been manifested to Apollonius sooner than if it had taken place in Egypt.⁵

The day after the private interview with Apollonius, the other philosophers are called in. Vespasian formally explains the motives of his action; describing the tyranny to which the Roman world has been subject from the reign of Tiberius, and

¹ v. 20.

² v. 22 (2).

³ v. 24.

⁴ v. 27. Tacitus also dated the beginning of improvement from the reign of Vespasian, to whose personal example he ascribes some influence in the return from excessive luxury to a simpler mode of living: "*Nisi forte rebus cunctis inest quidam velut orbis, ut quem ad modum temporum vices, ita morum vertantur; nec omnia apud priores meliora, sed nostra quoque aetas multa laudis et artium imitanda posteris tulit.*" (*Ann.* iii. 55.)

⁵ v. 30.

pointing out that if Vitellius is allowed to rule, Nero will have come to life again. "You have learned how not to govern," said Apollonius, "from those who governed badly: let us now consider how a good ruler ought to act."¹ Euphrates, however, who has become jealous of the special attention paid to Apollonius, makes a long speech in Stoic phraseology: first remarking that it is premature to consider how one is to proceed in a certain course of action before it has been decided whether that is the right course. In the end he approves of the resolution of Vespasian to march against Vitellius, but advises that, if he is victorious, he should restore to the Romans the democratic form of government under which they were most prosperous, and gain for himself the glory of having begun an era of freedom. Dion partly agrees and partly disagrees with the advice of Euphrates. He agrees in particular that Vespasian would have done better to let the Jews separate if they chose; political separation being appropriate to the singularity of their manners. Instead of spending his force in bringing them to subjection, and thus doing all that was in his power to preserve the empire for Nero, he ought to have straightway attacked him. At the same time he approves of the enterprise against Vitellius. A democracy, if inferior to an aristocracy (of Platonic type), is to be preferred to tyrannies and oligarchies: but he fears lest the Roman people, tamed as they now are by a series of tyrannies, should find the transition to liberty as unbearable as that from darkness to sudden light. Let Vespasian, however, put the question to the vote, and if the people choose democracy, grant it. In that case he will win fame universal and unparalleled. If, on the other hand, they choose monarchy, who should be Emperor but himself? Apollonius demonstrates at length the impracticability of all this. To him personally the form of political government is indifferent, since he lives under the gods; but he does not think that the human flock ought to be left to perish for want of a just and prudent pastor. As one man pre-eminent in virtue, when he becomes ruler in a democracy, makes that polity seem identical with the form of government in which the one best man rules; so the government of one, when it keeps steadily in view the good of the commonwealth, is in effect a democracy.² At Vespasian's request Apollonius, premising that the art of government is not a thing that can be taught, goes on to lay down some general maxims for the exercise of kingly power. The king is himself to be ruled by the law. Vespasian personally is advised not to let his sons take for granted that the empire will fall to them as his heirs, but to teach them to regard it as the prize of virtue. He is not to go too fast in repressing the pleasures to which the people have become accustomed; they must be brought to temperance by degrees. Governors of provinces should know the language of

¹ v. 32 (3).

² v. 35 (4).

the provinces they are sent to govern. The disadvantage of not observing this rule he illustrates from the failure in the administration of justice when he was in the Peloponnese; the Roman governor, who did not know Greek, being at the mercy of those who had an interest in deceiving him. Euphrates allows that further discussion would be idle, since the course to be taken has already been resolved on; but, with an allusion glancing at Apollonius, gives the future emperor the parting advice to embrace the philosophy that is according to nature, and to have nothing to do with that which professes itself inspired by the gods, liable as such claims are to be the source of deception.¹ Vespasian perceives his animus: and, when Euphrates afterwards hands him an epistle full of requests of presents for himself and his friends, he reads it aloud; thus giving Apollonius the opportunity of retorting on Euphrates by contrasting his readiness to ask for gifts from the emperor with his counsel to establish a democracy.

This, Philostratus tells us, is what he has been able to learn about the origin of the difference between the two philosophers. With Dion Apollonius was always on good terms, though he thought Dion's philosophy too rhetorical. Euphrates, according to the story, was afterwards in favour under Domitian. When Vespasian as emperor revoked the liberty granted by Nero to Greece, Apollonius did not care to see him again; though he approved of his good administration generally. In connexion with the story of the philosopher at Alexandria, a strange tale is recounted of his detecting the soul of King Amasis in a tame lion.² He left Alexandria on a journey to Æthiopia, accompanied by ten disciples out of the number that had again gathered round him since the dispersal under the persecution of Nero.³

On the borderland between Egypt and Æthiopia a primitive system of barter was practised. This Apollonius praised for its moral superiority over the habits of commercial bargaining among the Greeks.⁴ An Egyptian youth named Timasio, who had overcome a temptation similar to that of Hippolytus, guided the company to the celebrated statue of Memnon. Apollonius praises him for his continence, and regards him as of more merit than Hippolytus because, while living chastely, he nevertheless does not speak or think of the divinity of Aphrodite otherwise than with respect.⁵ He and his companions, still guided by Timasio, arrive among the Gymnosophists, whom they have set out to visit. In consequence of a trick of Euphrates, who has sent his disciple, Thrasybulus of Naucratis, to prepossess them against Apollonius, they put off receiving him for some time. At

¹ v. 37 (1): φιλοσοφίαν δέ, ὃ βασιλεῦ, τοῦτ' ἄρα λοιπὸν προσειρήσεται, τὴν μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαινῶν καὶ ἀσπάζου, τὴν δὲ θεοκλυτεῖν φάσκουσαν παραιτοῦ· καταψευδόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ θεοῦ πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόητα ἡμᾶς ἐπαίρουσιν.

² v. 41.

³ Cf. iv. 37.

⁴ vi. 2.

⁵ vi. 4.

length, after negotiations through Damis, who detects the trick, they consent to receive him, though still resenting his reported preference of the Indian wisdom to their own.

The eldest and chief of them, who is called Thespesio, delivers a long address, in which he seeks to place the aims of himself and his associates above those of the Indians; advising Apollonius to have no care about automata or wonder-working, but to choose rather the wisdom that goes with toil and simplicity of life. In his peroration, he reminds him of the pictures he must have seen of the Hercules of Prodicus. As in the Choice of Hercules Vice stands on one side luxuriously adorned, and Virtue poorly clad on the other, so let Apollonius think of himself as placed between the alluring wisdom of the Indians and the rugged discipline of the Egyptian Gymnosophists. Apollonius explains that he has not come thus late to make his choice between two philosophies. Surrounded as he was in his youth by the teaching of all the schools, he of his own accord adopted the Pythagorean discipline, in spite of the austerity which from the first it did not conceal.¹ Among the rewards it promises to its votaries is to appear more pleasing to the gods though sacrificing little than do those who pour forth to them the blood of bulls. The doctrine of Plato regarding the soul, divinely taught by him at Athens, Apollonius perceived not to have won general acceptance among the Athenians. He therefore sought out a city or nation in which one person should not say one thing and another the opposite, but the same doctrine should be confessed by all. First, accordingly, he looked to the Egyptians; but his teacher told him that the original fathers of this wisdom were the Indians. For the rest, he addresses to the Gymnosophists an apology on behalf of the arts and graces of life and the adornment of temples; pointing out that Apollo does not disdain to clothe his oracles in verse, and that self-moving tripods are introduced by Homer at the banquets of the gods. Nor has any accusation yet been laid in heaven against Hephæstus for corrupting matter by his art. Every art will have a care for ornament; because the very being of arts was invented for the sake of ornament.²

The speech of Apollonius made a powerful impression on all, and especially on Nilus, the youngest of the Egyptians. Thespesio, though black, might be seen to blush. This, of course, is a reminiscence of Thrasy machus in the *Republic*, as it is likewise when we are told that he becomes reconciled with Apollonius. Requested by Nilus and Thespesio, Apollonius recounts his adventures. He and his companions are courteously entertained

¹ Special stress is laid on the virtue of chastity. The Pythagorean philosophy is represented as addressing the neophyte: *κἂν ἀφροδισίων ἡττηθέντας αἰσθῶμαι, βάραθρά ἐστί μοι, καθ' ὧν σοφίας ὁπαδὸς δίκη φέρει τ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ὠθεῖ.* See vi. 11 (5).

² vi. 11 (17): *κόσμου γὰρ ἐπιμελήσεται τέχνη πᾶσα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι τέχνας ὑπὲρ κόσμου εὐρήνται.*

by Nilus at a repast. Nilus desires to become his companion; and, to show that this is no rash impulse on his part, relates his history. His father had sailed to the Indian coast, and had told him what he had heard about the sages in India. Informed by him also that the Gymnosophists were a colony from thence, he gave up his patrimony and joined them. He found them wise indeed, but not like the Indians; and had he not met with Apollonius, he would himself have sailed to India like his father. The eager and ingenuous Nilus also proposes that he shall try to persuade his elders of the inferiority of their wisdom: but this Apollonius discountenances; receiving him on condition that he will not make an attempt which would be of no avail.

Apollonius pays a visit to Thespesio, and asks him to instruct him in the Egyptian wisdom, so that he may communicate it to others, as he has communicated that which he received from the Indians. Thespesio signifies his readiness to answer questions. Apollonius begins by asking why the Egyptians represent the gods for the most part so absurdly; their sacred images being apparently made in honour of irrational animals rather than of divine beings. Thespesio parries this attack on zoomorphism by a similar question about the anthropomorphism of the Greeks. Did your Phidias and your Praxiteles ascend into heaven and copy the forms of the gods? And if it was not imitation that produced their art, what then could it be? An artist of more wisdom, answers Apollonius, namely, Imagination.¹ He who conceives the form of Zeus must see him in his mind's eye accompanied by the heaven and the seasons and the stars: the fashioner of a statue of Athena must think of armies, and of wisdom in counsel, and of the arts, and of how she sprang from the head of Zeus. Thespesio, on his part, contends that the Egyptians display more reverence to the gods in not audaciously trying to realise some conception of their forms, but using only symbol and suggestion. Apollonius replies that there is nothing to call forth reverence in the image of a dog or an ibis or a goat. If, as Thespesio says, that is regarded with more reverence which is only suggested to the mind, then the Egyptians should have had temples and rites indeed, but no images at all; leaving the mental representation entirely to the worshipper. "But you," he says in concluding, "have taken away from the gods both visible beauty and the beauty of suggestion."² "There was a certain Athenian named Socrates," is the retort of Thespesio, "an old man of no intelligence like ourselves, who used to swear by the dog and by the goose and by the plane-tree." "Not that he thought them gods," returns Apollonius, "but so that he might not swear by the gods."

¹ vi. 19 (3): *φαντασία ταύτ' εἰργάσατο, σοφωτέρα μιμήσεως δημιουργός.*

² vi. 19 (5): *ὅμεις δ' ἀφήρησθε τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὸ δρᾶσθαι καλῶς καὶ τὸ ὑπονοεῖσθαι.*

Thespesio, as if changing the subject, inquires about the scourging of boys at Sparta. Do the Greeks endure such a custom? And did Apollonius not reform it when he was occupying himself with the affairs of the Lacedæmonians? Apollonius replies that it would have been madness to contend against a religious custom such as this. The scourging is performed in accordance with an oracle directing that the altars shall be sprinkled with an offering of human blood to the Scythian Artemis. This no doubt was originally a requirement of human sacrifice; but the Spartans, by subtly interpreting it, have at once evaded the obligation of putting a human victim to death and turned a rite which they could not get rid of into an exercise in fortitude. Thespesio, however, skilfully presses the point; ending with the remark that he has been speaking not against the Lacedæmonians but against Apollonius. If we thus rigorously investigate customary rites the origin of which reaches back to a grey antiquity beyond knowledge, and cross-examine divinities as to their reasons for delighting in them, not the Eleusinian nor the Samothracian nor any other mysteries will be safe. We can always ask "Why this and not that?" and take offence at one thing or another. In these matters at any rate, if not in all, the Pythagorean silence is good. Apollonius accordingly, relinquishing further argument on behalf of the Spartans, consents to go on to another topic, and proposes that they shall discuss the nature of justice.¹

Such a subject of discourse, Thespesio agrees, is suitable both for professional philosophers and for others. Apollonius then recalls the comment of the Indian sages on his notion that when, being in a former body, he had refused to betray his ships to pirates, he had performed an act of justice. They laughed at this use of the word, holding that justice involves something more than the absence of injustice. Rightly, answers Thespesio, for no virtue consists in a mere negation. And we must not expect to find men publicly rewarded for practising justice. In the cases of Socrates and of Aristides we rather find the opposite. No doubt it will seem absurd: but as a matter of fact Justice, being appointed by Zeus and the Destinies to prevent men from injuring one another, takes no measures to prevent herself from being injured. Imagine, however, that when Aristides returned from his apportionment of tribute among the allies of Athens, the proposal had been made by two orators to confer the crown upon him for his justice; and that one had assigned as the reason his returning no richer than he went, and the other his observance of due proportion to the capacity of each allied State, and his refraining from all excessive demands: would not Aristides himself have protested against the first orator for the inadequacy of his reason, and recognised that the second was aiming at

¹ vi. 20.

the true mark? And indeed, in maintaining due proportion he had regard to the advantage both of Athens and of the islands; as was seen afterwards when the Athenians, by imposing heavier burdens, brought about the revolt of their tributaries and the loss of their empire. He, then, is just who both acts justly himself and so orders things that others shall not act unjustly. And from this diffusive virtue—which is better than oaths taken on sacrifices¹—will spring both other virtues and in particular those of the judge and of the legislator, which come peculiarly within the province of justice.²

To this account of the just man Apollonius assents. After some further discourse, he informs Thespisio of his intention to go in quest of the sources of the Nile. In the account of so remote a journey the geography and zoology as usual become mixed with the marvellous, though they are not wholly fictitious. We are told of the Androphagi and the Pygmies, who are of Æthiopian race, and extend as far as to the Æthiopic Sea, into which no one voluntarily sails. We also hear of cataracts haunted by dæmons; and there is a curious story about the taming of a satyr in one of the villages by Apollonius.

On his return, he signified his approval of the conduct of Titus, after he had taken Jerusalem, in refusing to accept a crown from neighbouring nations.³ Titus, now associated with his father in the government, invited him to Argos, and consulted him as to his future behaviour as a ruler. Apollonius says that he will send him his companion Demetrius the Cynic as a free-spoken counsellor; and Titus, though the name of the Cynic is at first disagreeable to him, assents with a good grace.⁴ He is also said to have consulted Apollonius in private on his destiny.

Apollonius, says Philostratus at this point, made many more journeys, but only to countries he already knew. He remained always like himself; and this is for the sage even more difficult than to know himself. Before proceeding to the account of his acts and sufferings under Domitian, the biographer brings together a few miscellaneous anecdotes. One of these throws interesting light on popular beliefs in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire. The cities on the left of the Hellespont, it is recorded,⁵ being once troubled with earthquakes, certain Egyptians and Chaldæans were collecting money for a sacrifice,

¹ vi. 21 (7) : *δικάσει μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦδε πολλῶν δικαιοτέρον ἢ οἱ κατὰ τῶν τομίων ὁμνύντες.*

² It is noteworthy that the place here assigned to justice as a positive virtue coincides with that which it occupies in Dante's description of the spirits in the heaven of Jupiter, who are those of men that bore rule on earth.

³ vi. 29 : *μη γὰρ αὐτὸς ταύτ' εἰργάσθαι, θεῶ δ' ὀργὴν φήναντι ἐπιδεδωκέναι τὰς αὐτοῦ χεῖρας.*

⁴ vi. 31.

⁵ vi. 41.

estimated at the price of ten talents, to Earth and Poseidon, and declared that they would not perform the sacrifice till the money was paid down. Apollonius drove them away for their greed, and by due rites quieted the earth.

Since those who adopt the philosophic life are best proved by their attitude to tyrannies, the behaviour of Apollonius in face of Domitian has now to be compared with that of elder philosophers when confronted with tyrannies in their time. Philostratus proceeds to make the comparison in set form; maintaining the thesis that Apollonius showed his superiority to all others, high-minded as they had undoubtedly proved themselves. It is not his purpose to depreciate the rest, but it is his duty to show the greatness of his hero.¹

Some of the sayings of Apollonius against the Emperor having been recorded, we are told that he fell under suspicion through his correspondence with Nerva and his associates Orfitus and Rufus. When proceedings against them were begun, he addressed to the statue of Domitian the words: "Fool, how little you know of the Fates and Necessity! He who is destined to reign after you, should you kill him, will come to life again."² This was brought to Domitian's ears by means of Euphrates. Foreknowing that the Emperor had decided on his arrest, Apollonius anticipated the summons by setting out with Damis for Italy. They arrive at Puteoli, and there fall in with Demetrius, who leads them to the seat of "the ancient Cicero," where they can converse privately. Demetrius tells Apollonius that he is to be accused of sacrificing a boy to get divinations for the conspirators; and that further charges against him are his dress and his manner of life and the worship that is said to be paid to him by certain people. He then tries to dissuade him from staying to brave the anger of a tyrant who will be unmoved by the most just defence, and who is undistracted by that devotion to the Muses which, when Nero was singing and playing on the lyre, gave the world some relief. Damis, who till now has been unaware of the purpose of his master in coming, seconds the argument of Demetrius. Apollonius holds this timorous counsel excusable on the part of Damis, who is an Assyrian and has lived in the neighbourhood of the Medes, where tyrannies are adored; but as for Demetrius, he does not know how he will make his apology to philosophy. He himself intends to remain; and in justification he sets forth the arguments that this is the only course worthy of his character. Of despotisms he allows that that is the most dangerous kind which, like the tyranny of Domitian, proceeds under forms of law. All the more, however, is he bound to appear and answer the charge against him; to flee from a legal trial would have the appearance of self-condemnation. And whither shall he flee? It must be beyond the limits of the Roman Empire. Shall he

¹ vii. 1, 2.

² vii. 9 (1).

then seek refuge with men who know him already; to whom he will have to acknowledge that he has left his friends to be destroyed by an accusation which he has not dared to face himself? Perhaps Demetrius will tell him to go among those who do not know him. But here too, as he makes impressively clear, starting from the use of the word by Euripides in the *Orestes*, the power called conscience (*σύνεσις*) will follow him, and will allow him no peace whether awake or asleep.¹ At the end of this address, Damis recovers courage, and Demetrius, far from continuing his opposition, cannot sufficiently express his admiration of Apollonius.

The *præfectus prætorio* at that time, the narrative continues, was Ælianus, who had been acquainted with Apollonius in Egypt. As a diversion in his favour before he arrives, he argues to the Emperor that the "chattering sophists," having nothing to enjoy in life, deliberately try to draw death upon themselves at the hands of those who bear the sword. Perceiving this, Nero could not be brought by Demetrius to give him the death he desired, but let him go, not as pardoning him but out of contempt.² On the arrival of Apollonius as a prisoner, Ælianus uses his authority to submit him to examination in secret. When they are alone, he gives expression to his friendly feeling, but explains the necessity of proceeding with caution. Apollonius asks him what he is accused of. Ælianus repeats the heads of accusation already mentioned; informing him that the most serious charge is precisely that which he himself knows must be false, but which the Emperor is most disposed to believe true: namely, that Apollonius slew an Arcadian boy for sacrifice to encourage Nerva in aspiring to the empire; the offering being made at night by the waning moon.³ In answering the charge, however, let Apollonius avoid a contemptuous attitude. The interview being at an end, Ælianus calls in the guards, and, with simulated anger, consigns him to custody among those who are awaiting their trial.

In prison, he is derided by a military tribune, who tells him that he knows what he is accused of if Apollonius does not. He is accused of being worshipped by men and thinking himself worthy of equal honours with the gods.⁴ As a test, let them go outside the walls, and he will try to cut off the head of Apollonius with his sword. If he succeeds, Apollonius is innocent

¹ vii. 14 (8-10). This passage is of high interest philosophically, as showing how fully the ethical conception of conscience had already been brought into view. The psychological conception of consciousness (sometimes expressed by the same word) was not so completely formulated till the Neo-Platonic period, with its more definite direction to abstract thought.

² vii. 16.

³ vii. 20.

⁴ vii. 21 (1): τὸ γὰρ προσκυνεῖσθαι σε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαβέβληκεν ὡς ἴσων ἀξιούμενον τοῖς θεοῖς.

of the claim to divinity. If he is terror-stricken and the sword falls from his hand, that is a proof at once of the divinity of Apollonius and of his guilt.

Here the histories are given of some of the other prisoners, who are deploring their fate. The philosopher, in accordance with his professional character, calls them together and addresses to them a consolatory discourse which gives them fortitude and hope. Telling them first not to despair before their cases are decided, he proceeds in a more elevated strain. During the whole of our life, the body is the prison of the soul; and those who dwell in palaces are more under this bondage than those whom they put in bonds. Nor is a savage mode of life a protection. The Scythian tribes are no freer than we are; but are surrounded with hardships by rivers impassable save when frozen over by the cold of winter, and shrink even within the shelter of their wagon-huts. And, if it is not puerile to recur to the fables of the poets,¹ one might tell of gods who are said to have been bound in chains, both in heaven and on earth. Think finally of the many wise and blessed men who have suffered at the hands both of licentious peoples and tyrannies, and resolve not to be surpassed by them in courage.

The next day, an emissary of Domitian comes in the guise of a much-dejected prisoner, but Apollonius sees his purpose of entrapping him, and discourses to his fellow-prisoners only of his travels. On the evening of the fifth day, one from Ælian brings him the message that he is to be led before the Emperor on the morrow; renewing the advice not to be contemptuous, and describing Domitian's appearance and manner of speaking. The fact that Apollonius had come forward to undergo danger on behalf of others, Philostratus here remarks, made a favourable impression even on those who before were prejudiced against him. While he is being led under guard to the Emperor's presence, he rallies his Assyrian disciple on the mortal terror he is in. Damis—who ingenuously confesses how terrified he is—is not admitted; and Domitian insists that the philosopher shall defend himself alone from the charges, and not Nerva, Rufus, and Orfitus, who are already condemned. Apollonius, nevertheless, declares them innocent, and protests against the injustice of assuming their guilt before their trial. Domitian, now telling him that as regards his defence he may take what course he likes, has his beard and his hair shorn, and puts him in fetters such as are reserved for the worst criminals. A letter attributed to Apollonius in which he supplicatingly entreats the Emperor to release him from his bonds, Philostratus pronounces to be spurious.²

When Apollonius has been lodged in his new dungeon for two

¹ vii. 26 (5) : *εἰ δὲ μὴ μαιρακιάδης ὁ λόγος.*

² vii. 35. This letter is not among the extant epistles.

days, a Syracusan who is "the eye and tongue of Domitian" visits him under the pretence that he is a well-wisher and has gained access to him by payment. After much feigned commiseration he reveals his drift; hinting that Apollonius can easily obtain his release by giving information about the supposed conspiracy against the Emperor. The Syracusan having gone away without result, Apollonius tells Damis that he was once that Pytho of Byzantium who came from Philip on a mission to the Greeks, and whom Demosthenes withstood at Athens. He also predicts that they will suffer nothing more than they have suffered already; and, to show that his submitting to bondage is voluntary, frees his leg from the fetter and then replaces it.¹

These things, says Philostratus, the more foolish sort ascribe to magic; against the efficacy of which he again takes up the argument. Successful events attributed to charms or sacrifices may be more rationally explained by chance coincidence. Nothing, however, will persuade those who have recourse to such arts that success does not result from performance of the prescribed rites, while failure is to be attributed to the omission of some detail the importance of which was overlooked. Others, he adds, have ridiculed the art at large; but if the young will follow his advice, they will have nothing to do with things of the kind, even in sport.² As is evident, he would willingly have ascribed the superhuman powers he conceived Apollonius to have possessed to some deeper knowledge of natural causation. Imperfect as the science of the time was, and credulous as opinion was becoming, philosophic culture repudiated in theory the anti-natural conception of miracle.

Apollonius is at last set free from his bonds, and conducted back to his former prison. His fellow-prisoners welcome him on his return, and he devotes himself unceasingly to giving them counsel. Damis he now sends to Dicæarchia (Puteoli) to expect with Demetrius his appearance after he has made his defence.

When the philosopher is brought to the imperial judgment-seat to be tried, Domitian is to be figured as vexed with the laws because they invented courts of justice.³ The court was decked out as for a festival oration, and all the illustrious were present. Apollonius, on entering, so disregarded the monarch as not even to glance at him. The accuser therefore crying out to him to "look towards the god of all men," he raised his eyes to the ceiling: thus indicating, says the biographer,

¹ vii. 38.

² vii. 39 (3): *ἐμοὶ δ' ἀποπεφάνθω μὴδ' ἐκείνοις ὁμιλεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἵνα μὴδὲ παύσειν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐθίζουσιν.*

³ viii. 1: *ἀνατυπούσθαι δὲ χρή οἶον ἀχθόμενον τοῖς νόμοις, ἐπειδὴ εὖρον δικαστήρια.*

that he was looking to Zeus; and thinking him who was impiously flattered worse than the flatterer.¹

He had prepared an oration in case this should be necessary; but Domitian merely put to him four brief interrogatories. Those he triumphantly answers, and the Emperor acquits him amid applause; telling him, however, to remain so that he may converse with him in private. Apollonius thanks him; but adds a stern reproof. "Through the wretches who surround you," he exclaims, "cities are destroyed, the islands are filled with exiles, the continent with groans, the armies with cowardice, and the senate with suspicion." Then he suddenly disappears from among them.²

Since Apollonius composed a speech which he was not allowed to deliver, Philostratus thinks that this too ought to be set before the reader. What he gives is an elaborate defence in which the philosopher repudiates all magical arts and all claims to divinity, except so far as good men may be said to participate in the divine. His life, pure from blood-sacrifice and other pollutions, brings him nearer to the gods, and the lightness of his diet enables him to form presages and hence to be of service to men. In turning men's souls from their vices he is of use to their rulers also, who find them more governable. This being so, if the people did think him a god, the deception would be a gain to the master of the flock.³ They did not think him a god, however, but only held the ancient opinion that by virtue men can participate in the divinity. A man who has something of divine order in his own soul can by wisdom draw away the souls of others from over-vehement desires of pleasure or wealth. For such an one, it is perhaps not impossible to withhold them from contact with murders: "but to wash them clean," adds the Pythagorean, "is possible neither for me nor for God the Maker of all."⁴ He is made to refer to some of the wonders recorded in the biography; but he disclaims the possession of power to keep a dying friend in life or to recover him from the dead. Had it been in his power to do either, he would have done it.⁵ In the part of his apology referring to the accusation of having said that if the Fates have determined that a certain man shall reign, then, though the Emperor kill him, he will come to life again, Apollonius points out that such assertions are of the hyperbolical kind adapted to produce conviction in those who find things that are put con-

¹ viii. 4 : ἐνδεικνύμενος μὲν τὸ ἐς τὸν Δία ὄραν, τὸν δ' ἀσεβῶς κολακευθίντα κακίῳ τοῦ κολακεύσαντος ἡγούμενος.

² viii. 5 (6).

³ viii. 7 (21) : ὥστ' εἰ καὶ θεὸν ἡγοῦντό με, σοὶ κέρδος ἢ ἀπάτη εἶχε· ζὴν προθυμία γάρ που ἡκροῶντό μου, δεδιώτες πράττειν ἃ μὴ δοκεῖ θεῶ.

⁴ viii. 7 (26) : φόνων γὰρ ἀνασχεῖν μὲν αὐτὰς μὴ προσάπτεισθαι οὐκ ἄδύνατον ἴσως ἀνδρὶ τοιοῦτόν, ἀπονύψαι δ' οὐτ' ἐμοὶ δυνατόν οὔτε τῷ πάντων δημιουργῷ θεῶ.

⁵ viii. 7 (46).

sistently with the appearance of reason incredible.¹ The implied view is obviously that of the Stoic determinism. If the pre-determined event is infallible, its conditions are in reality equally necessitated. Unconditional fate is an abstraction; though it is an impressive and a moralising abstraction. In conclusion, he quotes the lines of Sophocles in the *Œdipus Coloneus* on the revolutions of human life—

μόνοις οὐ γίγνεται
θεοῖσι γῆρας οὐδὲ κατθανεῖν ποτέ,
τὰ δ' ἄλλα συγχέει πάνθ' ὁ παγκρατὴς χρόνος.

Let the Emperor remember how ephemeral is good fortune, and put an end to the oppressions through which he has been made hateful to all, as all things have been made hateful to him.

When Apollonius, as has been related, strangely disappeared,² the tyrant did not break out into a rage, as most expected, but rather gave signs of trouble. This having taken place at Rome before noon, Apollonius appeared in the afternoon of the same day at Puteoli to Damis and Demetrius, as he had promised. He came to them when they were beginning to despair of ever seeing him again; and convinced them by having a tangible body that he had not returned from the shades. After he has slept, he tells them that he is about to sail for Greece. Demetrius is afraid that he will not be sufficiently hidden there: to which he replies that, if all the earth belongs to the tyrant, they that die in the open day have a better part than they that live in concealment.³ To those in Greece who asked him how he had escaped he merely said that his defence had been successful. Hence when many coming from Italy related what had really happened, he was almost worshipped; being regarded as divine especially because he had in no way boasted of the marvellous mode of his escape.

Of this residence in Greece one singular adventure is related. Apollonius desired to visit the cave of Trophonius at Lebadea in Bœotia. The priests refused to admit him; making excuses to him personally but alleging to the people as their ground his being a sorcerer. He went, however, in the evening with his companions and forced his way in. In this he did what was so pleasing to the god that Trophonius appeared to the priests and rebuked them. To the inquiry of Apollonius, what philosophy he regarded as the best and purest, he replied by allowing him to carry off a book containing the Pythagorean precepts. This book, says Philostratus, is now at Antium; and his own opinion is that it was brought with some of the epistles of Apollonius to the Emperor Hadrian, and left in the palace there.⁴

¹ viii. 7 (53): τὰς γὰρ ὑπερβολὰς τῶν λόγων ἐσαγόμεθα διὰ τοὺς τοῖς πιθανοῖς ἀπειθοῦντας.

² viii. 8: δαυμόνιον τε καὶ ῥάδιον εἶπεῖν τρόπον.

³ viii. 14.

⁴ viii. 19, 20.

A concourse of disciples from Ionia joined with those of Hellas to surround the philosopher; and rhetoric lay neglected as an art that can teach only language. He kept his disciples away from the forensic orators (τοὺς ἀγοραίους); having always been hostile to them, and now, since he had seen the Roman prisons, regarding them and their money-making art as more responsible for the state of things there than the tyrant himself.¹

About this time a crown (στέφανος) was seen around the sun obscuring its rays. The portent was fulfilled when Stephanus plotted the death of Domitian, then fresh from the murder of Flavius Clemens. Stephanus, says Philostratus, being the freedman of his wife—who was, like Clemens himself, a relation of Domitian, though not his sister, as Philostratus has it—avenged his death by attacking the tyrant with a spirit equal to that of the most freeborn Athenians. He proceeds to give an account of the tyrannicide, which, as we see, he approves in entire consistency with classical ethics. While this was taking place at Rome, Apollonius—having returned to Ionia after a stay of two years in Greece—was speaking at Ephesus. Interrupting his discourse, which had gradually become troubled, he stepped forward three or four paces and cried out, "Strike the tyrant, strike!" Then he told his audience that Domitian had been slain at that hour; and this vision of his from the gods was afterwards confirmed circumstantially.²

Near the end of Nerva's brief reign (96-98) he disappeared from among men, in some way that is not precisely known; for he sent Damis away when the expected time approached, on the pretext of entrusting him with a confidential letter to the Emperor. Damis does not even tell his age, which some make to have been eighty, some over ninety, and others more than a hundred. According to Philostratus, his statues in the temple at Tyana showed him to have possessed in a pre-eminent degree the charm which is sometimes found to accompany old age. Several legends are related of the manner in which he was called from earth.³ He always taught the immortality of the soul, but did not encourage the indulgence of curiosity about its future. To a disputatious youth who, even after his departure, continued to argue against immortality, he appeared in a vision and delivered an oracle. If the verses⁴ are by Apollonius, he would seem to have anticipated the attitude of Kant at the conclusion of his *Träume eines Geistersehers*. Philostratus lastly tells us that he has found no tomb or cenotaph of Apollonius anywhere, but that everywhere he has met with marvellous stories.

¹ viii. 22. Cf. Tac., *Dial. de Oratoribus*, 12: "nam lucrosae huius et sanguinantiae eloquentiae usus recens et malis moribus natus, atque, ut tu dicebas, Aper, in locum teli repertus."

² viii. 26.

³ viii. 30.

⁴ viii. 31 (3).

The effect of the work of Philostratus on cultivated opinion was decisive. Apollonius was henceforth recognised as at least a philosopher and perhaps something more. Not that the marvels related produced this effect. No school was led by them to call itself after the name of Apollonius, and no one appealed to his wonder-working as evidence of the truth of the doctrines attributed to him. The feeling seems to have been—and, as we shall see, an adherent of the new religion was not entirely exempt from it—that here was undoubtedly a genuine moral and religious teacher. When, however, the struggle between Christianity and the established polytheism reached its critical point, it occurred to one advocate of the old religion to select the *Life of Apollonius* as containing wonders better authenticated than those appealed to by the Christians. The argument of Hierocles, so far as it can be gathered from Eusebius, was this: "You proclaim Jesus a god on account of a few prodigies recorded by your evangelists. We have writers of more education than yours and with more care for truth, who relate similar wonders of Apollonius; and yet we, showing more solid judgment, do not make him a god on account of them, but only regard him as a man found pleasing to the gods." This is practically all that Eusebius tells us about the contents of the work written by Hierocles under the title *Philalethes*. Everything else in the book, he asserts, has been urged by others and has been already replied to. The parallel between Apollonius and Christ is all that is new, and this only will be taken up. What seems especially to have stung the father of ecclesiastical history is the taunt of Hierocles about the "heedlessness and lightness" (εὐχέρεια καὶ κουφότης) of Christian belief, to which he recurs again and again. A brief analysis of his argument will not be un instructive.

He will waive, he tells us, such points as this,—that the coming of Christ alone was foretold by the wise men of the Hebrews under divine inspiration, and that to this day devils are cast out by the power of his name, as the writer can testify from experience.¹ Of the biographers referred to by Hierocles—namely, Maximus of Ægæ, Damis the Assyrian, and Philostratus the Athenian—it will be sufficient to consider the last. From his trustworthiness, that of the rest may be judged. Accordingly the method of Eusebius is to examine in succession the eight books of Philostratus, pointing out in each the inconsistencies and incredibilities of the narrative. I have no objection, he says, to placing Apollonius as high as anyone likes among philosophers. But when his biographer, be he Damis the Assyrian, or Philostratus, or anyone else, represents him, under cover of Pythagoreanism, as going

¹ *Adversus Hieroclem*, 4: εἰσέτι καὶ νῦν τῆς ἐνθέου δυνάμεως τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιδείκνυται μοχθηροὺς τινὰς καὶ φαύλους δαίμονας ψυχαῖς ἀνθρώπων καὶ σώμασιν ἐφεδρεύοντας ἀπελαύνων διὰ μόνης τῆς ἀρρήτου προσηγορίας αὐτοῦ, ὡς αὕτη πείρα κατελήφαμεν.

beyond the bounds of philosophy, then he is really made out to be an ass in a lion's skin, a juggling quack instead of a philosopher. There are limits set to human powers which no man may transgress; though a higher being may condescend to the conditions of human nature.

Was Apollonius then a divine being? If so, let the biographer preserve consistency through the whole narrative. He is said to have been announced to his mother before his birth as an incarnation of the god Proteus, and swans are said to have sung him into the world. Whence did the writer get this? It cannot have been from a disciple who joined him long after in Nineveh.¹ In one place he is made to describe himself as knowing all languages without learning them. Yet he is said to have acquired the Attic mode of speech by discipline and attention, and not by nature, and to have been taken by his father to a rhetorician at Tarsus. Many things related of him, Eusebius allows, are credible as belonging to the history of a wise and good man. It is the attempt to ascribe to him a nature more than human that gives ground for blaming both the author and the subject of the biography.

Passing from the first to the second book, Eusebius points out inconsistencies in the account of the journey to India and the meeting with King Phraotes. He then dwells on the marvellous tales about India related in the third book. Behold, he exclaims, the incredibilities in which "Philalethes" glories; preferring Philostratus to our divine evangelists not only as a man of highest education but as careful about truth!² Iarchas, the chief teacher among the Brahmans, is represented as sitting, in the manner of a satrap rather than of a philosopher, on a more elevated and more adorned seat than his fellows. This outward distinction by the marks of tyrannic privilege was a fitting mode of doing honour to the teacher of divine philosophy!³ The account by Philostratus of the vegetative growth like wool that enables the philosophers to dispense with clothing made from materials furnished by animals seems to require that we should think of them as labouring at the loom,—unless we are to suppose that this substance of its own accord changes into their sacred raiment.⁴ That Apollonius praised the automatic mechanisms of the sages is inconsistent with his not caring to know of them in detail or to emulate them.⁵

Not till the return of Apollonius from India does the biographer, in the fourth book, make him begin his wonderful works. Yet, had he been of a diviner nature than that of man, one would say that he ought to have begun them long before, without need of communicating with the Arabians and the Magi and the Indians.

¹ *Adversus Hieroclem*, 8. Cf. 12.

² *Ibid.*, 18.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 23.

² *Ibid.*, 17.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 25.

Eusebius then scornfully comments on the account of his destroying the plague of Ephesus. The story about the ghost of Achilles, he proceeds, is also full of absurdities and inconsistencies. The ghost appears at dead of night and disappears at cockcrow; circumstances which would be appropriate enough in the case of evil demons, but are out of place when related of the soul of a hero. The "heedlessness" of the writer in his accounts of the casting out of a demon from a young man, and of the chasing away of the lamia, does not need much elaboration of proof; for this, as they say, is a casting out of demons by demons.¹ The raising of a maiden from death to a second life is most incredible, and to Philostratus himself seems a marvel to be explained away.² Had such a wonder really been performed by Apollonius at Rome, it would hardly have escaped the attention of the Emperor and of all his subordinates, and especially of the philosopher Euphrates who at that time was there, and who would not have failed afterwards to include this among his accusations of magic.

In his interviews with Vespasian, this steersman of an Egyptian ship—for such Apollonius told the Indian sage that he had been in a former life—gives himself the airs of a god and of a kingmaker. He commends Euphrates to Vespasian; and afterwards, when he is at variance with him, speaks of him to Domitian as the worst of men. How does Philostratus reconcile this with the prescience he attributes to his hero? Evidently, if the wonders related by the writer actually took place, Apollonius performed them by the aid of a demon. Had the superhuman insight he displays on some occasions been of a divine character, he would have displayed it always, and would never have needed to inquire about anything. The fact that he foreknows some things and not others is best explained by the theory of demoniac assistance.³ As was said above, he could drive away a demon like the lamia by a more powerful demon.

From the accusation of magic that was brought against Apollonius his biographer is anxious to defend him. The incident in the dungeon, however, by which Damis is said to have been first convinced of his superhuman powers, if true, plainly confirms the charge. The explanation here suggested by Eusebius is that an impression made on the imagination of Damis by his master's associate demon (ὑπὸ τοῦ παρέδρου δαίμονος) caused him to see the fetter apparently removed and then replaced.⁴ Apollonius, it is here evident, did not know the future; for he prepared a long defence which, in the event, was not needed. Moreover,

¹ *Adversus Hieroclem*, 30: δαίμονας γὰρ ἀπελαύνει ἄλλω ἄλλον, ἢ φασί, δαίμονι.

² *Ibid.*: ἀπιστότατον καὶ αὐτῷ δόξαν τῷ Φιλοστράτῳ παραιτητέον.

³ *Ibid.*, 35: ὅρα δὴ οὖν, ὡς ἔφην, τὴν πᾶσαν αὐτῷ παραδοξοποιίαν, ὡς διὰ δαιμονικῆς ἀπετελεῖτο ὑπουργίας.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 39.

if we examine that defence, we shall find a sufficient justification of the charge of magic by merely comparing his own definition of a sorcerer as a professor of false wisdom (*ψευδόσοφος*) with the things recorded of him by Philostratus. In what he says to Domitian about the words he had uttered on Necessity, he evades the true charge that he had predicted his end; and is thus placed before us as a flatterer and a liar and anything rather than a philosopher. Perhaps, however, the falsehood comes from his biographers. In that case, where are the "men of highest education" of "Philalethes"? The splendour of the truth has convicted them as plainly liars and uneducated men and jugglers.¹

Lastly, says Eusebius, arriving at the culmination, Philostratus, having thrown doubt on the place and manner of his departure from life, will have it that Apollonius went to heaven bodily, accompanied by an unexpected song of maiden voices.²

Selecting now, as an example of his false doctrine,³ the utterances attributed to him on the certainty of fate, Eusebius ends with some declamation on free-will: ⁴ remarking finally that, should any still think fit to place Apollonius among philosophers, he does not object, if only they will clear him of the false ornaments affixed to him by the writing under examination; the real effect of such additions being to calumniate the man himself under the guise of raising him to divinity.

The moral of the Bishop of Cæsarea's tract is, it may be hoped, too obvious for comment. We may go on now to consider briefly an interesting problem raised by the reforming activity of the philosopher or prophet of Tyana.

Eusebius does not suggest that Philostratus himself had either a hostile or a friendly intention with regard to Christianity. Yet it seems likely that, living when he did, he had some slight bias one way or the other. One passage might be adduced in support of the former view. The declaration of Apollonius, that not even the supreme Deity can wash away the stain of murder, if it were found in Julian, could safely be set down as pointed against the Christian ecclesiastical doctrine. To Philostratus, however, it probably appeared as simply a re-affirmation of the higher ethical view, at once poetic and philosophic, against the imaginations of the multitude that by prayers or ceremonies the necessary expiation to be undergone by the soul itself—perhaps in a series of lives—can be dispensed with. This idea of an inflexible moral order, not to be derived from arbitrary volitions, severe or indulgent, was an important part of the Hellenic conception of an ethically reformed religion; but, to bring it into relief, no contrast was needed except that which Plato had drawn

¹ *Adversus Hieroclem*, 43: *ψεύστας ἐναργῶς καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους καὶ γόητας τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ φέγγος διήλεγξεν.*

² *Ibid.*, 44. *ἡ ἐν δόγμασι ψευδοδοξία τὰνδρός.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 45-48.

between the philosophic thinker on religion and the popular "medicine-man." The aim of Philostratus, in spite of his introduction of marvels, was to make it quite clear that Apollonius was not this kind of person; and indeed the position about sacrifices which by universal consent was his, ought to be of itself sufficient to prove that he was not.

While there is thus nothing to show hostility to Christianity on the part of Philostratus, there is some slight evidence of a not unfriendly intention. The Syrian emperors of the third century, for whom he wrote, were themselves favourably disposed to the new religion. And in representing Apollonius as accused of perpetrating a ritual murder, may he not have meant to hint at the absurdity of the vulgar accusations against the Christians? This seems at least possible. That Christianity should become the exclusive religion of the State he would certainly not have desired. What he hoped for was, we may judge, a system of toleration accompanied by ethical reform of the local cults wherever such reform might be needed. Of Christianity itself he probably knew little. He was not one of those who had caught a glimpse of the theocratic aims of the Church.¹ Indeed Themistius the Peripatetic, and Ammianus Marcellinus the military historian, had scarcely appreciated those aims in the latter part of the fourth century. Even after the victory of Christianity they seem to have still cherished dreams of a mutual toleration; taking the ground natural to sensible men of the world imbued with secular culture who saw the general agreement of all the organised doctrines, philosophic or religious, on practical morals. They could hardly have imagined that what must have seemed to men of their type so moderate and obvious a solution would have to wait, not for its triumph but for a mere beginning of its effective recognition, to the time of Locke.

The *régime* of "religious liberty," desirable as it must always have seemed to statesmen who were not bigots, has not always been practicable for governments sincerely anxious to uphold freedom of opinion. The repression of the rising Christian Church in the second century was probably, in its inception, a policy similar to the legislation of modern States against the reactionary

¹ In spite of its defective information on the detail of Jewish antiquities, there is evidence in the fifth book of his *Histories* that Tacitus had gained some real insight into the spirit of intolerant theocracy which, at once dislodged and liberated by the destruction of Jerusalem, was shaping for itself a new embodiment in the incipient Catholic hierarchy. See especially c. 5. On the support furnished by theocracy to monarchy, compare what he says about the Hasmonæan kings, "qui pobilitate vulgi expulsi, resumpta per arma dominatione fugas civium, urbium eversiones, fratrum coniugum parentum neces atque solita regibus ausi superstitionem fovebant, quia honor sacerdotii firmamentum potentiae adsumebatur" (*Hist.* v. 8).

conspiracies fomented by Catholic organisation in its death-struggle; though the exact degree of knowledge of those who attempted it, and the degree of harshness in the method used, may be for ever impossible to discern through the cloud of ecclesiastical legend. An attempt to show how a more clearly conceived policy of the kind, aided instead of thwarted by accident, might have been successful in throwing Christianity back on the East, has been made by M. Renouvier in his *Uchronie*. According to M. Renouvier's hypothetical reconstruction of history, the official Stoicism retains the direction of opinion; the extra-legal power of the Emperor is gradually reduced with a view to the restoration of the Republic; slavery is brought to an end by legislation under the continued Stoical influence, instead of being left, as it actually was, to be slowly extinguished in the Middle Ages through economical causes unassisted by directing ideas. The process of return from the type of society initiated by the Cæsarean revolution being thus accelerated, Europe about the ninth century is a little in advance of what actually became its condition in the nineteenth. The empire of the West has in the meantime been resolved into a system of national republics in friendly alliance. The Christian propaganda is re-admitted when the force of the Catholic idea has spent itself in the East in mutual massacre and abortive crusading. Thus, in the hypothetical reconstruction, formal toleration of all sects, religious or philosophic, becomes at length the official system, as it is in the actual modern world after a far more wasteful struggle.

It is tempting to take this sketch as a basis and to make modifications in it by giving a more definite part than M. Renouvier does to the Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic movements. To bring about, for example, the abolition of the customs of animal sacrifice and of divination by inspection of victims, the ideas of a reformer like Apollonius were necessary; Stoicism having somewhat derogated from its philosophical character by defending the official religion as a whole. Again, to an idealist the Neo-Platonic metaphysics ought to seem an advance on the Stoic materialism. And indeed it seems clear that, in the absence of Christianity, Neo-Platonism and not Stoicism would finally have assumed the direction of opinion in the Empire. Had this been the course of events, Græco-Roman civilisation would have preserved its organic continuity, and the barbarian attack would doubtless have been thrown off. In the latter part of the second century the conservative patriotism of Celsus foresaw that, as things were, the latent civil war kept up by the *imperium in imperio* of the Church would be fatal; that, unless the Christians could be persuaded to yield the required allegiance to the State, the whole fabric would sooner or later go down under the shock of invasion. He did not indeed foresee the recovery; but expressed the apprehension that the religion of the Christians

itself, as well as true philosophy, would be submerged in universal chaos. This, as we know, did not in the end come about; though the prospect might seem near being realised in the dark centuries of the West between the end of antiquity and the beginning of new life in the Middle Age. What then would have been the result if the break-up had been averted? Would Western civilisation have assumed a fixed form analogous to those of the East though superior,—combining, let us say, the political order of China with the higher speculative thought of India and with a legal system that recognises rights as well as duties, but never developing new forms of freedom or new lines of art and thought? Or would there have been such accelerated progress as M. Renouvier has imagined?

A progressive movement might be conceived as starting from interaction between the Roman Empire and the free but undisciplined tribes of the North, when these, kept at length within their own boundaries, settled down to a life of comparative peace and began to draw their higher culture, as they would have done, from the old civilisation of Europe. We might then suppose an ethnic republic arising in the North—say, in Scandinavia—and, by offering to the South a new type for imitation instead of the city-republic of the past, leading to a system of independent national States. As the imperial absolutism, according to the hypothesis, remains unconsecrated by a new hierocracy, we should naturally suppose a transition from the monarchical to the republican form less violent than the French Revolution. Thus we should come round to M. Renouvier's result in a different manner. It would be easy to fill in details and, by selecting factors with a view to the required product, to show how every distinctive element in modern civilisation might have been evolved.

M. Renouvier himself, however, at the conclusion of his "apocryphal sketch," has sufficiently indicated at once the possibilities and the limitations of this kind of reconstruction; and the scientific interest of any such attempt cannot, of course, be in its positive result—since the result is necessarily unverifiable—though it may suggest new ways of looking at the actual process of history. We are led to see that in the complexity of real circumstances factors intervene which from time to time make continuous progress impossible.¹ Perhaps it is irrational even to desire that there should have been continuous progress; as Heraclitus thought Homer irrational for giving utterance to the aspiration "that strife might be destroyed from among gods and men"; since this would mean the destruction of the cosmic

¹ A recent example of this kind is the overgrowth of industrialism throughout the civilised world. It is remarkable that two poets so unlike in many respects as Wordsworth and Shelley foresaw the imminent evil of plutocracy in the early years of the nineteenth century.

harmony itself. It is still possible to apply the teleological idea in Kant's sense to the historical process. That is to say, we may use it as a "regulative idea" to interpret history as it was; though we may not use it to inform us as to what history in general must have been. Taking it in the first sense, and using the terms of post-Kantian metaphysics, we might regard the pseudo-synthesis of Athanasius and Augustine and the rest, itself entirely without human value, as the obstacle posited by the world-soul in order to rise more explicitly to the idea of spiritual freedom. This is not of course to deny that there are gleams of borrowed light in their Kingdom of Darkness; but it is to deny the too anthropomorphic teleology of Comte, with its insistence that the Catholic ideal, as one expression of the "human providence," must have been a progressive phase in the history of humanity. The immanent reason in things, being cosmic and not simply human, works in the affairs of man also through pauses like night and winter.

Such seasons, we know, bear the germs of the future; and the future is more than simply a return to a vanished past. To historical Christianity may be assigned on one side the merit of partially appropriating the idealistic metaphysic which was the legacy of Hellenic thought; and, on the other side, of preserving, in the documents to which it appealed for its authoritative dogma, elements of ethical culture which, when cleared of their dogmatic superstructure, could be seen to contain something emotionally unique. In the Hebrew prophets there is a more ardent, though not a purer and certainly not a nobler, morality than that of classical antiquity even in its final stage; and the teaching of the Gospel has become, when dissociated from a creed which was always extraneous to it, the inspiration of a more impassioned, though not of a wider, philanthropy. The first modern to bring out clearly the permanent ethical value of the Christian as well as of the Hebrew documents was Spinoza, who was enabled to do it by having discarded more systematically than anyone before him the whole framework of rabbinical and ecclesiastical dogma. Since, however, the problem of making a new synthesis of the elements of ethical and intellectual culture still remains, there seems to be some advantage in returning for inspiration to more than one source. The movement of moral and religious reform from within the Hellenic world failed, owing to the circumstances of the time, as much through its merits as through any shortcomings that may be ascribed to it. Its philosophical idea of divine justice, as we have seen, was opposed to the doctrine of vicarious punishment distilled by Christian theology from the lower paganism. And for a time the original Christian teaching, such as Biblical critics now suppose it to have been, failed more tragically than the Hellenic movement. Græco-Roman civilisation indeed was broken up; and the Christian

Church was victorious : but, on the other hand, the genuine Hellenism has been easier to rediscover than that which Spinoza regarded as the mind or spirit of Christ ; ¹ which, in its association with the ecclesiastical system, became distorted almost if not quite beyond recognition. In the endeavour after restoration, may not the " Hebraist " and the " Hellenist," in the true sense of both terms, regard themselves as co-operating to a common result ?

¹ This, for Spinoza himself, is something completely detachable from any legislation of an actual teacher, and indistinguishable from ethical truth as perceived by the pure mind without words and images. Those who follow the dictate of reason in this sense need no other revelation (*Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, cc. iv., v.).

I have heard the question put, whether the ideal Christ of Spinoza, thus set apart from all the prophets, can have been conceived by him as historical. However this may be, the essential meaning of Spinoza was that certain " eternal truths " are expressed in sayings of the Gospels with crystalline clearness and without the element of turbid " imagination " that belonged to the temperament of the prophets, but that laws laid down in the New Testament for a particular historical society, the Church, have no more general validity than the legislation in the Old Testament for a particular people, the Jews.

CELSUS AND ORIGEN

RECENT historians of antiquity have shown how narrowly Greece, at the opening of its great period, escaped falling under the dominance of a theocracy on the Oriental model, started by the dissemination of a religion at once new and archaic, and proclaiming itself revealed.¹ The inference was perhaps too obvious to draw, that what Orphism failed to do was done by the Christian hierarchy seven or eight centuries later. In the meantime a distinctively European ideal had been determined in outline by the temporary efflorescence of republican States, and by the growth of philosophy as a power not subordinated to popular religion, but claiming to satisfy the highest aspirations of the individual after speculative insight and a moral rule of life. Thus it remained possible long afterwards to break again the spiritual dominion of the East over the West. The ambition of those who represent the system that dominated European life in the middle period is nevertheless still active. Some even think that, skilfully directed and taking advantage of the ever-renewed reaction starting up from a past embodied in institutions, it may yet prevail. Though this view seems to take too little account of the critical work of the modern time, by which the whole historical basis of the old spiritual edifice has been irremediably sapped, a comparison with the situation near the close of the ancient world may show it not to be altogether chimerical. In the treatise of Origen against Celsus, we have the ablest defence that could be made in the third century against the attack of a well-informed opponent of Christianity in the second. Of the weight of that attack we can only judge from the fragments preserved by the apologist; but these suffice to prove that, where learning was approximately equal on the two sides, the advocates of the new creed were at a distinctly lower level of rationality than its antagonists. Yet the religion of the "barbarians," for all that reason could say against it, triumphed. The event was made possible fundamentally by the social conditions of the age. It may, therefore, be worth while for educated moderns to consider how far the economic order, for example, which they allow to go on, favours a revival of outworn orthodoxies that

¹ See Ed. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, vols. ii. and iii.; and compare the view of Prof. J. B. Bury in his *History of Greece*.

would bring with it again something like the old Eastern structure of life. The Byzantine age furnishes a warning as to the mode in which this could return and overgrow a new world that appeared to have transcended it once for all.

In Celsus and Origen we must not expect to meet with the two ideals in what seems to us their purity. Celsus represents the particular compromise between social authority and individual freedom arrived at by the governing classes in the Roman Empire during the second century of the Christian era; that is, at a time when the transition on the secular side was more than half accomplished. This attitude is philosophically liberal and politically conservative, as against revolutionaries whose aim is by no means to go back to a freer past, but to establish a new authority extending beyond action over all human thought. We must bear in mind that we are confronted with the anomaly, as it began to appear to liberal thinkers in the nineteenth century, of a civilisation running down. The chief problem for the men that cared most for the slowly accumulated results of the thought before them was to preserve what remained. Thus we do not find in Celsus hopes for a higher order of things in the future of the world. For him as for Marcus Aurelius and Ecclesiastes, "the thing that hath been, it is that which shall be." Or, if there is a difference, it belongs only to the different phases in a cycle. Origen, on the other hand, holds that a true religious faith, formerly limited to a small people, has now been enlarged, and is to prevail over the whole earth. This presents a kind of likeness to the modern ideal of progress. But, as we can see plainly enough even in his more conciliatory version of it, his creed, while continuing the breaking down of local custom which had been begun by the cosmopolitan empires, Asiatic and European, was bound to be fatal to that unrestricted liberty of philosophising which for later antiquity was an accepted part of the inherited order. Like Eusebius afterwards, he is fully conscious that he represents the "barbarians" as against the "Greeks." If his philosophical learning enables him to take much from the great Hellenic thinkers, it is to serve a cause which could never have been theirs.

A lately published research of Prof. Gunkel¹ seems to show that the root-idea of the spiritual transition must be traced back finally to Babylonia. The imagination of a priest-king who is to establish his dominion everywhere, and to make one religion prevail universally, cannot at first have sprung up in a small tribal group; it must have originated in a great empire. The Jews were only the bearers of the Messianic idea, though it became strongly Judaised in the process. Now, in whatever

¹ *Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des Neuen Testaments* (Göttingen, 1903). Also published in translation in *The Monist* for April, 1903.

way Christianity arose, it was, as Gunkel has shown, from the first a highly syncretistic religion. Some of the Eastern ideas it contains may not have come to it by way of Judaism: though actual Judaism was much more composite than it appears in its canonical Scriptures. In the case of this idea, however, there is no difficulty in understanding the historical process. For, as we know, the Judaised conception of world-wide theocracy was especially that of the powerful "Catholic" groups among the early believers. Thus (drawing again an obvious inference) we may say that the theocratic ideal migrated from Babylon to Rome, through the Messianic Jews first and then the Catholic Christians. The old civilisation which had become for the apocalyptists the symbol of the secular world-state was the original source of their own dream of all-embracing religious dominion. And the new empire of the West, having already succumbed to the Eastern institution of absolute monarchy, was the necessary recipient of the ideal which for their successors took the form, no longer of a "New Jerusalem," but of the universal "City of God."

Here we have one far-reaching illustration of Sir Edward Tylor's theorem regarding the immense potency of "survivals in culture." Fortunately, ideals new as well as old can be revived, and the human race has some control over the circumstances that give a field for their growth. The conceptions of the republican State and of the liberty of philosophising were restored after they had gone into latency; and they have gained a larger scope. What kind of conditions the modern world is providing for their further development is a practically important question the discussion of which would lead far. If civilisation should continue to be based on the existence of a huge mass with no instruction except what is of utility for material needs, then it seems clear that culture of a rational type will not permanently retain even such directing power as it has.¹ This remark, however, is made only in passing. My object at present is, not to bring into view all the complex issues, but to give a straightforward account, mainly from the intellectual side, of a particular controversy which throws light on the perennial strife of ideals.

This account I have not subordinated to a thesis, though it might serve to illustrate more than one. What I propose is to set forth the debate itself in some detail, but with no pretention of exhausting its interest. Thus I have not attempted a complete reconstruction of Celsus, or a special study of his whole

¹ Meyer's remarks on the rise of capitalism in the Greek world are in this relation of extreme interest. He points out that its evil effects were for a time masked by the rapid political and economic advancement of the State. See *Geschichte des Alterthums*, iii. § 305, and compare v. § 884: "Wie zu allen Zeiten gehen auch in Griechenland der Sieg des Capitalismus und die Proletarisierung der Massen Hand in Hand."

view, on the lines of Keim¹ or of Pélagaud.² If C. J. Neumann's promised reconstruction in Greek had already appeared, I might not have set myself to go through the treatise of Origen in full; but, having made a study of it, I find that there is room for a supplement to other work.³

The edition I have used is the new one by Koetschau.⁴ From Koetschau's introduction I give the facts it is necessary to bear in mind as to the time and place of composition. The treatise was composed probably at Cæsarea in Palestine. Its date (as established by Neumann) is 248. Celsus wrote his work against the Christians sometime between 177 and 180. Origen's reply, we learn from the dedication, was written in response to a request of his friend Ambrosius, who sent him a copy of the work of Celsus, entitled the *True Word* (Ἀληθὴς Λόγος). Who Celsus was, Origen himself does not know. He would like to identify him with an Epicurean of the same name who wrote against magic, and to whom Lucian dedicated his exposure of Alexander the "false prophet"; but he discovers by degrees that this conjecture has too little plausibility, and at length ceases to make his points dependent on it. Celsus was in fact a Platonist. As Origen was of the group of Fathers who, in their borrowings from philosophy, found most that seemed to their purpose in Plato, the opponents have to this extent something in common. Both for this and for other reasons, the apologist does not find it possible to keep up consistently the tone of contempt which he assumes in his "Proem" towards the assailant of the faith.

Of Origen's reputed heterodoxy little appears in the treatise before us. Those who wish to know exactly how he mitigated his creed by a philosophic doctrine of "world-periods" and by the theory of a "restitution of all things," must consult his *Principles*.⁵ We find now and then hints of a less damnatory eschatology;⁶ but this does not seem to affect the position that, to whomsoever salvation comes, it must in the end be through acceptance of Jesus Christ as the Saviour.⁷ From the first it is obvious that the

¹ *Celsus' Wahres Wort* (1873).

² *Étude sur Celse* (1878).

³ Patrick's *Apology of Origen* (1892) is on different lines.

⁴ *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte herausgegeben von der Kirchenväter-Commission der Königl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.* Origenes, I., II., Leipzig, 1899.

⁵ See the next Essay.

⁶ See in particular *Contra Celsum*, vi. 26. It is not without danger, says Origen, to commit what is meant clearly to writing (ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀκίνδυνον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων σαφῆνειαν πιστεῦσαι γραφῇ). The mitigation cannot safely be brought to the knowledge of the multitude, hardly held in check as it is even by the fear of eternal punishment.

⁷ After a careful study of the *Principles* as edited later by Dr. Koetschau, I gladly recognise that in his own thought, whatever his exoteric language may seem to imply, Origen was quite clear of the doctrine of "exclusive salvation" by creed, ritual or faith in a person.

contest is not between rival philosophies, each to be rationally maintained. Origen assumes that Christianity is a revelation to be received by faith. Greek philosophy, so far as it claims independence, is treated as a hostile power, not indeed without persuasiveness to those who are grounded in its principles, though precisely for that reason an apostolic warning (Col. ii. 8) was necessary against it. The Old and New Testaments are held unquestioningly to be the inspired word of God. If the limit between canonical and uncanonical matter was still indeterminate, that in no way affects the general principle. When Celsus speaks of "inspired" poets or philosophers, his language has not much more in common with Origen's in reference to the Scriptures than the modern literary sense of "inspiration" has in common with the sense it conveyed to a text-quoting theological disputant of the sixteenth or seventeenth century. The difference is that in the early centuries of our era the man of ecclesiastical authority was the man of the future, while the man of liberal and rational culture was the man of the past.¹

The opening of the treatise gives us an insight into the fanaticism with which the ancient world was being assailed. Celsus brings against the Christians the ordinary charge of holding unlawful assemblies. A civilised man finding himself among Scythians and unable to escape, replies Origen, would rightly live in secret in his own manner with any whom he could persuade to do likewise. Now what is lawful among "the nations" regarding statues and "godless polytheism" is as bad as the customs of the Scythians or anything more impious than these. Similarly those would do well who should secretly conspire against a tyrant that aimed at destroying their city. Thus the Christians are right in making compacts forbidden by the law against that tyrant whom they call the Devil.

Celsus remarks that although the doctrine is of barbarian—that is, Oriental—origin,² he does not blame it on this ground, for the barbarians have shown themselves competent to make discoveries; but the Greeks are better at judging and confirming and putting in practice the things discovered.³ So they can do in the case of Christianity, was the reply: but it is to be added that the Christians have a diviner mode of proving their doctrine than the Greek dialectic;⁴ namely, by "spirit and power," as the

¹ The estimate of Origen's rationality that would be formed from the *Contra Celsum* alone is modified all round by the *De Principiis*, which, now that it has been edited with all the accuracy attainable, ought to rescue him from the *limbus patrum*.

² i. 2: *βάρβαρον ἄνωθεν εἶναι τὸ δόγμα*.

³ This idea of progress from the Oriental to the Hellenic world is to be found already in the *Epinomis*, 987 DE: *λάβωμεν δὲ ὡς ὑπὲρ ἂν Ἕλληνες βαρβάρων παραλάβωσι, κάλλιον τοῦτο εἰς τέλος ἀπεργάζονται*.

⁴ i. 2: *οἰκεία ἀπόδειξις τοῦ λόγου, θειοτέρα παρὰ τὴν ἀπὸ διαλεκτικῆς Ἑλληνικῆς*.

Apostle said, or, in other words, from the fulfilment of prophecy and from miracles.

Early in the treatise the difficult question is raised as to the precise grounds assigned for the repression of Christianity.

Celsus expresses approval of the conduct of the Christians in so far as they cannot be brought to renounce doctrines they have sincerely embraced; ¹ but observes that, if they have had to undergo persecution, this is only what has happened to philosophers like Socrates.² In other passages also he speaks in the same tone; but on the other hand he treats some that have been punished as merely executed criminals. These no doubt were they who (as he mentions) publicly insulted statues and abused the gods. We must remember that the Christians in the end conquered, and that they had no scruple in exercising control over the sources of information. Not a single book directed against them has been allowed to reach us, except, like this of Celsus, in the fragments preserved by an opponent.

Origen in a later passage puts it on record that up to this time (that is, near the middle of the third century) extremely few Christians have suffered death for their opinions.³ He ascribes this to supernatural protection. The genuine dislike of a government not yet theocratic for anything that savoured of religious persecution, even when it seemed politically necessary, he cannot or will not understand. The respect of Celsus for the martyrs ⁴ he supposes to be artfully assumed. Here, he says, Celsus conceals his Epicureanism, and speaks as if he believed in a divine element in man.⁵

The ethical teaching of Christianity and its condemnation of images, Celsus points out, is not new. Origen partly agrees: for if these teachings had not been written under the form of "common notions," in the hearts of men generally, how could God justly have punished them for their sins? ⁶

The accusation of relying on the utterance of names and magical formulæ, he finds to contain an allusion to the Christian exorcists. But, he replies, these cast out devils not by the power of enchantments but by the name of Jesus and by declaring the histories concerning him.⁷ So powerful is that name that even bad men can sometimes cast out devils by it. Celsus indeed knows this, for he asks why the Saviour condemns those that have done works like his own.

¹ i. 8.

² i. 3.

³ iii. 8: ὀλίγοι κατὰ καιροὺς καὶ σφόδρα εὐαρίθμητοι ὑπὲρ τῆς Χριστιανῶν θεοσεβείας τεθνήκασι.

⁴ It must be remembered that the word "martyr" did not primarily mean one who suffered death, but was applied to anyone who expressed his faith as a Christian when the confession was unpopular or socially inconvenient.

⁵ i. 8.

⁶ i. 4, 5.

⁷ i. 6: οὐ γὰρ κατακληθήσεαι ἰσχύειν δοκοῦσιν ἀλλὰ τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ μετὰ τῆς ἀπαγγελίας τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἱστοριῶν.

To the charge of keeping the doctrine secret¹ he replies that the chief Christian doctrines,—the Virgin-birth, the Crucifixion, the Resurrection, the Judgment,—are better known than those of the philosophers. For the rest, the philosophers too have the distinction between exoteric and esoteric discourses.² And the mysteries in general, whether of Greeks or barbarians, have not been attacked for their secrecy. Then why those of Christianity?

Celsus commends rational method, apart from which those who receive dogmas by faith are subject to every kind of deception. "And he compares with us those that believe without reason in the begging priests of the Mother of the Gods and in observers of signs, in divinities like Mithras and Sabazius, and anything anyone has met with, apparitions of Hecate or of some other demon or demons."

"He says that some, willing neither to offer a rational account nor to answer questions about the object of their faith, make use of the phrases, 'Do not examine, but believe,'³ and 'Thy faith will save thee,' and 'Evil is the wisdom in the world, but folly is a good.'"⁴ To this Origen replies that doubtless acceptance of doctrines as the result of examination is the ideal; but it is impracticable except for the few. Among the Christians not less than among others there are those that examine; that is, as he explains, who are skilled in the interpretation of what is "symbolical" in the prophets and the gospels. The Christian inculcation of doctrines to be received by faith has raised the multitude to a higher moral life. And, as a matter of fact, the ordinary adherents of philosophic schools accept the doctrines of their own teachers without systematic comparison with those of others. All human things depend on faith. To act, men must have faith in the recurrence of harvest after seed-time, and generally in the prosperous result of an event where the issue is doubtful. Is it not then more reasonable to have faith in God?⁵

Why, he asks, does Celsus, in asserting a community of reason among the nations, omit the Jews and treat their historians alone as unworthy of credence?⁶ His refusal to allow of an allegorical interpretation of Moses is comparable to the procedure of the Platonic Thrasymachus in refusing permission to Socrates to

¹ i. 7 : κρύβιον τὸ δόγμα.

² Misunderstanding of this phrase had begun. The ἐσωτερικοὶ λόγοι were not a secret doctrine reserved for adepts. (See Grant's *Ethics of Aristotle*.)

³ i. 9 : μὴ ἐξέταζε ἀλλὰ πίστευσον.

⁴ i. 11 : πῶς δ' οὐκ εὐλογώτερον, πάντων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πίστεως ἡρημένων, ἐκείνων μᾶλλον πιστεύειν τῷ θεῷ;

⁵ i. 14. Celsus had somehow arrived at the view that the books of Moses were a late compilation from widely-diffused pagan myths, such as that of a Flood. Cf. i. 21, and, among later passages, iv. 42 : εἰ μὴ ἄρα οὐδὲ Μωϋσῆως οἶεται εἶναι τὴν γραφὴν ἀλλὰ τινων πλειόνων τοιοῦτον γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸ παραχαράττοντες καὶ ῥαδιουργοῦντες τὸν Δευκαλίωνα, κ.τ.λ.

on Jesus (*Ant.* xviii. 3, 3) was clearly not in the text when he wrote; for he does not mention it, though it would have been more to the purpose. Both of the other passages, of course, may be Christian interpolations dating from before his time. The second has been manipulated since he wrote; the present text of Josephus not agreeing with his account.¹

Celsus himself was firmly convinced that all claims to the possession of an authoritative supernatural revelation were founded in illusion or imposture. This was fundamentally his attitude, not merely to Christianity, but to the other new gospels that were then wandering over the world. He believed in philosophy as the true "wisdom," and defended the established system of mutually tolerant civic and national cults, partly on the ground that they did no harm. This philosophic attitude went along with a certain positive attachment to them on patriotic and æsthetic grounds. The gods of the civic religions were also the gods of literature. Why should their worship—a defender of the old order might say—give place to barbarian rites and myths, whose claim to possess greater truth was only the expression of a more sophisticated stage of popular religion, in which it begins to pass over from spontaneous natural fancy into deliberate organisation by jugglers and fanatics? But the remark applies perfectly to Celsus that the educated world of antiquity, through the development of its own culture, had ceased to understand the religions by which it was surrounded.² Still less were the more archaistic forms of religious belief intelligible. Celsus, it is true, has a keen eye for analogies, both Greek and Oriental, to the Christian story, such as miraculous births and descents into Hades and resurrections; but he cannot penetrate to its origin because he cannot penetrate to the origin of these. He apparently supposes them to have been tales devised by the men themselves who came to be revered as gods, or fabrications by their followers, or at best half-sincere fictions having their beginning in visual hallucinations. Modern criticism long attempted explanations on similar lines. If, however, in comparative mythology as in the other sciences, truth is the daughter of time, then the outlook has been changed. For, according to what now seems an established position, no human hero ever becomes one of the great gods,—a God such as Jesus was for undoubtedly early Christians.³ Many of the heroes, on the

¹ About the passage referring specially to Jesus there ought never to have been any doubt in the minds of European scholars since the treatise of Origen against Celsus was in their hands. Yet, although the silence of Origen corroborates the plain marks of forgery in the passage itself, it has been the subject of volumes of controversy, and has hardly been officially abandoned till our own days.

² Cf. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums* ii. § 11.

³ See Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums* ii. § 277. The case of deified kings, as Meyer says, is essentially different. So also, it might be added, is the representation in India of particular persons as avatars of divine

contrary, were themselves gods brought down to earth. The ancient god (solar or other) who had descended into the underworld, and risen again, became, as for example in the typical case of Orpheus, a human hero of whose life this adventure formed part. The process of myth-formation not being understood, a new story of this type would necessarily be found elusive so far as the question of origin was concerned, however absurd it might appear philosophically. Thus, as we might expect, Celsus is at his strongest in showing the intrinsic irrationality of the new supernatural story. The attempt by the Jewish spokesman at a reduction of the life of Jesus to natural events, is on the whole of less interest. Still, there are some points on both sides of the controversy worth bringing out.

On the sacrifice of Christ, Origen takes the view which was also that of the Eastern Gnosis. A similar view of the meaning of sacrifice was no doubt latent in the Chthonian religion of Greece. And the position is not limited by Origen to the one sacrifice which is for his Christian belief central, but is applied to the case of every just man who has voluntarily offered himself for the sake of humankind. There is something, he holds, in the nature of things, which exacts this kind of offering in order to avert the evil worked by certain dark powers: ¹ the sacrifice is not conceived as a piacular offering to the supreme God. Mythological though the passage is in expression, it is worth dwelling on for a moment in contrast with the petrified creeds.

It is by a subtle implication of a similar idea that the Olympian gods in Swinburne's *Erechtheus* are kept clear of the guilt of demanding blood-sacrifice. Their oracle does not itself cry out for blood, but declares that the powers beneath the earth will allow Athens to be saved only on the condition that a selected human life is given them with the due religious rites. Zeus and his prophet Apollo, being themselves subject to fate,² cannot alter the condition.

powers. The application to Christianity is not pointed out; but a very significant passage in relation to Christian origins may be quoted from vol. III. § 85. The historian is speaking of Gaza in the Persian time. "Ein grosses Völkergemisch fand sich hier zusammen; aber das Uebergewicht haben die Aramæer: der Hauptgott von Gaza heisst jetzt Marna, d. i. aramæisch 'unser Herr.'" Marna, the Syrian "Lord" of the cosmopolitan Phœnician town, at once suggests *μαρὰν ἀθά* (ὁ κύριος ἡκει), the early Christian password. [See *MARANATHA* in *Ency. Bib.*]

¹ i. 31: εἰκὸς γὰρ εἶναι ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων κατὰ τινὰς ἀπορρήτους καὶ δυσλήπτους τοῖς πολλοῖς λόγους φύσιν τοιαύτην, ὡς ἕνα δίκαιον ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀποθανόντα ἐκουσίως ἀποτροπασμοὺς ἐμποιεῖν φαύλων δαιμονίων, ἐνεργούντων λοιμοὺς ἢ δυσπλοίας ἢ τι τῶν παραπλησίων.

² Apollo, in early Greek religion, was invoked as able to sympathise with mortals because he had himself been a fugitive on earth: see *Aesch. Supp.* 213-215:—

ΧΟ. καλοῦμεν ἀγὰς ἡλίου σωτηρίου.

ΔΑ. ἀγνόν τ' Ἀπόλλω, φυγάδ' ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ θεόν.

ΧΟ. εἰδὼς ἂν αἰσὰν τήνδε συγγνώη βροτοῖς.

Unfortunately there is not much that has this kind of speculative interest. In proximity to the passage cited, we meet with the argument so familiar to eighteenth-century apologists: Whence came to the disciples of Jesus, if they had not witnessed their master's resurrection, the strong motive they must have had for setting themselves against the laws at once of the Jews and of other nations? Again: Where, if the disciples had not the power of working miracles, could they have gained the courage to preach an innovating doctrine, when they had no skill in dialectic, like the Greek sages? ¹ Origen has anticipated more recent theologians in appealing to the zoological fact of parthenogenesis in support of the Virgin-birth.² He adds that if, as is the opinion of many of the Greeks also, the world had a beginning, the production of the first men must have been more paradoxical than the birth of Jesus, "half in the manner of other men." He then brings in the story that Plato was in reality the son of Apollo by a virgin birth, as a proof that the Greeks too thought it appropriate to regard a great man as not begotten by a human father. The introduction of "the Greek fables about Danae and Melanippe and Auge and Antiope," he dismisses as buffoonery. Incredulity in relation to these, however, could not be declared out of character in a Jew.

The Jew of Celsus asks: What trustworthy witness saw the dove descending on Jesus, or who heard the voice? ³ After a prologue on the difficulty of demonstrating the truth of histories, especially when mixed with marvels, as in the case, for example, of the siege of Troy, Origen here finds fault with the "personification." If the person asking the question had been an Epicurean, or a Democritean, or a Peripatetic, it would have been in character. Attributed to a Jew, who himself believes greater marvels than that of the Holy Spirit descending in the form of a dove, it is out of place.⁴ The reply of some might be, that the account was not written down from report, but through inspiration of that Spirit which taught Moses the history older than his own time. One who understands the spiritual meaning can show why the appearance was in the form of a dove and in no other.⁵ If the Jew asks for a proof of the mission of Jesus, let him first supply a proof of the mission of Moses.⁶ Traces of that Holy Spirit once seen in the form of a dove are still preserved among the Christians, who charm away demons and accomplish many cures, and sometimes have visions of future things according to the will of the Word.⁷

Of the argument that the prophecies said to refer to "the

The servitude of Apollo under Admetus is said to have meant originally his descent into the underworld. And the infant Zeus had to be saved by the Curetes from destruction at the hands of the ancient king, Cronos.

¹ i. 38. Cf. 46.

² i. 37.

³ i. 41.

⁴ i. 43.

⁵ i. 44.

⁶ i. 45.

⁷ i. 46.

things concerning Jesus" may fit other matters, Origen admits the plausibility;¹ but he thinks he can furnish a satisfactory answer. He mentions, for example, the existence of the cave in Bethlehem, shown by the inhabitants as the place where Jesus was born, and held to be such even by those alien to the faith.² The rejection of Jesus by the Jews, though he manifestly fulfilled the prophecies, is explained by the innate conservatism of human nature, especially as regards dogmas.³ The suffering Christ, Origen argues, was predicted in Isaiah liii. He mentions, indeed, that the Jews interpret this as referring to the people of Israel, but contends that it is not fully explicable unless referred to a person, as by the Christians. Celsus and his Jew and all those that have not believed in Jesus fail to recognise that the prophecies speak of two comings of the Christ among men, one in which he is subject to human affections, and the other in which he is glorified.⁴ He wonders why Celsus does not say anything about the star in the East, but volunteers an explanation of what is related. First, it was a new star, of the nature of a comet. Such stars, as is generally held, appear on the eve of extraordinary events. He thinks he can make the Greeks understand the visit of the Magi. The demons to whom they owed the virtue of their accustomed incantations were quelled by the greater power born into the world. Hence they desired to seek this out; and, possessing as they did the prophecies of Balaam which Moses also wrote down, they guessed the meaning of the star (Num. xxiv. 17).⁵ Next he undertakes to refute the incredulity of the Jew regarding Herod's massacre of the children. Herod was moved by the Devil, who from the beginning was plotting against the Saviour.⁶

Replying to a description of the Apostles as ignorant and disreputable tax-gatherers and so forth, Origen contends that the choice of unlettered men was appropriate, since the Gospel was to be preached as a divine revelation, not to be advocated as a mere philosophical doctrine with the aid of dialectic and rhetoric.⁷ Perhaps, he remarks, support for the attack on the character of the Apostles was found in the Epistle of Barnabas (v. 9), where it is said that Jesus chose for his own apostles men lawless beyond all lawlessness (*ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν ἀνομίαν ἀνομωτέρους*).⁸ But Jesus came, he replies, to save sinners; and what greater manifestation of his power to heal was possible than to raise such men into patterns of pure life? Philosophy tells of a case or two

¹ i. 50.

² i. 51: καὶ τὸ δεκνύμενον τοῦτο διαβόητόν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς τόποις καὶ παρὰ τοῖς τῆς πίστεως ἀλλοτρίοις, ὡς ἔφαρ ἐν τῷ σπηλαίῳ τούτῳ ὁ ὑπὸ Χριστιανῶν προσκυνούμενος καὶ θαυμαζόμενος γεγέννηται Ἰησοῦς.

³ i. 52.

⁴ i. 60.

⁷ i. 62.

⁴ i. 56.

⁶ i. 61.

⁸ i. 63.

like the conversion of Polemo; but what are these to the work that has been done by Christianity? With their boasted care for the public good, its accusers ought at least to offer a tribute of thanks to the utility of the new method, if they cannot acknowledge its truth.¹

If Jesus was a god, asks Celsus or the Jew, why was it necessary that he should be taken away to Egypt to save him from death at the hands of Herod? Origen answers that he was of composite nature,² at once God and man, and had not, as Celsus appears to think that he ought to have had, a body like those of the Homeric gods, shedding ichor instead of blood.³ Incongruously, as Origen thinks, the Jew is made to ask, as if he was an educated Greek, what great thing Jesus has done comparable to the deeds ascribed to Perseus, Amphion and others, who were said to be of the seed of the gods. The apologist replies partly by reference to the miracles of healing and so forth, still worked in the name of Jesus; partly by an appeal to the mild and philanthropic disposition produced in those who have accepted the Christian doctrine in reality and not hypocritically for the sake of a livelihood or of human necessities.⁴ To the Jew's charge that the impression Jesus made was due to magic, he replies that it is not the way of magicians to use their arts in order to turn men from evil to good.⁵

Celsus makes his Jew accuse the Christians of deserting the law of their fathers. This Origen takes to imply a misunderstanding, on the part of Celsus, of the real position of the Jewish Christians, to whom the accusation must be assumed to be addressed. The Ebionites, as they are called, do not depart from the Jewish law.⁶ A later passage, however, proves that Celsus knew of the Ebionites.⁷ Of course they were not necessarily Jews by race; nor according to the apostolic legend, which he may have thought himself entitled to follow, did Jewish converts to Christianity necessarily continue the practice of the law.

¹ i. 64.

² i. 66: σύνθετόν τι χρήμά φαμεν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι.

³ Elsewhere (ii. 36) Origen says, in answer to the question whether there was any such manifestation of divinity at the crucifixion, that it is to be found in the "blood and water" of John xix. 34.

⁴ i. 67: καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐκστάσεις μὲν διανοίας ἀνθρώπων ἀφίστησι καὶ δαίμονας ἤδη δὲ καὶ νόσους, ἐμποιεῖ δὲ θαυμασίαν τινὰ πράξιν καὶ καταστολὴν τοῦ ἥθους καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ χρηστότητα καὶ ἡμερότητα ἐν τοῖς μὴ διὰ τὰ βιωτικά ἢ τυνας χρεῖας ἀνθρωπικὰς ὑποκριναμένοις ἀλλὰ παραδεξαμένοις γνησίως τὸν περὶ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐσομένης κρίσεως λόγον. From this passage we learn indirectly how powerful already was the economic organisation of the Church.

⁵ i. 68. This was urged by Philostratus in his defence of Apollonius of Tyana against the accusation of magic. (Koetschau is of opinion that Origen had read the Life of Apollonius, and that he intentionally ignored it.)

⁶ ii. 1.

⁷ v. 61.

Here as in many other places the apologist tries to show that he has a more accurate knowledge than his adversary of the shades of difference among Jews and Christians. However this may be in particular cases, the very effort is a tribute to the extensive information that Celsus had acquired. That he had gone beneath the surface appears sufficiently from the nullity of Origen's reply to the argument, again assigned to the Jew, that the Christians in their teaching about "the resurrection of the dead, and the judgment of God, and a reward for the just and fire for the unjust," have introduced nothing that was not already familiar,—that is, to the Jewish apocalyptists.¹ "Our Jesus," he immediately answers, "seeing the Jews doing nothing worthy of the doctrines contained in the prophets, taught them by a parable that the kingdom of God should be taken from them and given to those from the nations." A proof of this transference of the kingdom to the Gentiles is the fact that the Jews have now no prophets or miracles to show, whereas some of the signs that are still found among the Christians are even greater than the former (as promised in John xiv. 12).²

To the objection that the predictions assigned to Jesus were feigned after the event, Origen replies by pointing to the fulfilment, after the time of Jesus, of his predictions of (1) persecutions for the mere profession of Christianity, (2) the preaching of it to all nations, (3) the destruction of Jerusalem. These prophecies, he says, could not have been written after the event: for it is not to be supposed that the hearers of Jesus handed down the teaching of the Gospels as a mere oral tradition and left their disciples without written memorials.³

In order to remove, in the eyes of "unbelievers," the improbability of the resurrection of Jesus, he gravely quotes from the *Republic* the story of Er, the son of Armenius, who was revived at so long an interval as twelve days after his death.⁴

What is meant by the "threefold and fourfold and manifold" rewriting of the Gospel, attributed to "some of the believers,"⁵ he professes not to understand. He knows only of heretics who have altered the Gospels, and this is a reproach not to the Word but to the falsifiers. True Christianity is no more to be blamed on account of those who have perverted it than philosophy on account of the Sophists or the Epicureans or the Peripatetics,⁶ or any who may hold false opinions. But, as has been pointed out,⁷ the phrase *τριχῇ καὶ τετραχῇ* evidently indicates a distinction

¹ ii. 5. ² ii. 8. καὶ εἰ πιστοὶ ἔσμεν λέγοντες, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἑωράκαμεν.

³ ii. 13.

⁴ ii. 16.

⁵ ii. 27: τινὰς τῶν πιστευόντων . . . ὡς ἐκ μέθης ἤκοντας εἰς τὸ ἐφεστάναι αὐτοῖς μεταχαράττειν ἐκ τῆς πρώτης γραφῆς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τριχῇ καὶ τετραχῇ καὶ πολλαχῇ καὶ μεταπλάττειν, ἵν' ἔχουσιν πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχους ἀρνεῖσθαι.

⁶ At this period Aristotle was so far from being the idol of the Church that he was not even included among the relatively orthodox philosophers.

⁷ See the opening of the article on "Gospels" in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*.

between the first three canonical Gospels and the fourth. In this notable passage, all are treated by the Jew as late writings derived from a more and not less apparently fabulous beginning, and even as having for their aim to make the story less open to hostile criticism than it was at first.

The Jew dwells on the slightness of the supposed prophetic tokens by which it is thought to be established that Jesus was God and the Son of God. The Son of God ought to have manifested himself by some clear light, like the light of the sun, first showing forth himself and then illumining all other things.¹ Origen here lays hold of a real causal relation; which he proceeds to invert into a proof that Christianity must have been supernaturally revealed. There *was* such a manifestation, he replies; for a peace-preserving world-empire was the necessary condition if the way was not to be barred to the universal preaching of a mild doctrine that did not even permit self-defence against enemies: accordingly the Roman peace under a monarch had been established by Augustus, in whose reign Jesus was born.

To several things that the Jew is made to say, he objects that they are not in character. A Jew would not have assented to the Christian position that the Son of God is the Word.² He would not have been likely to quote the *Bacchæ* of Euripides.³ To the objection, however, that the governor who condemned Jesus suffered no punishment such as befell Pentheus when he had imprisoned a Deity, Origen replies that Pilate was not so much to blame as the Jewish race; which, by the judgment of God, has been rent and scattered over the whole earth worse than Pentheus.⁴

The recurrent argument against the divinity of Christ from his sufferings and death is met by the reply that those were necessarily related to the end of his coming. To try to get rid of a real crucifixion, with the succeeding death and burial, is to deny the postulate of the Christian system.

Celsus, in the person of the Jew, points out the inconsistency of the appeal to miracles in proof of one doctrine with the condemnation of them when they are used to prove another.⁵ Origen can only appeal to ultimate success; remarking that that which causes men to lead better lives cannot be deception.⁶ The

¹ ii. 30: θεὸν δὲ καὶ θεοῦ υἱὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκ τοιούτων συμβόλων καὶ παρακουσμάτων οὐδ' ἐξ οὕτως ἀγεννῶν τεκμηρίων συνίστησιν. . . . ὥς γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος, φησί, πάντα τὰ ἄλλα φωτίζων πρῶτον αὐτὸν δεικνύει, οὕτως ἐχρὴν πεποιηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ.

² ii. 31.

³ ii. 34: οὐ πάνυ μὲν οὖν Ἰουδαῖοι τὰ Ἑλλήνων φιλολογοῦσιν. Origen might have remembered Philo, to whom he refers elsewhere as remarkable for Hellenic learning; but by the third century, through the intensification of sectarian divisions, the Jews had no doubt closed themselves in more.

⁴ ii. 34: ὅπερ καταδικάσται ὑπὸ θεοῦ σπαρμαχθέν και εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ὑπὲρ τὸν Πενθέως σπαραγμὸν διασπαρέν.

⁵ ii. 49: πῶς οὖν οὐ σφέλιον ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔργων τὸν μὲν θεὸν τοὺς δὲ γόητας ἡγείσθαι;

⁶ ii. 50.

existence of false miracles worked by magic power, he goes on to argue, proves that there must be true ones worked by divine power. To infer from the former the non-existence of the latter is as if one were to infer from the existence of a sophistical dialectic the non-existence of a dialectic leading to truth.¹ Then he shows that for a Jew to adopt the line of argument ascribed to him by Celsus would lead to rejection of the prodigies recorded in his own sacred books equally with those recorded in the gospels. Moses, as well as Jesus, gives warnings against being led astray by the miracles of prophets who shall teach another doctrine.²

A very stringent criticism of the resurrection story in the Gospels is quoted, in which it is compared to similar stories among Scythians and Egyptians and Greeks. "Or do you think that the relations of the others both are and appear fables, but that with you the catastrophe of the drama has been devised becomingly or persuasively?"³ As this is assigned to the Jew, Origen replies again by putting him on the defensive. What plausibility is there in the statement of Moses that he alone drew near to God, while the rest of the people stood afar off? The Jew cannot apologise for what Moses relates of himself without at the same time involuntarily apologising for what is related of Jesus. The cases of the Greek and other heroes, cited by the Jew but not appropriate in his mouth, are not comparable to that of Jesus. They indeed could withdraw themselves from men's eyes and then, when they returned, feign that they had been in Hades. Jesus could not, since he died publicly on the cross. And his disciples would not have faced danger and death in order to bear witness to a resurrection of which they had fabricated the account.

A Jew, Origen continues, could not consistently question whether it was possible for one who had really died to rise up with the same body; for he would have remembered the children whom Elijah and Elisha brought back to life. "And I think that for this cause also Jesus dwelt with no other nation than the Jews, accustomed as they had become to marvels; so that by setting the things they held in belief side by side with the things that had come to pass by him and were narrated about him, they might receive it as true that he who had been the centre of greater events and by whom more marvellous deeds had been accomplished was greater than all those of old."⁴

Some of the objections Origen admits to be well taken and not altogether easy to dispose of. But, he says, the notion of an illusory appearance might account for a dream (*ὄναρ*), but not for a waking vision (*ὕπναρ*), except in the case of madness or

¹ ii. 51.

² ii. 53. Origen, it is perhaps worth noting, takes for granted (c. 54) that Moses wrote the account of his own death in Deut. xxxiv.

³ ii. 55.

⁴ ii. 57.

melancholy. Celsus indeed, in an allusion to Mary Magdalene as a "crazy woman" (γυνή παρουστρος), insinuates that this might be the cause; but the written history does not prove it, and he has only this to go upon.¹

If, it is said, Jesus really willed to show forth divine power, he ought to have been seen after his resurrection by those that had treated him despitefully, and by him who had condemned him, and in short by all.² Origen replies that Jesus after his resurrection appeared only to his disciples, and to them only at intervals, because only to the few who were spiritually prepared, and to them not always, could the vision of his glorified body be revealed. The revelation was given to such as could comprehend it.

To the question, "What God becoming present to men meets with disbelief?"³ Origen replies that, in spite of all the miracles they had seen performed in Egypt and in the wilderness, the Jews themselves disbelieved and fell into idolatry. Thus, with their conduct as recorded in the Old Testament the behaviour of their descendants in rejecting Jesus was quite consistent.

Jesus, the objector urges, being unable to persuade, uses threats and denunciations.⁴ So also, replies Origen, does the God of the Old Testament, and even divine powers among the Greeks. The Sirens persuade with flattery and pleasant words.

Leaving the personification, Celsus now states it as his own opinion that nothing can be idler than the contest between the Jews and the Christians about the Messiah.⁵ The Christians, he maintains, were in the beginning simply a faction of the Jews as the Jews were of the Egyptians.⁶ Here of course he has adopted, like Tacitus earlier, the inventions put forward by the Egyptian annalists to give a different turn to the legend of the exodus. On this ethnological point Origen, who knew Hebrew, is able to furnish, here and elsewhere, satisfactory refutation. The Jews, he proves as far as it can be proved by the test of language, belong to an ancient and distinct ethnical group.

The Christians, says Celsus, few in number and united at the beginning, now that they are many are split up into sects.⁷ Origen replies, first, that divisions had already appeared in the apostolic times, as is proved by the documents. Then he remarks with some liberality, that differences of opinion only manifest themselves about things of high value;⁸ citing the cases of

¹ ii. 60. It is clear that at this time Mary of Magdala, out of whom seven devils were cast, had not yet been confused with the "woman who was a sinner." Celsus takes for granted that possession by devils meant in reality some form of madness.

² ii. 63.

³ ii. 74 : τίς θεός παρὼν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπιστεῖται;

⁴ ii. 76.

⁵ iii. 1.

⁶ iii. 5.

⁷ iii. 10.

⁸ iii. 12 : οὐδενὸς πράγματος, οὐ μὴ σπουδαία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τῷ βίῳ χρήσιμος, γέγονασιν αἰρέσεις διάφοροι.

medicine and of philosophy. Unfortunately, the toleration seemingly indicated in this passage was really of a very limited kind; as is evident from the tone towards both philosophy and "heresy" in passages where Origen speaks more conformably to the general spirit of the Church.

We now come to a very interesting group of statements by Celsus which, if examined closely, may reveal a rather complex ritual as the hidden core of the earliest Church-life. He speaks successively of "fabricated terrors,"¹ and of "highly superstitious worships abounding in mysteries."² Further, he is described as "likening the inner and mystic things of the Church of God to the cats or apes or crocodiles or he-goats or dogs of the Egyptians."³ And this, as is shown by another citation, had some kind of reference to the "relations about Jesus."⁴ Origen professes not to know what is meant; asking what there is of all this in the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, which Celsus also desires should be preserved, or in the Gospel story (which perhaps he means) of Christ crucified. The ground, of course, is uncertain; but does it not seem as if we are here brought into contact with the Mystery Play which has been conjectured to underlie the story in its present form? We might even be tempted to infer from a later passage, comparing the Christians to those who bring forward terrifying apparitions in the Bacchic mysteries,⁵ that the drama in its original form included a representation of the descent into Hades. The comparison which Celsus makes with the eclectic cult which in Egypt had gathered round the name and fate of Antinous⁶ tends to confirm some such theory. As, however, Church-organisers had long been engaged in systematically regulating the rites and removing scandals, we must not expect to get a very clear vision of the earliest cult. Into the process of regulation the first Epistle to the Corinthians gives some insight.

In what Celsus says about men who have become gods among the Greeks, Origen finds an artful ambiguity: he would have liked the defender of the official religion to say clearly what is his own opinion about the divinity of the Dioscuri.⁷ With Celsus, however, the stress of the argument is on the more recently recorded cases of men who have gained a reputation for some supernatural power; who have even been reported divine; and for all that have not become, or have not long remained, the object

¹ iii. 16: δειμάτα συμπεπλασμένα.

² iii. 17: θρησκεία μάλα δεισιδαίμονες καὶ μυστηριώτιδες.

³ iii. 21: ὁμοιοῦντος τὰ ἔνδον καὶ μυστικά τῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ θεοῦ τοῖς Αἰγυπτίῳ αἰλούροις ἢ πιθήκοις ἢ κροκοδείλοις ἢ τράγοις ἢ κυσίν.

⁴ iii. 19: εὐθὺς δ' εἶναι μὲν σεμνότερον ἱράγων καὶ κυνῶν τῶν παρ' Αἰγυπτίους εἰσάγοντας ἐν ταῖς περὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ διηγήσεσι.

⁵ iv. 10: ἐξομοιοί ἡμᾶς τοῖς ἐν ταῖς Βακχικαῖς τελεταῖς τὰ φάσματα καὶ τὰ δειμάτα προεισάγουσι.

⁶ iii. 36.

⁷ iii. 22.

of a cult. The story, for example, is quoted from Herodotus (iv. 14, 15), that Aristæas of Proconnesus, who mysteriously disappeared from among men and afterwards reappeared, was declared to the Metapontines by Apollo's oracle to be a proper object of worship: and yet no one now thinks him a god.¹ This seems to Origen an evidence, by contrast, of the power of Jesus. He has been accepted by multitudes as divine, although the demons whose power he came to destroy, instead of announcing him as a god, stirred up their votaries against him.² Then, after referring to some more cases mentioned by Celsus, he can only suggest that "certain evil demons" brought it about that such stories should be written, in order that the things prophesied about Jesus and spoken by him should either be classed as inventions like the rest, or, not being regarded as pre-eminent, should be in no way admired.³

After some more reference to the oracles, he formulates the alternative. Either Celsus sees nothing divine or dæmonic in prophets like Amphiaraus, who are said to have been raised from the dead to the rank of gods, in which case he dissents from the religion of the Greeks and is a confessed Epicurean; or he has no right to reject what is related of Jesus on no worse evidence. If he accepts it, he will be obliged to go further and admit that Jesus is more powerful; since none of the others forbids honour to the rest, whereas Jesus condemns all of them as evil demons.⁴

Although, for the reasons already indicated, he could not explain it, we see that it struck Celsus as a paradox needing explanation, that among the Christians a man who had actually lived and died should have come to be worshipped as a great god, or even as God himself. In speaking of the cult of Antinous, he says that the Egyptians would not endure to hear him called a god in the same sense as Apollo or Zeus.⁵ This Origen, without reason given, declares to be false. The ceremonial he finds to be merely a case of the usual deceiving mysteries of the Egyptians, brought into relation with a particular person.⁶ Of course for Celsus this was the very point of the comparison. The only moral he could draw from it was that the Christians were more credulous than other men in raising a human being to the height of divinity.⁷ Yet this cannot altogether have satisfied him, for

¹ iii. 26 : τοῦτον οὐδεὶς ἔτι νομίζει θεόν.

² iii. 29. Pagan oracles, however, came to be quoted as testifying to Jesus.

³ iii. 32.

⁴ iii. 35. Origen himself appears to be ashamed of this argument : ἐβουλόμην δὲ πρὸς τὸν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως τοιαῦτα λέγοντα τοιαῦτά τινα πρεπόντως αὐτῷ ἀδολεσχεῖν.

⁵ iii. 37 : καὶ παραβάλης αὐτῷ τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα ἢ τὸν Δία, οὐκ ἀνέχονται.

⁶ iii. 36.

⁷ This was reinforced afterwards by Hierocles with a new illustration from the Life of Apollonius.

he never ceases to express his astonishment at such exalted deification of a man recently dead. With the phenomena he saw around him, Celsus would have had no difficulty in understanding the rise of a minor cult.¹

After some remarks on the relation between faith and prejudice, he went on to accuse the Christians of appealing in public only to the ignorant and servile,² and of underhand proselytising among boys and weak women.³ Of their secret propaganda in households he gives a graphic account. They tell youths not to regard their parents or lawful instructors, but to listen only to them. If the father or teacher or any person of knowledge comes on the scene, their reduction to silence or whispering contrasts with their volubility in corners where there is no one to oppose them. Thereupon they will lead off the children with their playmates to some conventicle, promising to give them perfect instruction; and in this way they succeed in persuading them.

Origen affects to treat all this as abuse. So far as public appeals are concerned, the philosophers would be glad to draw such multitudes together if they could. Some of the Cynics have attempted something of the kind, and when it is a question of teaching philosophy, instead of Christianity, to ignorant popular audiences, Celsus and his like have no objection to raise but consider the attempt philanthropic.⁴ Far from being peculiarly indiscriminate in their appeals, the Christians put those who are willing to hear them through a preliminary examination, and exercise strict discipline over them afterwards.⁵ The deeper parts of their doctrine they reserve for those who have made progress.⁶ Why should they be blamed for appealing to slaves? The philosophers pride themselves on having turned slaves as well as others to the virtuous life. Is that permissible to "you, O Greeks,"⁷ while "we," the Christians, are to have no credit for our philanthropy? In private, Christian propagandists have no wish to draw away pupils from grave preceptors or studies.⁸ To the complaint that they will not speak out in the presence of the fathers of boys whom they are trying to proselytise, Origen replies that they are only too glad to open themselves before elders who are serious-minded.⁹ Would not philosophers similarly mask themselves before the frivolous?

¹ A curious point in Origen's demonology may be noted in passing. He tells us (c. 37), as part of the higher knowledge of "esoteric" Christians, that, as there are many men who think they possess truth in philosophy, so there are, among separated souls and angels and demons, some that are falsely persuaded they are gods.

² iii. 50. Cf. 18: πάντα μὲν σοφὸν ἀπελαινόντων τοῦ λόγου τῆς πίστεως αὐτῶν μόρους δὲ ἀνόητους καὶ ἀνδραποδάδεις καλούντων.

³ iii. 55.

⁴ 18. 50.

⁵ iii. 51.

⁶ iii. 52.

⁷ "Greek" here, as so often, means an adherent of philosophic culture or "Hellenism." Origen is himself described as a Greek by race.

⁸ iii. 56.

⁹ iii. 58.

Celsus expresses himself as willing to apologise if he has said anything too harsh; but, to show that he has spoken under compulsion of the truth, he proceeds to quote the calls to everyone who is sinful, unwise, and so forth, to come and be received into the kingdom of God. Does not the "sinful" mean the unjust, the thief, the poisoner? What different class would a robber call to his company? In the other mysteries, the call is to those only who are pure of hand and just and of good conscience.¹ Origen replies by distinguishing between the general multitude whom the Christians receive to make them better, and those who are admitted to the peculiar mysteries of the religion. These are reserved for the just and pure not less but more rigorously than any other mysteries.

We are told, continues Celsus, that God will receive the unjust man who humbles himself through baseness; but the just man who has practised virtue and looked up to him from the beginning he will not receive. When he is represented as having to be moved by loud lamentations over past misdeeds, he is made to judge not in response to truth but to flattery. Origen of course meets this by asserting the impossibility of sinlessness for man; but here he does no more than restate in Pauline language a concession made by Celsus in words to which a parallel has been found in the Book of Job (xv. 14, xxv. 4). The thought is one in which, as might easily be supposed, the Greeks and the Hebrews coincide.² Celsus explains his meaning more fully by the observation that to change the nature completely is very difficult, and that those who (in an ordinary sense) are free from fault, are better for the fellowship of life.³ And Origen is in the end obliged to admit that he may have represented the faith of the less rational Christians correctly in saying that they regard God as an unjust judge who lets off the bad if they bewail themselves and appeal to his pity, and rejects the good if they do not.⁴

The charge of hostility to knowledge is one of those to which Celsus constantly returns. The Christians, he says, teach directly that "knowledge is an evil."⁵ The wise, in their view, turn away from their doctrines, deceived by wisdom.⁶ He brings all this to a head by declaring that they thus insult the God of the universe "to the end that they may lead worthless men astray by light hopes and persuade them to despise the things that are better."⁷ Origen replies by a distinction between true and false wisdom. None who have true wisdom reject Christianity

¹ iii. 59.

² iii. 63: τοῦτο μὲν ἐπεικῶς ἀληθές, ὅτι πέφυκε πως τὸ ἀνθρώπινον φύλον ἁμαρτάνειν. The equivalent is to be found in Isocrates, 89B: ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἅπαντες πλείω πεφύκαμεν ἑξαμαρτάνειν ἢ κατορθοῦν. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* vi. 3, 10: ὁρῶ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα ἀναμάρτητον διατελοῦντα.

³ iii. 65: φύσιν γὰρ ἀμείψαι τελείως παγχάλεπον· οἱ δ' ἀναμάρτητοι βελτίους κοινωνοὶ βίου.

⁴ iii. 71.

⁵ iii. 75.

⁶ iii. 72

⁷ iii. 78.

when explained by a competent instructor. Any philosophy that leads men to reject it must be false.¹ A little later, he attacks all the four recognised philosophic schools,—the Epicureans, the Peripatetics and the Stoics by name, and the Platonists by implication.² Are any of these the skilled physicians from attention to whom Celsus accuses the Christians of withdrawing ignorant minds? The Platonists Origen does not care to condemn by name, because he is engaged in adapting their doctrine of immortality to Christian teaching. With those who teach the permanence of the soul, he says, we have some things in common. He reserves for a more suitable occasion the proof that the blessed life to come will be only for those who accept religion according to Jesus and allow no regard for generated things to contaminate the purity of their theism.³ By this contamination he means the permission of statues; in which, as he maintains elsewhere, all the philosophic schools alike have rendered themselves accomplices with the crowd, thus falling under the guilt of idolatry.

Having finished three books, the apologist at length begins to be conscious of the seriousness of his task, and, at the opening of the fourth, invokes divine assistance. What he has to deal with now is a concentrated attack on the idea of a special revelation to a particular people or to their self-constituted successors. The refutation, Celsus holds, of those Jews or Christians who say that some God or Son of God has come down or is to come down to earth as a corrector of things here, does not need a long discourse.⁴ Origen finds that the defence needs one of some length.

Does God, the claimants of authority from the revealer are asked, come down to learn what is going on among men, as if he did not know all? Or does he know, and yet not set things right, because he cannot do this by his divine power, without sending a deputy? Or does he leave his own seat because, being unknown among men and feeling himself neglected, he wishes to make trial of those who believe and those who do not, like the newly-rich exhibiting themselves in their grandeur? To say so is to lay to his charge a stock of very paltry desire for signs of honour.⁵ Or, if they say that the coming down is for the salvation of men, how is it that God first thought of correcting human life after so long a period of negligence? ⁶

¹ iii. 72.

² iii. 75.

³ iii. 81 : πρὸς οὓς κοινὰ τινα ἔχοντες εὐκαιρότερον παραστήσομεν ὅτι ἡ μέλλουσα μακαρία ζωὴ μόνοις ἔσται τοῖς [τῇν] κατὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν θεοσέβειαν καὶ εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸν εὐσέβειαν εἰληκρινῇ καὶ καθαρὰν καὶ ἄμικτον πρὸς ὅτι ποτ' οὖν γενητὸν παραδεξαμένοις.

⁴ iv. 2 : ὅτι δὲ καὶ Χριστιανῶν τινὲς καὶ Ἰουδαίῳ, οἱ μὲν καταβεβηκέναι [λέγουσιν], οἱ δὲ καταβήσεσθαι εἰς τὴν γῆν τινὰ θεὸν ἢ θεοῦ υἱὸν τῶν τῆδε δικαιοτήτων, τοῦτ' αἰσχιστον, καὶ οὐδὲ δεῖται μακροῦ λόγου ὁ ἔλεγχος.

⁵ iv. 6 : πολλὴν [γοῦν] τινὰ καὶ πάννυ θνητὴν φιλοτιμίαν τοῦ θεοῦ καταμαρτυροῦσι.

⁶ iv. 7.

The question why God does not set human affairs right if he knows them, replies Origen, may be retorted on Celsus if he is a believer in providence. In our view, God's method of working is to be always sending those whose office it is to introduce corrections. Of old the revelation how he is to be served was committed pre-eminently to Moses and the prophets. Now Jesus has come, not to be the Saviour merely of those in "one corner" of the world, but so far as depends on him (τὸ ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτῷ), of all men everywhere.¹ One reason for divine revelation is that unbelievers may have no excuse.² It was not delayed: there were friends of God and prophets in every generation.³ A particular race no doubt was preferred: "the Lord's portion is his people; Jacob is the lot of his inheritance" (Deut. xxxii. 9). But this, the preparation for the coming of Christ, is a mystery too profound for the popular hearing,⁴—a matter for deep searching of Scripture on the part of those who "philosophise."⁵ The many, for their part, must be content simply to put their trust in God and the Saviour and his *ipse dixit* (αὐτὸς ἔφα).

The flood and the last judgment, Celsus contends, are fables having their source in misunderstanding of what the Greeks and others have told about deluges and conflagrations that occur in concomitance with certain periodic states of the universe.⁶ "We," replies Origen, "attach neither the deluge nor the conflagration of the world to cycles and periods of the stars, but say that the cause of both alike is sin."⁷ As for the "coming down" of God, to which Celsus makes repeated reference, this is figurative; a reply which may serve also for the mockery that, according to the Christians, "God will come down bringing fire, like a torturer."⁸ When God visits the world, he comes to purge sin. The "refiner's fire" (Mal. iii. 2) is a metaphor.

To the argument that God, being perfect and unchangeable, cannot become of the nature of mortal man, Origen replies first that the Scriptures say so too; and then points out that, according to the Christian doctrine, God the Word ceases not to exist continually in the same perfection through having taken upon him a human body and soul.⁹ And yet this assumption of a human body and soul is not merely apparent, as Celsus argues that it must be,—and therefore, as deceptive, must be unworthy of God,¹⁰—if the divine is not to become of inferior nature.¹¹ Are "the Greeks," Origen asks in the course of the argument,¹² to be allowed to interpret metaphorically what is said of the tearing in pieces of Dionysus by the Titans and his coming to life again, while the Christians are not to be allowed to bring out the logical implications of their own Scriptures?

¹ iv. 4.² iv. 6.³ iv. 7.⁴ iv. 8.⁵ iv. 9.⁶ iv. 11.⁷ iv. 12.⁸ iv. 13: ὅτι ὁ θεὸς καταβήσεται δίκην βασανιστοῦ πῦρ φέρων.⁹ iv. 15.¹⁰ iv. 18.¹¹ iv. 19.¹² iv. 17.

On the recriminations between the Jews and the Christians, an extremely contemptuous passage of Celsus is preserved; in which he compares them to assemblies of bats or ants or frogs or worms declaring that the God of the universe busies himself solely with them and their affairs, that they rank next to him, and that all things—earth and water and air and stars—have been subjected to them.¹ And the worms—that is, says Origen, “we,”—are made to say: “Now, since some among us offend, God will come, or will send his Son, that he may burn up the unjust and that the rest of us may have eternal life with him.” These things, Celsus added, would be “more tolerable from worms and frogs than from Jews and Christians quarrelling with one another.”

For Origen, the question is settled in advance by the destruction of Jerusalem and the ruin of the “race of all Jews,” at the end of “one whole generation,” after what Jesus had suffered at their hands. If anyone wishes to refute the assertion that they did thus draw upon themselves the wrath of God, let him show it to be false that they are now in this condition.² The fact that the piety of Christian believers is so steadfast as not to be overcome by the persuasiveness of rational arguments, ought, Origen thinks, to contribute to the proof that they are not to be compared to worms.³ The comparison—which, however, he will not imitate Celsus by making—would apply better to the philosophers who try to contemplate the nature of the universe and of the soul without divine revelation.⁴

Though insisting that the Jews are now for ever rejected from divine favour, Origen has still to contend for the illustrious character of their race. One evidence is that there was no painter or sculptor in their State: ⁵ so rigorous were they in rejecting idolatry. That they were not merely fabling for themselves an illustrious ancestry in tracing back their pedigree to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, he tries to show by appeal to the fact that these names, conjoined with the name of God, are used in prayers and exorcisms not only by members of the nation but by those in general who occupy themselves with enchantments and magic.⁶ This was no doubt the fact on which Celsus relied in maintaining, as he seems to have done, that the names were those of certain deceivers of old who were in great repute for their arts, and from whom therefore the people desired to trace its descent. Origen

¹ iv. 23.

² iv. 22.

³ iv. 26: ἡ τηλικαύτη εὐσέβεια, οὐθ' ὑπὸ πόνων οὐθ' ὑπὸ κινδύνου θανάτου οὐθ' ὑπὸ λογικῶν πιθανότητων νικωμένη.

⁴ iv. 30.

⁵ iv. 31: οὔτε γὰρ ζωγράφος οὐτ' ἀγαλματοποιὸς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ αὐτῶν ἦν.

⁶ iv. 33: ὧν τοσοῦτον δύναται τὰ ὀνόματα συναπτόμενα τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορίᾳ, ὡς οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθνους χρῆσθαι ἐν ταῖς πρὸς θεὸν εὐχαῖς καὶ ἐν τῇ κατεπείδῃ δαίμονας τῷ ὀνόματι καὶ ὁ θεὸς Ἰσαὰκ καὶ ὁ θεὸς Ἰακώβ ἀλλὰ γὰρ σχεδὸν καὶ πάντας τοὺς τὰ τῶν ἐπωδῶν καὶ μαγειῶν πραγματευομένους.

takes the same fact as a proof of the holiness of the ancient men whose names were thus used. In the eyes of modern comparative mythologists, it will tend to confirm the theory that the names were at first those of ancient gods of the Semitic race, and that only later did they become those of its heroes and ancestors. A similar, though not quite identical, conclusion is suggested by what Origen tells us about the use of the angelic names Michael, Gabriel and Raphael, and, it may be added, of the name of Jesus. All were at first names of gods; and how much of the supernatural character remained, or how much could be restored, depended on obscure circumstances only traceable in an imperfectly preserved literary tradition.

Celsus went on to describe the stories in Genesis of the fashioning of man by God from the earth, and of his fall, as clumsily put together by the Jews in a corner of Palestine, where they had never heard that these things had been sung long ago by Hesiod and innumerable other inspired men.¹ This gives Origen an opportunity to make one of his rhetorical points. Can it really be the Epicurean Celsus who calls the poets "inspired men" (*ἀνδρας ἐνθέους*)? Such mythologisers as Homer and Hesiod, the Christian Father holds, were rightly expelled by Plato from his ideal State; but of course Celsus is a better judge than Plato! The account in Genesis, he proceeds, is maliciously turned into ridicule by Celsus, who does not even consider the possibility of an allegorical interpretation, though in the sequel he says that the more reasonable-minded Jews and Christians try to allegorise things they are ashamed of.² Then, provoked by the reference to the formation of woman out of a rib of the first man, he quotes from the *Works and Days* the account of the fashioning of Pandora by Hephaestus at the command of Zeus. And this ridiculous myth, he exclaims, is to be treated as a philosophical allegory! So also, it seems, are the stories told by Egyptians and other barbarians. The right to allegorise is to be refused to none but those who interpret the Jewish authors.

He then tries to show the allegorical nature of the occurrences in the Garden of Eden by comparing the Platonic myth of the birth of Eros. This, he thinks, may have been borrowed by Plato when he was in Egypt from those who knew something of Judaism. He complains that the attack ignores the more edifying things in Genesis. When, however, Celsus, referring to the plot of Rebecca and Jacob against Esau, declares it absurd that God should be represented as dwelling nearest to such as these, Origen finds here no exception to the beauty and strength which he sees in the recorded actions of the friends of God.³ If,

¹ iv. 36.

² iv. 38: καίτοι γε ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς λέγων ὅτι οἱ ἐπικεικότεροι Ἰουδαίων τε καὶ Χριστιανῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσχυνόμενοι πειρώνται πως ἀλληγορεῖν αὐτά.

³ iv. 43: ἀγχίστα δὲ τοῖς πᾶσι συμπολιτευόμενον εἴ φαμεν τὸν θεόν, τί ἄτοπον πράσσομεν πειδόμενοι μηδέ ποτε ἀφιστάνειν τὴν ἐαυτοῦ θεϊότητα τῶν μετὰ τοῦ καλῶς

as Celsus objects in the ancient spirit of contempt for interested morality, God is made to reward the just by abundantly satisfying their material needs, it is replied that "all these things happened unto them for types: and they are written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come" (1 Cor. x. 11). On the story ("worse than Thyestean," Celsus calls it) of Lot's daughters, Origen's apology¹ might have served as a model for the most accomplished of the casuists satirised by Pascal. Naturally, he does not spare a counter-attack on the Greek myths. Then he returns to the question, Who has the best right to allegorise? Celsus maintains that the Jews and Christians have no such right, their early records being mere foolish stories without any deeper philosophical meaning.² It appears that he was not judging without examination, but had looked into some of the allegorising writers. "Their allegories," he says, "fit together, with a kind of amazing and absolutely tasteless folly, things that can in no way be harmonised."³ In passing, he described a disputation between "one Papiscus and Jason" as "worthy of pity and hate rather than of laughter."⁴ This has not come down to us; but it is known to have been a popular work in which the Christian view of the prophecies supposed to refer to Jesus was defended against the Jews.⁵ Origen insists that "pity and hate" are incompatible feelings, but allows that the book is not among the writings adapted to move intelligent readers. He thinks that if Celsus had read Philo with attention he would have thought better of his allegorising method; since there is much in Philo of Greek philosophy.

Starting from the *Timæus* (like Julian afterwards) Celsus proceeded to develop a philosophical view of creation as against the Judæo-Christian view.⁶ Though Origen here finds that nothing is to be made of the attempt to excite prejudice against the "Epicurean," modern readers must be struck with the bent towards scientific naturalism that went along with the Platonism of Celsus. He seems to have opposed to the idea of an original production of the various kinds of bodies by successive acts of volition, the general philosophical conception that it is of the essence of material things to be in an alternating flux; so that particular bodies must be explained as resultants of one uniform natural process, and not assigned without further inquiry to the will of a maker.⁷ "No offspring of matter," that is, no particular

καὶ ἐρρώμενως βιοῦν αὐτῷ ἀνακειμέναν; Esau was a bad character (cf. 46: ἀνδρὸς κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ὁμολογουμένου φαύλου). In v. 59 Origen says that he knows only of a plot of Esau against Jacob, not of a plot of Jacob against Esau.

¹ iv. 45.

² iv. 50.

³ iv. 51.

⁴ iv. 52.

⁵ By one of the ironies of history, it was translated into Latin by a writer named Celsus.

⁶ iv. 54 ff.

⁷ iv. 60: κοινὴ ἢ πάντων τῶν προειρημένων σωμάτων φύσις καὶ μία ἐς ἀμοιβὴν παλίντροπον ἰοῦσα καὶ ἐπανιοῦσα.

material body, "is immortal."¹ The necessity of evil (as with Plato) results from the plunging of souls into the flux. Since its primal source is always the same, its total quantity can neither be increased nor diminished.² There are periodic movements of mortal things, but no miraculous catastrophes.³

To part of this, Origen raises the objection that some evils have been abolished while others have sprung up in human history.⁴ An obvious reply would have been that this illustrates the balance; but in any case the objection does not touch the position of Celsus, who had spoken of the "evils in things" (*κακὰ ἐν τοῖς ὄντιν*) regarded as portions of the whole. He did not hold that human societies have always existed, but, in a Lucretian spirit, traced man back to beginnings as a mere animal.⁵ "Without philosophising," Celsus had remarked, "it is not easy to know whence evils are born." "Nor yet is it easy if you do philosophise," retorts Origen, "nor perhaps possible without divine inspiration." The greatest of evils is ignorance how God is to be served; and that some of the philosophers have been thus ignorant is proved by the existence of different sects in philosophy. According to the Christian view (*καθ' ἡμᾶς*), no one who does not know that it is an evil to think that piety is preserved in the established laws of what are commonly thought to be States, has it in his power to know the source of evils. And no one who has not an accurate knowledge regarding the Devil and his angels and how he came to be the Devil has it in his power to know the source of evils.⁶ Evil in us has not matter for its cause, but the choice made by our ruling principle. A periodic and necessitated cosmic movement, like that which Celsus affirms, would take away our moral responsibility (*τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν*).⁷

Miraculous interpositions, which Celsus had protested against as involving an anthropomorphic conception of Deity,⁸ Origen defends as a kind of medicine periodically administered by the Creator when the world is in need of it. That evils are such only to individuals, and are part of the order of the whole, he is able to admit in his own way.⁹ The Scriptural imagery about the "wrath of God" he defends as a mode of speech adapted to human weakness. When Celsus, going more into detail, argues against the view that all things were made for man, Origen points out that he is in opposition to the Stoics, and again affects to associate him with the Epicureans.¹⁰ But in fact it was especially by the Platonists that the opposition to the narrow teleology of the Stoics was carried on. What is given of the arguments of Celsus has much in common with the treatment of the subject

¹ iv. 61.² iv. 62.³ iv. 69.⁴ iv. 63.⁵ iv. 79.⁶ iv. 65.⁷ iv. 67.⁸ iv. 69: ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὡς ἄνθρωπος τεκνηνόμενός τι ἐνδεώς καὶ ἀτεχνότερον ὁ θεὸς προσάγει διδρῶσιν τῷ κόσμῳ, καθάριον αὐτὸν κατακλυσῶ ἢ ἐκπυρῶσει.⁹ iv. 70.¹⁰ iv. 75.

by Plutarch earlier and by Porphyry later. He points to the signs in the lower animals of an innate intelligence by which they rule their actions for their own preservation, as against the view that they are simply "irrational" and created only to be subservient to man. With Origen it is a fixed dogma that no animal but man can possess reason. If any seem to perform rational actions, it is in them blind instinct of nature; they are really moved by a divine intelligence external to them. The hexagonal cells in hives are part of an arrangement set in action that bees may provide men with honey.¹ In referring to what Celsus relates of the way in which ants help one another with burdens, Origen comments to the effect that to represent ants as having knowledge in doing this, will turn away people of the simpler sort from giving the like mutual aid, because they will no longer have the consciousness of a superiority as human beings.² Remembering afterwards a well-known passage in Proverbs (xxx. 24-28), he escapes from the necessity of admitting that the animals mentioned are really "wise," by treating proverbial, or "parabolic,"³ literature as consisting essentially of "enigmas." "Wherefore also it is written in our Gospels that our Saviour said: 'These things have I spoken unto you in proverbs' (or parables)."

That Celsus did not seriously found anything on what he brought together about the divinatory powers of certain animals,⁴ Origen himself suspects. The argument that such animals are in closer relation to the Deity than the men who have to consult them in order to gain knowledge of the future, looks like a final and rhetorical touch in a brief literary development of the thesis, and does not seem intended to be taken for more. At any rate, it gives Origen an opening for a long disquisition, in the course of which he states it as the Christian view that certain demons of the Titan or giant race, impious and fallen from heaven, enter into the bodies of animals, preferably birds or beasts of prey, and making them the vehicles of their own foreknowledge, lure mankind by this means from the worship of the true God.⁵

The tone in which Celsus brings this portion of his argument to a close seems of itself to exclude the idea that he attached any weight to his excursion into the lore of divination. "Not therefore for man have all things been made, as neither have they been made for the lion or the eagle or the dolphin; but that this world as a work of God should become complete and perfect altogether. For the sake of this, all things have had their measure assigned, not for the sake of one another (except secondarily) but of the whole. And God cares for the whole;

¹ iv. 82.

² iv. 83.

³ iv. 87: ἐπιγέγραπται γὰρ τὸ βιβλίον Παροιμίας.

⁴ iv. 88.

⁵ iv. 92.

and this whole providence never forsakes; nor does it become worse; nor does God after an interval turn it back to himself; nor does he become angry on account of men, any more than he becomes angry on account of apes or mice. Neither does he threaten those beings of which each in its particular order has received its allotted part." ¹

Origen goes through this, point by point, agreeing or differing as his dogma requires. Then he concludes the fourth book by again, as at the beginning, invoking divine assistance for the continuance of the work.

At the opening of the fifth book, he observes that Celsus in asserting as he does that no God or Son of God has ever come down to men,² is in effect denying the popular mythology. The philosophical resistance to the new faith was at a tactical disadvantage here, and the Christian apologist can again profess to discover traces of the impious "Epicurean."

Passing now from the nature of the supreme unity to the graduation of beings in the universe, Celsus puts questions skillfully directed to show that Christianity, and even Judaism, implied in principle as much "polytheism" as the official religion of the Græco-Roman world. Of what nature, he asks, are the "angels," spoken of by the Jews and Christians? Are they what others call gods, or are they "demons"? ³ And since the Jews revere the heaven and its angels, why do they refuse all honour to the sun and moon and the other stars? ⁴

To this Origen replies with a certain moderation. The angels are sometimes called "gods" in the Scriptures, but they are not therefore to be worshipped in place of the supreme God.⁵ They are certainly not "demons," for this name is to be understood only of evil powers acting without a gross body.⁶ The Jews worship a God not merely above the parts of the heaven, but above the whole heaven itself. As the chosen people of the Supreme, they were not allowed to worship anything subordinate like the heavenly bodies, which were assigned to "the nations" (Deut. iv. 19, 20).⁷ Yet the sun and moon and stars, as works of God, are often celebrated in the Scriptures. Perhaps they are guided by higher intelligences. The opinion of Anaxagoras, that the sun is merely a "red-hot mass," does not commend itself to Origen. Like Philo, he has here come under the influence of the later Hellenism.

Accordingly he does not, in replying to the attack of Celsus on the "resurrection of the flesh," defend the literal sense of the doctrine. This was held, he seems to allow,⁸ by the simple-minded believers; but St. Paul, in what he said about the "spiritual body," had indicated a truer view. Celsus, on his part, distinguishes "some of the Christians" from those whom

¹ iv. 99.

⁵ v. 4.

² v. 3.

⁶ v. 5.

³ v. 4.

⁷ v. 10.

⁴ v. 6.

⁸ v. 19.

he is attacking; but on the believers who cherish the "hope of earthworms," that after being long dead they are to rise up from the ground with the bodies they formerly had, his attack is unsparing. What soul of a man would desire a putrefied body? And how can a body, once decomposed, return to its former state? "Having nothing to answer, they flee to a most absurd subterfuge, that everything is possible to God. But God cannot do what is vile, nor does he will to do what is against nature . . . For he is the Reason of all beings, and cannot do a work that is contrary to reason or to himself."¹ Contemptuous as the phrases are, Origen does not feel himself hurt by them.² For in fact his own doctrine is the immortality of the soul, contrasted by Celsus in the same passage with that of a physical resurrection. The ideas of the earliest believers have been left behind, and those of Greek philosophy substituted, as they had begun to be in the Pauline writings. With the heretics, however, who altogether deny the Scriptural dogma of the resurrection, Origen will not make common cause. There is to be a body, but it is to be glorified.³ And even a literal resurrection of the former body, he retorts on Celsus, is in accordance with some doctrines of the Greeks. The Stoics suppose that, after their world-conflagration (for they too have this), bodies exactly like those that existed before will appear in the new cycle without even the remains of these to grow from. And surely this is more paradoxical than what is really held by Christians, who suppose the new body to grow, not indeed from the old, but from a λόγος latent in it.⁴

The Jews, Celsus proceeded, whatever one may think of their religion, do at least agree with other men in practising a form of worship which is that of their ancestors. This seems expedient, not only inasmuch as they are preserving laws that were arrived at by common consent in the particular country where they are in force, but also because it is a reasonable view that the different parts of the earth have been from the beginning distributed among different powers.⁵ Thus it is unholy to dissolve what has been established by custom in each place.

To this view Origen brings as an objection unholy customs,

¹ v. 14 : αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ πάντων τῶν ὄντων λόγος· οὐδὲν οὖν οἷός τε παράλογον οὐδὲ παρ' ἐαυτὸν ἐργάσασθαι.

² Indeed, he can be just as contemptuous himself when speaking, as Bruno expressed it, "among the few, the good and the wise." I owe to Dean Inge's *Philosophy of Plotinus* (vol. ii. p. 17, n. 1) the following passage on popular Christian views about the resurrection of the body : τίνος οὖν ἔσται σῶμα ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει ; καὶ οὕτως εἰς βύθον φλυαρίας συμβήσεται ἐμπύπτειν, καὶ μετὰ ταύτας τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπὶ τὸ πάντα δυνατὰ εἶναι τῷ θεῷ καταφεύγουσι (Origenes in *Psalms*, 533).

³ v. 22.

⁴ v. 23.

⁵ v. 25 : δοκεῖ δ' οὕτως καὶ συμφέρειν, οὐ μόνον καθότι ἐπὶ νοῦν ἦλθεν ἄλλοις ἄλλως νομίσαι καὶ δεῖ φυλάττειν τὰ ἐς κοινὸν κεκυρωμένα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ὡς εἰκὸς τὰ μέρη τῆς γῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλα ἄλλοις ἐπόπταις νενεμημένα καὶ κατὰ τινες ἐπικρατείας διειλημμένα ταύτη καὶ διοικεῖται.

such as incest and human sacrifice, sanctioned by various religions. Are these to be preserved where they are established? ¹ Further, if religion is an affair of local custom, must not the same principle be applied to the moral virtues? ² Then he attempts a positive view. Celsus, in what he says on the distribution of the parts of the earth among the gods of the nations, has been misled by certain dim traditions "outside the divine word." To learn the truth, we must go to Deuteronomy (xxxii. 8, 9) and to the account in Genesis of the tower of Babel. This indeed has a secret meaning not to be divulged to the uninitiated, but a hint may be given. All except one race wandered "from the East" (Gen. xi. 2), that is, from the light of truth, and may be supposed to have been placed as a punishment in various localities under the government of inferior angels. The one race that was "the Lord's portion," was not, indeed, exempt from shortcomings, but for a time these were not irreparable. At length, this race too having been completely scattered abroad for its sins, the revelation of Jesus is come to all; and, against a revelation from the supreme God, the customs prevailing among the dispersed portions of the human race under the penal dominion of lower powers have naturally no right to exist. Accordingly, when Celsus asks the Christians whence they in particular derive their paternal laws, and tells them that they are merely revolted from the Jews, Origen replies that now, "in the last days," "the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth" (1 Tim. iii. 15) is "exalted above the hills" and that "all nations shall flow unto it" (Isa. ii. 2). "And we say to those that ask us whence we are come or what leader we have, that we come according to the pledges of Jesus," from all nations, to beat our swords into ploughshares and our spears into pruning-hooks, "becoming through Jesus sons of peace." ³

Here are plainly to be seen the theocratic pretensions of the "great Church" ⁴ as against the system of local liberties and tolerance which Celsus was defending in terms of a "theologico-political" theory elaborated to meet practical exigencies. It did meet them on the whole, but it needed accommodation, as Origen was able to show. For the empire did not recognise every detail of religious custom as absolutely sacred. More than a generation before the treatise against the Christians was written, a decree of Hadrian had made all human sacrifices illegal. And the local religions, while their privileges generally were maintained, had no power of coercion over individual dissentients who chose to neglect their rites. So, when Celsus quotes the famous passage of Herodotus (ii. 18) on the inviolableness of their own customary laws to each people, Origen replies by asking what then is to be thought of the teachings of the philosophers against superstition (*κατὰ δεισιδαιμονίας*). And if the

¹ v. 27.² v. 28.³ v. 33.⁴ Cf. v. 40.

right of those who philosophise to desert paternal custom is recognised, how can that of the Christians be denied? Celsus and those who think with him, were they serious in their appeal to custom, would have to lay down the rule henceforth that those who in Egypt adopt the opinions of the philosophers must continue to practise all the abstinences from kinds of food and all the ritual of the Egyptian religion. Anyone who did this would be a queer philosopher.¹

It seems to have been already perceived in the second century that pleas of this form, urged on behalf of the Church, were not really for liberty but for power. Thus Celsus, as if by anticipation, had devoted the next portion of his argument to invalidating the exclusive claims of the Christians (founded on those of the Jews) by setting against them other claims that seemed *a priori* no less valid. Then, at the end of the section, he pointed out that those who arrogate a divine right of dominance over the world cannot even agree among themselves, but differ more fiercely than other men. Origen's method of reply is simply to reaffirm the claims; but there is some interest in observing how he does it.

The god Ammon, says Celsus, has no worse claim to convey messages as to what is sacred than "the angels of the Jews."² Ammon, replies Origen, may command abstinence from the flesh of cows, and such a command may to a superficial view appear on a level with similar prescriptions in the Jewish law. If, however, Celsus had known the true meaning of such legislation as that of Deut. xxv. 4 ("Thou shalt not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn"), he would have known that it is symbolical and refers to the relations of men (cf. 1 Cor. ix. 9), and not to "irrational animals."

There is record in history, Celsus pointed out, of the introduction of a new god, Serapis.³ But the Son of God, Origen replies to the intended parallel, if he came but recently to dwell among men, is not therefore new; for the Scriptures have knowledge of him as the eldest of all creatures, by whom man was made in the image of God. Serapis came in yesterday or the day before by the deceit of Ptolemy, who wished to show to the Alexandrians, as it were, a god manifest.⁴ How he was constructed, and what various things of nature he participates in, we have read in Numenius the Pythagorean. Then, as if unaware that he is himself displaying the parallel syncretism, he goes on to set forth the all-comprehensive attributes of the Son of God.⁵

The Jews, Celsus concedes, are not to be blamed for clinging to their own customs, but only for the claim they make to be

¹ v. 35: γελοῖος ἂν εἴη φιλόσοφος ἀφιλόσοφα πράττων.

² v. 36. ³ v. 37.

⁴ v. 38: περὶ δὲ Σαράπιδος πολλὴ καὶ διάφανος ἱστορία, χθὲς καὶ πρῶν εἰς μέσον ἐλθόντος κατὰ τινὰς μαγανείας τοῦ βουλευθέντος Πτολεμαίου οἰονεῖ ἐπιφανὴ δείξαι τοῖς ἐν Ἀλεξανδρίᾳ θεόν.

⁵ v. 39. (Here called δεῦτερος θεός.)

holier than other men.¹ Though Origen's reply here repeats some positions given above, it contains one or two details worth noting. If it is true, as Celsus maintains, that neither the monotheism nor the rites of the Jews are their peculiar property, we must still distinguish. The name by which the Highest is called is not indifferent : for, as was said before, names are something more than conventional signs. This is especially the case with divine names. To call upon "the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob" has an efficacy in controlling the demons which would be entirely lost if one were to substitute in the formula translations of the names of the patriarchs. So likewise with the names of Israel, of Sabaoth, and of Adonai. Zeus is not the same as Sabaoth : for his name is not divine at all, but is that by which a certain demon pleases to be called upon, who is not friendly to man nor to the true God.² Circumcision, though it cannot be denied to be common as a rite to the Jews and to some other nations, nevertheless differs according as the doctrines of those who practise it differ. It may have been performed because of some angel hostile to the Jewish race, who was thus deprived of his power to injure.³ When Jesus had undergone the rite, the angel's power against the uncircumcised who worship only the Creator was altogether destroyed, so that there was no further need to avert injury by the shedding of blood. Kinds of abstinence, again, differ according to the intention. If, for example, Christian ascetics abstain from the flesh of animals (though no longer required to observe the distinctions of meats according to Jewish law), this is in order to bring the body into subjection, and not, as with the Pythagoreans, because they think they are sparing their kindred.⁴

Reference to the Jewish and Christian doctrine of angels led again to an incidental criticism of the resurrection-narratives in the Gospels. Origen begins an attempt at reconciliation of discrepancies, but cuts short the reply by hinting at a mystical significance of the number of angels at the tomb in the different narratives. Equally strange stories, he proceeds,⁵ are told among the Greeks.

In noting the contradictory positions of the Christian sects, Celsus brought in the speculations of the Gnostics ; though he was aware of the exclusive pretensions of the "great Church," with its acceptance of the God of the Jews as at once the creator of the world and the highest God. It appears from the account given that he knew of Christians who lived according to the

¹ v. 41.² v. 46.³ v. 48. Following a method already adopted by Hebrew interpreters for getting rid of anthropomorphisms in the Bible, Origen substitutes "an angel" for "the Lord" in the barbaric story of Ex. iv. 24-26.⁴ v. 49.⁵ v. 57.

Jewish law,¹ as well as of the anti-Jewish Gnostics. Origen repudiates some of the Gnostic sects on the ground that they are not Christian at all. Of some he declares that he has never come in contact with them. Here, however, what Celsus was chiefly concerned to bring into view was the unmeasured vituperation of one another by sects all of which claimed to be Christian, and their deadly mutual hate.² Origen tries to palliate differences, as before, by comparing with them the quarrels of philosophical and medical sects. The hatred imputed he will not admit. To hate those that have been led astray by heresies would be inconsistent with the blessings pronounced in the Gospel on peacemakers and on the meek. Celsus from his point of view had not failed to observe the same contrast; as may be seen from his trenchant summing-up. "All those," he says, "who are so much at variance and who in their wranglings confute one another with the most shameful abuse, you will hear saying, 'The world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world.'"³ Whereupon the apologist exclaims in triumph that all cannot say this; for some of the heretics do not accept the Pauline epistles. Now the passage cited is from Paul (Gal. vi. 14), and they would not quote the Apostle whom they reject.

Though the beginning of the doctrine is naught, continues Celsus in entering upon the next section of the argument, let us examine the teaching itself.⁴ Then he compares the religious and moral precepts of Christianity with those of philosophy, and finds that the same things have been said better by the Greeks and without overstrain, or the assertion that they were spoken by God or a son of God.⁵ To this Origen sets himself to reply in the sixth book; remarking first that he has no quarrel with the teachings adduced from the philosophers, but that, excellent as they are in themselves, they have the defect of not appealing to the multitude. He is obliged to confess, however, that if Plato is read only by students, Epictetus at any rate is in popular use.⁶

Then the tone changes. It turns out that Plato's wisdom became folly, according to what St. Paul said (Rom. i. 21-23): for the men who have written such things as Celsus quotes about the "first good" go down to the Piræus to offer up prayer to Artemis and to gaze on a procession of the vulgar.⁷

¹ v. 61. Of these Origen writes: οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ διττοὶ Ἑβριῶναιοι, ἡ-οὶ ἐκ παρθένου ὁμολογοῦντες ὁμοίως ἡμῖν τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἢ οὐχ οὕτω γεγεννησθαι ἀλλὰ ὡς τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους.

² v. 63: καὶ βλασφημοῦσι δέ, φησὶν, εἰς ἀλλήλους οὗτοι πάνδεινα ῥήτὰ καὶ ἄρρητα· καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴξαιεν οὐδὲ καθ' ὅτι οὖν εἰς ὁμόνοιαν, πάντῃ ἀλλήλους ἀποστυγοῦντες.

³ v. 64.

⁴ v. 65: φέρ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μηδεμίαν ἀρχὴν τοῦ δόγματος ἔχουσιν, αὐτὸν ἐξετάσωμεν τὸν λόγον.

⁵ vi. 1.

⁶ vi. 2.

⁷ vi. 4.

In the opening passage of the *Republic*, the Christian Father can see nothing but a degrading compliance with popular idolatry; which was appropriately avenged when God chose the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, "that no flesh should glory before God" (1 Cor. i. 27-29). The truth that was in Plato did not profit even himself, for he thus incurred the punishment of sinners.¹

Pursuing the argument, Celsus remarks that Plato, although perceiving that the highest knowledge is accessible to but few, does not talk in a portentous manner, and stop the mouths of questioners, and straightway command the acceptance as of faith that "such is God, and he has such and such a Son, and this Son came down and conversed with me."² To parry this, Origen falls back on the marvels related in the biographies of the philosophers; again bringing forward the story of Plato's virgin birth. He adds that Plato himself, in one of his epistles (Ep. vi. p. 323 D) has stated the doctrine of a divine sonship; speaking of the God of all as the Father of the ruling principle and the cause.

In what Celsus had to say about faith, there occur in the form of deductions from the Christian view, put as absurdities, positions that have since been adopted seriously by the bolder apologists. Because we say that the Son of God suffered the most disgraceful punishment, "Believe all the more."³ Again; if one sect brings in one person, another another, and all alike say, "Believe if you wish to be saved, or depart," what shall they do who really wish to be saved? Shall they decide by throwing dice?⁴ The first challenge was accepted in the paradox of Tertullian.⁵ The second will at once suggest to modern readers the "wager" of Pascal: "Stake your eternal happiness on the truth of that creed whose promises and threats are the most transcendent."

The distinction between human and divine wisdom, observed Celsus, is not new, but is to be met with in Heraclitus and other philosophers. Then he points out that a fitting humility in presence of the divine law is taught by Plato (*Leges* iv. 715 E-716 A). This the Christians have distorted into a base

¹ vi. 5. Cf. 3: διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τοὺς τὰ ἀληθῆ περὶ θεοῦ ὑπολαβόντας καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀληθείας θεοσεβείαν ἀσκήσαντάς φημεν ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς τῶν ἀμαρτανόντων κολάσεσιν.

² vi. 8.

³ vi. 10: ταύτῃ καὶ μᾶλλον πιστεύουσιν.

⁴ vi. 11.

⁵ *De Carne Christi*, 5. That Father could be audacious in more than one direction. See Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. xxi. n. 19 (ed. Bury, vol. ii. p. 337): "Tertulhan (adv. Praxeam, c. 16) has a remarkable and dangerous passage. After contrasting, with indiscreet wit, the nature of God and the actions of Jehovah, he concludes: Scilicet ut haec de filio Dei non credenda fuisse si non scripta essent; fortasse non credenda de Patre licet scripta."

humility.¹ Plato had also said, before the Gospels, that no one can be extremely rich and attain the height of goodness.² In reference to the last point, it is interesting to note that according to the spokesman of the Church the expressions "rich and poor" in the Gospels are not to be understood literally. "For not even the first man you meet would praise the poor indiscriminately, of whom the most part have the very worst morals."³

A tangled disputation on the sources of the idea of a heaven or heavens, and on the gnostic sects, Christian or non-Christian, and related topics, is important for ecclesiastical history, but does not contribute much to the direct argument on either side. It may be noted that, according to Origen's report, certain Oriental sects (the "Ophiani"), declared by him to be non-Christian, and perhaps representing the oldest Gnosticism, denied even the existence of Jesus; going beyond the "docetists" who said that he had only an apparent body.⁴ Celsus, in his investigations, had come upon strange formulæ of Eastern mystagogues, in which the primeval idea recurred of a "slaying" of the heaven and earth and of many people that they might live, intermingled with ideas of the cessation of death by the death of sin. Everywhere he found the symbolism of the "tree of life," and of a "resurrection of the flesh from the tree"; but of course completely misinterpreted it when, with vigorous sarcasm, he treated it as derived from historical circumstances.⁵ Modern anthropologists know that, whether an actual Jesus died on the cross or not, the imagery is far older. The suggestion of Origen that Celsus had invented the most primitive details of it⁶ merely shows that he also was too far removed from primitive ideas to understand them without the aid of a science not yet born.

A passage which has been thought inconsistent with the opinion that identifies Celsus with Lucian's friend who wrote against magic would by itself rather confirm this; although

¹ vi. 15: ὁ ταπεινός φρων ἀσχημόνως καὶ ἀπαισίως ταπεινοῦται, χαμαιπετὴς ἐπὶ τῶν γονάτων καὶ πρηγῆς ἐρριμμένος, ἐσθῆτα δυστήνων ἀμφισκόμενος καὶ κόνιν ἐπαμώμενος.

² vi. 16: ἀγαθὸν ὄντα διαφόρως καὶ πλούσιον εἶναι διαφερόντως ἀδύνατον.

³ vi. 16: οὐκ ἂν γὰρ οὐδ' ὁ τυχὼν ἀκρίτως τοὺς πτωχοὺς ἐπῆνευσεν, ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φαυλότατοί εἰσι τὰ ἥθη.

⁴ vi. 28: ὅρα γοῦν πῶς ἀλογώτατον πεποίηκεν ὁ Κέλσος ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Χριστιανῶν λόγοις παραλαβὼν ὡς Χριστιανούς τοὺς μὴδ' ἀκούειν θέλοντας τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, κἂν ὅτι σοφὸς τις ἢ μέτριος τὰ ἥθη ἢ ἀνθρωπὸς τις ἦν. The ἦ before ἀνθρωπὸς τις was omitted on conjecture in the edition of Delarue (1733), which till Koetschau's served as the basis for newer editions. (See Koetschau's textual note, vol. ii. p. 98.) In its place, it proves that some of the Gnostics denied the historical Jesus of the Church, as distinguished from the Saviour-god, not merely to have been "a wise or good man," but to have existed as a human being at all.

⁵ vi. 34: πανταχοῦ δὲ ἐκεῖ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ξύλον καὶ ἀνάστασιν σαρκὸς ἀπὸ ξύλου, διότι οἱ μὲν δὲ διδάσκαλος αὐτῶν σταυρῷ ἐνηλώθη καὶ ἦν τέκτων τὴν τέχνην. κ.τ.λ.

⁶ vi. 35.

for the rest the evidence is decidedly against it, since the friend of Lucian was plainly an Epicurean.¹ Celsus quotes, as from a certain Dionysius whom he had met,² the view that, for those who live the life of philosophic virtue, magical arts lose the power they have over others. The fact that he quotes this, instead of giving it directly as his own view, would seem to show that he desired to avoid any except a purely hypothetical concession to the claims of magic.

While pointing to representations derived, as he thought, by Christianity from Mithraism, Celsus does not appear to have connected the idea of Satan in particular with the Persian religion. He finds that the old Greek mythologists, in their stories of Titans and Giants, offer sufficient materials for distortion into the Christian notion of the Devil. This he regards as involving an impious attribution of human weakness to the highest God, who is represented as having an adversary limiting his power.³ Origen's reply consists mainly in an attempt to show that the idea of a diabolic resistance to God is present in the Hebrew Scriptures, and therefore cannot have been derived from Greek fables, which are younger.

The idea of the Son of God Celsus takes to have been derived from the language of "ancient men" who applied similar names to the world because God is its source.⁴ Origen once more replies by insisting on the greater antiquity of Moses and the prophets as compared with the ancients whom Celsus has in view.

Next comes a discussion on the Mosaic cosmogony, which, so far at least as the creation of man is concerned, Celsus declares to resemble the stories of world-production that the poets of the Old Comedy set forth in jest.⁵ In the detailed argument, Origen evades some points by affecting uncertainty whether Celsus is aiming his darts at the cosmogony in itself or as it is interpreted by the heretics. To the description of the heterodox interpretations as "abysmal nonsense" (*λήρον βαθύν*),⁶ he would have had no objection; but Celsus, he complains, has not even discriminated heresy from heresy.⁷ He does not profess here to give a full reply: for an adequate exposition whole treatises would be required. With the subject of the six days' work he has dealt in his commentary on Genesis.⁸ In what follows, he appropriates as far as possible the Platonising expressions of Celsus on the relation between God and the universe. Of course the most refined philosophical theses are supposed

¹ The failure of the attempt to maintain the identification has been made clear by Pélagaud.

² vi. 41: *Διονύσιόν τινα μουσικὸν Αἰγύπτιον*.

³ vi. 42.

⁴ vi. 47: *ἄνδρες παλαιοὶ τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ γερόμενον παῖδᾶ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡθεον προσεῖπον*.

⁵ vi. 49.

⁶ vi. 50.

⁷ vi. 53.

⁸ vi. 60. This exposition is lost.

to be present in the Scriptures. No light that was not there can have been derived from the heathen. Celsus is in darkness, and wishes to cast darkness over the eyes of Christians.¹

Amid the deluge of Scripture-quotations, a topic of some philosophical interest emerges. Celsus raises objection to the expression "God is spirit" (πνεῦμα ὁ θεός) as having a corporeal reference; ² and maintains that the Christians, in what they say of the "spirit of God," do not differ from the Stoics, with their notion of a divine breath that runs through and contains in itself all things.³ Origen's reply is that when God is said to be "breath" or "spirit," this is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, just as when he is described as a "fire"; and that the Christians do not agree with the Stoics in holding the divinity to be corporeal. In reality, they understand by what they call "spirit" an incorporeal essence (ὑσώματον οὐσίαν).

Celsus was here of course thinking in terms of the Greek psychology, for which spirit (πνεῦμα) meant breath or warm air, intermediate between soul and gross matter. For the Jews and Christians, the "spirit" of man or God, coming primarily from a more archaic psychology, had acquired an application to the highest part of the soul, or principle of life and thought, conceived as a recipient of divine inspiration. Thus it could take no intermediate position, but must be made parallel with mind or intellect (νοῦς), the highest part of the soul in the psychology of the Greeks. The Platonising Fathers, having adopted the idea of an opposition of nature between soul (ψυχή) and body, must *a fortiori* dematerialise "spirit." Their device, we see, was to treat the expression as figurative. For the possibility of introducing more exact distinctions into their own psychology, they had to wait till another advance had been made by independent Greek thought.

A passage quoted from Celsus a little later puts briefly some characteristic objections to the Christian scheme of revelation. "If God, waking up, like the Zeus of the comic poet, from the long sleep, was willing to rescue the race of men from evils, why did he send this breath, as you call it, to one corner, when he ought to have blown through many bodies alike and despatched them throughout the whole inhabited world?" ⁴ But it was by way of raising laughter in the theatre that the poet let his Zeus be waked up, and then made him send Hermes to the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. And can you avoid the thought that you have done something more ludicrous in sending the Son of God to the Jews?" When Origen treats it as unworthy

¹ vi. 67: Κέλσος μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ παραπλήσιοι αὐτῷ προβάλλειν σκότον τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἡμῶν θέλουσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ τῷ φωτὶ τοῦ λόγου ἐξαφανίζομεν τὸ σκότος τῶν ἀσεβῶν δογμάτων.

² vi. 70.

³ vi. 71.

⁴ vi. 78: δέον πολλὰ ὁμοίως διαφυσῆσαι σώματα καὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀποστεῖλαι τὴν οἰκουμένην.

of the dignity of philosophy to compare the awakened sender of Hermes in the comedy with God the Maker of all,¹ the retort is obvious. It was precisely the intermittent action and the partiality ascribed to the God of the universe, as distinguished from the gods of popular belief, that the philosopher regarded as more ludicrous.

For the Christian apologists of those ages, as we have in part seen, the vital centre of the case was the fulfilment of what were held to be the Messianic prophecies, by the life and death of the Christ. Thus, when Celsus returns to the attack on this position, again setting the various supernaturalist claims in rivalry with one another, Origen marks the point reached in the controversy by opening another book (the seventh); at the beginning of which he once more invokes divine aid, adding a prayer for the destruction of words against "the truth."

The Christians, says Celsus, while they take no account of the innumerable oracles among Greeks and Egyptians and others, which have benefited mankind by giving equitable decisions for the settlement of the earth, regard as miraculous the things spoken or not spoken by the men of Judæa.² To this Origen replies by a tirade against the "demons." Apollo's oracle at Delphi, among other discreditable circumstances, such as being uttered through women instead of men, once went so far as to call frivolous writers like the tragic poets "wise."³ He notes the insinuation of Celsus in the words "spoken or not spoken" (*λεχθέντα ἢ μὴ λεχθέντα*); remarking that if Celsus thinks the Messianic prophecies were only written, without having been previously spoken, that shows his ignorance of Hebrew chronology.⁴

Celsus had gone on to state that predictions such as the Christians rely upon in the Jewish writings were still, to his own knowledge, put forth in Phœnicia and Palestine. There are, he says, many kinds of prophecy; but the most consummate is as follows. Then he gives a description of many nameless prophets, in temples and out of temples, each of whom is ready and accustomed to say: "I am God, or Son of God, or Divine Spirit. I am come; for already the world is being destroyed, and you, O men, are undone through wrong-doings. But it is my will to save you; and you shall see me coming again with celestial power. Blessed is he that now worships me, but upon all others I will cast eternal fire, and upon cities and countries. And men who know not their own recompenses (*οἱ μὴ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ποινὰς ἴσασιν*) will repent in vain and groan; but those that have obeyed me I will eternally preserve." They add further, he proceeded, such utterly obscure and crazy things as no one with intelligence can find out the meaning of, for they have no clear-

¹ *Our God* (τὸν τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργὸν θεὸν ἡμῶν), as Origen puts it, thus emphasising the point that offended the philosophers.

² vii. 3.

³ vii. 6.

⁴ vii. 8.

ness and are nothing; but to every fool or charlatan the things said give a pretext for making out of them anything he likes about anything.¹ Some of these prophets Celsus claims to have personally confuted and brought to confess their method of fabrication.²

To this very damaging attack Origen replies by flatly declaring the statements to be falsehoods. If Celsus asserts that prophecy of the old kind has continued in Phœnicia and Palestine, this must be false; for prophecy ceased among the Jews through the departure of the Holy Spirit in consequence of the rejection of Jesus.³ The statement that many kinds of prophecy are known to him is a false pretence.⁴ His assertion that he has personally confuted some of the prophets is a manifest lie. If he wished to be believed, why did he not mention their names? ⁵ Yet Origen himself tells his readers more than once that he has witnessed the casting out of devils by Christian exorcists. It is fair to add that he does not press his individual testimony, recognising that the fact will, by outsiders, be thought incredible.

We may believe without difficulty both that Origen thought he had seen devils cast out, and that Celsus had actually exposed some Messianic impostors or "false Christs." Whether any "true Christ" had appeared whose actions agreed with the Hebrew prophecies as interpreted by the Christians, he thought not worth more particular inquiry. What was to be said on this topic as between one supernaturalist and another, he had relegated to the discourse of his imaginary Jew. For himself, the reflection sufficed that, even if certain writings did predict that God was to eat the flesh of sheep and to drink vinegar or gall, such things were not therefore to be believed; ⁶ though, in his opinion, nothing so degrading could have been foretold by the prophets. The question is not whether a work has been declared beforehand, but whether it is worthy of God. In the base and shameful, though all men go mad and seem to foretell it, we must still disbelieve.⁷ With much of this, Origen, by one of the theological distinctions that were then being wrought out, was able to agree formally. It was not God the Word that suffered and died, but the man Jesus, with whose body and soul God dwelt.⁸

Celsus next contrasts the legislation of Moses and of Jesus. If the prophets of the God of the Jews foretold the coming of Jesus, why does God through the law of Moses make it the aim of human life to be rich and powerful, and command his

¹ vii. 9.

² vii. 11.

³ vii. 8.

⁴ vii. 9.

⁵ vii. 11.

⁶ vii. 13.

⁷ vii. 14: ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν προείποιεν τοῦτο οἱ προφῆται· κακὸν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀνόσιον. οὐκοῦν οὐτ' εἰ προείπον οὐτ' εἰ μὴ προείπον, σκεπτέον, ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἔργον ἀγίου ἐστὶ θεοῦ καὶ καλόν. τῷ δ' αἰσχροῦ καὶ κακῷ, κἂν πάντες ἀνθρώποι μαίνόμενοι προλέγαντο δόκωσαν, ἀπιστητέον.

⁸ vii. 16, 17.

people to slaughter out their enemies without sparing youth or age, and to kill the whole race of them, on pain of suffering the same things themselves if they disobey; while his Son the Nazarene (ὁ Ναζωραῖος ἄνθρωπος) issues the contrary law, that no thought is to be taken about meat or clothing, and that the other cheek is to be turned to the smiter? "Whether does Moses or Jesus lie? Or did the Father, when he sent him, forget what he had laid down to Moses? Or did he condemn his own laws and repent?"¹

Though Origen's knowledge of the Old Testament enabled him to point out texts, especially in the prophets and psalmists, containing the principles, and even the very expressions, of the teaching of Jesus, he can make no effective use of them, but soon takes refuge in allegory. For the other teachings are there also; and the whole was held to be inspired. According to the true meaning of the old law, as penetrated by what Origen took to be a deeper critical insight, the enemies to be slaughtered out are sinful thoughts in the soul;² while riches and poverty, just as in the New Testament, have a "spiritual" interpretation. To show that the prophets could not have made riches, in the literal sense, the reward of a righteous life, he quotes from the Epistle to the Hebrews (xi. 37, 38) the list of their sufferings.³ An incidental remark is indeed ventured on behalf of the "latter," that with a law of non-resistance to enemies it would have been impossible for the ancient Jews to maintain themselves as a separate political community.⁴

The Christian idea of a "new earth," Celsus proceeded to argue, was derived from Plato or from the ancient poets.⁵ But Moses, replies Origen, was of much greater antiquity than Greek letters, not to speak of Plato and the rest of the Greek authors, who were younger not only than Moses but than most of the prophets. Now Moses had already introduced God as promising the "holy land," the "land flowing with milk and honey." And by this land he could not mean the literal Judæa, which is a part of the earth generally that was cursed for Adam's transgression. The "pure earth situated in a pure heaven," spoken of in the *Phædo*, came therefore from the Hebrews; Plato and "the Greeks" having either heard of or met with the sacred writings and appropriated what they said about the "better land."

To modern readers, accustomed to a Platonised Christianity, the attack on the Christians for the grossness of their materialistic conceptions will seem paradoxical: yet Origen's admissions

¹ vii. 18. We may here detect an allusion to one of the gnostic positions about the Demiurgus, of which the mythological development is indicated in the words that follow (καὶ τὸν ἄγγελον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἀποστέλλει;).

² vii. 22.

³ vii. 18.

⁴ vii. 26.

⁵ vii. 28.

make it clear that the literalness with which imagery (as he himself regarded it) was understood by the multitude of believers, did not even need to be rhetorically exaggerated for attack. Refuted on every side, continues Celsus, they will return, as if they had heard nothing, to the same question: "How then, unless he be perceptible, shall we know and see God? And how shall we go to him?"¹ Well, he comments, if bodily perception really seems to them the only means of knowing the divine, let them go to the abodes of such gods in human shape as Amphiarus and Trophonius and Mopsus. These at any rate associate constantly with those who will; and have not merely glided once to their side.² In the opinion of Celsus, then, says Origen, what appeared to the disciples of Jesus after his resurrection was a phantom. But how can a phantom have been the source of so many conversions and of so many expulsions of devils?³ Celsus, however, introduces the Christians as again asking, "What is it possible to learn without sense-perception?" and answers: "The voice is not that of man nor of the soul but of flesh. And yet let them hear, if indeed, craven and body-loving race as they are (*ὡς δειλὸν καὶ φιλοσώματον γένος*), they can give ear to anything. Shut off the vision of sense, and look up with the mind; turn aside from flesh, and awaken the eyes of the soul: only thus will you see God." And if they are in quest of a leader on this way, let them shun deceivers and jugglers and those that follow after idols; taking care not to be themselves exposed to derision as having fallen to a lower level than idolatry, worshipping not even an image but a dead man, and seeking a father like unto him.⁴

The last touch, as we learn from Origen's repudiation, refers to the notion that the ruling principle of the world is corporeal,⁵ which historians of philosophy attribute to no less instructed a Christian than Tertullian. So far as the defence is relevant, it consists in the citation of thoughts from the New Testament that suggest a more refined interpretation, such as the Pauline distinction between things invisible and the visible things of nature.⁶ We shall see, however, that Celsus did not really confound the Christians in an indiscriminate mass, but recognised that those who, in their own language, called themselves the "spiritual," had more philosophical ideas.

Again Origen disclaims formulæ that Celsus may have heard from the "Ophiani," who absolutely deny Jesus.⁷ These, he gladly admits, are indeed deceivers and jugglers, and indulge

¹ vii. 33.

² vii. 35.

³ The "visible gods," of whom Celsus speaks, "we know to be demons" (*ἴσμεν γὰρ ἡμεῖς τοὺς αἰμόνας δυνάεις*).

⁴ vii. 36.

⁵ Cf. vii. 27.

⁶ vii. 37.

⁷ vii. 40: 'Οφίανοι . . . ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ἐλέγομεν, τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐξ ὅλων πνούμενος.

in mythopœic fancies; but they have nothing in common with true Christians.

Whom then, the apologist asks, does Celsus wish us to follow? He sends us, as he says, to inspired (*ἐνθέρους*) poets and philosophers, for whom he would have us desert Moses and the prophets. "Blind guides concerning the truth," though they may not have been wholly blind.¹ The passage quoted by Celsus from the *Timæus* (28 C), where Plato speaks of the difficulty there is in finding out "the Maker and Father of this whole," he admits to be nobly expressed; but adds that to Plato or any of the Greeks the difficulty was actually insurmountable, for if it had not been so they would have worshipped the Creator only. Celsus appears to think that the knowledge of God is to be attained by some process of mental synthesis or analysis or analogy. In this way, it is at most possible to arrive at the vestibule. In the true sense of knowing, "No man knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whom," by a certain divine grace, "the Son will reveal him."²

Pointing to the disquisition in the sixth book of the *Republic* on the visible and the intelligible world, Celsus thus exhorts the Christians: "These things have been said by men of intelligence, and if you too comprehend anything of them, it is well with you. And if you think that some spirit coming down from God announces divine things, by that spirit we may suppose that these are declared; filled with which, men of old proclaimed much that is good. But if you cannot understand this, be silent and hide your own ignorance, and do not call those blind who see, and lame who run; yourselves being altogether lamed in soul and mutilated, and living with the body, that is, with the corpse."³

We are careful, replies Origen, not to set ourselves in hostility with what is well said, even by those outside the faith; and it is we, the abused Christians, who not merely in word distinguish between "being" and "birth," between the "intelligible" and the "visible," between the truth of the former and the deception of the latter. "But some who, by the providence of God, have ascended to the knowledge of such things, act not worthily of the knowledge, and commit impiety."⁴ That is (as he explains in the sequel), the philosophers, by not dissenting from the religious use of statues, were involved in the general guilt of idolatry; so that their superior knowledge only rendered them the more inexcusable. Further, the sacred writers have not been content with a theoretical distinction between "birth" and "being," but have applied it by treating the whole natural life of man on earth as corruption and vanity.⁵

Since you were bent on some innovation, continued Celsus, why did you not take up Orpheus, if none of the other heroes

¹ vii. 41.² vii. 44.³ vii. 45.⁴ vii. 46.⁵ vii. 50.

would suffice? By common consent he was in possession of a holy spirit, and he too died a violent death. But perhaps you felt that you had been anticipated. There was Anaxarchus, however, who, being cast into a mortar, and broken under most outrageous blows, said, "Go on bruising the case of Anaxarchus; himself you cannot bruise." This was in truth the voice of a divine spirit. Or, if he too had followers already, there was still Epictetus, who, when his master was twisting his leg, said, undisturbed and with a gentle smile, "You will break it"; and then, when he had broken it, "Did I not say you would break it?" What speech of this kind did your God utter when he was being punished? Or else—since some of you can interpolate her verses—why did you not put forward the Sibyl as the child of God? Or you might have taken Jonah under the gourd, or Daniel from among the wild beasts, or personages still more portentous.¹

Origen is inclined to conjecture that if Celsus had not been in search of an abusive parallel to Jesus, he would have condemned the poems of Orpheus to be expelled from the well-regulated State; for the Orphic is even more impious than the Homeric theology.² The saying of Anaxarchus to the tyrant of Cyprus, and the words of Epictetus, are undoubtedly magnanimous; but the silence of Jesus under insult is still more impressive.³ If, as Celsus asserts without proof, the Christians have interpolated the Sibylline verses, let the genuine uninterpolated ones be pointed out. In what he says of Jesus (whom, in accordance with the Jewish story, he speaks of as a malefactor), Origen thinks that Celsus was moved by some spirit whose power Jesus had destroyed to the end that he might no longer have blood and the reek of sacrifice, nourished on which he used to deceive the people who seek God in images.⁴

The claim made to novelty on behalf of revelation, Celsus now tests first in the case of an ethical precept, and then in the prohibition of statues, so much dwelt on by Origen. The Christians, he says, have a precept, not to resist violence, but "if you are smitten on the one cheek, offer also the other." This too is ancient. All that they have done is to coarsen the expression. Plato makes Socrates, talking with Crito, argue that one ought never to inflict an injury in return for an injury. This was the opinion of Plato, as it had been the opinion of divine men before him. "But about these and the other

¹ vii. 53.

² vii. 54.

³ It might have seemed obvious here to quote the prayer for the forgiveness of his enemies in Luke xxiii. 34; but this does not occur in the earliest manuscripts, and was pretty certainly not extant in the time of Celsus or of Origen. Cyril, in his reply in the fifth century to Julian, who seems to have pleaded it against the Christian persecution of the Jews, declared it spurious.

⁴ vii. 56.

things which they spoil in the borrowing, let what has been said suffice. He who cares to seek further will acquire the knowledge."¹

This, Origen finds, is at any rate an admission that the Christian precept is right. And if the substance in the gospel and in the quotation from Plato is the same, we must not think that the beautiful phrasing of Plato's Greek raises it entirely above the commoner and simpler language in use among Jews or Christians; although, it must be said, the diction of the prophets has in the original Hebrew an elegance of its own.² A greater benefit has, in fact, been conferred on mankind by those who devoted themselves to putting moral precepts in a popular form than by the Greek philosophers, who wrote only for the few.

Celsus, going on to the next point, tried to show that intolerance of "idols" was no ground for pride. The same non-endurance of temples, altars and statues is found among the Scythians and among the Libyan nomads and other nations the most impious and lawless. The Persians too, as is related by Herodotus, thought the use of these external things foolish, because the gods have not human forms; and Heraclitus speaks of the folly of those who pray to statues and cannot distinguish the nature of a hero or a god. But to take statues for actual gods is an error of the most infantile kind. No extraordinary wisdom is needed to see through this. Moreover, the Jews and Christians have no special right to condemn statues in human shape. According to their own documents, "God made man in his own image."³

But, answers Origen, if others are intolerant of the same things, their intolerance is not therefore equivalent to ours.⁴ The same act in different persons may be due to the most diverse opinions. What distinguishes the Jews and Christians in their refusal to pay regard to statues, is that they are obeying a command of God, whose law forbids them to make the likeness of anything and to worship it.⁵

Celsus went on to say that he was aware of the Christian view that statues are representations of demons. But why should not the orders of divine beings called "dæmons" or "angels" or "herocs" receive their own share of honour? Has not their place in the whole been assigned them by the

¹ vii. 58.

² vii. 59: οὐδὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ τοῦ κάλλους τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φράσεως λεγόμενον τὸ αὐτὸ πάντως κρείττον εἶναι νομιστέον τοῦ εὐτελέστερον ἀπαγγελλομένου καὶ ἀπλουστεραῖς λέξεσι παρὰ Ἰουδαίοις ἢ Χριστιανοῖς· καίτοι γε ἡ πρώτη Ἰουδαίων λέξις, ἥ οἱ προφῆται χρησάμενοι καταλείπασιν ἡμῖν βιβλία, Ἑβραίων διαλέκτῳ καὶ σοφῇ συνθέσει τῶν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ κατ' ἐκείνους ἀναγέγραπται.

³ vii. 62.

⁴ vii. 63: οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο ἴσον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι τούτων ἐκείνους τῷ καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι αὐτῶν.

⁵ vii. 64.

providence of the supreme God?¹ Origen replies that all, or nearly all, who acknowledge the existence of demons acknowledge that some of them are evil. Now God does not appoint, but only permits, the part which evil beings have in the whole. This, indeed, belongs to a deeper investigation, of which Celsus had no knowledge. So far are the Christians from approving a worship of the demonic or diabolic powers served by "the nations" that they exorcise them by prayers and by lessons from the Holy Scriptures.

To judge by the opening of his eighth book, Origen thought that this method might not be without efficacy as applied to the spirit or demon that animated Celsus.² He had before this been brought to confess that his own arguments scarcely suffice without the aid of faith divinely implanted in his hearers, and that the worth of his confutations depends on something other than the "wisdom of men."³

The Christians, says Celsus, when they raise objection to the worship of the "demons" on the ground that "no man can serve two masters," are, so far as their thought is concerned, impressing a copy of their own passion on the mind of God.⁴ No doubt there is among men a detraction from the service of one when another is served; and the same competition is conceivable in relation to different heroes or *dæmons*. But with the highest God, who is untouched by injury or grief, there can be none to compete. Rather, in the service of those ministers who must have received their places in the whole by his appointment, he himself also is served. To say otherwise involves the impiety of dividing the kingdom of God and making a sedition, as if there were some party-chief opposed to him in the universe.⁵ For the rest, if they did in fact refuse all honour save to one God, there might be some rational consistency in their unbending attitude; but, as it is, they devote an excessive worship to him who lately appeared, and do not think that in the service of this his minister they commit any fault towards God.⁶ If you should tell them that their founder is not peculiarly the Son of God, but that God is the Father of all, and is alone to be truly worshipped, they would not hear of it. What distinguishes them is not really their high veneration for the Supreme, but their extraordinary magnifying of the founder of their sect.⁷

Origen, in the small portion of his reply which has a philosophical character, admits that properly there can be no grief or injury to God. Worship of God, to the exclusion of other powers, is for the sake of the worshippers, who thus guard against withdrawal from their own highest good.⁸ Here he

¹ vii. 67.

² Cf. vii. 56, viii. 10.

³ Cf. v. 1.

⁴ viii. 2: *νομίζουσι δὲ τοὺς τοῦτο λέγοντας τὸ ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ἀπομάττεσθαι τὸ σφότερον πάθος εἰς τὸν θεόν.*

⁵ viii. 11.

⁶ viii. 12.

⁷ viii. 14.

⁸ viii. 6, 8.

coincides in principle, though not in application, with a defender of the pagan ceremonial cults like the author of the *De Mysteriis*, who agrees with his antagonist Porphyry that observances cannot move the gods, but holds that they bring those who perform them nearer to the divinity. And in speculation, here as on occasion before, the Christian Father admits a kind of polytheism. Subordinate "gods" (*i.e.*, the angels) are spoken of in the Bible; though "all the gods of the nations are demons."¹ On the "demons," he thinks it sufficient to educe from the Scriptures the accepted Christian position. Whence, he inquires, can Celsus prove that honours have been appointed to these as to subordinate powers? If Celsus puts a corresponding question about Jesus, "we shall prove that to be honoured has been given him of God, 'that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father' (John v. 23)." The proof has been furnished through prophecy and miracle.² No worship is withdrawn from the Father, since the Father and the Son are one (John x. 30): and yet there are two "hypostases," of which the second is subordinate to the first.³ Thus the Saviour is not by the Christians (with the exception of a few among the many) regarded as the highest God; for they believe his own saying, "The Father who sent me is greater than I." It is therefore a calumny when Celsus accuses them of subjecting him whom they now call the Father to the Son of God.⁴

We might have taken this for a slightly rhetorical statement by Celsus of the practice of the orthodox Christians as distinguished from their theory; but it is evident from the passage next following⁵ that he had definitely some of the Gnostics in view, who in their formulæ declared the Son of Man greater than the God that rules the world. Origen, as usual, repudiates the "heretics"; but he cannot do this without a recurrence to the unfortunate suggestion that perhaps Celsus did not find the theory, but constructed or added to it. There is nothing whatever in the character of Celsus as revealed in the fragments of his work to justify the ascription to him of fraudulence or indifference to truth. I have no doubt about the complete personal rectitude of both the opponents; but against pious fraud for a good end I think Celsus would have felt stronger moral indignation.

To forms of cult he evidently attached no importance. In the endeavour to understand the scrupulosity of the Christians, he could only conjecture that their avoiding the setting up of altars and statues and temples must proceed from reliance on the policy of holding together as a secret society.⁶ Pure theism does not necessitate their religious separatism. The God who is common to all is good and has need of nothing, and is with-

¹ viii. 3.² viii. 9.³ viii. 12.⁴ viii. 14.⁵ viii. 15.⁶ viii. 17.

out envy. What prevents those who are especially dedicated to him from taking part also in the national festivals? ¹ If the "idols" are nothing, what harm is there in a public feast? If there are any "demons," then it is manifest that they too are of God, and ought to be propitiated in accordance with the laws.²

The religion of the Christians, answers Origen, is too inward and spiritual to permit of their founding external altars and statues and temples. And it seems more reasonable, having regard to the nature of God, to abstain from festivals that trace their beginnings to fabulous stories. If someone should urge that the Christians have holy days of their own, the reply is that the perfect Christian rises above all this symbolism,³ which in its sensible form exists to remind the many of what they might otherwise forget.⁴

If the Christians have some traditional rule (*τι πάτριον*) ⁵ that requires them to abstain from sacrificial meals, then, says Celsus, they ought to abstain from the flesh of all animals, as was the opinion of Pythagoras, because of the honour he paid to the soul and its instruments.⁶ The implication clearly is: such a generalised position would put the particular scruple on the ground of reason and humanity. In answer, Origen proceeds again to quote the Scriptures in order to show what is, or what is not, a divine command. If there is any ground for abstinence apart from revelation, to him it can only be the ascetic ground.⁷ The Christians do not share the opinion of Pythagoras about animal souls, but honour only the rational soul and its instruments.⁸

In the same passage, however, we come upon a curious point of coincidence between the philosophers and the orthodox. If, proceeds Celsus, the Christians abstain for the sake of not joining in a banquet with the demons, "I congratulate them on their wisdom," which consists in a slowness to understand that they are always thus participating. For do not the bread they eat and the wine they drink and the fruits they taste and the very water, and even the air they breathe, come to them from the "demons"? The same argument, with the substitution of "demiurgus" for "demons," was pressed by the Fathers against the Gnostics. Celsus is of course arguing on the basis of what was held in common by Jews, by Christians, and by heathen polytheists, who all alike conceived the powers of the visible world under this personal form. But, Origen replies, the good

¹ viii. 21.

² viii. 24.

³ viii. 22.

⁴ viii. 23.

⁵ Such as the rule of the Essenes.

⁶ viii. 28.

⁷ viii. 30.

⁸ Whatever insight was contained in the distinction between the human and the animal mind which the Christians were appropriating, was of course derived from the Peripatetics and the Stoics, who had made it clear to themselves that conceptual thought is peculiar to man. The true line of psychological advance, however, was to make the dogma not more but less hard-and-fast. Plutarch, Celsus and Porphyry all attempted this.

things mentioned come from the angels of God, not from the powers called demons. From these, which are all evil, come famine and drought and pestilence.¹ He thus gives his adherence to a kind of Persian dualism, as against the extreme pessimism of some Gnostics, who formally declared the whole visible world evil. Later orthodoxy tended to a completer acceptance of the philosophic position that the system of the world is an absolute unity; though this had still to be reconciled with the existence of a devil. By the belief in the devil and his angels Origen is so deeply permeated that he will allow those who, like Celsus, are under their government, and "know not God," to give thank-offerings to demons.² And comparison with other passages shows that this is not mere irony.³

The remainder of the book strongly confirms the view that Celsus was not simply a detached philosopher, but was a practical administrator, probably a Proconsul, like Hierocles, the later opponent of Christianity. His last resource is to try to persuade those who will still, in spite of all argument, adhere to the new faith, not to set themselves in open opposition to public institutions and withdraw wholly from civic life. The danger of a combined attack by the barbarians on the Empire was visible, as indeed it had been to Tacitus.⁴ The spirit to resist, Celsus evidently felt, was departing. Thus he is brought to appeal to the surviving patriotism of the more reasonable Christians to come to the aid of the State against its impending destruction, which threatens to involve philosophy and their own religion in one ruin. Those who have commented on the closing passage have noticed how Origen has cut down the appeal. So far as I can judge, this is the only case in which he

¹ viii. 31.

² viii. 33: καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα δὲ Κέλσος μὲν ὡς ἀγνοῶν θεῶν τὰ χαριστήρια δαίμοσιν ἀποδίδωται.

³ Cf. viii. 34: οὐκ ἀναιροῦμεν οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι δαίμονας ἐπὶ γῆς ἀλλὰ φάμεν εἶναι μὲν αὐτοὺς καὶ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων κακίαν, μηδὲν δὲ δύνασθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἐνδυσταμένους τὴν πανοπλίαν τοῦ θεοῦ. In c. 36 a curious fact is given about foods "tabooed" in the names of the "demons," accompanied by a characteristically naïve explanation.

⁴ See *Agricola*, 12; *Germania*, 33. Consciously or unconsciously, Tacitus brings into proximity with the danger from without a symptom of internal decline. Speaking of voyages to discover the reported "pillars of Hercules" in the northern Ocean, he remarks that "daring was not wanting to Drusus Germanicus, but Ocean stood in the way, both of inquiry into himself and into Hercules. Soon no one any longer made the attempt: it seemed holier and more reverent to believe than to know about the deeds of the gods." (*Germania*, 34.) This was *praeparatio evangelica* in the ancient religion.

One of the last expressions of the passion for exploration in antiquity was Nero's despatch of two centurions to discover the sources of the Nile: see Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.* vi. 8, 3-4. They are thought to have come rather near one source; and I cannot help thinking the severe condemnation passed on Seneca for his compliment at least to the tyrant's intellectual curiosity undeserved.

felt that he could not afford to state his opponent's argument with practical completeness. Substantially he has nothing to reply to the charge of "incivism" against the Christian Church. He probably did not like the attitude himself; for he saw clearly that without the Empire the Church could not have lived; and yet some ground is given for the inference that the conversion of the barbarians after the dissolution of the ancient State was already a not unattractive prospect.

Before his final appeal, Celsus tries to terrify the fanatics, who publicly insult statues and blaspheme the gods,¹ with the vengeance of those "demons" in the reality of whom, we must remember, they firmly believed. Origen, while half conceding that this may have been done by uneducated Christians, declares it contrary to the divine law, which bids us "bless and curse not"; and argues that no Christian could be foolish enough to expect that his impunity after such an act would contribute to destroy the ordinary opinions about the gods. For neither the founders of the impious systems of so-called philosophy that deny providence nor those who embrace their doctrines have suffered any of the things that are thought evil by the multitude. On the contrary, instead of having fallen visibly under the displeasure of heaven, they enjoy health and wealth.

A priest of Apollo or Zeus, says Celsus,² would answer with the verse of the gnomic poet about the "mills of the gods,"³ or with that of Homer applied to the punishment of children's children.⁴ Origen of course knows the philosophic teaching which Celsus, as we see by his putting the appeal to terror in the mouth of a priest, holds in reserve. This teaching he urges against the tone of the appeal. Chastisement is not in the end an evil to be feared, since it is for the good of the punished; and the individual is responsible only for his own sins. To show that this "better" view is the teaching of the Bible, he quotes Ezekiel; adding that the present is not the proper occasion to explain the significance of the "parable" in Exodus about "visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation." Then, to the counter-argument of Celsus, that the God of the Christians did not avenge what was undergone by his Son, he replies that vengeance was taken when Jerusalem was destroyed.⁵

To an enumeration of the benefits conferred by oracles, he opposes similar marvels related in the Scriptures; observing incidentally that the philosophic schools of Democritus and Epicurus and Aristotle have not believed in the Greek stories, but would perhaps have believed in "ours" if they had

¹ viii. 38: εἶτα . . . φησὶ τοὺς Χριστιανοὺς λέγειν· ἰδοὺ παραστὰς τῷ ἀγάλματι τοῦ Διὸς ἢ Ἀπόλλωνος ἢ ὅτου δὴ θεοῦ βλασφημῶ καὶ ραπίζω, καὶ οὐδέν με ἀμύνεται.

² viii. 40.

³ ὅπερ θεῶν ἀλέουσι μύλοι, ἀλέουσι δὲ λεπτά.

⁴ II. xx. 308.

⁵ viii. 42.

witnessed the evident miracles performed by Moses or by some of the prophets or by Jesus himself.¹ And what but miraculous powers could have given the apostles of Jesus, "unlearned and ignorant men," the courage to devote themselves to the preaching of Christianity?²

The mystagogues of other sacred rites, says Celsus, hold out the threat of eternal punishment as you do. Why should we believe your threats more than theirs?³ Origen here again proposes the ethical test. Who is brought to live better by the threatenings? For the rest, the evidence relating to the pagan oracles is nothing compared with that from the fulfilled predictions of Hebrew prophecy.

Approaching now the end, Celsus turns with a final expression of contempt from those who believe they are to rise again for reward or punishment with their bodies, and makes his appeal to the more philosophical, who conceive that which is eternal in them to be the soul or the mind (whatever they choose to call it, spirit or living soul or offspring of a divine and incorporeal nature). With Christians of this kind he can hold discourse.⁴ Perceiving evidently the kinship of their "spiritualist" doctrines to the more mysterious among the teachings of early philosophers, he goes on to cite Empedocles as one of those who declare that men have been banished to a life of wandering in the body, either because this is requisite for the ordering of the whole, or to expiate some ante-natal sin, or through some drag on the soul.⁵ Then, since the "demons" are the guardians of this earthly life, must you not pay deference to them if you wish to live at all, and not forthwith to go out of the world?⁶ The Egyptians, for example, tell of the control such powers exercise over the parts of the human frame.⁷ Yet, on the other hand, "perhaps we ought not to disbelieve wise men," who say that most of the terrestrial demons, being bound to fleshly things, can only hold out to men or cities the prospect of material benefits; whence devotion to them must have its limits, so that we may not become too much attached to the body and forget what is divine.⁸

This concession was adapted to the popular demonology of the Platonists, who were joining with Neo-Pythagorean reformers to oppose animal sacrifices. From those reformers Christians of the higher type, to whom Celsus is now addressing himself, had no doubt derived some positions, as the Essenes are thought to have done earlier. Porphyry, who himself wrote against blood-sacrifice, and urged as a popular argument the demonology

¹ viii. 45.² viii. 47.³ viii. 48.

⁴ viii. 49: τοῖς μὴν γε τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὸν νοῦν (εἴτε πνευματικὸν τοῦτον ἐθέλουσι καλεῖν εἴτε πνεῦμα νοερὸν ἄγιον καὶ μακάριον εἴτε ψυχὴν ζῶσαν εἴτε θείας καὶ ἀσωμάτου φύσεως ἔκγονον ὑπερουράνιον τε καὶ ἀφθαρτον εἶθ' ὃ τι καὶ ὃ τι χαίρουσιν οὐνομάζοντες), τοῖς τούτο ἐλπίζουσιν ἔξεν αἰώνιον σὺν θεῷ, τούτοις διαλέξομαι.

⁵ viii. 53.⁶ viii. 55.⁷ viii. 58.⁸ viii. 60.

here referred to by Celsus, appears to have maintained in his work against the Christians that they had no right to reject in principle what was commanded by the Jewish law. The Christian Father has hardly a glimpse of this difficulty. Any-one, he exclaims triumphantly,¹ who may have thought our position impious when Celsus was theologising on oracles, and we affirmed that they were works of demons, can now see that in the end he is obliged to agree with the Christians, "as if conquered by the spirit of truth."² We can have nothing to do, he reiterates, with the powers that love the reek of sacrifice. And yet service to such a power was just as plainly commanded by the Jewish law as by the laws of "the nations"; though it was opposed in passages of the prophets, as by Greek philosophers and reformers, from Heraclitus³ onward.

To the appeal of Celsus not wilfully to provoke the anger of rulers, who cannot have had assigned to them the government of things here without some dæmonic might, Origen replies partly in language not unworthy of a philosopher, by rejecting all unmanly compliance, and partly by calling to mind that the Christians too have been taught that "the powers that be are ordained of God" (Rom. xiii. 1)⁴ and have been commanded to "honour the king" (1 Peter ii. 17).⁵ They cannot, however, swear by the emperor's fortune; because "fortune" is either nothing but a name, in which case it ought not to be sworn by, or it is actually one of the evil demons. Celsus doubtless remembered that he was addressing Oriental sectaries, for whom the modes of thought that had given birth to the titles of Alexander the son of Ammon, and Ptolemy the Saviour, and Antiochus the God Manifest, and Divus Julius, were not alien; yet he shows no disposition to override the individual conscience, but allows, and even affirms strongly, that all tortures and all deaths ought to be endured in preference to doing or saying anything impious towards God.⁶ But, he says deprecatingly, and as if hoping that æsthetic feeling might count for something, you will show more reverence to God by praising the Sun or by singing a beautiful pæan to Athena, thus going through the manifestations of divinity in detail, than by stopping short at a colourless devotion to the highest.⁷

¹ viii. 62.

² When Celsus suggests as an alternative that it may be better to regard the demons as really in need of nothing and as doing justice without favour, but as pleased with the voluntary offerings of piety, Origen finds that he has slipped back into falsehood under his own wickedness. Then he judiciously concludes: *δοκεῖ δέ μοι συγχεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸν τόπον καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὑπὸ τῶν δαιμόνων ταραττεσθαι, ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ καὶ ἀναιήφων ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπ' ἐκείνοις ἀλογιστίας ἐπ' ὀλίγον τι βλέπειν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.* (viii. 63.)

³ *Fragm. 5* (Diels).

⁴ viii. 65.

⁵ viii. 68.

⁶ viii. 66.

⁷ viii. 66: *ἐὰν δὲ κελεύῃ τις εὐφημῆσαι τὸν Ἥλιον ἢ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν προθυμώτατα μετὰ καλοῦ παιᾶνος εὐφημεῖν, οὕτω τοι σέβειν μᾶλλον δόξεις τὸν μέγαν θεόν, ἐὰν καὶ τοῦσδε ὑμνῆς· τὸ γὰρ θεοσεβὲς διὰ πάντων διεξιόν τελεώτερον γίνεται.*

We have no objection, Origen replies, to praising the Sun, as a creature of God: indeed we do this of our own accord; but, as we flee fables and seek truth, we cannot dissociate Athena (whom some may allegorise into Wisdom),¹ from the manifold adventures of the goddess. Nor may we sing hymns except to God and his only-begotten Son, whom the sun and moon and stars also hymn.

Then, returning to the argument about the respect to be paid to rulers, he quotes the warning of Celsus to the Christians that, in view of their attitude, it is reasonable for the Emperor to take measures against them. "For if all should do the same as you, there will be nothing to prevent his being left alone and deserted, and the things on earth becoming the prey of the most lawless and the wildest barbarians; no fame being left any longer among men either of true wisdom or of your religion."² And, he proceeded, it is no use your saying that if the Romans are persuaded by you, and give up their ancestral laws about things divine and human, your Most High will come down and fight for them. In spite of all the promises you attribute to him, his first worshippers, instead of being lords of the whole earth, are left without a clod or a hearthstone; and you yourselves are in hiding and are sought out to be condemned to death.³ You fancy indeed that you will persuade one set of rulers after another till you have brought all the world under a single authority;⁴ but he who thinks it possible that the inhabitants of Asia and Europe and Africa, that Greeks and barbarians to the ends of the earth, should agree in accepting the same law, knows nothing.⁵ Come and help the Emperor, with all your strength: be his fellow-labourers in administering justice; fight in the army as soldiers and as commanders.⁶ Take part in governing your country.⁷

The extremely fragmentary character of the concluding citations is obvious on the surface. Origen's reply amounts in effect to setting the theocracy over all States alike. "If all should do the same as I," the barbarians will yield themselves to the word of God and be the mildest and most law-abiding of men.⁸ It has been foretold in the prophetic writings that all the nations shall be brought "under one yoke." This, in its full sense, is perhaps not possible for those still in the body; but it is not impossible when they are released from the body.⁹ We help

¹ viii. 67.

² viii. 68.

³ viii. 69. This, it is held, fixes the time of composition of the work of Celsus after 177 (or 176), the date of the rescript of Marcus Aurelius here alluded to; while a reference in c. 71 to "our present rulers" (*οἱ νῦν βασιλεύοντες ἡμῶν*) places it within the time when Commodus was associated in the empire (177-180). (See Koetschau's Introduction, p. 1.)

⁴ viii. 71.

⁵ viii. 72.

⁶ viii. 73.

⁷ viii. 75.

⁸ viii. 68.

⁹ viii. 72: *καὶ τάχα ἀληθῶς ἀδύνατον μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτο τοῖς ἐτι ἐν σώμασι, οὐ μὴν ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀπολυθείσιν αὐτῶν.*

the emperors by praying for them, as we are instructed to do (1 Tim. ii. 1, 2). You do not make the priests of your own temples serve in the army, seeing that they have to keep their hands pure for sacrifice.¹ The Christians, more than all other men, benefit their countries; for they train their fellow-citizens to piety towards the city of God, "taking up into a certain divine and heavenly city those that live well in the least cities."² In each city we have a fatherland of another constitution (*ἄλλο σύνστημα πατρίδος*), founded by the word of God; and we call to government over the churches of God those who are unwilling to rule, but whose fitness we recognise and therefore constrain them.³

Finally, Origen asks Ambrosius whether Celsus fulfilled his promise to write another book, in which he proposed to give instructions to those who were willing to take his advice. If so, he is requested to send it, so that Origen may refute the false doctrine it contains, and at the same time bear witness to the truth of anything that is well said.

It is not entirely because the event is known that readers have been impressed in the concluding passage of Celsus with the consciousness of impending defeat, and throughout the treatise of Origen with his full confidence in victory. As Plutarch said, that from the time of Cæsar the whole drift of things seemed to be to monarchy, so a century or two later it might have been perceived that the drift was to its complement theocracy. Yet, if we look at the present state of the world, we shall find that so far as there is a principle of rational order in it, it has returned to a system much more like that of Celsus than of Origen. Europe was indeed for a time brought under the "one yoke" of the "great Church," whose law, as Origen proclaimed, was to be king to the exclusion of other laws;⁴ but the new reign still left "many unsubdued." In Europe itself the turn of the tide came; and now the Western successors of those who adopted Christianity or had it imposed on them recognise, within limits differing little from those that Celsus and the statesmen of his time would have fixed, the autonomy of local religions. The claim of an authoritative creed to lay down the law within that which it considered its own sphere is repudiated by the principles of legislation. Take for example the government of India, and observe whether it conforms more to the model of Rome in the age of the Antonines or to the ideal of the historic Christian Church.

The doctrine of the "one yoke" is of course still represented. It is cherished by reactionary minds in Europe; and it is embodied in the claims of actual institutions. Of these the Papacy is perhaps alone incurably theocratic, proclaiming an order that is in theory universal, authoritative and revealed.

¹ viii. 73.

² viii. 74.

³ viii. 75.

⁴ v. 40.

Its head is the vicegerent of the anointed priest-king whose phantom, hovering over the world, has held together for ages "the axes and the rods which awe mankind."¹ This ideal, though we call it Asiatic, does not, however, extend over all Asia. Probably starting from Babylonia (at first as the dream of a mild and beneficent universal rule—but the rule of a despot), it moved on the whole westward. It was promoted by the denationalising process carried out by Assyrian kings. It seized the imagination of Persians and of Jews, and took form in systematic religious propaganda. At last it realised itself in the Christian and to a less extent in the Mohammedan religion; in "Holy Wars" for Cross or Crescent, and in the Holy Inquisition. Eastern Asia, though not since then altogether untouched by the movement, has in the meantime preserved its own types which are different. In India, a priestly caste secured for itself the highest social rank; but, being pre-eminently speculative, it maintained philosophic liberty, though its distinctive philosophy began as a mystical development of religion, and hardly at all went through a scientific stage like philosophy in ancient Greece and in modern Europe. The more secular-minded races of China and Japan, while preserving the outward form of a political theocracy—the emperor being held divine—placed the idea of the State and not of a Church uppermost. Geographical extremes therefore in a manner meet. The nations that have emerged from the theocratic order of Christendom into the systematised religious tolerance of modern Europe and its extensions have a certain common ground with those that have stood outside the process and formed themselves on a different model from the beginning.

A kind of "grammar," not of "assent" but of a liberal order, thus appears to be secure. And on a general survey it does not seem likely that the forces of light will be overpowered by the forces of darkness. Still, it is worth while to remind ourselves that the ancient European civilisation, even in its later and on the whole inferior phase, had something which we have not. The theoretical principles to which the men who practically directed affairs openly appealed as the highest, were those of a free philosophy, not of an authoritative creed. Now the unity that may for good and not for evil embrace the world is that which is arrived at in the end by the consensus of the best minds; not a unity imposed in the name of something outside humanity. For the order of the universe, so far as man is concerned, expresses itself, as Celsus may still teach us, through human reason, and not through superhuman beings coming down to live among men.

¹ Of course I refer to the Papacy as a religious institution. The actual Popes have sometimes proved themselves statesmen and "good Europeans."

ORIGEN AS PHILOSOPHER

THE publication of the long-desired critical edition of Origen's most famous work, the *Principles* (Περὶ ἀρχῶν), by the editor of the *Contra Celsum*, Dr. Paul Koetschau,¹ has given me a welcome opportunity of supplementing the preceding essay. In the books against Celsus, as I have come to see more clearly since I wrote the exposition, Origen puts the case for the faithful, using all the arts of the orator; appealing, for example, to Greek supernatural stories in proof of the credibility of the Jewish and Christian stories; but often barely indicating his own real view. The exposition I have occasionally, but not deeply, revised. As it stands I think it gives a correct notion of the merits of the argument on each side. This has on the whole been recognised by theologians, though I did not conceal my own sympathies. Now, however, having dealt with Origen in his character as a polemist on behalf of the rising Church and its dogma against the philosophy of religious comprehension under the Roman State, I desire to do justice to his merits as a thinker. For it is as a thinker, and in some respects a very free thinker, that he appears in what is allowed to be the first systematic attempt at a Christian philosophy.

The fates of Celsus and Origen were strangely alike. Celsus owes the preservation of all that remains of his work to quotations by an opponent for the purpose of refuting him. Origen owes the preservation, not indeed of his work but of its most distinctive positions, at least in their clear statement, to embittered enemies. Some gaps even have been filled up from the record of anathemas pronounced on his doctrines by the Synod held at Constantinople in 543, in response to a letter addressed by the orthodox Emperor Justinian to the Patriarch Mennas. The original work, written in Greek, was left to perish; as was also the accurate Latin translation made by Jerome expressly to prove it heretical and to expose the manipulated version of Rufinus, Jerome's former friend.² A portion indeed of the Greek is preserved (not without

¹ *Origenes Werke*, Bd. v. *De Principiis* (Περὶ ἀρχῶν). Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Kirchenväter-commission der Königl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften von Hofrat Prof. Dr. Paul Koetschau. Leipzig, 1913

² See the quotation from Jerome in the Introduction (p. cxxix): "Duplex in opere meo utilitas fuit, dum et haereticus auctor proditur et non verus interpres arguitur." Rufinus had offended Jerome by unseasonably drawing attention to his appreciation of Origen, whom, after the condemnation in 400 by Theophilus of Alexandria, he wished to repudiate.

demonstrable omissions) in the selection of edifying extracts called *Philocalia* made from Origen's writings by Basil and Gregory Nazianzen. Fragments of Jerome's translation also survive. With the aid of these and other materials (including the anathemas) the work has now been so far reconstructed that there is no ambiguity about any important position maintained in it;¹ but the text as it actually stood cannot be restored. In the edition that we now possess, everything seems to have been done that critical learning can do. From consultation of the previous editions, I had concluded that the ground was too uncertain for anyone who was not himself a philological critic; but now, with the text and notes of the present edition, I feel that I can proceed without risk of serious error.

One doubt in particular has been completely set at rest. For a time I did not feel at all sure that the work had not been tampered with by some of the heterodox—the "advanced Origenists," as I described them to myself—before the time of the orthodox excisions and interpolations. The new edition makes it perfectly clear that this suggestion, made already by orthodox apologists for Origen, and in particular by Rufinus, had nothing in it. The work as now put together is an organic if loosely constructed whole, evidently proceeding from a single mind. And comparison with the *Contra Celsum*, which at first suggested the doubt, most completely resolves it. The *De Principiis*, it is ascertained, was written certainly before 230, probably not long after 220; the *Contra Celsum* dates from 248. The former was deliberately written as an esoteric treatise, and had been an object of attack from the time when, contrary to Origen's desire as is said,² it became public; the latter was decidedly exoteric. Yet the books against Celsus contain slight but sufficient indications that Origen had retracted nothing of his most audacious and peculiar doctrines. He hints at them as the kind of positions held among Christians who (in his own phrase) "philosophise." We should hardly know what they were precisely if we had not the treatise in which he set forth his own philosophy; but, with this before us, his allusions to an esoteric Christianity corroborate at every point the genuineness of the Greek work that was in the hands of Rufinus at the end of the fourth century. The thought has coherence and unity; and, as Origen, being a naturally copious writer, often repeats himself in spite of his effort to condense, Rufinus has allowed passages to remain that quite agree in their

¹ "Ja, man kann behaupten, dass gerade diejenigen Stellen von *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, welche Rufin hatte unterdrücken oder abschwächen wollen, uns in erfreulicher Vollständigkeit und genügend bezeugt vorliegen." (Introduction, pp. lxxxix-xc.)

² Jerome cited by Koetschau (Introduction, p. xix): "Ipse Origenes in epistola, quam scribit ad Fabianum, Romanæ urbis episcopum (a. 236-250), poenitentiam agit, cur talia scripserit, et causas temeritatis in Ambrosium refert, quod secreto edita in publicum protulerit."

drift with the reports of Origen's heterodox opinions now inserted conjecturally at the places where excisions can be inferred.

Substantially the judgments passed on Origen by sticklers for ecclesiastical orthodoxy agree with the judgment of Porphyry cited by Eusebius. Origen, says Porphyry, lived as a Christian, but thought as a Greek under the form of the alien myths.¹ From the Christian side Marcellus of Arcyra, also cited by Eusebius,² says that he began to write too soon after leaving the philosophic schools, and in consequence mixed too much of Plato with the Scriptures. This is evidently quite in harmony with the usual statement that he had been a pupil of Ammonius Saccas, who was giving a new impulse to Platonism at Alexandria, and was afterwards also the chosen teacher of Plotinus. The time of Plotinus of course was long subsequent. Origen was born in 185, Plotinus twenty years later; and the record is that Origen studied philosophy as a youth, whereas Plotinus, though not fresh to philosophy, was in his twenty-eighth year when he became a pupil of Ammonius. The *Principles*, we infer from the dates, had then been written, but it is not in the least likely that Plotinus, who limited his reading to what was necessary, knew the work. Porphyry, as untiring a reader as Origen himself, no doubt read Origen as part of the preparation for his own treatise against Christianity; which, like the Greek original of the *Principles*, has perished. In philosophy, however, in spite of the real community noted from both sides, Origen and the Hellenic Neo-Platonism diverge at the source.

To the common training in the renovated Platonism of the time, the use made both by Origen and by Plotinus of the conception of "emanation" is undoubtedly traceable. This means not a process in time, but the explanation of the lower by the higher through the necessarily reduced "degrees of reality" in which this manifests itself. Thus everything depends on the highest point, which by all is called God. And it is here that the divergence begins. By Plotinus the name of God is not very frequently applied to the first principle; the usual term being that of technical philosophy, "the One." The One is beyond Mind, and from it proceeds that which Plotinus calls creation, with the necessity of a natural process. The "freedom" of individual minds consists in their being realities that count for something in the whole. Without differences not dependent wholly on causes external to each, the individual will could not be what it is. In distinction from this idealistic pantheism, with its subtly determinist theory of freedom in which Plotinus anticipates Kant and Schopenhauer, the doctrine of Origen is a very clearly

¹ Introduction, p. xiii: κατὰ μὲν τὸν βίον χριστιανῶς ζῶν καὶ παρανόμως, κατὰ δὲ τὰς περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ θείου δόξας ἐλληνίζων τε καὶ τὰ Ἑλλήνων τοῖς ὀθνεῖοις ὑποβαλλόμενος μύθοις.

² *Ibid.*, pp. xiii, xiv.

stated pure theism with a naïvely indeterminist conception of free-will. God is personal Mind, creates both other minds and matter out of nothing by volition, and endows created minds with the power of undetermined choice. Matter, though defined much like the Aristotelian or Neo-Platonic matter as "without quality," is a substance distinct from minds. When we consider the questions at the summit, therefore, Origen presents himself as an orthodox theist and dualist of a type scarcely fixed with more exactitude by Christian Scholasticism. Whence then came his reputation for heterodoxy? And why must we recognise that on one side he was in reality a "Greek," thinking under the forms of Christian myth?

The reply is that, while he diverges from the Neo-Platonists in the type of his metaphysico-theological thought, he is at one with them in his general conception of the history of souls and in the type of imaginative construction by which he solved the problem of theodicy as traditionally understood in the Greek schools. For him as for them the soul is immortal in the sense of pre-existence as well as survival; its sin was an ante-natal "fall" from divine contemplation, and is to be expiated and in the end healed by experiences in the body, perhaps in many lives; and there is no final state of reprobation for any soul. Nor is there, when his theory is ultimately thought out, any final state of beatitude; although there is a consummation of the ages at the end of great periods of the universe. Bruno quite correctly inferred this from what he knew of Origen; finding that his doctrine more radically excluded any term to metamorphosis than that of Plotinus. This, however, is not precisely the difference. It is that for Plotinus there is only one world, which continually exists as a whole that remains always in general aspect like itself, the consummation being attained only by individual souls,—not indeed asserted to have attained a finally stable condition, as Bruno thought; while for Origen there are innumerable worlds in time, successively created as residences for immortal souls and successively passing into a more "spiritual" state as they reach their limit of perfection; till again the whole process of lapse and recovery is renewed, though with no exact repetition as in the successive worlds of the Stoics, yet with ever-varying metamorphoses (as Bruno rightly said) to infinity. Than this, expressed though it is under the Christian form of a mythology of angels and evil "demons" nothing could be more Greek, if to be Greek means to follow the ancient tradition, for which there was no first or last state of the world in time.

Having given this preliminary statement, I proceed to the more circumstantial account of the work itself, which is divided into four books, the subjects of which have been summed up as (1) God, (2) The World, (3) Freedom, (4) Revelation. The last

forms a kind of appendix, going over the ground again with some slight additions, the philosophical treatment being substantially completed at the end of the third book. We may congratulate ourselves that Origen did not put the book on the interpretation of the Scriptures first, as some theologians have thought that he should have done; for in reality his philosophy is prior to the texts from which he professedly educes it.

If, says Koetschau, the whole of Jerome's translation were extant, then, without more of the Greek than we possess, an attempt might be made to restore the original. With the version of Rufinus this is impossible; for it is careless, incompetent, and actually falsified by omissions and insertions. Jerome's was a much better translation, both because Jerome was a more accomplished scholar and because he meant to extenuate nothing. Perhaps, however, he himself would not have regretted its loss when it had done its work in helping to give Origen his reputation in the West as a heretic; for he was very angry that a copy of it should have been surreptitiously taken. Origen, we may be sure, in spite of his apparently similar complaint, would have desired that his thought should be known as accurately as possible, not indeed to the multitude but to a kind of spiritual aristocracy of adepts. To his esoteric Christianity he must have felt, in transcribing some of his extracts from Celsus on the more "spiritual" Christians, that the enemy of the new dogma would have had little or no objection. By one with the requisite dramatic power, an interesting Dialogue of the Dead might be written in which the two opponents, after the long lapse of the Christian centuries, meet and find that they are not far from agreement. Indeed some of Origen's own objections to the popular Christianity of his time are fundamentally those of Celsus himself, and are only evaded by the Alexandrian device of allegorical interpretation, which Celsus knew but thought absurd, at least as applied to the Jewish and Christian Scriptures.

All that can be said in favour of Rufinus is that in his prefaces (to the first and third books) he has told us his own method. And perhaps a more faithful translation would not in any case have been allowed to reach us. Neither excuse is valid for the translator into English of Kant's *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, who gave no hint, even general, of his procedure, but, while showing himself a competent scholar, artfully suppressed or disguised the carefully marked reserves of Kant as to the existence of any basis whatever for the Gospel-story in historical fact. As the translation (by J. W. Semple) dates from 1838, and Strauss's *Leben Jesu* from 1835, it has occurred to me that this may account for the unscrupulous treatment of those particular passages. Strauss's elaborate analysis of the Gospels, with the result of explaining their details from myth, may have revealed the significance of Kant's pointed

refusal to commit himself even to the barest skeleton of a story, which seems mostly to have escaped the attention of philosophical students.

Origen's attitude to the sacred book was of course not that of a modern Biblical critic. He unreservedly accepts as divine revelation the Old and New Testaments with the "apostolical" and the ecclesiastical tradition.¹ Yet for the few competent he claims a large freedom. Much has by the ecclesiastical tradition been left undetermined; and this it is his object to investigate.

For example, it is part of the ecclesiastical doctrine that the world was created from nothing; but in the formulation of the doctrine it is not determined what was before the world or what will be after it.² Again, it is open to investigation whether that which the Greeks call "incorporeal" (*ἀσώματον*) is designated in the Scriptures: admittedly the word is not there.³ At what time the angels were created, and whether the sun and moon and stars are animated, has also not been determined.⁴ Therefore Origen, like so many liberal thinkers in the Church after him, does his best to find in the Scriptures an encouragement to the exercise of the intellect. "Inluminare vobis lumen scientiae."⁵

In one respect the polemic of Origen runs parallel with that of Neo-Platonism, though his interest is dogmatic instead of scientific. For Plotinus the very centre of his systematic teaching was the critical refutation of the Stoic materialism; and it was from this centre that he carried the Platonic idealism to a higher degree of metaphysical precision. For Origen the problem is to prove to those who, like Tertullian, had found a kind of materialism to be supported by the words of the Bible, that "the letter" can be interpreted as metaphor and so is not incompatible with the assertion that the highest existences are incorporeal. How effective the polemic of the Platonising Fathers has been may be realised by anyone who will consider the easy acceptance by a modern mind of the saying that "God is a spirit," as the purest expression of belief in an incorporeal Deity, and will then contrast with this the difficulty experienced by Origen. For to him as to his contemporaries, educated or uneducated, the words meant primarily "God is a breath," and he could not deny that at first sight their effect was to support those believers in a material Deity of whom Celsus was so scornful. His method is to argue that expressions like "fire" or "breath," when applied in

¹ *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, i. Praef. 2: "illa sola credenda est veritas, quae in nullo ab ecclesiastica et apostolica traditione discordat."

² Praef. 7.

³ Praef. 9.

⁴ Praef. 10.

⁵ Hosea, x. 12. Origen evidently used the Septuagint, which has: *φωτίσατε ἑαυτοῖς φῶς γνώσεως*. The Vulgate and the English Versions (Authorised and Revised), which, I suppose, render the Hebrew more accurately, have nothing about enkindling the light of knowledge. "Innovate vobis novale," "Break up your fallow ground," are the words of the corresponding clause.

Scripture to the Deity, indicate by means of material imagery what Greek philosophy called incorporeal mind.¹ By his successors this mode of appropriation was applied to the later developments of Platonism also; so that, with a certain difference in the terms, the last form taken by the Greek psychology became the authorised theory of the Church.

Another development parallel to Neo-Platonism is that which concerns the doctrine of the Trinity. For although the Neo-Platonic and the Christian Trinity have, as it has been put, little more in common than a name, similarities in dialectical method bring about similarities in formulation. Origen is at an early point in ecclesiastical history, before usage has become fully determinate. Modern Catholic writers therefore might seem to have a fair apologetic case for their view that he is not to be tied down too strictly to the apparent "subordinationism" in his doctrine of the Trinity. I can only say that to me this term seems to describe it correctly. It is "subordinationist" in the sense of Neo-Platonic emanation. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit for Origen belong to the region of "intelligibles," of incorporeal existences, like the One, Mind and Soul; therefore also, as with Neo-Platonism, while they succeed one another in an order described as "causal," there is no sequence of one to another in time. Son and Spirit for Origen coexist eternally with the Father, just as Mind and Soul for Plotinus coexist with the One which produces them. The unquestionable difference is that for Origen all are personal, while for Plotinus personality begins only with particular souls. The disputed point is whether it is compatible with Origen's teaching to say that they are co-equal, as in the fully-formulated Catholic doctrine of the Trinity. I really do not see how their coequality can be reconciled with his repeated expressions, especially as now filled in from other sources at the places where they were suppressed by Rufinus. They seem to suggest for Son and Spirit just such successively reduced degrees of reality (or, as Origen said, of "truth") and of causal efficacy as was attributed by Neo-Platonism to Mind and Soul compared with the One. The Son, he says, has in relation to us the truth of an image of the Father, but is not, in relation to the Father, a true or adequate image.² Again, the Saviour is the image of the goodness of God, but is not the Good itself.³ The Father comprehends himself more fully than he is comprehended by the Son.⁴ The creative or productive activity of the Father extends to all things; that of the Son to rational beings; that of the Spirit only to the rational beings that are also "sanctified."⁵ Both Son and Spirit, according to a probable reconstruction, are called "creatures" (*κτίσματα*).⁶ The "subordinationism" is

¹ Bk. i. 1.

² i. 2, 6, pp. 36, 37, with notes.

³ i. 2, 13, pp. 46, 47, with notes.

⁴ iv. 4, 8, pp. 359, 360, with notes.

⁵ i. 3.

⁶ i. 3, 3, p. 52 note; Rufinus falsifies; cf. iv. 4, 1, p. 349, note.

completed in a passage where the power of the Holy Spirit, which is less than that of the Father and the Son, is said to be greater than that of the other sanctified beings.¹ This offers a parallel to the hierarchies of minds and souls, following the general Mind and Soul, in the system of Proclus.

On one point where Scripture would have left him free, Origen already feels himself committed to a dogma which from the time when it was formulated became distinctively that of the Judæo-Christian tradition. For creation purely and simply out of nothing, as held against all the philosophic schools, it is true that he refers in general terms to the Scriptures, but his most definite authority is the *Shepherd* of Hermas,² a book of the second century which he acknowledges to be uncanonical.³ The dogma applies to minds as well as to matter. Yet for him ultimately there is no first act of creation. There were acts in the past to which no limit can be set; there was always a world,⁴ a new one replacing each that perishes; and minds, once created, unlike matter, never perish. Thus it requires some subtlety to distinguish his position from the assertion that there are uncreated forms of minds (*νόες*), ascribed to him by adversaries. He does, however, always expressly declare minds also to have been created from nothing. They were all created equal, and all fell, by the exercise of their free-will (*τὸ αὐτεξούσιον*), to the state of "souls" or animating principles of bodies. The cause of the fall, as in the Platonic myth, is weariness of contemplating the divinity. They are fallen to different degrees; angels being the least fallen. Human souls occupy an intermediate position between angels and dæmons. For all rational natures all possibilities of mutation always remain open.⁵ By his enemies Origen was accused of teaching that lapse from the life of reason may have for its consequence transmigration into the bodies of irrational animals;⁶ but, though Rufinus demonstrably suppressed passages on this subject,⁷ I take the developments of the thought to be dialectical and tentative only.⁸ Origen merely held such transmigration

¹ i. 3, 5, pp. 55, 56. The "heretical" position is given in full from the letter of Justinian to Mennas.

² i. 3, 3. In ii. 1, 5, the Second Book of Maccabees is added, and (with some doubt) a psalm.

³ Cf. iv. 2, 4.

⁴ i. 2, 10: "ut omnipotens ostendatur deus, omnia subsistere necesse est."

⁵ i. 6, 3. This position is quite clear even from what Rufinus gives.

⁶ i. 4, 1, p. 64, with notes.

⁷ Cf. i. 8, 4, pp. 102-105, with notes.

⁸ This kind of development is certainly not infrequent with Origen; so that the whole has to be kept well in view in trying to state fairly his positions. That hero of Catholicity, Athanasius, made use of the dialectical character of his method to defend his orthodoxy—or to use him as an authority for that which was to become orthodoxy: *ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ζῆτῶν καὶ γυμνάζων ἔγραψε, ταῦτα μὴ ὡς αὐτοῦ φρονούντος δεχέσθαι τις.* (Introduction, p. xvi.) I cannot, however, agree with the modern successors of

to be a possible mode of punishment as an alternative to becoming dæmons. All punishments have for their end ultimate restoration.

The system of which this is a brief summary appears to Origen the only one consistent with the justice of a creative God. Were the various orders of rational beings, he asks, always in their present ranks, or did they reach their positions through merit and demerit? His answer is that, since the view first suggested would require that the dæmons hostile to the good should also have been made necessarily such from the beginning, and this is inadmissible, the opinion must be accepted for all alike that the positions resulted from the voluntary use made of reason. All were created from nothing and endowed with free-will, and consequently had the equal possibility of becoming on the one hand seraphim or cherubim and on the other hand of falling to the lowest depth like Satan and his angels.¹ From the fall of some souls follows the necessity of redemption, because it could not be part of the divine plan that souls once created should perish for ever.² The dæmons may repent, expiate their sins in human bodies, and again become angels.³ An equal possibility of the contrary movement remains for those that have reached the highest point of virtue and glory. To be immaculate by nature and wholly free from the material embodiment that comes from the fall belongs only to the Trinity. The sun, moon and stars are animated by souls not immaculate (Job xxv. 5) enclosed in those bodies because of a fall, and, like other souls, to be redeemed by the Saviour (Rom. viii. 20 ff.).⁴ These souls, like the rest, were created before their bodies were made for them.⁵ Like the angels, they are of the higher order of created beings; but this, as Origen again and again insists, is not an intrinsically predestined order, as was held by some Gnostics. Just as the dæmons are capable of good and of ultimate return from the extreme of wickedness, so apostles and prophets are subject to temptation and capable of evil; as is illustrated by Paul's persecution of the Christians and by Peter's denial of Christ.⁶ That Origen finds the invisible powers to whom was committed the regulation of the chosen people not remote in character from the "demons" of the Gentiles is shown by a passage which, in

Athanasius that, in case of discrepancy, what Origen wrote for the mass of the faithful must be regarded as his real opinion, and what he wrote for the few as no more than dialectical exercise. Indeed in replying to Celsus he hints the opposite.

¹ i. 5.

² i. 2, 4.

³ i. 6, 3, p. 83, with notes.

⁴ i. 7. This peculiar doctrine, treated as heterodox because it took over the animation of the heavenly bodies from the Greek philosophical religion, furnishes, in the development it receives from Origen, an interesting example of his "spiritual" use of the Scriptures.

⁵ i. 7, 4.

⁶ i. 8, 2.

relation to the *Contra Celsum*, throws interesting light on his real view about the Jewish sacrificial cult; for here he himself speaks of "the angels of the Jews" as delighting, like the demons, in blood and the smoke of incense because they too are fallen beings.¹

These speculations concerning God and immaterial existences, developed in the first book, are applied in the second to the world; but no one can help being struck by the very slight interest of physical science for Origen as compared with his Neo-Platonic contemporaries to whom the world as figured by astronomy seemed always present. Yet, without too much of paradox, perhaps something might be found here of gain as well as loss. His vaguer language, with his complete repudiation of exactly repeated cycles, in a manner prefigures the new and larger conceptions that came in after the break in culture. No one will be surprised that Jerome finds in his hypotheses more of Gentile philosophy than of Christian simplicity.

The cause of variety in the world for Origen is the fall of souls.² The world is one system as being ruled by one Deity. He does not depart from the philosophical view in regarding it as one animated whole; but he remains a thorough dualist; his world could not be called a manifestation, a "theophany," like that of Erigena; it is a system of created things governed by a supreme will and subordinate wills. Matter is the means towards change and variety. It was created simply to be an instrument for souls in accordance with the requirements of the state to which each had fallen. A question which, from his dualist point of view, preoccupies Origen is, Will matter ever be destroyed? ³ The result of his avowedly tentative discussions presents itself to me as follows.⁴ There is a series of great world-periods, each including many successive worlds or "ages," themselves grouped within their great period into many "ages of ages." Matter is created from nothing at the beginning of each great period and destroyed at the end. Souls once created are not only permanent through all the "ages," but go on to the new great periods. It is for their sake that matter is created again at the beginning of each new period; for there can never be cessation of their power of choice, and from this it results that there must be new lapses with new introduction of variety, for which matter is needed as the ground. The particular body of each rational soul, according to this view, is dissolved to be replaced by a new body when it again descends. Neither in the new worlds nor in the series of these nor in the new great periods is there repetition of an identical order. The changed orders within the great period seem to be

¹ i. 8, 1, p. 97. This is part of a reconstructed passage, but it is not an isolated expression of opinion, as will be seen later.

² ii. 1, 1.

³ ii. 2. Cf. i. 6.

⁴ For details, see especially ii. 3.

conceived as due to transpositions of body in unknown modes. For the consummation itself, three possible hypotheses are stated, (1) subsistence of separable souls without matter; (2) change of gross matter into ether; (3) migration of perfected souls to higher spheres.¹ The first hypothesis cannot refer to a state that is for ever, since Origen holds that no intellectual essence except the Trinity can endure without material substance. A conclusion that would reconcile his various utterances is that, the other stages of progress to perfection having been passed through (the etherealisation of matter having come at the last stage), absolute separability of the soul is attained at the final consummation, the "restitution of all things"; but that this (the ἀποκατάστασις) is not, as some have supposed, an end after which there is to be no change, but a limit with no distinguishable existence marked by an interval of time. Beyond the stage of "etherealised" matter, the separable existence without matter is only the transition to a new great period through the new fall that succeeds the attainment of perfection. Thus, as Origen says clearly, the end and the beginning are identical; and, as he indicates more obscurely, the beginning, even after the universal restitution in which all souls are redeemed and made perfect, is ever renewed.²

From Origen's opinion, incidentally expressed, about the sacrifices prescribed in the Jewish Law, no hostility to the Old Testament is to be inferred. For him the meaning underlying the apparent prescription of a ritual was symbolic and only to be understood by those who could penetrate to the inner "spiritual" sense. It is not that he disbelieved in angels and demons who could confer benefits and inflict injuries for obedience or neglect; but,—in this agreeing exactly with Celsus and Porphyry,—he held the supreme God to be above propitiation by any external cult. The God of the Old Testament, however, he does not doubt to be both the supreme God and the Creator of the world; whence he is in opposition to the anti-Jewish Gnostics, who would not admit that the wrathful Jehovah of the Jews could be the same as the Heavenly Father of the New Testament. Secure in the possession of the "spiritual" key to both Testaments, he proceeds to make counter-criticisms on the Parables of the Gospels, where also, as he shows, the Father is represented as angry.³

Some of the Gnostics distinguished between the merely "just" God of the Old Testament and the "good" (or benevolent) God of the New. Origen acutely replies by citing, among other things, the parable in which the guest who had not on a wedding-garment

¹ ii. 3, 7.

² This interpretation seems to be established by a fragment from Maximus Confessor (Introduction, p. cxxiv): *ὅτι αἰὲν πῶσις καὶ ἀνάκλισις καὶ μετάνησις τῶν οὐρανίων γίνεται νοῶν, ὡς φησὶν Ὁριγένης. . . . καὶ μετὰ βραχεία ἐπάγει λέγων· Μετὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πάσι τέλος πάλιν ἀπόρρευσις καὶ κατὰπτωσις γίνεται.*

³ ii. 4.

is cast into outer darkness, although good and bad alike had been expressly invited from the highways (Matt. xxii. 9. 13).¹ What kind of God, he asks, does the King in this parable represent? ² On the other hand, was the God of the Old Testament even just when he visited the sins of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation? Believing firmly as he does in the inspiration of the sacred book regarded as a single document, he finds the denial by Ezekiel (xviii. 2, 3) that this is the divine law sufficient to prove that the law of Moses is allegorical. Divine forgiveness of the worst offenders, he goes on, is preached in the Old Testament, as in the New. Justice is not inconsistent with benevolence. Punishment is part of the divine plan, and is never for mere vengeance. In fact, with other illustrations, his theodicy is identical in spirit with that of Proclus, whose use of Homer is very like Origen's use of the Bible. Both, of course, were continuing and refining on the interpretations of older allegorists.

The Incarnation of Christ is for Origen different in degree rather than in kind from what takes place in others.³ Jesus was an individual soul pre-eminently united by love to the Word or Wisdom of God. Christ is the name of the composite being.⁴ In Christ as in others Origen distinguishes "spirit" from "soul." The spirit (πνεῦμα) of Scripture he identifies with the mind (νοῦς) of Greek philosophy. Soul (ψυχή) in relation to this signifies an inferior state of being. Pre-existent mind lapses into the soul that animates a body, to be restored again to the condition of mind. The "soul" of the Saviour is spoken of in the Gospel where some passion or trouble is indicated. To the Father he commends not his "soul" but his "spirit" (Luke, xxiii. 46).⁵ This psychology of soul and spirit does not seem to have been objected to. The passages mutilated by Rufinus are those that describe minds as pre-existent and the whole material world as subsequent to their fall and created to be instrumental to them in their state of lapsed souls.⁶ What, in Origen's view, seems to correspond in

¹ ii. 5, 2.

² At the end of the preceding chapter (ii. 4, 4) an earlier verse of this parable (Matt. xxii. 7) is glanced at, though apparently displaced in Origen's memory and assigned to another (Luke xix. 14, cf. 27), about burning up with fire the city of the men that had rejected the king.

He does not omit to quote the words addressed to the disciples: "Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the Kingdom of God: but unto them that are without, all these things are done in parables: that seeing they may see, and not perceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest at any time they should be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them" (Mark iv. 11, 12).

³ ii. 6, 6. This position is quite clear in the *Contra Celsum*, from which a parallel passage (iii. 28) is cited by the editor in a note (p. 145).

⁴ ii. 6, 4, p. 144: "anima cum verbo dei Christus efficitur." Justinian finds here the heresy "that the Lord was a mere man" (p. 143, note). Even in the *Contra Celsum*, Origen formally rejected the paradox that God the Word (the θεός λόγος) suffered.

⁵ ii. 8, 4.

⁶ See especially pp. 159-161.

the case of Jesus Christ to the lapse of the soul is a voluntary "emptying himself" of divine perfections in order to become a redeemer of other souls.¹

A point of contact with some modern formulations of theism is Origen's definite and reasoned denial that God is infinite. In the beginning God created as many minds, or intellectual essences, as he had power to set in order. For we must not hesitate to say that the power of God is finite. Infinite power could not think itself, for the infinite is by its nature incomprehensible.² Being good and just, he created all equal. Inequality, Origen again argues, had its source in the free-will of creatures. To rebut the determinism of certain Gnostics (Marcionites, Valentinians and Basilidians) who on the ground of the Pauline "election" (one vessel to honour, another to dishonour) maintained that ranks of beings were created intrinsically different from the beginning, he brings in the theory of pre-existence. It is true that Esau and Jacob had done nothing in this life to deserve their election, which so far was independent of any merit or demerit on their part; but it was not independent of the use they had made of the power of self-determination in their ante-natal lives.³ Origen, however, does not commit himself to the view that fortune in this life is strictly proportioned to the merit acquired in others; some of higher merit are ordained to "have compassion" and to devote their service to inferiors.

Origen's doctrine of the "resurrection" (*ἀνάστασις*), to which we next come, is in reality a doctrine of reincarnation. Against those philosophers and heretics who denied that there is any resurrection of the body as distinguished from the immortality of the soul, he sets forth a theory of which opponents had a very confused notion, but which can be made out from Rufinus with the aid of the *Contra Celsum*. Associated with the pure soul is a certain λόγος (translated *ratio*) of the body,—a law or form in accordance with which, in the conditions of another world or a new state of the universe, an appropriate physical organism can be built up suitably to the past life of the soul. This theory, ostensibly derived from the Pauline idea of the "spiritual body."

¹ Cf. iv. 4, 5, with notes, pp. 355, 356.

² ii. 9, 1: *ἐὰν γὰρ ᾗ ἀπειρος ἡ θεία δύναμις, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴδὲ ἑαυτὴν νοεῖν τῇ γὰρ φύσει τὸ ἀπειρον ἀπερίληπτον*. This, which is taken from the letter of Justinian to Mennas, is half translated by Rufinus in such a way as to apply it only to the creation and not to the Creator. The note to the passage (p. 164) makes plain the mis-statement.

Origen's theism has in common with Bruno's pantheism the Platonic denial of "the envy of God." For Bruno the universe is necessarily infinite because God is infinite. For Origen the universe is finite because God is finite. According to the teaching of the Catholic Church, with its mediation between antitheses, an infinite God created this particular finite world, having it in his power to create a better. It was worth while that the world should exist, but it is not the best possible world.

³ ii. 9, 7.

own good is included in the end; and this not for a single life but for immortality.¹ It is as when a disease has to be made worse by the physician before it can be cured,—precisely the illustration used by Proclus when he explains the words of the poet about the breaking of the truce between Greeks and Trojans through the impulse of a goddess “hardening the heart” of a Trojan hero: the deity worked by his means not only for the good of the whole but for the ultimate cure by punishment of what was in him till then only a latent disposition. So for Origen the ultimate salvation of Pharaoh is part of the providential order.²

To explain apparent anomalies the doctrine of pre-existence is again brought in. The lots of Esau and Jacob, as the Apostle says (Rom. ix. 11), were determined apart from merit in this life; but it does not follow that they were determined apart from merit in previous lives. Even without the aid of Jerome’s attacks on Origen’s heresy, the doctrine could be made out from the chapter we are dealing with; and it is to be noted that Rufinus has preserved in his translation an important passage, omitted by the editors of the Greek, in which there occurs one of Origen’s many assertions that in the infinite course of time all changes of rank are possible for all souls in the universe. Beginning with small faults unamended, human souls may sink to be demons; and demons through a long course of discipline may return to be angels.³ According to the interpretation of Jerome, “Gabriel and the Devil, Paul and Caiaphas, virgins and prostitutes,” will in some future world-cycle change places.⁴

A dissertation on diabolic powers⁵ is more rationalising in spirit than might have been expected from the *Contra Celsum*. Of course Origen asserts the existence of such powers. That is an essential part of his system, as indeed the activity of evil demons was not denied by Celsus. But, as in a passage already referred to,⁶ he draws no superstitious distinction between deeds of blood commanded by supernatural beings among the Jews and among other nations. Apparently in his view it was some inferior angel that told Abraham to sacrifice Isaac: it was such a power that tried to kill Moses (Ex. iv. 24). A protest follows against the notion of the simpler believers that all the sins com-

¹ iii. 1, 13, p. 218: θεὸς γὰρ οἰκονομεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς οὐχ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φέρ' εἰπεῖν πενηκονταετίαν τῆς ἐνθάδε ζωῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς τὸν ἀπέραντον αἰῶνα· ἀφθαρτον γὰρ φύσιν πεποίηκε τὴν νοερὰν καὶ αὐτῷ συγγενῇ, καὶ οὐκ ἀποκλείεται ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα ζωῆς ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ τῆς θεραπείας.

² iii. 1, 14.

³ iii. 1, 23, p. 242. Jerome’s translation of this is extant also, but I give the last sentence from the translation of Rufinus: “Ex quo opinamur, quoniam quidem, sicut frequentius diximus, immortalis est anima et aeterna, quod in multis et sine fine spatiis per immensa et diversa saecula possibile est, ut vel a summo bono ad infima mala descendat, vel ab ultimis malis ad summa bona reparetur.”

⁴ i. 6, notes at pp. 80, 84.

⁵ iii. 2.

⁶ i. 8, 1.

mitted by men are due to temptations of the Devil and his angels. Origen proceeds to show that the soul's mere existence with a body in the life on earth is sufficient to account for temptations,—that is, for disordinate desires,—even if there were no evil spirits. Thus he approaches the Platonist theory of Celsus about matter as the cause of evil, which in his apologetic work he treats as shallow because neglectful of supernatural causes. Finally, dealing with the language of Scripture on contentions with invisible principdoms, he argues that this does not refer to a warfare of all men at all times with all the legions of darkness together, but only to combats of particular persons at special times against particular powers.

On the "wisdom of this world," Origen takes up, for a Christian thinker of his time, a liberal position. Certain supernatural powers of inferior order, yet not malevolent, have, he is inclined to think, inspired the knowledge of astronomy and other sciences among Chaldeans, Egyptians and Greeks; just as the founders of the various philosophical sects desired to teach others what they themselves thought true.¹ The oracles and verse of the Greeks are apparently, in Origen's opinion, distinguished by the "insanity" which Democritus and Plato (not mentioned by name) found to be a condition of genuine poetry.² This indicates possession by some dæmonic power, whereas the divinely inspired prophet retains his rational free-will.³

The language of Scripture about the striving of the flesh against the spirit, we learn from one disquisition,⁴ had raised among early Christian thinkers the question whether by "the flesh" is meant the mere material body or another soul opposed to the higher soul. Origen, I think, held that the soul must be regarded as unitary, but that it may become "carnal" through turning more to the material body, or "spiritual" by turning to God. He discusses the question, however, in a tentative way; recognising the difficulty that the body, if a dead thing, did not seem to furnish any explanation of feeling. Still it remained for him a dead thing, apart from government by will. There is no desertion of the animism with dualism adopted as the orthodox Christian metaphysic. In a later passage⁵ a suggested outlet is even refused. Matter, as we have seen, must be a substance opposed to mind and created from nothing. To call it, with Neo-Platonism, a kind of "not-being" necessarily correlative with God or

¹ iii. 3, 3. Light is thrown on the rather obscure passage by a condemnatory judgment cited (p. 259, note) from Theophilus of Alexandria which may refer to it: "ex quo perspicuum est eum idololatriam et astrologiam et varias Ethnicorum fraudulentæ divinationis præstigias approbare."

² iii. 3, 3, p. 259: "Denique quam plurimi Graecorum opinati sunt artem poeticam sine insaniam non posse constare."

³ iii. 3, 4, p. 261: "sicut exemplo sunt omnes vel prophetae vel apostoli, qui divinis responsis sine ulla mentis obturbatione ministrabant."

⁴ iii. 4.

⁵ iv. 4, 6-8.

the One, and only "created" in this sense, would not at all satisfy the dogma.¹ This precise position, indeed, was not yet in view, but the suggestion is glanced at only to be dismissed that the "corporeal nature" is no other thing than its qualities.² It is not enough for Origen that the qualities should be said to exist by the Will of God. There must be a matter in itself which is substance without qualities, made by divine volition simply from nothing.

To the penultimate chapter of the third book, the rather misleading title is assigned, "That the world has a temporal beginning and end."³ Origen, it is true, asserts that this world began and will end, founding his doctrine on the Scriptures; but he also undoubtedly asserts, here as elsewhere, successive worlds before and after without limit. It must be admitted that the argument is not very logically carried through. Everything, he says, that can be comprehended by a mind, even by God's mind, must have a beginning and an end: therefore the world must have a beginning and an end.⁴ But can it be supposed that God was inactive before he made the world? The answer is that it cannot, but that he made other worlds in the past, as he will make more in the future.⁵ The puzzle regarding the infinite past series of events has thus been touched only to be unconsciously evaded.

A more elaborate Christology completes the doctrine of the fall of souls and of their final restoration. Christ is the last and greatest of the revealers that have been sent into the world not because they had fallen but for the sake of others. Among the servants of mankind, some are said to have come willingly, some unwillingly. Of those that came unwillingly seem to have been the souls of the sun and moon and stars.⁶ "Subjection" of enemies, spoken of by Paul, means restoration of those that were lost.⁷ As Origen had said earlier,⁸ the enemies of God are in the end to be made subject to him in the sense in which his saints are subject.

In the last chapter,⁹ I find only one new point, namely, that in the consummation of the world irrational animals are to disappear along with lifeless things.¹⁰

The topic of the fourth book, as has been mentioned, is the inspiration of the Scriptures. Not much remains to add from it to the account of Origen's philosophy. I have made use of it to supplement the preceding exposition, and now give only a few points not yet incorporated.

¹ Cf. iv. 4, 6: "omni genere abnuimus ingenitam vel infectam dici debere materiam."

² iv. 4, 7: "nihil aliud esse naturam corpoream quam qualitates."

³ iii. 5: "Ὅτι γενητός ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρτός ἀπὸ χρόνου ἀρξάμενος," "Quod mundus ex tempore coeperit."

⁴ iii. 5, 2.

⁵ iii. 5, 3.

⁶ iii. 5, 4, pp. 274, 275, with notes.

⁷ iii. 5, 7.

⁸ Cf. i. 6, 1.

⁹ iii. 6: *Περὶ τέλους*, "De Consummatione Mundi."

¹⁰ iii. 6, 2.

We have already met more than once with the polemic against the Gnostics. Here it is continued; but Origen has also something to say to the Catholics. The simpler sort, he observes, of those who boast that they are "of the Church" have escaped the error of the anti-Jewish Gnostics, who deny that the "demiurge," or God of the Old Testament, is the supreme God; but, through literal acceptance of what is written about him, they attribute to him such things as would not be attributed even to the most cruel and unjust of men.¹ When not debating with an antagonist, he has no more scruple in dismissing as absurd the story of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden than he has in his reply to Celsus in pouring scorn on the legend of Pandora which he transcribes from Hesiod. In debate, it must be said, both antagonists are inequitable to one another's myths, reserving the right to allegorise only their own.

As we have seen before, Origen is fairer than the ancient Gnostics and many moderns in holding the balance between the Old and the New Testament. In the case of the latter as of the former, if a narrative, or even a precept, taken literally, offends the reason or the moral sense, he says so plainly. Perhaps he had been taught by the experience of his own rashness. Where he gives examples of precepts he holds to be right in the literal as well as in the spiritual sense, Rufinus, whom we can here check by the Greek, modifies the selection with gratuitous faithlessness. Omitting the exhortation not to be angry with one's brother without a cause (Matt. v. 22) he interpolates the declaration (Matt. v. 28), which Origen has not included, that the feeling of "concupiscence" is equivalent to adultery.² In the preceding section, he suppresses Origen's rather contemptuous query, implying that this was usually taken along with the next precept in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v. 29): "Who, charging himself with looking on a woman to desire her, would reasonably, ascribing the cause to the right eye alone, pluck this out?" Instead he interpolates: "Or who, laying hands upon himself, will be held free from the extremity of guilt?"³

Some sections variously mutilated by the editors of the *Philocalia* and by Rufinus seem to have contained an attempt to derive from interpretation of the ethnic names, Israel, Egypt, Babylon, as referring to certain "spiritual" races, a theory of alternating lives in our world and in others, in the sense of Heraclitus and Euripides: death in this world is birth into that, and death there is birth here. Origen's theory, however, is more

¹ iv. 2, 1, p. 308: τοιαῦτα δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅποια οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ὀμωτάτου καὶ ἀδικωτάτου ἀνθρώπου.

² iv. 3, 4.

³ iv. 3, 3: "Aut quis extra maximum crimen habebitur, ipse sibi inferens manus?" This may have been an oblique way of denying what was related of Origen, as modern Catholics try to suppress it.

elaborate, his imagination being of many worlds, and not simply of an alternation between the seen and the unseen.¹

Jerome of course found in this speculative development things "to be condemned by the Churches of Christ";² but we cannot take Jerome, except when he translates, as entirely trustworthy. When he only says that some heterodox position is to be inferred from Origen, or ought to have been held by him, we may be sure that Origen did not state this in so many words: otherwise Jerome would have given them. A case of peculiar unfairness is his attempt to prove Origen (in later language) a pantheist; for no speculative theologian was ever less a pantheist than Origen. Jerome's malevolent attack is founded on no more than this: that Origen deduces the immortality of the "rational nature," though this also was created simply out of nothing, from its being "made in the image of God." Minds, therefore, participating so far in the divine substance, must have been created once for all; there are no annihilations and new creations of minds as of the matter that was made to be their instrument. This, argues Jerome, contains the impious teaching of a substantial unity of all minds with God.³

That Origen taught that the "temporal Gospel" of Christ on earth is sometime to be superseded by an "eternal Gospel" in the heavens (*εὐαγγέλιον αἰώνιον*, Rev. xiv. 6) is quite clear;⁴ but his speculation about other crucifixions in the celestial spaces "for the dæmons" is stated too obscurely to permit of a definite conclusion as to its meaning. We, approaching the subject with sympathies opposite to those of Origen's theological enemies, yet with no desire to exaggerate on either side, may think that a doctrine more compatible with his philosophy than that of one "historical Christ" would have been that there were many Christs, —like the many Buddhas of the later Buddhism; and that he himself had been thrown into the wrong social medium. Yet he was after all a Christian ecclesiastic as well as a philosophic or theosophic speculator. The outward form of Catholic Christianity, if taken only as outward form, and the letter of the Scripture, if taken only as the letter, did not displease him; and he was willing, as we saw in the treatise against Celsus, to throw all his force into the defence of Church and sacred book as of universal authority. At the same time, he was equally determined to place the spirit above the letter for those whom he thought worthy to understand it. If we find ourselves obliged to agree with Porphyry on the one side and with Jerome on the other, that what he regarded as the spirit of his religion was in reality Hellenic philosophy, we shall not think worse of Origen for that, but shall rather cherish a regard for his uncanonised name as some counterpoise, in the history of Christianity, to names that more truly represented the faith for the ages that believed.

¹ iv. 3, 9 and 10, with notes.

² iv. 4, 9, p. 362, note.

³ p. 337, note.

⁴ iv. 3, 13, pp. 343, 344.

JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA

WHENEVER the time shall arrive for a final estimate of the doctors of Latin scholasticism, the compassion expressed by Dante for the virtuous and philosophic heathens whom he saw in Limbo¹ will be transferred to them. Powerful as were their intellects, not even the greatest of them could achieve work having the permanent suggestiveness or the æsthetic value we find even in much that is not of supreme rank in ancient and modern thought. Under the compressive force of authoritative revealed religion, the most that they could do was to prepare the way for happier ages by showing, through the very failure of all constructive effort, that their faith and their philosophy could not live together. In the end, positive advance came not from their results, but from fuller knowledge of the Greeks, whom they themselves, with imperfect means, had sought out as the masters of all science. The humanists and thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries took the right way in breaking, as far as might be, with the middle period. Now, however, that the intellectual contest has long been decided, even those who have least sympathy with that period ought to make some attempt at doing justice especially to the figures in it that belonged by spiritual affinity not to their own but to a past or a future age.

Among these, unquestionably, the greatest is John Scotus Erigena. Born in Ireland early in the ninth century, he does more than anyone else to confirm the opinion that has found favour about the adventurous genius of the Celt.² While frequently penetrating, through the veil of its Christianised version, to the genuine thought of that Neo-Platonic philosophy which was the last expression of Hellenism, he is even more remarkable by his direct anticipations of Spinoza and Berkeley and Hegel. And these are not the casual thoughts of one who did not know whither they might tend. No one was ever more clearly conscious of what he meant to say, and of its bearing; and no thinker was ever more audacious. Yet even this illustrates the strength of the spiritual yoke that had now been laid on the European mind. When Erigena comes down from

¹ *Inf.* iv. 43-45.

² The genius of Erigena was at the same time pre-eminently architectonic; a quality denied by Matthew Arnold to the Celt.

the heights of metaphysics where he is at home to the details of his system, it is evident that for him there is no conceivable structure of life and thought but that of Catholic Christianity. Historical sense has disappeared. Boethius, who died in 524, was still an "ancient." For him, the Greek and Roman past presented itself in perspective. For Erigena, on the other side of the gulf, it is all "heathendom," with its "secular philosophers," whose intellectual authority has sunk under that of the Church and its fathers.

Of his own predilection for the Greeks he was nevertheless conscious, and he knew that he was of their lineage, though speaking of himself as the last and the least. He must have been one of the latest in Western Europe to possess an effective knowledge of Greek before it ceased for six centuries. This he had no doubt acquired in the monastic schools of Ireland. From Ireland he found his way to the court of Charles the Bald (the grandson of Charlemagne), who placed him at the head of the royal school in Paris, and set him to translate into Latin the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite. To his translation, Erigena appended some verses in which he vigorously assailed papal Rome, and declared that the glory had departed to the Greeks and to Constantinople. This was an illusion of which doubtless a visit to the Greek empire would have cured him; as the last Neo-Platonists were cured of their illusion that they would find the ideal state in Persia. The Latin West was at any rate alive: the double-headed system of Pope and King or Emperor was less deadly than the Byzantine form of theocracy, as events have shown. Amid conflicting wills, the division of power between the spiritual and the secular chiefs allowed modern Europe to emerge. And Erigena found in practice the advantage of the division. His imperial patron could protect him from the demand of Pope Nicholas I. that he should be sent to him to be examined, or at least should be dismissed from court.¹ The demand may not unnaturally have been provoked by such verses as these.

Constantinopolis florens nova Roma vocatur :
Moribus et muris Roma vetusta cadis.

Transit imperium, mansitque superbia tecum,
Cultus avaritiæ te nimium superat.

Vulgus ab extremis distractum partibus orbis,
Servorum servi, nunc tibi sunt domini.

Truncasti vivos crudeli vulnere sanctos,
Vendere nunc horum mortua membra soles.²

But of course it would be an error to regard this as an attack

¹ *Joannis Scoti Opera*, Migne, *Patrol. Lat.* vol. cxxii., pp. 1025, 1026. The authenticity of the papal letter and of the verses has been denied, perhaps because they are so exactly what might have been expected.

² *Opp.* 1194.

on the order of Western Christendom. The imagination is already that of Dante, that an ideal Christendom once existed, and that its rulers had become corrupt.

Erigena, it appears from contemporary evidence, was not an ecclesiastic. He is described as a *scholasticus* or man of learning. As such he had won a great reputation, accompanied by suspicions of heterodoxy. These may first have arisen from the treatise he wrote, at the request of Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, and Pardulus, Bishop of Laon, against the ultra-Augustinian doctrine of predestination put forth by the monk Gottschalk. The treatise of Erigena *De Prædestinatione*, which saw the light (or the darkness) in 851, was condemned by the Synod of Valence in 855, and by the Synod of Langres in 859. These condemnations, however, had no traceable effect on the fortunes of Erigena, and they certainly did not change the spirit of his philosophising. In his great work *De Divisione Naturæ*, the distinctive views of his early tract fall into their place as part of a comprehensive system; and still more audacious positions are added to those that had called forth even in that age the wail, "*Pulus Filius hominis veniens inveniet fidem in terra?*"¹ Not till the thirteenth century, however, was his later work decisively suppressed. The reason assigned for the suppression was that the "worms of heretical pravity" with which it was found to swarm had attracted the lovers of those profane novelties that the Apostle gives instruction to avoid. In short, it was thought to have contributed to the revolt against the Church which had just been stamped out in blood and fire. After the Albigensian Crusade came the centralised Inquisition; and, in 1225, Honorius III. ("Bishop, Slave of the Slaves of God, etc."), with the usual preamble about the enemy who ceases not to sow tares, sentenced it to the flames.²

Thus for the later Middle Ages—for typical Scholasticism—the system of Erigena was unknown. If either then or at the opening of the modern period it had any influence, this must have been indirectly, through positions of his heretical successors in the twelfth century, quoted by orthodox schoolmen in order to refute them. At last, in 1681, Th. Gale, afterwards Dean of York (who also edited the book *De Mysteriis*), having come upon a manuscript that had escaped destruction, published the first printed edition. With no long delay, the *De Divisione Naturæ* was placed upon the Index of Prohibited Books (1685). Since then, however, the authorities of the Roman Church have decided that, as Erigena's works are so important for the history of Scholastic theology, they may be officially reprinted. Thus the edition that students must now possess is that of H. J. Floss

¹ See the "Monitum ad Lectorem" prefixed to the *Liber de Prædestinatione*. (*Opp.* 353, 354.)

² *Opp.* 439, 440.

(first published in 1853) in Migne's "Latin Patrology." There appears to be still important textual work to do;¹ though in the edition of Floss good use was made of the materials available at the time. It seems only fair to recognise here a certain liberality; but, as may be gathered from the notes and preliminary essays, the condemnation passed on Erigena's doctrines has been in no way withdrawn.

The present study aims at giving some account of the philosophy of Erigena as set forth in his principal works.² For us, the interest of these is that, in a dark period of European history, they recall the light of the past and prefigure the return to it. Yet, while in speculative power Erigena was probably inferior to no metaphysician that ever lived, we must not expect to find in his philosophy positions completely detached from the outward form of an accepted creed. He cannot, as both late Greek and early modern thinkers still can, furnish us with hints for new paths to follow. Freer though he was than the systematisers properly called "Scholastics" who came after him, the mythical element in his religion still to a certain extent dictated the type of his theory of the universe.

To form an estimate of his intrinsic power, it is instructive to consider the limitations in the philosophical culture of his age. Any History of Philosophy may be consulted for the list of books that he read. He possessed a portion of the *Timæus* in the Latin translation of Chalcidius, Aristotle *De Interpretatione*, the *Categories* with the *Isagoge* of Porphyry; and, for the basis of encyclopædic knowledge as then understood, the compendia of Martianus Capella (fifth century), Boethius, Cassiodorus (sixth century), and Isidore of Seville (seventh century). Metaphysical doctrines of Aristotle he knew only at second hand. He was trained, of course, on the Latin Fathers, and drew much from Augustine's *Confessions* and *City of God*. Works ascribed to Augustine on Dialectic and the Ten Categories were used by him. His favourites, however, were the Greek ecclesiastical writers, whom he read in the original. Of these he is especially devoted to the Pseudo-Dionysius (end of the fifth or beginning of the sixth century), and to Maximus the Confessor (seventh century), who depended on Dionysius and on Gregory of Nyssa (fourth century). This Gregory, Erigena in

¹ See J. Dräseke, *Johannes Scotus Erigena und dessen Gewährsmänner* (1902).

² For a fuller account of his distinctively theological positions and of his relation to the circumstances of his time, I refer the reader to Miss Gardner's interesting *Studies in John the Scot* (1900).

The most circumstantial English work is now Mr. Henry Bett's *Johannes Scotus Erigena* (Cambridge, 1925). It is a merit of the author to have investigated and set forth in detail the philosopher's biblical and patristic sources. He seems to have proved that, before coming in contact with Dionysius, Erigena had found in Augustine a kind of palimpsest through which he read the metaphysical thought of Neo-Platonism.

citing him confuses with Gregory Nazianzen. Through this series he derives, on the theological side, from the school of Origen, whose *Principles* he quotes.

Perhaps it may be thought that the very narrowness of his training gave him some advantage. The discontinuity of culture in the West was doing what Proclus had seen the need of when he expressed the wish that the mass of ancient writings might for a time be withdrawn from the eyes of men. The ancient structure of thought being broken up, it was easier for some of its separate original ideas to go on to new phases. Thus Erigena could carry forward some of the ideas of Neo-Platonism—which, in its genuine Hellenic form, he probably did not know at all—to what we now recognise as a more modern stage. While repeating the mystical positions, he gives the impression of being personally very little of a mystic; and he is more explicitly a pantheist, and is a pantheist of a more naturalistic type, than the ancient Neo-Platonists. On this side he may have been inspired by the poets. As is noted by Prof. W. P. Ker,¹ he quotes the famous lines of Virgil on the immanent spirit of the world. These were afterwards the favourite quotation of Bruno (who, of course, cannot have read his mediæval precursor). To the new faith no positive virtue can be attributed in bringing on this development. Bruno was in conscious opposition to the mediæval view of life; and Erigena deliberately puts forward this side of his thought against what he takes for granted are the received opinions. If the faith had any part in the altered point of view, it was that of Sin and Death and Hell in the philosophy of Erigena himself; these being, according to his interpretation of theological doctrine, the negative element involved in a world-process leading to perfection.

Although the whole philosophy of Erigena is contained in his chief work, *On the Division of Nature*, it is worth while first to give a short account of what he found it possible to bring out in his refutation of Gottschalk. Theologically as the topic of predestination was conceived, he appears from the beginning as a philosopher. True philosophy and true religion, he declares, are identical.² The formal statement, indeed, is adopted from Augustine; so that too much stress should not be laid on it taken by itself. But while it might have been applied in either direction, Erigena sets out to argue as a philosopher, and only in a secondary way tries to prove his agreement with the authorities. This gives colour to what in itself is a neutral assertion.

In his references to Gottschalk, the philosopher descends to

¹ *The Dark Ages* (1904), p. 163.

² *Liber de Prædestinatione*, cap. i. 1, 358 A: "veram esse philosophiam veram religionem, conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam."

the conventional language of theological controversy,¹ and professedly holds himself to be defending the Catholic faith against heresy. What the orthodox representatives of the faith thought of the defence, they were not long in showing.

And, if Erigena's rhetoric sometimes goes far, it must be remembered that he was protesting against what he himself describes as the "most stupid and most cruel madness"² of the position that part of the human race is, by divine decree, damned to everlasting fire. That there was in his inner thought no horror of heresy as such is shown by his contention that heresies (including that of Gottschalk) are useful in stirring up inquiry.³

What had drawn down on Gottschalk the condemnation of the church was not precisely the cruelty of his doctrine. Here the question could only be between lighter and darker shades. The true ground of objection was the exalted and self-confident fanaticism that would have diminished the function of the priest. If there was a "double predestination," by which every man was already assigned to hell or heaven, the mediation of the hierarchy between man and God, though not necessarily made an end of in theory, became in effect of smaller importance. Now Erigena's position was here not less dangerous than Gottschalk's. Making divine predestination indistinguishable from divine foreknowledge,⁴ he is as thoroughgoing a determinist as his antagonist can have been. On the other hand, he abolishes the real hell of the theologians, belief in which was not Gottschalk's heresy. God, he maintains, knows only the real: hence both sin and punishment, being unrealities, fall outside the divine knowledge and have no true causation.⁵ They are—to anticipate the later result—passing illusions determined by the apparent separation of individualities which are never really separate, and which will in the end return in appearance also to the unity of the whole.

The practical-minded prelates who had called in a dialectician to help them must have been dismayed to find him, in his opening pages, starting off from the juridical problem of the Roman theologians to speculative metaphysics. For him "the will of God" is identical with the cause of all, and the logic of this does not allow him to think of God as a person among

¹ in. 7, 369 D: "Merito quippe in oleo atque pice ardere debuisti, qui et lumen caritatis et mysterium prædestinationis perperam docere non timuisti." Gottschalk had volunteered to submit himself to the ordeal by boiling water, boiling oil, boiling pitch and fire as a test of the truth of his professions (see *Studies in John the Scot*, pp. 62, 72).

² 1. 4. "stultissima crudelissimaque insania."

³ 1. 3.

⁴ in 2, 361 B: "Quod est ergo Deo esse, hoc est ei sapere, et quod est ei sapere, hoc est scire, et quod est scire, id est destinare." The qualification that follows is not allowed essentially to affect this position.

⁵ This is a general philosophical statement of his doctrine. Cf. in 3, 366 B. "Peccatum, mors, miseria, a Deo non sunt. Forum igitur causa Deus non est."

persons, laying down laws and rewarding or punishing their observance or transgression. To necessarian antagonists it must have seemed an evasion when he argued that because the sum of things is a product of the will, which is identical with the being or nature, of God, the predestination in them is not "necessitated"; since the will of God is free and exempt from all constraint of necessity. What he meant was, that there is no difference between the real nature of things and the nature of God, and that this is caused by nothing outside itself. The fundamental thought of Erigena about the causal order allows no more place than that of Spinoza for the possibility that anything could be other than it is. Evils, he grants, are also foreseen in a manner, and therefore predetermined:¹ for, as the position was afterwards developed, there is no actual evil that does not contain an effort after some good, and this is real. Nor does he altogether refuse to employ the term "necessity" in relation to particular things.² The thought that love in all things loves God, that is, itself,³ has received a Spinozistic turn.

Of course the argument could not remain all through at this high philosophic level; and much trouble had to be taken in manipulating the authorities. Erigena, however, finds general support in the theory of Augustine, derived from Neo-Platonism, that sin by itself has no positive nature;⁴ the disappearance of all good being equivalent to the disappearance of all essence. This he developed with rigorous logic on his own lines, and heroically tried to make the Father agree with him in detail. Who, he asks, can think of contradicting Paul or Augustine?⁵ He repeats that sin and death and eternal torments are nothing at all; wherefore they can neither be foreknown nor predestinated.⁶ God's foreknowledge or predestination is one with the true and positive essence of things.

Still, though what is proper to evil may be only privation, there is the appearance to explain. Whence comes the appearance of sin and suffering? The answer of Erigena is that it comes not from any divinely created nature, but from a perverse motion of the individual will. As the sin arises from the will of each person, so does the punishment.⁷ Neither sin nor punishment comes from God.⁸ The sinner damns himself. And it is not the "nature" of the sinner, but only the perverted will, that sins and is punished. No nature, as such, will be punished, and therefore none will be miserable. For every nature either is God or was made by God. Now the creative nature is incapable of misery; and it cannot justly punish the

¹ ii. 4, 5.

² ii. 6, 364 B: "Nam si omnium naturarum est necessitas Dei voluntas, cum Dei voluntas naturarum necessitas."

³ iii. 6, 368 D: "Caritas in omnibus Deum, id est, se ipsam diligit."

⁴ vii. 6 Quoted from *De Libero Arbitrio*.

⁵ xi. 3, 7.

⁶ x. 5. Cf. xv. i.

⁷ vi. i.

⁸ x. 3.

natures which it created.¹ In the system of things, the evil will is prevented from finally attaining its end; and in this its punishment consists. As no nature is punished so also no nature, whether creative or created, punishes.² It is sin itself that punishes sin. There is no separate place of punishment.³ "Accordingly, if there is no beatitude except life eternal, and eternal life is knowledge of the truth, then there is no beatitude except knowledge of the truth. But whatever is believed of beatitude, the counterpart of this must necessarily be believed of its defect, which is misery. Thus if there is no misery except death eternal, and eternal death is ignorance of the truth, then there is no misery except ignorance of the truth."⁴

In this particular treatise, Erigena does not go forward to his doctrine of the restitution of all things at the end of the world-process. No "nature," it is said, is damned; and all natures, as such, enjoy happiness. Yet, as the appearance of sin and punishment, found in the present life, is not said to cease in the future, "eternal damnation" is formally retained, if in an unorthodox sense. Sin continues to punish itself in the future life.⁵ A distinction exists between those that are predestined to life and those that are simply left to undergo, in their individual wills, the penalty of sin. As all have sinned, how is this "election" just? Why should any, even so, be "reprobate?"

The theory on which Erigena grounds his reply is that all individual wills were placed in the first man, and therefore can justly be punished; for each, as thus prefigured, sinned. That which sinned was not the general nature of man.⁶ A different view would make the punishment unjust, for in no one can another's sin be justly punished. And, it is repeated, what sins and is punished was not substantially created by God.⁷ It was, however, involved somehow in the eternal order of

¹ xvi. 1, 418 AB: "Naturam creatricem miserie esse capacem, dementissimum est suspicari. Creatrix autem natura quali iustitia punitura sit naturas, quas ipsa creavit, non invenio. Nulla dehinc natura punietur, non punita non erit misera." Cf. xvi. 5, 423 A: "divina aequitas non punit, quod sua bonitas creare voluit."

² xvi. 4.

³ xvii. 7, 428 D: "Proinde nulla universitatis parte punietur impius, sed sua propria impietate in se ipso."

⁴ xvii. 9, 430 AB.

⁵ xvi. 6, 423 C: "In omni enim peccatore simul incipiunt oriri et peccatum, et poena ejus, quia nullum peccatum est, quod non se ipsum puniat, occulte tamen in hac vita, aperte vero in altera, quae est futura."

⁶ xvi. 3, 419 BC: "Non itaque in eo peccavit naturae generalitas, sed uniuscujusque individua voluntas."

⁷ xvi. 3, 420 A: "In nullo quippe vindicatur juste alterius peccatum. Proinde in nullo natura punietur, quia ex Deo est, et non peccat. Motus autem voluntarius, libidinosus utens naturae bono, merito punietur, quia naturae legem transgreditur, quam procul dubio non transgrederetur, si substantialiter a Deo crearetur."

things. To the question why the consequences of sin should be healed in some natures and not in others, an answer is assumed that appears formally orthodox. All might justly have been left in the general mass, but free grace was given to the elect. In the later treatise this is turned into a philosophical doctrine of the necessity that there should be a scale of beings in the universe. Some must be "reprobate," in the sense that all cannot be gods or seraphim. None are deprived of happiness, but there are degrees.

The foregoing exposition, of course, gives little notion of the medium through which Erigena was obliged to work his way to these theories. Yet it must be obvious that the language of the faith did not well fit them. It is interesting to observe that, rough as the time was, he could still make a point incidentally by urging the less vengeful character of human justice as against the theological hell. Even human laws do not decree that men shall sin, and then punish them for sinning; but threaten punishments in order to deter them if possible, and punish to correct them.¹

The Division of Nature, to which I now proceed, is in the form of a dialogue between a master and a pupil. This dialogue is not a catechism. The pupil shares equally in the argument, both putting serious objections and from time to time taking up of his own accord the thread of the positive exposition. The conversation, indeed, is not dramatic in the sense that there is collision between different types of thought. The system expounded is that of Erigena and no other. Yet the form adopted gives the discussion a certain increased liveliness.²

The work begins by a broad statement of the "division." "Nature is the general name of all things that are and that are not." Its "parts" or "species" are: first, that which creates and is not created; second, that which is created and creates; third, that which is created and does not create; fourth, that which neither creates nor is created.³ The first is God as principle; the fourth is God as end. The second is the intelligible system of causal ideas or reasons by which the world was produced; the third is the visible world as a system of effects. In reality all are substantially identical: each is the whole viewed in a certain aspect. This is to be understood when they are called parts or species or forms. We are obliged to

¹ xiv. 5, 412 B: "Quod si ita est in legibus mutabilitate temporum transitoriis, quid putandum fieri in aeternis pietatis justitiaeque immutabili vigore refertis?"

² This observation has been made by Noack, the German translator of the *De Divisione Naturae*. See his "Schluss-Abhandlung" (1876) in J. H. v. Kirchmann's *Philosophische Bibliothek*, Bd. 66. In the preface to the translation, Noack oddly tries to claim Erigena as the first representative of the "Christian German consciousness." As in the case of Shakespeare, the British Islands have a prior claim.

³ *De Divisione Naturae*, lib. i. 1.

use the words; but here they indicate no essential division or demarcation.

Not all these points are brought out at the very beginning; but, as will be seen, they are a fair summary of Erigena's metaphysical position. And he transports us rapidly to the centre of it.

A disquisition on the various kinds of "not-being" introduces the paradox, well-known later to the mystics, that that which surpasses all intellect, as well as that which falls below it, may be said not to be, or to be nothing. This can, of course, be traced to Plato's idea of the good beyond being; its antithesis, which is indeterminate matter, being treated as similarly incomprehensible. In the use of this form of paradox, it may be observed, the Neo-Platonists were more cautious than the mystics of the East or of mediæval Europe. I do not think the assertion is anywhere flatly made by Plotinus, that God, or the One, both "is and is not." The principle of things "is not" any of the particular things that have being; though in another sense (as Erigena also says) it is all of them because it produces them.

Of the remaining antitheses, the most important for its bearing on the argument that follows is this. In one sense, things are said to be or not to be according as they exist at a particular place and time among products of generation, or are still latent in their causes. For example, the men that are to be born in the future, though already existent in the creative reasons that prefigure them, are said not to be. In living things the virtue of the seed is said not to be so long as it keeps silence among the secrets of nature: when it has appeared among actual births and growths of animals, or in the flowers and fruits of trees and herbs, it is said to be.¹ On the other hand, according to the philosophers, those things only that are comprehended by intellect are said truly to be; and these are the reasons of things. Generated things that appear at particular times and places, and are subject to change and corruption, are said not to be.²

God cannot be known in essence to any intelligence whatever, even angelic. What is called knowledge of God is, and must always continue to be, through certain "theophanies." The height of knowledge attainable would be to view all things, whether sensible or intelligible, as manifestations of God. Thus, while in one sense the divine nature is nothing, in another it is all that exists. It not only creates but is created, "because there is nothing essentially beside itself; for it is the essence of all things."³ A similitude may be found in our intellect,

¹ i. 5.

² i. 6.

³ i. 12, 454 A: "creatur autem, quia nihil essentialiter est praeter ipsam; est enim omnium essentia."

which is said to be (*esse*) before it arrives at thought and memory, and to be made (*fieri*) when it has received form from certain phantasies. As it becomes thus formed though in itself without all sensible form; so the divine essence, itself above intellect, is self-created in all forms of intellect and sense. This self-creation is identical with the creation of things.

The same positions are more elaborately developed in a discussion on the two kinds of theology, the negative (*ἀποφαιτική*) and the affirmative (*καταφατική*). The first shows how nothing can be predicated of the divine essence; the second, how all things that are can be predicated of it.¹ Terms like "super-essential," and so forth, positive in form, have a negative meaning. For what is definitely asserted is "not essence"; what there may be beyond, remains undefined. As there is nothing opposite to God, so no term that has an opposite can be predicated of him: hence not "being," not "goodness." In reality this negative theology agrees with the affirmative. For the affirmative says, the divinity can be called this, but does not say, it is this properly: the negative says, it is not this, although it can be called this.²

The negative theology is carried through in the form of a proof that every one of the Aristotelian categories loses all its sense when applied to the divine nature.³ Detailed discussion of the category of place in particular leads to its resolution into "definition." Every definition is contained in some scientific discipline, and every discipline in the mind. Hence place exists properly in the mind,⁴ and is therefore incorporeal; as are indeed in the last resort all the ten categories. Erigena then goes on to prove that corporeal matter is nothing but a "composition of accidents."⁵ It is, as he says afterwards, put together from incorporeal qualities.⁶ If common usage asserts the essence of things to be nothing but their visible and tangible body, that is only as all things known by sense or reason or intellect are predicated of God, though the pure contemplation of truth approves him to be none of these.⁷ The essence underlying the composition of accidents called body is a certain individual unity (*unum quoddam individuum*), to be thought of as incorporeal.

Place and time are inseparable, and without them are no

¹ i. 13.

² i. 14.

³ Erigena brings the categories under two genera, motion and rest, and these again under τὸ πᾶν. See i. 22.

⁴ i. 28, 475 B: "Si enim definitio omnis in disciplina est, et omnis disciplina in animo, necessario locus omnis, quia definitio est, non alibi nisi in animo erit."

⁵ i. 34.

⁶ i. 42, 484 C: "Ipsa etiam materies, si quis intentus aspexerit, ex incorporeis qualitibus copulatur."

⁷ i. 36.

generated things.¹ All essence (*οὐσία*) created from nothing is local and temporal: local because it is in some manner, since it is not infinite; temporal because it begins to be what it was not.² The "nothing" from which creation takes place, we are told elsewhere, is indistinguishable from the divine nature; for there is in reality no other nature. What we are to understand here by the creation of particular things is that, before the local and temporal manifestation of an eternal essence, that local and temporal manifestation did not exist; not that the eternal essence did not exist. The manifestations, however, constitute all that gives determination to the essence.³

On matter and body, no new argument seems to be added to what may be found in the Neo-Platonists; and the distinction between the technical terms has become a little blurred. The conceptions of formed body and of merely potential matter run into one another. The advance is in the tendency, characteristic of British thought more than of modern thought in general, to single out the problem of the external world as a specially interesting one, instead of leaving it to be settled by implication as part of a total philosophical system. This leads to the pointed assertion that there is no "corporeal substance" distinguishable from the immaterial essence of the individual. When the course of phenomenal "accidents" is taken away, no reality at all remains in body as such. To Erigena, as to Berkeley, any other view seems almost too absurd for refutation.⁴ Of course he does not anticipate Berkeley's empirical treatment of the problem.

He is fully conscious of the objections that will be raised to his "negative theology," but this does not prevent him from following it out to its last results. Action and passion, he finds, can be predicated of God only by metaphor: "and so in reality God neither acts nor suffers, neither moves nor is moved, neither loves nor is loved."⁵ But is not this, the pupil asks, opposed to the authority of Holy Scripture and of the Fathers? The teacher cannot be unaware how difficult it will be to persuade simple minds, when even the ears of those that seem to be wise are horrified. "Be not afraid," the master replies. "For now we are to follow reason, which investigates the truth of things, and is put down by no authority, nor is in any manner hindered from publicly opening and declaring what the effort of studious inquiry searches into and with labour discovers."⁶ While the authority of Holy Scripture is to be

¹ i. 39, 482 A: "Itaque aliquo modo esse, hoc est localiter esse, et aliquo modo inchoasse esse, hoc est temporaliter esse."

² i. 45, 487 A.

³ i. 45, 487 B: "Nam et causa omnium, quae Deus est, ex his, quae ab ea condita sunt, solummodo cognoscitur esse; nullo vero creaturarum argumento possumus intelligere, quid sit: atque ideo sola haec definitio de Deo praedicatur, quia est, qui plus quam esse est."

⁴ i. 47.

⁵ i. 62, 504 B.

⁶ i. 63 fin.

followed in all things, it is not to be believed that its words in their obvious meaning always convey the truth: rather, certain similitudes are used in order to raise up our yet rude and infantile senses. Hear the Apostle, who says: "*Lac vobis potum dedi non escam.*" Thus, while the faithful are provided with something definite to give a stay to their thoughts of the divine nature, reason goes beyond and shows that of God nothing can properly be asserted. And yet not irrationally, on the other side, all things from the height to the depth can be asserted. The Creator is even the cause of contraries, in virtue of what he has positively created; and thus to the opposites of each good their place in nature is allowed till the process shall be completed that ends by abolishing even the appearance of evil.¹ After these and other explanations, the disciple feels himself ready, in spite of the terrors of authority, to proclaim his open adherence to what reason clearly establishes; "especially as such things are not to be treated of except among the wise, to whom nothing is sweeter to hear than true reason, nothing more delightful to investigate whilst it is being sought, nothing fairer to contemplate when it is found."²

In the remainder of the first book, the antithetic statements are continued. All significant terms carried over from *natura condita* to *natura conditrix*, we are told, must be understood as predicated *translative* only, not *proprie*.³ It is thus when God is said to love and to be loved, to make and to be made. God is without beginning and end, therefore without motion or process, and therefore, since making implies movement, in the proper sense can neither make nor be the object of making.⁴ But if he is conceived as a maker, then his making must be regarded as co-eternal and co-essential with him. Thus understood, his making or action is indistinguishable from his essence. He alone truly is, and nothing else subsists by itself.⁵ What is really signified by the words used in Scripture,—such as, to will, to love, to see, to hear,—is nothing but the ineffable essence, or rather, the more than essence, incomprehensible by all intellect.⁶ On the other side, God is rightly said to love because he is the cause of all love: by this love all things are held together in the whole and are moved towards the end of their desire. In short, every action and passion may be affirmed and denied of him alternately.⁷ Yet the denial belongs to a higher order of

¹ i. 66.² i. 67 *fin.*³ i. 68.⁴ i. 71.⁵ i. 72, 518 A: "Cum ergo audimus, Deum omnia facere, nil aliud debemus intelligere, quam Deum in omnibus esse, hoc est, essentiam omnium subsistere."⁶ i. 73.⁷ i. 75, 521-2: "Deus itaque per seipsum amor est, per seipsum visio, per seipsum motus: et tamen neque motus est, neque visio, neque amor, sed plus quam amor, plus quam visio, plus quam motus. . . . Amat igitur seipsum et amatur a seipso, in nobis et in seipso: nec tamen amat seipsum nec amatur a seipso, sed plus quam amat et amatur in nobis et in seipso." And so for the rest.

truth.¹ For the affirmation, as we have seen, is by metaphor (*translative*); the negation, in the proper sense (*proprie*). And Erigena does not try to evade the consequence by insisting on terms like *ὑπεράγαθος*, *ὑπερούσιος*, and so forth. "More than" goodness and essence, he has pointed out, means only "not goodness and essence as understood by us." On the other hand, when the divine essence is conceived as in all things, true reason compels us to say, in the words of Scripture but with no limited reference to the disciples of Christ: "It is not you who love, who see, who move, but the Spirit of your Father."²

Still, however, the pupil is troubled by the question, how is this compatible with Holy Scripture and with the Catholic faith? Philosophically, it has been proved that God is no being along with others, and yet is all beings. But in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, a series of definite assertions is made about the divine essence. Why this particular selection from all possible assertions? Whenever the difficulty recurs (and it recurs frequently), it is met with the curt reply that the object of the doctrine seems to have been that Christians might have something distinctive to say. And yet, in detail, Erigena has an elaborate philosophical interpretation of the Christian Trinity. In his historical circumstances this is, of course, perfectly intelligible. He could emphatically declare that reason is by nature prior to authority. True authority is nothing but truth found out by reason and handed down in written tradition for the benefit of posterity.³ But the authority referred to was that of the Fathers (with the Scriptures). A philosopher of the ninth century might try to turn them also into philosophers to be respected by the after-world for their insight and discoveries; but not thus was the "dogmatic slumber" of Europe to be definitively broken. The non-philosophical data of their system were for them its essence; and these no mediæval thinker could in so many words set aside. Thus Erigena, after scaling the heights of reason, has to plunge again into the morass. Fortunately, this side of his thinking can be in great measure, though not wholly, ignored. We see how external it was to him in reality.

At the opening of the second book, the teacher proves expressly that one identical ground is indicated by all the four terms of his division of nature. The division is not really of genus into forms or species, nor of whole into parts, but proceeds "by a certain intelligible contemplation of the universality—by the universality I mean God and creatures." All may finally be brought back to a single individual unity, which is both cause and end. The first term and the fourth,

¹ i. 76, 522 B: "Verius enim negatur Deus quid eorum, quæ de eo prædicantur esse, quam affirmatur esse."

² i. 76.

³ i. 69.

—namely, that which creates and is not created, and that which neither creates nor is created,—are evidently to be understood only of God, and so refer to one subject. The first indicates the unformed principle of all; the fourth, the end which all things desire and to which all return. These are in themselves indiscernible. Only “in our theory,” according to a difference of aspect, are the principle and the end two and not one. That which takes the second place in the division, namely, the nature that is created and creates, consists of the primordial causes “in created nature”; from which primordial causes the nature created and not creating flows as effect. The reality indicated by this third term, and that which is indicated by the second, as alike included in “created nature,” are there one. Further, Creator and creature, the sole self-subsistent and that which, so far as it is at all, is only a participation in the sole self-subsistent, are in reality the same: so that the reduced pairs are not to be held apart, but coalesce into a single unity. In the present book is to be discussed mainly the procession of creatures from the one first cause though the primordial causes or ideas.¹ A warning, however, is given that, in view of the connexion of one aspect with another, the topics cannot be strictly limited.

Certain distinctions of Maximus are first introduced, leading to the position that in man is represented every creature visible and invisible.² Here we find ourselves involved in mythology. Man, we are told, in accordance with the theory of Maximus, was originally a sexless unity. This was divided into the two sexes and multiplied into diverse varieties in consequence of the fall, but is to be restored to unity in Jesus Christ, “in whom there is neither male nor female.” A noteworthy point is the insistence of Erigena that the dignity of human nature has not been lost. Its character as the microcosm of creation is innate and indestructible.³ The punishment due to the fall was inflicted not in anger, but as a means of bringing man back to his original state of unity.

A difficulty is raised by the pupil as to the relation between the history in time thus presupposed, and the unity that never ceases to exist while the process including the lapse and the restitution is going on. For by pure intellect the world is even now contemplated not as a changing aggregate of diverse and separate parts, but as a whole immutably subsisting in its reasons.⁴

¹ ii. 1, 2. Cf. iii. 1.

² ii. 5 *int.*: “Est enim ex duabus conditae naturae universalibus partibus mirabili quadam adunatione compositus, ex sensibili namque et intelligibili, hoc est, ex totius creaturae extremitatibus conjunctus.”

³ ii. 11, 539 CD: “Non enim in mundo moles corporeas, spatiisque distentas, multiplicesque diversarum partium ejus varietates vera ratio considerat et honorificat, sed naturales et primordiales illius causas, in seipsis unitas atque pulcherrimas, in quas dum finis venerit, reversurus erit, et in eis aeternaliter mansurus.”

⁴ ii. 14.

To be quite clear about the solution (here only in part given), it is necessary to keep well in mind a whole series of discussions both in the present and in the later books. Particular statements might otherwise be found misleading. The general result may be thus anticipated. Erigena accepted the Neo-Platonic view of "creation"; namely, that it does not refer to an order in time, but in "dignity."¹ It is in this sense that the cause of all precedes the ideas, and that these precede the things of time and space. The unity remains in reality unbroken. The whole is always perfect: in the universe, all contraries are harmonised. At the same time, the datum of the Christian revelation is accepted, that there is a total process of finite and temporal things, having a beginning and an end. Before and after this process there is nothing but eternity. Erigena makes no attempt to explain this away, and even declares it rational: yet he nowhere gives distinct philosophical reasons for it. His metaphysical doctrine in truth required the view that there is no limit in the past or in the future to the history of appearances; but, on this side, he never came face to face with the logic of the position. It is enough for him that all the reality of the world is prefigured in the eternal ideas. Process, involving beginning and end, can therefore be treated as really nothing.² But, a Neo-Platonist would have said, if the mixture of illusion arises by some necessity, is not the necessity always the same? What ground then is there for assigning any limit in time to the world of mixture? Erigena often puts questions bordering on this, but this precise question he never puts. The evasion, however, seems unconscious. And thus, it may be remarked, the opinion is confirmed that he did not know the original Neo-Platonists, whose treatment of the topic had been quite explicit. An attempt to sap orthodoxy by indirect methods and ironical phrases would have been impossible in his age. Where he differs from the received view, he points out the difference and openly defends his own. And, as a matter of course, any view taken is defended on the ground that it is really compatible with the orthodox and catholic faith, however strange it may appear to the vulgar.

In an elaborate interpretation of the Mosaic cosmogony, contained partly in this and partly in the next book, the sacred writer is found to be setting forth in general the relation between the intelligible and the sensible world, and in detail the elements of physical science as this was understood in Erigena's time. A long disquisition on the Trinity leads to the psychological theory

¹ ii. 19.

² ii. 21, 561 A: "ea sola, quae aeterna sunt, ante hunc mundum fuerunt, et post eum futura sunt. Et nihil sub sole novum, hoc est, quicquid novum sub hoc mundo est, nihil est; mundus enim iste totus novus dicitur, quia aeternus non est, et in tempore ortus est; ideoque nihil est."

of man. In human nature there is found to be the derivative trinity of *οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια*, *essentia, virtus, operatio*; again, *νοῦς, λόγος, διάνοια*, *intellectus, ratio, sensus*. These trinities are the same. Here "sense" means internal, not external sense (*αἰσθησις*), which refers, as the Greeks say, to the conjunction of body and soul. Within this trinity are not included, as substantial parts of human nature, vital motion and the corruptible body. These are the results of sin; and, at the resurrection, will not indeed perish, but will lose their separateness and pass over into the essential trinity of human nature.¹ In paradise,—that is, in the archetypal state,—man's body was spiritual, as it is to be after the resurrection.

The psychology here presents nothing scientifically original. The intermediate position, for example, of discursive reason between pure intellect and sense-perception was an established doctrine of later antiquity, transmitted by the Greek Christian writers. The discussion brings us, however, to an interesting metaphysico-theological development. The human soul, it is concluded, being the image of God, resembles God in everything save that its essence is derivative. But between God and his image, asks the pupil, is there not also this difference; that God knows both that he is and what he is, whereas the soul knows only that it is, not what it is (*quid sit*)? ² I see, replies the teacher, that you have been deceived by a semblance of true reasoning. For if God is absolutely infinite (*universaliter infinitus*), he must be indefinable not only by every creature but by himself. How can the divine nature understand what it is, when, as was shown in the first book, it can be brought under no category and is none of the things that exist? God does not know "what" his nature is, because distinctively it is not anything.³ This paradox of the "divine ignorance," which is the highest wisdom,⁴ is further developed. One corollary is that God does not know evil. If he knew it, evil would have a substantial existence in the nature of things. "For God does not therefore know the things that are, because they subsist; but they therefore subsist, because God knows them."⁵ That is to say, God knows only in creating determinate existences. The indeterminate, whether above these like the divine essence, or below them like "privation," is unknowable. In God, to know and

¹ ii. 23, 571 A: "In hoc enim ternario summae ac sanctae Trinitatis imago expressa cognoscitur."

² ii. 27.

³ ii. 28, 589 BC: "Deus itaque nescit se, quid est, quia non est quid; . . . seipsum non cognoscit aliquid esse."

⁴ ii. 28, 594 A: "Ipsa itaque ignorantia summa ac vera est sapientia." Cf. ii. 29, 598 A: "Et in quantum se nescit in his, quae sunt, comprehendere, in tantum se scit ultra omnia exaltari; atque ideo nesciendo seipsum, a seipso melius scitur."

⁵ ii. 28, 596 B.

to do are the same. He knew all things that were to be made before they were made. "And, what is more wonderful, all things therefore are because they have been foreknown. For the essence of all things is no other than the knowledge of all things in the divine wisdom."¹ By an application of these positions, as we have seen, Erigena thought to banish the doctrine that God predestines to evil. The knowledge which God has of all that he creates does indeed carry with it predetermination; since the divine knowledge necessarily causes the existence of the things known (or is those things): but evil, as a falling-off from the reality of nature, is outside this knowledge.

Of theology, says the master, the part called the negative (*ἀποφατική*) has now again been set forth; in which it is shown that God is none of the things that are and that are not, and knows not himself as any of them; "which species of ignorance surpasses all knowledge and understanding."² Under the head of the theology called affirmative (*καταφατική*) we are offered further developments on the Trinity. The end of all that can be uttered about the Trinity in Unity, it is observed, is merely that we may have something to say in praise of what is ineffable.³ Incidentally we meet with a modification of a "Johannine" thought. If human nature does not first know and love itself, how can it desire the knowledge of God?⁴ The book ends with the reaffirmation that the "primordial causes," which the Father created in the Son, are "what the Greeks call ideas." They are also called predeterminations (*προορίσματα*) or predestinations, or divine volitions (*θεῖα θελήματα*); and are said to be the principles of all things because all objects of sense or thought, whether in the visible or in the invisible world, subsist by participating in them.⁵

The third book is specially devoted to the consideration of the nature which is created and does not create; but the desirability is recognised of first setting forth some descending order of the causes among themselves, though this can have no absolute philosophical validity.

The order to be adopted is that of St. Dionysius the Areopagite in his treatise *De divinis Nominibus*. This order is discerned in the mind that contemplates rather than in the causes themselves.⁶ As it depends on our choice whether we begin with one or another of the spaces into which a circle is divided by its radii, so, in considering the primordial causes, we may begin where we like. The choice has been made to begin with goodness as a principle. But this choice, says the pupil, cannot be altogether arbitrary. Nor is it, the teacher concedes: but he desires to

¹ ii. 20, 559 B. ² ii. 30, 599 C. ³ ii. 35. ⁴ ii. 32. ⁵ ii. 36.

⁶ iii. 1, 624 A: "Ipsae siquidem primae causae in seipsis unum sunt, et simplices, nullique cognito ordine definitae, aut a se invicem segregatae, hoc enim in effectibus suis patiuntur."

avoid any rash promise of satisfaction, finding that he has "scarcely a place among the last followers of the great philosophers."¹ If possible, however, he would escape the doom of the servant who neglected his one talent. He will therefore venture an explanation why goodness comes first in the series.

The explanation is that things are because it was good that they should be: it is not their mere being that makes them good. Goodness being entirely taken away, no essence remains. And it is not conversely true that, essence being entirely taken away, no goodness will remain. For there is a goodness beyond that of "beings"; which are so called because they fall under definite forms of intellect or sense. Thus goodness is more general than essence. The things that "are not" (in any circumscribed mode) are better than the things that "are" (as thus defined).²

Here Erigena has thought his way back to a metaphysical position of Plotinus. The method which he follows of descending from the more general to the more special is carried through on the model fixed for the latest dependents on Neo-Platonism by Proclus. As goodness is more general than essence, so essence is more general than life, and life than reason. This, as has been said, is not in strictness true of the primordial causes themselves; but it has its application to their effects as mentally contemplated. For in goodness participate things that are and that are not, but in essence only things that are; in essence things living and not living, but in life only things living; in life things rational and irrational, but in reason only things rational. All the "distributions," we are always to bear in mind, are united "by a certain ineffable unity."³

As with Proclus, so with Erigena, the outward progression has its complement in a return of all things to their source.⁴ The difference is, on the one side, that for Proclus the relation of principle to end does not express itself by a total process in time; on the other side, that for Erigena the pantheistic thought is more explicit. The cause of all is all.⁵ An analogue is our own intellect, which remains intrinsically invisible and incomprehensible while manifesting itself by certain signs. Hence in both cases a whole series of coincident contraries: "appearance of the non-apparent," and so on.

The Christian dogma of creation, however, brings back the difficulty: How is the eternal existence of all things in the Wisdom of God compatible with their beginning to be and ceasing to be in time? How can that be eternal which was not before it was made? The supposition of a formless matter

¹ iii. 1, 627 A.

² iii. 2.

³ iii. 3.

⁴ iii. 4, 632 C: "*iterumque per secretissimos naturae poros occultissimo meatu ad fontem suum redeunt.*"

⁵ iii. 4, 633 A: "*Ambit enim omnia, et nihil intra se est, in quantum vere est, nisi ipsa, quia sola vere est.*" Cf. 634 A: "*quae ineffabilis diffusio et facit omnia, et fit in omnibus, et omnia est.*"

in which temporal things are generated from their eternal causes offers no way of escape, since this too has no origin outside God, but is among the things divinely predetermined.

The teacher cannot promise a complete solution; but he will go as far as thought, divinely illumined, permits, and then, when the mind has reached its limit, confess ignorance.¹ After some further preliminaries on the existence of the causes, ideas or reasons of things in the Word of God, which may also be called the Reason and Cause, the answer already hinted at is given more circumstantially. If you take away their eternal causes from the things that begin to be and cease to be in time, these are nothing. Their real existence is identical with their ideal pre-existence.² As pre-existent, they are both "made," in the all-inclusive Word, and eternal. As temporal, they are partly real (having eternal causes), partly unreal. The pupil, however, cannot all at once get over the apparent opposition, and restates the difficulty in a pointed form: "The things that are eternal never begin to be, never cease to subsist, and there was no time when they were not, because they always were; but the things that have been made have received a beginning of their making."³ Moreover, that which has begun to be must inevitably cease to be. It is not conceivable that the master has in view to defend the position of some who think that the visible creation, or part of it, will last for ever in the future and thus maintain a kind of "semi-eternity," in spite of its having had a beginning. Rather it may be conjectured that he follows those who hold that, while the whole world will be dissolved, its incomposite nature will survive; this being incorruptible because incorporeal. The teacher confesses that he did once accept the false opinions referred to; but he has retraced his steps. Then the pupil goes on to say that the views now commended to him on the authority of St. Dionysius the Arcopagite are incomparably deeper and more wonderful than his former ones. What he had held was that God alone is without beginning, and that all things else are not eternal but have been made. The new position is "yet unheard of and unknown not only to me but to many and almost to all. For if it is thus, who would not straightway break forth into this speech and cry out: God therefore is all, and all things are God! Which will be esteemed monstrous even by those who are thought to be wise."⁴ Let the doubt then be resolved, so that he may not sink back in thickest darkness after the hope has been raised of the dawn of light to be. And let the way of reasoning be begun with natural examples, "which none resists unless blinded by excess of foolishness."

¹ iii. 7.

² iii. 8, 640 AB: "Nihil enim aliud nos sumus, in quantum sumus, nisi ipsae rationes nostrae aeternaliter in Deo substitutae."

³ iii. 9, 647 C.

⁴ iii. 10, 650 CD.

The example given by the teacher is from the science of arithmetic, interpreted according to a speculative idea which he traces to Pythagoras.¹ Unity, or the "monad," eternally contains in itself, as a system of latent "reasons," infinite number and all the rules by which numbers are combined. Number is thus, in analogy with creative deity, at once maker and made; maker as the monad, made in all determinate combinations of numbers. The monad as principle is identical with the monad as end, into which all the numbers produced return when analysed. Its existence as unity does not cease through the production of plurality; and all that it contains and makes is eternal like itself, not having its origin from a beginning in time. It is itself one eternal product of the deity, to whose action it furnishes a natural analogy. Of arithmetic as of the other natural arts, the created and human intellect is not the maker but the finder, though it finds them within itself, where they are produced, and not without.²

This is only illustration. The direct reply is a restatement of the principle of immaterialism already affirmed.³ The things that begin and cease to be have their true being in their "primordial causes," which are eternal. As determined to a particular time and place, they are only appearances. To the difficulty that time and place too must have their primordial causes in the Word of God, so that even "accidents" do not fall outside the Word, the concession is made that here is a mystery of which the mode is beyond investigation. All is no doubt predetermined, including what are to us accidents. Thus these too have corresponding to them a reality; but, difficult as the distinction may be, this reality is not to be confounded with the beginning and ending and spatial limitation of the appearances under which the causes of things are manifested. An illustration may be found in the incorporeal virtue of the seed, manifested in all that grows out of it, from grain to harvest. And, if anyone objects that this requires a matter to manifest itself in, the reply is, that every manifestation can be resolved into something in the last resort immaterial, such as colour, odour, and so forth.⁴

Thus it is God himself who is created in all that exists. There is no being or not-being outside his essence. And within the divine nature there is nothing that is not co-essential with it. We must not conceive of God and the creature as two things

¹ iii. 11, 652 A.

² iii. 12, 658 B.

³ iii. 14, 663 A: "MAG. Recordarisne, quid de ipsa materia in primo libro inter nos est confectum, ubi ex intelligibilium coitu ipsam fieri disputavimus? Quantitates siquidem et qualitates, dum per se incorporeae sint, in unum vero coeuntes informem efficiunt materiam, quae adjectis formis coloribusque incorporeis in diversa corpora movetur. Disc. Recordor sane. MAG. Ex rebus itaque incorporalibus corpora nascuntur."

⁴ iii. 16.

standing apart from one another, but as one and the same.¹

"Eternal, he begins to be, and immovable he is moved to all things,² and in all things he is made all." And this, the teacher explicitly declares, is not said of the Incarnation of the Word in human form, but of the universal theophany which has neither cause nor matter nor occasion outside the divine nature.

This leads to that "identification of contraries" which fascinated later pantheists. The two extremes of super-essential reality and not-being are alike formless; and in each alternately, according to the point of view, may be seen the source of all that is manifested in the appearances of the visible world. Are they not then equally good names for the indefinable cause which is all and yet nothing? The Scripture seems to bear this out. "His light," says the Psalmist, "is as his darkness."³

Not only are the extremes identified, but the mean—that is, the graded variety of existing things—is declared identical with both. "Accordingly the divine goodness considered as above all is said not to be, and to be nothing at all; yet in all things it both is and is said to be, because it is the essence of the whole universality." Thus considered, as having passed from "nothing" to "something," every category may be applied to it.⁴ In descending the scale of production it is therefore made apparently the basest and vilest things; and to say this can offend those only who are unwilling to see the clear light of wisdom: for to the universe as a whole there is nothing vile or base. God is now all in all, and is not merely to be made so at the end of a process in time.⁵

When Erigena comes down from metaphysics to physics, he has to educe such science as he can from the account of the six days' work in the Book of Genesis. Throughout the exposition, he insists that the six days are not to be understood of an order in time, but of an intelligible order of causation. The visible world issued as a whole, and not part by part, from its invisible primordial causes.⁶ Here again it is explicitly declared that the

¹ iii. 17, 678 BC: "Proinde non duo a seipsis distantia debemus intelligere Deum et creaturam, sed unum et id ipsum."

² Movement, as with Aristotle, means change in general.

³ iii. 19. Bruno (*Della Causa*, Dialogo Terzo) quotes the same verse of the same psalm in support of his doctrine that "absolute act" coincides with "absolute potency": *Tenebrae non obscurabuntur a te. Nox sicut dies illuminabitur. Sicut tenebrae ejus, ita et lumen ejus.* Cf. p. 327, note 1.

⁴ iii. 19, 681 D. Cf. 681 A: "Dum ergo incomprehensibilis intelligitur, per excellentiam nihilum non immerito vocatur. At vero in suis theophaniis incipiens apparere, veluti ex nihilo in aliquid dicitur procedere, et quae proprie supra omnem essentiam existimatur, proprie quoque in omni essentia cognoscitur, ideoque omnis visibilis et invisibilis creatura theophania, id est, divina apparitio potest appellari."

⁵ iii. 20, 683 B: "Ac sic ordinate in omnia proveniens facit omnia, et fit in omnibus omnia, et in se ipsum redit, revocans in se omnia, et dum in omnibus fit, super omnia esse non desinit."

⁶ iii. 27, 699 C: "de causis adhuc incognitis, ac veluti formis adhuc

cause and the effect are in reality identical.¹ Against those who, professedly founding themselves on Scripture, say that the heaven with its stars, the ether with the planets, the air with its clouds and winds and lightnings, the water and its fluctuant motion, earth likewise with all its herbs and trees, are without soul and every kind of life, he cites Plato and his disciples;² who not only assert a general life of the world, but also confess that no bodily thing is deprived of life, and have had the hardihood to give to this life, whether general or special, the name of soul. This position he defends at length, arguing that the "most universal soul," or "most general life," penetrates all that exists, even what appear to our senses to be dead bodies; and this it does in a manner of which the all-diffusive power of the solar rays furnishes an imperfect similitude.

While protesting that he would avoid the appearance of "following the sect of Plato,"³ he again takes up the position that man is a microcosm, uniting in himself the intellect of angelic spirits (in terms of the Christian transformation of Platonism) with the discursive reason peculiar to himself and the sensitive and nutritive life of the animal and of the living germ that is in all things.⁴ So far as this book is concerned, he seems to be on the way to a doctrine like that of the Arabian philosophers who held that the only human immortality is the immortality of the race and its general mind. At least in explaining the unlikenesses among men, he brings in no intrinsic difference between one human soul and another, but lays down the position that all manifested unlikenesses are due to accidents of time and place and circumstance; the "substantial form" of human nature being one and the same in all.⁵ We may infer, however, from portions of the later books, that he retained in theory as well as in dogmatic belief something of the metaphysical "individualism" of his Platonic predecessors, Hellenic or Christian. Whatever his doctrine may be, it is applied equally to the souls of animals. On purely philosophical grounds, he decides that these do not perish with their bodies. Incidentally

carentibus omnium rerum visibilium conditio, nullis temporum spatiis vel locorum interpositis, simul in formas numerosque locorum et temporum producta est." Cf. 31, 709 D: "ipsa natura simul in omnes coepit currere creaturas, nec ulla alteram locorum seu temporum numeris seu spatiis praecessit."

¹ iii. 28, 704 B: "Aliter enim in causis, aliter in effectibus una eademque res theoriae speculationibus intimatur." Cf. 25, 693 AB.

² iii. 36, 728 A: "Plato, philosophorum summus, et qui circa eum sunt."

³ iii. 37, 732 D.

⁴ iii. 37, 733 B: "non immerito dicitur homo *creaturarum omnium officina*, quoniam in ipso universalis creatura continetur. Intelligit quidem ut angelus, ratiocinatur ut homo, sentit ut animal irrationale, vivit ut germen, corpore animaque subsistit, nullius creaturae expertus."

⁵ iii. 27, 703 BC.

he points out the difficulty of reconciling the absolute unlikeness assumed between man and brute with the evidences that have been collected of animal intelligence.¹ The main argument, however, is from the relation of species to genus. The highest genus in which living things participate is the primordial life or soul. Now if the species included under this perish in part, the whole loses its integrity. If, for example, the only species left were to be man, that would not be the preservation but the ruin of the genus. And if the genus is a substantial unity, how can it perish? By participation in this, then, the life or soul of every species must be supposed to remain after the destruction of the particular bodies it governs. Erigena recognises that the authority of eminent Fathers is against him: but he conjectures that they put forward in public the doctrine they taught, not because they were careless about the investigation of truth, but in order to deter the unwise among men from imitating irrational animals. With this aim, they represented them as viler than they are. And indeed, as not having the distinctive characteristics of man, the lower animals are not fit objects of human imitation, though they no less contain a reality that is imperishable.

The fourth and fifth books, comprising nearly half the entire work, treat of "the return of all things into that nature which neither creates nor is created."² The difficulty of this, the master says, is such that, in comparison with it, what has gone before may seem plain sailing in an open sea. Yet, in spite of all the syrtes and the hidden rocks that beset the passage, he ventures to promise, under divine guidance, safe arrival in port. The disciple is eager to continue the voyage; declaring that reason experienced in this deep (*ratio perita hujus ponti*) gains more delight from the exercise of virtue in the secret channels of the divine ocean than from the smooth and leisurely course that is insufficient for the disclosure of its strength.

Modern readers too will find this second part more difficult and complex than the first; and they will not fail to recognise the particular syrtes and hidden rocks that are the cause. In Erigena's statement, however, there is no irony. We must not forget that, deeply as he sought to transform it, he accepted the account of man's creation and fall and redemption given by the Christian creed as in some sense a divine revelation. Thus he takes for granted that a theory of reality can be conveyed by a rational interpretation of the faith. This makes the genuinely, if not completely, philosophical character of his theorising the more remarkable; as appears especially when it is cleared (so far as possible) of the Scriptural and patristic developments in which it is frequently immersed.

A profound thought that presents itself detached from these is the idea of a "dialectic" running through nature. The art

¹ iii. 39.

² iv. 2.

which divides genera into species and resolves species into genera, is found to be no mere human contrivance, but to have been established in the nature of things. Thence it was discovered by the wise and turned to account for its use as an instrument of investigation.¹ It hardly needs pointing out how on one side this suggests the Hegelian Dialectic; on the other, Mill's "Natural Kinds."

The principle laid down for the interpretation of Scripture is not in itself different from that of many orthodox Fathers and Doctors. There was general agreement that the sacred writings may yield the utmost variety of senses.² Whether the particular interpretation adopted was, in the opinion of ecclesiastical authority, legitimate, depended not on the method but on the result. If the most strained and violent allegorising yielded orthodox doctrine, no fundamental objection was raised. Criticism, in our sense, was as completely absent as in the ascription of documents to apostolic authors by the early Church. And often, so far as I am aware, nothing would be said against Erigena's procedure. A case in point may, I suppose, be found in his development of the Pauline pneumatology in the sense of the Neo-Platonic antithesis between body and immaterial soul and mind, and the reading of this into the double account of creation in the Book of Genesis. Here modern criticism detects two documents, in one of which man was described as created with the animals but last of the series, in the other as separately created before them. Erigena sees quite plainly the facts that are the basis of the modern theory; but, regarding the whole as revealed, finds in the double account an indication in what manner man is an animal and a spirit, and both at once.

The heterodoxy comes in when he approaches his theory of the restitution of all things. To this the fourth book is mainly preliminary, giving an interpretation of the Creation and Fall; but soon we perceive his preoccupation with the theory already in part expounded in the *De Praedestinatione*, that no real nature is to be finally lost.³ As this theory logically requires, every reality, of whatever kind, is held to be prefigured in the creation. The conclusion is here already involved: all that exists being predetermined, the process must end in the complete preservation of all reality in its perfection for ever. There is, for Erigena, a beginning of process in time; but there is no historical fall of man. Both the devil and man, as he puts it, fell without

¹ iv. 4.

² iv. 5, 749 C: "Est enim multiplex et infinitus divinatorum eloquiorum intellectus. Siquidem in penna pavonis una eademque mirabilis ac pulchra innumerabilium colorum varietas conspicitur in uno eodemque loco ejusdem pennae portiunculæ."

³ iv. 5, 760 C: "Non enim divinae justitiae est visum, ex eo, quod fecit, quidquam perire, praecertim cum non ipsa natura peccaverit, sed perversa voluntas, quae contra naturam rationabilem irrationabiliter movetur."

temporal interval.¹ There was no primeval perfection of human nature in a local paradise, but only in the archetypal idea. There was no actual or appreciable time during which man lived without sin.² His "fall" consisted in descent from the state of an idea, prefigured in the divine mind, to the conditions of birth.

Even man's body, so far as it is truly body, "subsists in its reasons."³ It was not sin that made an animal of man, but nature.⁴ As has been said, God created every creature, both visible and invisible, in man. The reality or substance of the human mind is not other than its notion in the divine mind.⁵ And, as the internal notion of things in the human mind is the substance of those things of which it is the notion, so the notion by which man knows himself is his substance.⁶

The notion of man in the divine mind, and the notion which he has of himself, though both called "substances," are not to be understood as two, but as one substance viewed in a twofold manner.⁷ The existence of the human mind, and its self-knowledge, are coincident. And the knowledge it has, even if only of its own ignorance, suffices to prove the existence of the self. In a remarkable passage, Erigena, after Augustine, gives vigorous personal expression to that notion of "consciousness" which had gradually become clear to the ancient schools, and which was afterwards to be made by Descartes the methodical beginning of a new movement.⁸

The self-knowledge of man in the primordial causes before time is general, not of any particular human mind. Human nature is there a unity without distinction of individuals.⁹ The self-knowledge of the particular human mind is a knowledge of itself in relation to time and place, and does not exist before these.

¹ iv. 20.

² iv. 15 ff.

³ iv. 5, 759 B.

⁴ iv. 7, 763 A.

⁵ iv. 7, 768 B: "Possumus ergo hominem definire sic: Homo est notio quaedam intellectualis in mente divina aeternaliter facta."

⁶ iv. 7, 770 A.

⁷ iv. 7, 770, 771: "Disc. Duas igitur substantias hominis intelligere debemus unam quidem in primordialibus causis generalem, alteram in earum effectibus specialem. MAG. Duas non dixerim, sed unam dupliciter intellectam. Aliter enim humana substantia per conditionem in intellectualibus perspicitur causis, aliter per generationem in effectibus."

⁸ iv. 9, 776 B: "Scio enim me esse, nec tamen me praecedit scientia mei, quia non aliud sum, et aliud scientia, qua me scio; et si nescirem me esse, non nescirem ignorare me esse: ac per hoc, sive scivero, sive nescivero me esse, scientia non carebo; mihi enim remanebit scire ignorantiam meam. Et si omne, quod potest scire se ipsum nescire, non potest ignorare se ipsum esse; nam si penitus non esset, non sciret se ipsum nescire: conficitur, omnino esse omne, quod scit se esse, vel scit se nescire se esse."

⁹ iv. 9, 776, 777: "Nam in illa primordiali et generali totius humanae naturae conditione nemo seipsum specialiter cognoscit, neque propriam notitiam sui habere incipit; una enim et generalis cognitio omnium est ibi, solique Deo cognita. Illic namque omnes homines unus sunt, ille profecto ad imaginem Dei factus, in quo omnes creati sunt."

Human and even animal sense, Erigena says with Augustine, is superior to the greatest splendour of the visible world regarded as devoid of life.¹ As we have seen, however, he does not in his own theory so regard it. The antithesis here is between sense and body in abstraction. The position to be enforced is that the whole soul, and not merely its higher part, called spirit or mind or intellect, was made in the image of God. This follows from its being all in the whole and all in every part, not only of the body but of itself. For (as had been shown in the ancient psychology) no mental "faculty" is isolated; in each the whole soul expresses itself. "But in two modes above all we know the human soul made in the image of God: first, because, as God is diffused through all the things that are, and can be comprehended by none of them, so the soul penetrates the whole instrument of its body, yet may not be enclosed by it; in the second place, because, as of God is predicated only being, but in no manner is it defined what he is, so the human soul is only understood to be, but what it is neither itself nor other creature understands."²

The material and external body, due to sin, is as a kind of vestment of the internal and "natural," identified by Erigena with the "spiritual," body. "For it is moved through times and ages, suffering increase and loss of itself, while that remains ever immutably in its internal state."³ Corporeal individuality is treated as one of the secondary things befalling man "from the qualities of corruptible seeds."⁴ And yet of this too there is something that remains. When the corruptible body is dissolved, a certain form of it endures in the soul, and preserves a relation to the material elements into which the body has been decomposed.⁵ In the creation, the consequences of sin were provided for before it happened.⁶ The bad will precedes the act: hence man was never without sin, as he never subsisted without mutable will. For even the irrational mutability itself of free-will, because it is the cause of evil, is necessarily a kind of evil.⁷

Thus in the original "paradise"—interpreted as meaning, not a place, but ideal human nature created as a whole—every-

¹ iv. 10, 784 D: "*Nam si melior est anima vermiculi, ut sanctus Pater Augustinus edocet, quam corpus solare totum mundum illustrans; vita siquidem extrema, qualiscunque sit, primo corpori pretiosissimoque dignitate essentiae praeponitur: quid mirum, si omnia totius mundi corpora humano sensui postponentur?*"

² iv. 11, 788 A.

³ iv. 12, 802 A.

⁴ iv. 12, 801 CD: "*Universaliter autem in omnibus corporibus humanis una eademque forma communis omnibus intelligitur, et semper in omnibus incommutabiliter stat. Nam innumerabiles differentiae, quae eidem formae accidunt, non ex ratione primae conditionis, sed ex qualitatibus corruptibilium seminum nascuntur.*"

⁵ iv. 13.

⁶ iv. 14.

⁷ iv. 14, 808 C: "*Nam et ipsa irrationabilis mutabilitas liberae voluntatis, quia causa mali est, nonnullum malum esse necesse est.*"

thing was prefigured. By the man placed in paradise was meant intellect (*voûs*); by the woman, sense (*αἴσθησις*).¹ This interpretation is adopted from Ambrose; who, as Erigena thinks, follows Origen, though he does not cite him by name. In the allegory is to be understood sometimes "internal," sometimes "external," sense. External sense, however, is not a part of the primal human nature, but is superinduced. Evil (as Erigena uniformly teaches) has no existence in itself, but is found only where falsity has its seat; and the recipient of error is no other than the external sense, by which the parts of human nature properly so called are deceived.² This is indicated by the "tree of knowledge," which is a mixed thing. So far as it is good, it comes from God: so far as it is evil, it is in reality nothing, and can be referred to no cause.

The difference between the good and evil in the mixture may be seen by considering, for example, a golden vase adorned with gems, viewed by one who is wise and by an avaricious man. The former will find the nature of the phantasy all good, referring the beauty of the vase simply to the praise of the Creator, and will feel no temptation of personal desire; the latter will be inflamed with cupidity, "the root of all evil."³ The meaning of the forbidden fruit is that intellect and sense (figured as the man and the woman) are prohibited from the indiscriminating appetite for good and evil, infixed in imperfect souls from the delight in the beauty of material things.⁴ Before the visible creature is delighted in, the praise ought to be referred to the Creator. When man through pride disregarded this due order, when he placed the love and knowledge of the Creator after the external beauty of the material creature, he took the way to perdition.⁵

The theory derived by Erigena from Maximus, and here again introduced,⁶ that if man had not fallen he would have been multiplied like the angels, without the union of the sexes, is declared by the Catholic editor to be theologically heterodox. Philosophically the interesting point is, whether the archetypal unity of the human race, as Erigena understands it, excludes real individuality. Now the reference to multiplication (whatever the theory may mean for a theologian) evidently decides

¹ iv. 16, 815 D.

² iv. 16, 826 B: "Nulla enim alia pars humanae naturae falsitatis errorem recipit praeter sensum exteriorem, siquidem per ipsum et interior sensus, et ratio, ipse etiam intellectus, saepissime fallitur."

³ iv. 16.

⁴ iv. 18. For all that, Erigena can recognise that the beginning of knowledge is in sensible experience. Cf. iv. 25, 855 B: "omne studium sapientiae, omnisque mentis conceptio, puraque veritatis cognitio a sensibus corporis auspiciis sumunt, ab inferioribus ad superiora, et ab exterioribus ad interiora ratione gradatim ascendente."

⁵ iv. 22.

⁶ iv. 23.

against this view. Since the species, even if retaining its archetypal perfection, is to be thought as multiplying itself, it must have implicitly contained the individuals, ideally prefigured.

The individualism which, in the last resort, has not been expelled from Erigena's system by his stress on the primal reality of genus and species, becomes most marked in the fifth book. Here, after the preliminaries of the fourth book, a full and positive theory is expounded of the return of all things to their principle, which is also their end. In what is said in Genesis of the "tree of life," the return of human nature to its original state is found to be indicated.¹ This return of man (in whose nature all creatures are included) is to be for ever.² Things visible and invisible, in spite of their apparent departure, always indeed remain in their original unity. When they have finally returned and are one in the divine nature, "as now and ever they are one in their causes," no nature further will be produced: whence the divine nature into which they return is rightly said not to create; as it is said not to be created because it is the cause which has no principle beyond.³

Arguments for the return are first drawn from sensible things. The rhythm alike of astronomical and of vital motion furnishes an analogy with which a total movement of the whole from beginning to end appears to be in agreement. The words *principium* and *finis*, of course, make it easy to identify on the one hand the temporal beginning with that which is held to be the ever-present cause or principle of all movement, and on the other hand the final cause or object of desire with a temporal end in which things attain rest. The metaphysical principle being conceived as identical with the end, the notion is further suggested of a corresponding identity between the primal and the ultimate state of the universe. Yet, in this book also, the whole is declared to be always perfect.⁴ For Erigena no less than for Proclus, the *μονή* coexists with the *πρόοδος* and the *ἐπιστροφή* (though Erigena does not know these particular terms). And the analogy of visible things is not consistently carried through. For we have no knowledge of any actual cycle that closes with a final rest of the visible agents. As Bruno said after the Ionians, the end of one process is the beginning of another. Thus, if the analogy of the parts were applicable to the whole, a repeated rhythm would be demanded, not a single world-process. But the real

¹ v. 1.

² v. 2, 862 D: "nunquam ad egestatem temporalium rerum, quae omnino cum mundo peribunt, reversurus, totus in Deum transiturus, et unum in illo futurus."

³ Cf. iv. 27.

⁴ v. 35, 954 C: "Aliud est enim considerare singulas universitatis partes, aliud totum. Hinc conficitur, ut, quod in parte contrarium esse putatur, in toto non solum non contrarium, verum etiam pulchritudinis augmentum reperitur."

ground of the theory is a dogma. Erigena is seeking for confirmations, and not simply "following the argument." We can guess what his system might have been earlier or later; but, as it is, he accepts a datum not purely philosophical, and not scientific even as science was understood.

The true tendency of his speculation may be seen in what he brings forward to illustrate recurrence in the "intelligible" order that is the object of the "liberal arts." The divisions of Dialectic, he points out, start from *οὐσία* and are brought back to it through the same stages. Arithmetic begins with the monad and resolves all numbers again into this. Geometry proceeds similarly in relation to the point; Music in relation to the single note; Astronomy in relation to the indivisible unit by which it measures spaces of time. In Grammar and Rhetoric, the remaining two of the seven liberal disciplines, he goes on to say, examples have not been sought; because, on the one side, they are attached to Dialectic as subordinate members; and because, on the other side, they do not treat of the nature of things, but rather of human rules of custom, or of special causes and persons. Not that they entirely want principles of their own: for Grammar may be said to begin and end with the letter, Rhetoric with the "hypothesis," or determined question which is beyond controversy for the disputants.¹

In all this, clearly, there is no reference to an order in time. And the same is true of what follows concerning human nature. This, says Erigena,² through all its corruption has in no wise lost the integrity of its essence, by which it is in union with God; nor can it lose it. His view here closely resembles that of Plotinus regarding the "pure soul," which remains exempt from all sin and suffering, while the "composite nature," produced by the association of soul and body, pays the penalty of what has been done amiss. Our nature, Erigena says in the same spirit, has not been lost or changed, but discoloured with the deformity of vices.³ From this "fall," however, it is to return by stages.

Without attempting wholly to extricate the philosophy from the mythology, we may proceed to the development of the theory as it stands.

The essence of sensible things will remain perpetually; because it was made in the divine wisdom beyond all times and places and all mutability; but what is generated at times and places will perish, after an interval determined by the Maker of all. To this end of preservation in their "reasons" from which they set out—not in their circumstances of place and time—all men aspire, and it cannot be supposed that they will rest till they have attained it. The whole of human nature will be finally liberated

¹ v. 4.² v. 6.³ v. 6, 873 A.

from death and misery, though it will not be equally blessed in all.¹

The stages of reversion are five : (1) When the body is resolved into the four elements from which it was composed, and the soul thus liberated ; (2) When each receives back his own body at the resurrection ; (3) When the body shall be changed into spirit ; (4) When the spirit, or more expressly, the whole nature of man, shall return into its primordial causes, which are ever and immutably in God ; (5) When nature itself with its causes shall be moved (*i.e.*, transformed) into God, as air illuminated is transformed into light.²

This transformation of man and of all things into God does not mean that their finite substance is to perish, but that they are to be carried over by degrees into a fuller existence.³ The end is not a confusion of substances, but a union in which each retains its identity.⁴ Examples of such union without confusion are found in the different individuals of a species, the species of a genus, the genera of the same essence (*οἰσία*), the numbers implicit in the monad, the lines implicit in the point.⁵ It is illustrated in simultaneous vision of the same object by many persons ; there being no confusion of the perceptions, though all refer to one thing.⁶ So also different musical sounds do not lose their particular qualities when combined in a single harmony. And if, as has been said, the qualities of visible things are in reality incorporeal, and terrene bodies are formed by a heaping up of these incorporeal qualities, what difficulty is there in the final resolution and return of all that has been thus put together into the incorporeal, which is the real ?⁷

The pupil here raises the question, whether all things do not, throughout the processes of generation and corruption, remain permanently in their causes ; the going forth to the procreation of visible things, and the return, being only an affair of places and times and accidents. Is not substance always in reality

¹ v. 3, 868 B : " Hoc autem dicimus, non quod natura in omnibus aequaliter futura sit beata, sed quod in omnibus morte et miseria futura sit libera. Esse enim et vivere et aeternaliter esse commune erit omnibus et bonis et malis ; bene autem et beate esse solis actione et scientia perfectis proprium et speciale erit."

² v. 8.

³ v. 8, 876 B : " Quomodo enim potest perire, quod in melius probatur redire ? Mutatio itaque humanae naturae in Deum non substantiae interitus aestimanda est, sed in pristinum statum, quem praevaricando perdiderat, mirabilis atque ineffabilis reversio."

⁴ v. 8, 879 A : " Non enim vera ratio sinit, superiora inferioribus vel contineri, vel attrahi, vel consumi. Inferiora vero superioribus naturaliter attrahuntur, et absorbentur, non ut non sint, sed ut in eis plus salventur, et subsistant, et unum sint." Cf. 880 A : " Naturarum igitur manebit proprietates, et earum erit unitas, nec proprietates auferet naturarum adunationem, nec adunatio naturarum proprietatem."

⁵ v. 10.

⁶ v. 12.

⁷ v. 13.

ground of the theory is a dogma. Erigena is seeking for confirmations, and not simply "following the argument." We can guess what his system might have been earlier or later; but, as it is, he accepts a datum not purely philosophical, and not scientific even as science was understood.

The true tendency of his speculation may be seen in what he brings forward to illustrate recurrence in the "intelligible" order that is the object of the "liberal arts." The divisions of Dialectic, he points out, start from *οὐσία* and are brought back to it through the same stages. Arithmetic begins with the monad and resolves all numbers again into this. Geometry proceeds similarly in relation to the point; Music in relation to the single note; Astronomy in relation to the indivisible unit by which it measures spaces of time. In Grammar and Rhetoric, the remaining two of the seven liberal disciplines, he goes on to say, examples have not been sought; because, on the one side, they are attached to Dialectic as subordinate members; and because, on the other side, they do not treat of the nature of things, but rather of human rules of custom, or of special causes and persons. Not that they entirely want principles of their own: for Grammar may be said to begin and end with the letter, Rhetoric with the "hypothesis," or determined question which is beyond controversy for the disputants.¹

In all this, clearly, there is no reference to an order in time. And the same is true of what follows concerning human nature. This, says Erigena,² through all its corruption has in no wise lost the integrity of its essence, by which it is in union with God; nor can it lose it. His view here closely resembles that of Plotinus regarding the "pure soul," which remains exempt from all sin and suffering, while the "composite nature," produced by the association of soul and body, pays the penalty of what has been done amiss. Our nature, Erigena says in the same spirit, has not been lost or changed, but discoloured with the deformity of vices.³ From this "fall," however, it is to return by stages.

Without attempting wholly to extricate the philosophy from the mythology, we may proceed to the development of the theory as it stands.

The essence of sensible things will remain perpetually; because it was made in the divine wisdom beyond all times and places and all mutability; but what is generated at times and places will perish, after an interval determined by the Maker of all. To this end of preservation in their "reasons" from which they set out—not in their circumstances of place and time—all men aspire, and it cannot be supposed that they will rest till they have attained it. The whole of human nature will be finally liberated

¹ v. 4² v. 6.³ v. 6, 873 A.

from death and misery, though it will not be equally blessed in all.¹

The stages of reversion are five : (1) When the body is resolved into the four elements from which it was composed, and the soul thus liberated ; (2) When each receives back his own body at the resurrection ; (3) When the body shall be changed into spirit ; (4) When the spirit, or more expressly, the whole nature of man, shall return into its primordial causes, which are ever and immutably in God ; (5) When nature itself with its causes shall be moved (*i.e.*, transformed) into God, as air illuminated is transformed into light.²

This transformation of man and of all things into God does not mean that their finite substance is to perish, but that they are to be carried over by degrees into a fuller existence.³ The end is not a confusion of substances, but a union in which each retains its identity.⁴ Examples of such union without confusion are found in the different individuals of a species, the species of a genus, the genera of the same essence (*οὐσία*), the numbers implicit in the monad, the lines implicit in the point.⁵ It is illustrated in simultaneous vision of the same object by many persons ; there being no confusion of the perceptions, though all refer to one thing.⁶ So also different musical sounds do not lose their particular qualities when combined in a single harmony. And if, as has been said, the qualities of visible things are in reality incorporeal, and terrene bodies are formed by a heaping up of these incorporeal qualities, what difficulty is there in the final resolution and return of all that has been thus put together into the incorporeal, which is the real ?⁷

The pupil here raises the question, whether all things do not, throughout the processes of generation and corruption, remain permanently in their causes ; the going forth to the procreation of visible things, and the return, being only an affair of places and times and accidents. Is not substance always in reality

¹ v. 3, 868 B : " Hoc autem dicimus, non quod natura in omnibus aequaliter futura sit beata, sed quod in omnibus morte et miseria futura sit libera. Esse enim et vivere et aeternaliter esse commune erit omnibus et bonis et malis ; bene autem et beate esse solis actione et scientia perfectus proprium et speciale erit."

² v. 8.

³ v. 8, 876 B : " Quomodo enim potest perire, quod in melius probatur redire ? Mutatio itaque humanae naturae in Deum non substantiae interitus aestimanda est, sed in pristinum statum, quem praevaricando perdiderat, mirabilis atque ineffabilis reversio."

⁴ v. 8, 879 A : " Non enim vera ratio sinit, superiora inferioribus vel contineri, vel attrahi, vel consumi. Inferiora vero superioribus naturaliter attrahuntur, et absorbentur, non ut non sint, sed ut in eis plus salventur, et subsistant, et unum sint." Cf. 880 A : " Naturarum igitur manebit proprietates, et earum erit unitas, nec proprietates auferet naturarum adunationem, nec adunatio naturarum proprietatem."

⁵ v. 10.

⁶ v. 12.

⁷ v. 13.

free from these, as finally it will become free from their appearance? Yes, answers the master. All that begins in time by generation must have an end; but this does not affect the incorporeal and intelligible grounds of corporeal and sensible things.¹

The extension of bodies will perish; and so also will time, with motion, of which it is the measure. Before and after the world, there is neither place, in this sense, nor time, but only eternity. Place understood as mental definition, on the other hand, is not among the things that perish.² Although, when the world has returned to its source, places and times no longer exist, there remain the "simple and unmixed reasons of places and times."³

What is dwelt on in the end is the perservation rather than the absorption of differences.⁴ The "effects"—namely, visible things—are to perish only by returning to their causes, and not by becoming simply non-existent.⁵ The "annihilation" of local and temporal forms, which are mere appearance, means the restoration of the things manifested under them to their true reality. In their causes and reasons, "all animals must be said to be more animals than in the corporeal and sensible effects themselves. For where they subsist, there they are truly animals. Similarly it is to be understood regarding all sensible things, whether celestial or terrene. Since the things that are varied in places and times and fall under the bodily senses, are all of them not to be understood as the substantial and truly existing things themselves, but as certain transitory images and echoes of these."⁶ This is illustrated by the transmutation of the passions into the virtues of the soul, and their preservation at this higher stage. Why then, Erigena asks, may not irrationality itself be transmuted (in the reunion of the whole) into the height of rationality?⁷

He thence goes on to deny the perpetuity of evil as an object

¹ v. 14.

² v. 18.

³ v. 23, 906 AB: "Mundus quippe peribit, nullaue ipsius pars remanebit: ac per hoc neque totum. Transibit enim in suas causas, ex quibus processit, in quibus neque loca sunt, neque tempora, sed locorum temporumque simplices sinceræque rationes, in quibus omnia unum sunt neque ullis accidentibus discernuntur. Omnia enim simplicia, omni compositione substantiarum accidentiumque carentia, et ut sic dicam, unitas simplex, et multiplex adunatio omnium creaturarum in suis rationibus et causis, ipsarum autem causarum et rationum in Verbo Dei unigenito, in quo et facta sunt et subsistunt omnia."

⁴ v. 21. "Plane perspicio," the disciple comments, "non aliud esse mundo perire, quam in causas suas redire, et in melius mutari."

⁵ v. 25, 913 B: "per inhumanationem Fili Dei omnis creatura in caelo et in terra salva facta est. Omnem vero creaturam dico corpus, et vitalem motum, et sensum, et super haec rationem et intellectum."

⁶ v. 25, 913, 914.

⁷ v. 25, 916 BC: "Si ergo passiones, quas rationabilis natura ex irrationabili in seipsam deduxerat, in naturales animae possunt mutari virtutes, cur incredibile sit, ipsam irrationabilitatem in altitudinem rationabilitatis transmutari?"

of punishment. At the consummation of things, all evil, whether in the human race or in the demons, will be abolished. The heterodoxy of this, the Catholic editor remarks, scarcely needs pointing out.¹ Erigena, while trying, as in the *De Praedestinatione*, to educe it from Augustine's borrowed doctrine that evil is no true being, but a negation of being, appeals more especially to "the blessed Origen,"² whose treatise *περὶ Ἀρχῶν* he cites at considerable length.³ Not the substance, but only the hostile will, of the enemies of the good, whether men or demons, is to be destroyed. The evil of punishment, fixed and retained for ever at the end of the whole process, the teacher argues, would mar the perfection of the "last things." The conception of hell itself, so long and so far as it continues to exist, he spiritualises by treating it as not a place, but the vain remorse of an evil conscience, or the state of the bad will deprived of the means of doing evil.⁴

This interpretation the pupil accepts; but he raises the difficulty, in what subject is the punishment. If all "substance," as created by God, is impassible and incorruptible, it cannot be this that is punished: neither can the punishment be that of a mere "accident," without subject. A third position, it is shown, remains; namely, that "vice, which is not, is punished, yet in something which is, and is impassible, since it is not permitted to suffer pains."⁵ The impassible subject of the pains imposed on its accidents, Erigena speaks of as "humanity"; thus again suggesting the peculiar form of Realism held afterwards by Arabian philosophers. This general and all-inclusive human nature he compares to the solar light, uncontaminated by contact with impurities;⁶ and to the element of air, vitalising all breathing things, and in its own substance unaffected by mixture with gross exhalations from the lower world.⁷

If we were to take certain passages by themselves, it might be thought that everlasting punishment in some form was maintained. The ambiguity comes from the necessity of using the consecrated theological language. Erigena, I take it, meant his explanation of what "the letter" calls eternal torments to refer only to what goes on while the world is in process. The ultimate cessation of hell is plainly implied.⁸ Those who hold the common opinions, he describes as "transfusing the gifts of

¹ "Ea, quae Joannes Scotus jam de abolitione mali deque poenis ac supplicis impiorum, sive hominum, sive daemonum, cet. disputat, veritati catholicae omnino repugnare, vix est quod moneamus." (p. 918, note a.)

² v. 27, 922 C.

³ v. 27, 929-30.

⁴ v. 29.

⁵ v. 30, 940 D. Cf. 31, 943 C: "Ipsa siquidem natura, sicut libera est, penitusque absoluta ab omni peccato, ita universaliter libera et absoluta est ab omni poena peccati."

⁶ v. 31, 942 D.

⁷ v. 31, 947, 948.

⁸ v. 35, 953 B: "Non enim conveniret immortalis Creatoris bonitati, imaginem sui aeterna morte detineri."

nature and of grace into the cruelty of vengeance." ¹ What is spoken of as divine infliction of penalties is a kind of "spiritual medicine" to bring back the creature, weary of mutable things, to the immutable forms of true reality.² And, he adds, repeating the doctrine already set forth, the perverse movements of the will, which are punished, are neither from God nor from created nature, but are "incausal": when they are sought out by themselves, nothing is found in them but privation and defect of the lawful and natural will.³

As there is no separate place of punishment, so there is no separate place of reward. The imagination of paradise as a circumscribed portion of a "new heaven and new earth" seems to Erigena so gross that on meeting with it in "books of the holy Fathers" he is stupefied. Those "most spiritual men," he thinks, can only have thus expressed themselves for the edification of such as are "given up to terrene and carnal thoughts and nourished on the rudiments of simple faith."⁴ Then he restates his own view that time and local situation are to cease entirely when the universe and all individual things return into their "reasons." In the final reversion of all things to their source, not even an "ethereal" body will be left, but the body itself will pass into spirit in its sense of intellect.⁵ While this return is definitely educed from the "ecclesiastical doctrine" and from Scripture,⁶ it is not identified with the Day of Judgment; which is treated in a rationalising manner as meaning essentially, not a catastrophic appearance of the Lord in the clouds, but the result of its mortal life for each individual soul.⁷

Though all souls are to return to God, not all are to be "deified." Deification is a gift not of nature but of grace. As is said in dependence on Dionysius the Areopagite: "It is common to all the things that have been made, to return, as by a kind of perishing, into their causes, which subsist in God; it is the property of the intellectual and rational substance to be made one with God by virtue of contemplation, and to be made God through grace."⁸ The gift of deification is reserved for some men and some angels.⁹ This is indicated by the parable of the wise and the foolish virgins. The foolish represent that portion of mankind which desires only natural goods: by the wise are signified they whose thoughts are directed to the higher perfec-

¹ v. 37, 985 A.

² v. 35, 959 B.

³ Cf. v. 35, 960 A: "Ac per hoc verissime de divina praedicatur justitia, quod in nulla creatura, quam fecit, puniri permittit, quod fecit; punit autem quod non fecit."

⁴ v. 37, 986 C.

⁵ v. 37, 987 B. The Greek Fathers maintain "non mutationem corporis terreni in caeleste corpus, sed omnino transitum in ipsum purum spiritum, non in illum, qui aether, sed in illum, qui intellectus vocitatur."

⁶ Cf. v. 19.

⁷ v. 38, 997 B.

⁸ v. 21, 898 C.

⁹ v. 23, 904 AB. Cf. 907 A: "ipsam deificationem, quae solis purgatissimis intellectibus donabitur."

tion to be attained through grace.¹ It is not in the least denied that natural goods *are* goods.² Accordingly, those that seek them are in the end to be restored to paradise in the general sense, that is, to the natural integrity of human nature; though only those that aim higher are, in the more special sense, to "eat of the tree of life," or to be deified with the saints.³ To any who may think this difference in the distribution of gifts inequitable, Erigena replies that a universe without variety and degrees would have no beauty. There are distinctions among the orders of angels; and, if man had not fallen, there would no less have been various orders of men.

Thus election and damnation are finally turned into the harmonious mixture of "aristocratic" and "democratic" justice in the universe. How little such a development was capable of overcoming the forms of the creed, the history of the later Middle Ages sufficiently proves. And of course the Gospel itself suggests no such softened interpretation of the "Gehenna" and "outer darkness" of the Parables. The Eastern despot or slaveholder, with his "tormentors" always at hand, could not be turned into the ideal ruler of the philosophic "City of Zeus," which Erigena would fain have restored. His own hope, as we may infer from the last sentence of the brief recapitulation that follows only too many pages of the customary allegorising, was in the perhaps remote future. "Unusquisque in suo sensu abundet, donec veniat illa lux, quae de luce falso philosophantium facit tenebras, et tenebras recte cognoscentium convertit in lucem."⁴

¹ v. 38, 1014 BC.

² Cf. v. 36, 936 AB. From the necessity of "phantasy" for knowledge, it is argued that this, like everything that springs from natural causes, is a good. "Disc. Phantasia igitur aliquod bonum est, quoniam naturalium rerum imaginatio est. MAG. Illud negare non possum: omne siquidem, quod ex naturalibus causis oritur, bonum esse non denegatur."

³ v. 38, 1015 AB.

⁴ Mr. Bett's rendering of this, the concluding sentence of the *De Divisione Naturae*, seems to me to invert Erigena's drift. He translates (*Johannes Scotus Erigena*, p. 87):—"Let everyone be fully persuaded in his own mind, until the light shall come which makes darkness of the false light of philosophers, and changes the darkness of those who think rightly into light." When the alterations are made that are necessary for strict accuracy, I think we get a different impression. "Let everyone be fully persuaded in his own mind, until that light shall come which makes darkness of the light of those who philosophise falsely, and changes the darkness of those who have right knowledge into light." To "those who philosophise falsely" the antithesis is "those who philosophise rightly" (*recte philosophantium*, two sentences earlier); so that there is certainly no intention of representing "philosophers" in general as under illusion in contrast with those who, in Platonic phrase, hold "right opinions."

NICHOLAS OF CUSA

FROM the birth of Nicholas of Cusa in the first year of the fifteenth century to the death of Giordano Bruno in the last year of the sixteenth, there extends the whole of the period commonly known as the Renaissance. Before Cusanus we are back in the later Middle Age; after Bruno we are in the distinctively modern world. And, unlike as were the fates of the Roman Cardinal and the condemned heretic, the two men were much alike not only in ideas but in spirit. The hopefulness of the early Renaissance, so conspicuous in Cusanus, was retained by Bruno in the time of the Catholic reaction. And there are more than mere germs of Bruno's pantheism in the work of the "divine Cusanus" whom he so enthusiastically celebrated.

The resemblances need not surprise us too much; for there is a continuous pantheistic tradition running from ancient to modern philosophy. Between Cusanus and Bruno there is undoubtedly direct affiliation of doctrine; but the general derivation is largely independent of contacts between one pantheistic thinker and another. There was a common source by which orthodox scholasticism had been permeated in such a way that a thinker predisposed to pantheistic ideas could draw them from the dialectical discussions in the ordinary text-books of philosophy. And the later thinkers often knew nothing of the earlier ones whom they most resembled. Neither Cusanus nor Bruno nor Spinoza can have read Erigena, whose great work *De Divisione Naturae* was sentenced to destruction by Pope Honorius III. in 1225, and did not come to light again through a single copy till 1681. And there is no evidence that Spinoza had read either Cusanus or Bruno. Directly or indirectly the source is always Neo-Platonism. Cusanus, one of the first in Western Europe to study Greek after its revival, knew the ancient Neo-Platonic thought to some extent directly; but he probably did not know very much more of it than Erigena, one of the last who could read Greek before it ceased to be studied for six centuries. The knowledge he chiefly shows is of the positions transmitted by "Dionysius the Areopagite" and by commentators like Chalcidius, the translator of Plato's *Timaeus*. To Bruno the sources were far more abundantly accessible; and he had a knowledge of Greek, though he probably read the

Greek authors chiefly in Latin translations. Spinoza's source for the Neo-Platonic modes of thinking discoverable in the minute structure of his philosophy is to be sought in scholastic text-books, Jewish and Christian, and in some heterodox Jewish philosophers. His distinctive positions cannot be explained, as was for a long time supposed, simply from Descartes.

For the logical character of the pantheism that took form in the newer minds, it does not seem to have mattered very much whether they derived the elements of Neo-Platonic thought from the original pagan or from Christianised sources. Within the limits of pure philosophy Cusanus, who knew chiefly the more or less Christianised Neo-Platonism of "Dionysius," scarcely yields in rigour and audacity to anyone. In the opening chapters of his most celebrated work, *De Docta Ignorantia*, he is recognisable at once as a great and an original thinker. It is on the basis of the first two books of this work that I propose to write a brief exposition of his philosophical doctrines.

The opportunity has been furnished by a critical edition published in Italy in 1913.¹ This is the first new edition of the Latin text since 1565. The work itself, we know from an extant record, was finished on the 12th of February, 1440, eight years before Cusanus was made a Cardinal. His fame in his own and the succeeding age was first German and Italian, and then European;² and it was largely among reformers. No doubt his proof, before Valla, of the historical impossibility of the "Donation of Constantine," helped in this.³

The title of the work that will always preserve his memory, *De Docta Ignorantia*, must not mislead us. His "learned ignorance" is completely different from Pyrrhonic suspension of judgment. It is conceived and put forward as a kind of knowledge, and as knowledge of the highest things. It is such knowledge as is attainable of the Infinite, or Absolute, and its relation to the universe. Want of this "learned ignorance," Cusanus says, prevented the ancients from innovating in astronomy as much as they might have done.

A century before Copernicus, he had completely rejected the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic astronomy. The earth, he distinctly says, moves; and so does every other body in the universe. The other worlds, he also held before Bruno, are inhabited. He did not, however, in any way, so far as I can make out, anticipate the definite Copernican hypothesis regarding the solar system, on the multiplication of which Bruno built his general theory

¹ *Nicolai Cusani De Docta Ignorantia Libri Tres. Testo Latino con Note di Paolo Rotta. Bari: Laterza, 1913.*

² In the dedication prefixed to the fourth edition of his works (Basel, 1565), there are mentioned as interested in Cusanus "viri Germani, Galli, Itali, Hispani, Angli et Poloni" (Rotta's Preface, p. xxxv.).

³ Rotta, p. xxxvii. n. 1.

of the constitution of the universe. Both he and Bruno deduce from their metaphysical principle, which asserts the infinity of the Cause or Reality, the position that the universe is in some sense infinite; but the senses differ. In sweep of poetic vision, Bruno has an immense advantage. His absolutely infinite universe, imagined to any assignable extent, remains always picturable. Cusanus seems to have felt no need for anything but the most generalised intellectual statement, and gives no new picture of the order of the worlds. Yet he is not without a compensating advantage. He had thought with more accuracy about the presuppositions of mathematical science; and it is possible that, while the abstract formula of Cusanus still remains defensible, Bruno, in making a leap from his own metaphysic to a spatially infinite universe with absolutely innumerable worlds, like that of Anaximander or of Lucretius, had come upon a view apparently imaginable without limit but in the end unthinkable.

Cusanus, on the other hand, definitely refuses to infer, from the mathematical possibility of adding space to space and number to number for ever, the actual existence of infinite space or of an infinite number of things. His universe, though he sometimes calls it infinite, is therefore simply a universe without assignable limits; and he comes remarkably near, though he does not actually arrive at, the description of the whole, by modern physical relativists, as "finite but unbounded."

More detail on these questions will come later. The preliminary outline should have made it clear that the metaphysic of the Infinite or Absolute was not conceived by the thinkers whom it inspired as a barren formula compatible with any view of the visible world. For them, it gave coherence and direction to the revolution that new science was preparing; and the very difference, along with likeness, in the applications made by Cusanus and by Bruno, is evidence of its stimulating power.

Linking himself to ancient thinkers, Cusanus, in his dedication to Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini, lays stress on "wonder" as the beginning of philosophy. There is a natural desire, he says, in all things to exist in a better mode. Thus a sane and free intellect desires and thinks it embraces truth. Difficulty increases in the process of search, especially in mathematics. All knowledge is by a kind of analogy or "proportion"; and the infinite as infinite, since it escapes all proportion, is unknown. Proportion cannot exist without "number." This conception Pythagoras extended from mathematics to all knowledge. Trying to go beyond number to the infinite, Socrates, Solomon, and "a certain other man of divine spirit" (conjectured by the editor to be Hermes Trismegistus)¹ have found that this ultimate knowledge is concealed from sight. Yet the knowledge

¹ Lib. i., cap. 1, p. 4 n.

that we do not know is itself an attainment in which the intellect can find satisfaction; and this it is that we call "learned ignorance."

As with all who speak of the unknowable, we soon find that much concerning it is held to be known. Cusanus applies to it first his favourite term, "the maximum." The maximum is that than which there can be nothing greater. It is absolutely one because it is all, and all things are in it because it is the greatest. Because nothing is opposite to it, the minimum coincides with it; wherefore also it is in all. In Book i., the philosopher says in laying down his plan, it will be treated as incomprehensible by human reason (*i.e.*, as God); in Book ii., as universal unity of essence in the many things of the world, not having subsistence outside the plurality in which it is. Book iii. will be devoted to the mysteries of Christian theology, showing how the determinate and particular in Jesus is at the same time the universal and absolute.

It is in reference to this third head that Bruno becomes, as Roman Catholic writers admit, though the admission is not meant for praise, "more logical than Cusanus." With extreme candour he told the Inquisitors at Venice that he was unable to combine, consistently with his speculative philosophy, the finite and the infinite in the Incarnation. In truth, Book iii. is quite arbitrarily connected with the rest; and I do not propose to give any exposition of it. It is not, like the speculative theology of Origen or of John Scotus Erigena, an attempt to transform Christianity itself, but simply sets forth the dogmas of Christian orthodoxy with a slight colouring from the philosophical vocabulary elaborated in the first two books. Bruno does not ignore this side of the divine Cusanus, but remarks on it as something that infected his genius, which without it "would have been not merely equal to but far superior to that of Pythagoras."¹

At the end of the chapter in which he sketches his plan, Cusanus puts excellently a point on which Plato and Berkeley also have incidentally dwelt; namely, that in philosophical discussion it is necessary to look beyond the words to the meanings, not quibbling over the exact literal or grammatical interpretation.²

Already in this chapter we find the position, common to Cusanus and Bruno, that in the Absolute all that is possible exists actually. Two or more things, he proceeds in the next, cannot be found of such similarity and equality that there shall not be other possible ones more similar up to infinity. Hence, measure and measured, however near equality, will always remain

¹ See Dr. J. L. McIntyre's *Giordano Bruno*, Part ii., ch. i, p. 141.

² Lib. i., cap. 2, p. 6: "Oportet autem attingere sensum volentem potius supra verborum vim intellectum efferre quam proprietatibus vocabulorum insistere."

different. The finite intellect, therefore, cannot precisely understand the truth of things by similitude. For there is nothing precisely like the indivisible truth to measure that in which it consists; just as that which is not a circle cannot measure the circle, of which the being consists in something indivisible. But as a polygon inscribed in a circle becomes more and more similar to it as it has more angles, though it never becomes equal even by multiplication of angles to infinity, unless it is resolved into identity with the circle; so we approach the truth more in so far as we learn that in its most absolute necessity of identity with itself it is incomprehensible by us.

This leads to questions concerning the theory of knowledge, to which Cusanus in his various works was always returning. His general position is that we attain the maximum "not otherwise than in an incomprehensible manner." The whole development of his thought here is from Platonism. Like Plato and, after him, Proclus, he is seeking to formulate a mental act that is not step by step reasoning; a kind of "nameless" process.¹ He himself, in another work, refers to Plato's well-known phrase in the *Timaeus*, where empty space or "not-being" is said to be apprehended by a sort of bastard reasoning (λογισμῶ τινὶ νόθῳ). The indeterminate possibility called matter Cusanus describes as got hold of "per adulterinam quandam rationem."² This is to apply the phrase of Plato to the Aristotelian matter with which his own "matter," as it came to be called, was identified by the Neo-Platonists, though Aristotle himself knew that "the Platonic matter" was simply space.³ The point, however, does not very closely concern Cusanus, who did not admit bare possibility in general, but, as we shall see, only particular possibilities. His own view about the mode of reaching the maximum resembles rather that of Proclus, who says that the One, at the other extreme from matter or bare possibility, is apprehended by "spurious intellect" or "bastard intuition" (νόθῳ νῶ).⁴ We must admire the candid concession all round of a defect in point of form. At the same time we must remember that the mind does not discover, but only tests truth, even in the regular sciences, by syllogism and the canons of induction. And the anomalous processes may be resolved; as for example Berkeley, in his *Theory of Vision*, resolved the appearance of direct intuition of space into a series of unformulated but effectual judgments. Perhaps something similar may

¹ Lib. i., cap. 5 *init.* The maximum is "innominabiliter nominabile."

² Cited by Rotta in a note to lib. ii., cap. 8, p. 91.

³ *Phys.*, iv., 2, 209, b 11. Zeller quite rightly quotes this in support of his own view: see *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, ii. 1, 14th ed., p. 735. n. 3.

⁴ I have tried both renderings; the first in *The Neo-Platonists* (Supplement), the second in the article "Reason" in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*.

be done for the paradoxes about the Infinite and Absolute which follow.

For we have now arrived at the famous principle of the coincidence of the maximum (than which there cannot be a greater) with the minimum (than which there cannot be a less). Cusanus tries to make this clearer by telling us to take the "most" great and the "most" small in quantity and eliminate intellectually the "great and small"; then we shall find coincidence in the superlative. This superlative is beyond all opposition, above all affirmation and likewise negation. "And all that is conceived to be, no more is than it is not. And all that is conceived not to be, no more is not than it is." "God, who is least of all light, is most of all light."¹ This transcends our intellect, which cannot combine contradictories in their principle by the way of reason. We have to see in a way beyond all discourse of reason that to be absolutely greatest is to coincide with the absolutely least.

The reflection to be made on all these quasi-mathematical paradoxes is that they have their real basis in a psychological thought. The insight out of which they sprang is that mind at once contains infinite space as perceived or conceived and itself does not occupy the minutest portion of space. When this insight tries to give itself a geometrical or arithmetical form, it inevitably falls into paradoxes. Thus Hamilton set against one another the Infinite and the Absolute, the "unconditionally unlimited" and the "unconditionally limited," and made them out irreconcilable by treating them as spatial. If we take the Absolute and Infinite as metaphysical terms, as referring to something of the nature of mind, the contradiction disappears and the coincidence is obvious. Immaterial reality, as distinguished from appearance, is at once absolute and infinite, that is, complete in itself because it contains all, and boundless because there is nothing to limit it. If, however, we must externalise it in order to have some imaginative form before us, then, it seems to me, the result that follows from the arguments of Hamilton and Mansel is not the agnosticism derived from them by Spencer, but acceptance of the coincidence of opposites as stated by Cusanus and Bruno. It may be observed that the Eleatics, before the great psychological development of philosophy, had, on their own line of objective thinking, obscurely arrived at something like this. Parmenides showed that "that which is" must be self-complete or absolute, and Melissus showed that it must also be infinite or boundless. Between came the paradoxes of Zeno on space and motion.²

¹ Lib. i., cap. 4: "Deus est maxime lux, qui est minime lux." This is probably a reminiscence of Psalm cxxxviii. 12 (Vulgate), quoted more exactly by Erigena and by Bruno: *Sicut tenebrae ejus, ita et lumen ejus.*

² See "A Note on the Eleatics," Appendix I.

Without number, Cusanus proceeds, there could be no order in things, no determinate relations of the many. In number we arrive at unity as the minimum. Unity is not a number, but the principle of all number, and this coincides with the maximum, which is infinity. This unity which is infinity, Cusanus expressly says, is God.¹ God is one in such manner that he is in act all that it is possible to be. As unity is presupposed by number; so the pluralities of things descend from infinite unity, and could not be without it.

The maximum is above all nameable being. It is most true that, simply in itself, the maximum "is or is not," or "is and is not," or "neither is nor is not."²

Cusanus recurs frequently to ideas of a philosophical Trinity. The first of his developments may be stated in detail as an example of the procedure.

Unity is prior by nature to otherness (alterity) which is the same as mutability; and that which naturally precedes mutability is immutable, and therefore eternal. Unity therefore is eternal. Equality similarly is prior to inequality, while inequality and otherness are together by nature. Equality therefore is eternal. Unity is either connexion or the cause of connexion; duality either division or the cause of division. But division and otherness are together by nature; wherefore also connexion, like unity, is eternal, since it is prior to otherness. But there cannot be more than one eternal; whence it follows that unity, equality and connexion, since they are all eternal, are one. "Et haec est illa trina unitas, quam Pythagoras, omnium philosophorum primus, Italiae et Gracciae decus, docuit adorandam."³

A warning given at the end of these speculations is that, to arrive at reality, at the true maximum, we must go beyond all mathematical figures.⁴ After that, we plunge into mathematical symbolism. The use of it is defended on the ground that mathematical abstractions come nearer than any other images that we can use to representing stable reality; and images are indispensable. For Cusanus, Pythagoras, with his doctrine of numbers, is the first of philosophers; next come Plato and the Platonists, among whom he counts Augustine. Even Aristotle, he says, "who wished to appear singular by confuting those before him,"⁵ has to recur to mathematical forms for his scientific explanation of forms in nature. This is of course in the characteristic tone of the revolt from Scholasticism.

Cusanus, however, does not relax the scholastic effort after exact thinking. "Everything mathematical," he declares, "is finite, and cannot even be imagined otherwise."⁶ Yet mathematical science leads beyond the finite. Every figure, without

¹ Lib. i., cap. 5.

² *Ibid.*, cap. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, cap. 11, p. 25.

⁴ *Ibid.*, cap. 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, cap. 10.

⁶ *Ibid.*, cap. 12, p. 26.

deviation from the rules of its construction, can be made by continuous modifications to come nearer and nearer to coincidence with figures of which the rules of construction are different. For example, the larger you make the circumference of a circle, the nearer an arc of it is to a straight line; the arc, therefore, of a circle than which there can be no greater will be actually a straight line. If supposed infinite, then, the curve and the straight line coincide. Considered as having reached the end of their modifications, he proceeds to show in detail, the line, the triangle, the circle and the sphere, are all at the same time infinite and one. That in which the notions of all the figures end is not, however, mathematically imaginable, but is simply "infinity." Thus, in dealing with mathematical "signs" in a "transcendent" manner, we find ourselves on the way to the highest reality, which is not in itself a possible object of mathematical science.

One method of getting at results is to set lines or surfaces in imaginary motion. Take a radius of a circle and set it in motion with the centre as fixed point; you will get as the result a three-sided figure. If you carry it back to its first position, you will get the complete circle. Continue the radius from the centre to the opposite point in the circumference; you will have marked off a semicircle. Set the semicircle in revolution round the diameter, and you will have a sphere. Now an infinite line is in act all that a finite line is in potency; and so it is at once triangle, circle and sphere. All these, as coinciding with the infinite line, are infinite. But this only means that *if* there were an infinite line it would be all these.

The position, Cusanus allows, is finally impossible as applied to quantities; but, ascending by it to things that are not quantitative, you see that what in quantities is impossible is in the whole necessary. Quantity, we may put it, is an abstraction which, when you try to complete it, leads beyond itself by revealing its incompleteness. This may sound rather Hegelian; but Cusanus is one of the thinkers in whom we are permitted to find anticipations of Hegel.

In the maximum considered as metaphysical reality, all that is possible is also actual. "Absolute possibility itself is not other in the maximum than the maximum itself in act, as an infinite line is in act a sphere; it is otherwise in the non-maximum, for there potency is not act, as a finite line is not a triangle."¹ We see that for Cusanus, as for Bruno later, in spite of the vigorous effort to get clear of the authority of Aristotle, his antithesis of the possible and the actual (*δυνάμει* and *ἐνεργείᾳ*) remains a "form of thought." The real inspiration of the thinking, it is true, does not come from Aristotle but from "Dionysius," the bearer of the systematised Neo-Platonism of Athens into Christian theology. God, who is the maximum, Cusanus proceeds,

¹ Lib. i., cap. 16, p. 32.

is not this to the exclusion of that; for, as he is all things, so also he is nothing of all things. He is known above all mind and intelligence; and this is the "learned ignorance." Returning to his previous formulations, Cusanus declares the minimum not opposed to the maximum; "but all that is measurable falls between the maximum and the minimum."¹

In this region of the measurable, nothing is equal to anything else: "no two finite lines can be precisely equal";² but all participate, though unequally, in the maximum. The infinite line is the *ratio* of all finite lines; a position expressly derived from the Platonic commentators, and meaning, if we may go back to Plotinus for its origin, that the law or formula of the production of a line is independent of any particular dimensions. Of the maximum beyond intellect, this infinity which is in each finite thing and yet in none so far as it is a particular thing, must be for us a symbol. The quest of the ultimate maximum issues in mystery. The way to seek knowledge of it is to remove in thought all participation of particular beings. When all these are removed from the intellect, nothing appears to remain. "And therefore the great Dionysius says that understanding of God rather approaches to nothing than to something."

What is meant by greater and less participation is illustrated by straight and curved lines. The straight line participates more in the "infinite line," which is the line as line; for the curve as such can be neither a maximum nor a minimum. "The most and the least curved is not other than a straight line."³ Thus the circumference of a circle participates more in rectitude in proportion as it is larger. The problem therefore in dealing with curves is to resolve the curvature in relation to rectitude.

The resolution of the triangle into a line by modification of its sides and angles to infinity is applied as symbolism to the reconciliation of trinity and unity. Out of this reconciliation there emerges the truth that the opposition of plurality in general and of unity, of "distinction and indistinction," ceases to have a meaning in the infinite.⁴ Counting is inapplicable to deity; a thought with which Cusanus is so possessed that he attributes it to Augustine; quoting him as saying, *Dum incipis numerare trinitatem, exis veritatem*.⁵ Trinity and unity are the same in the infinite and eternal because it embraces contradictories. The maximum, "though infinitely above all trinity,"⁶ is to be called

¹ Lib. i., cap. 16, p. 35.

² *Ibid.*, cap. 17, p. 38.

³ *Ibid.*, cap. 18, p. 40.

⁴ *Ibid.*, cap. 19, p. 44: "Nam ubi distinctio est indistinctio, trinitas est unitas; et e converso ubi indistinctio est distinctio, unitas est trinitas."

⁵ I accept it on the authority of the editor (p. 43 n.) that Augustine has used no such expression as that with which he is here credited. Cusanus, though erudite, is loose in his quotations.

⁶ Lib. i., cap. 20, p. 47: "licet sit supra omnem trinitatem per infinitum."

triune, as in mathematics the triangle, being the polygon with the smallest number of sides, can be taken at once as the minimum and the adequate representation of polygonal figures in general; these serving for symbols of all the multitudinous operations of nature and of the mind, comprehended in the absolute maximum.

Applying next the notion of the circle—circumference and centre, with diameter as medium—to the unity of the maximum and the minimum, Cusanus, passing over from symbolism, shows how the maximum is identical with nothing that exists nor yet different from anything. Its all-containing unity comprises being and not-being, "all things that are and are not."¹ The unity of the motions in it from potency to act and from act to potency, the alternate composition of individuals out of principles and resolution of individuals into principles, "consists in a certain circular perpetuity."

The providence of God includes all things, even contradictories. It comprehends in its unity both the things that happen and those that do not happen but can happen. "All things in God are God, who is absolute necessity."² So far the doctrine is entirely pantheistic; but there is an approximation to ordinary theism when Cusanus adds that there are many things which God could have providentially determined but did not and will not, while he did providentially determine many things that he had the power to withhold. This is a concession that disappears from the more consistent pantheism of Bruno, who declares that in the infinite universe every possibility is realised. In God, will, power, and act are the same.

For the comparison of "the existence of God in act" to an infinite sphere, Cusanus finds a precedent in Parmenides. His editor points out an inexactitude in the reference;³ yet that both Cusanus and Bruno found an affinity in their own thought to that of the Eleatics is a fact to be accounted for in the history of philosophy. Cusanus at any rate quite rightly takes the sphere to signify for Parmenides the all-inclusive perfection of all that is. Considered in relation to the sphere, all motion, he says, is rest; rest being the end of motion. When he remarks parenthetically that "the sphere arises after infinite circulations," there may perhaps be a glance at the theory of cosmic evolution in Empedocles; but the revival of the Ionian side of Greek thought, which Empedocles tried to combine with the doctrine of his Eleatic master, was reserved for Bruno.

In the rest of Book i., Cusanus undeviatingly follows out the logic of his system. No affirmative name, he says, is applicable to God, not even that of creator, except in relation to creatures, for he is not any one thing more than he is all others. "If you

¹ Lib. i., cap. 21, p. 49: "reperitur omnia quae sunt et non sunt ambire, ita quod non esse in ipso est maximum esse, sicut minimum est maximum."

² *Ibid.*, cap. 22, p. 51.

³ *Ibid.*, cap. 23, p. 53 n.

call him truth, falsehood comes in the way ; if you call him virtue, vice comes in the way ; if you call him substance, accident comes in the way, and so with the rest." ¹ Even the name of unity, though it seems nearest, is infinitely distant from the reality. The argument is confirmed by citations from Hermes Trismegistus and from Dionysius. In Augustine (less clearly) support is found for the view that the names of the Trinity and of its Persons, being affirmative names, are only relative to distinctions in the human mind. There is no exception even in the most sacred names among the Hebrews and Chaldeans, unless it be the ineffable tetragrammaton (JHWH); ² but that is an exception because it affirms no property. In short, it is " the exception that proves the rule." ³

The names assigned to God in the pagan religions are interpreted as names relative to the variety of natural powers in the world. With evident sympathy, Cusanus remarks on the bisexual character attributed to deity in the Hermetic books, and quotes a Roman poet " Valerius," who cannot be identified, for the ascription of double sex to Jupiter. ⁴ The varied powers being so many, none can be excluded if we attempt to express what is ultimately inexpressible. Yet there is also a negation which excludes all. The idolatry into which the simple folk among the pagans fell was the result of attending to the manifestations of divinity as " explicit " in the world (explicationem divinitatis), instead of adoring the pure unity of God himself, like the Jews and some others. When they ought to have used the varied manifestations as images, they took them for truth. This view Bruno modified only by arguing that there was no error. ⁵ The Greeks and Egyptians knew what they were doing. It was the Jews and their successors of Christendom and Islam who could not distinguish between the image and the natural or divine power signified by it.

In the last chapter of Book i., we arrive at the culmination of the doctrine in a formal statement of the " negative theology," for which there is an element of idolatry even in the worship of the Jews and Christians, though this vestige is admitted to be necessary. So long as religion affirms of God, as it must, the best we know of " creatures," addressing him as one and three, most wise, light unapproachable, life, truth and so forth, there is, says Cusanus, still idolatry unless it calls in also the negative theology which removes all attributes. In so far as he is simply infinite,

¹ Lib. i., cap. 24, p. 57.

² Cusanus knew Hebrew and gives the Hebrew letters.

³ See Professor Carveth Read on " *exceptio probat regulam* " (*Logic*, 4th ed., p. 274).

⁴ Lib. i., cap. 25, p. 60: " Iovem omnipotentem, genitorem, genetricemque Deum."

⁵ Cusanus himself allows this as regards the philosophers, referring to Cicero *De natura Deorum*.

God is neither truth nor intellect nor light, neither Father nor Son nor Holy Spirit. Infinity, as infinity, is neither generating nor generated nor proceeding. "When considered as infinity, God is neither one nor many, and, according to the theology of negation, nothing is found in God but infinity." According to that theology, he is "cognoscible neither in this nor in a future world."¹ Nevertheless, the negations that remove the more imperfect things from the most perfect are truer than others. It is truer that God is not a stone than that he is not life or intelligence; truer that he is not ebriety than that he is not virtue; and, correspondingly, the affirmation is truer that he is intelligence and life than that he is earth, stone or body.

This of course is quite consistent with the rest. A pantheism so formally complete as that of Spinoza not only does not assert, but definitely denies, that all manifestations of the reality in things are equal. In Book ii., therefore, we go on to an account of the differences of manifestation within the universe. Nothing in it, Cusanus says, is precisely like anything else. Grades to which no limit is assignable can be passed through without reaching either the maximum or the minimum. The motions in the heavens are never exactly repeated. Even in geometrical diagrams actual equality is impossible; nothing agrees precisely with anything else in figure or in magnitude. Similarly for music, there are countless differences in instruments, voices, and so forth; it is only in the abstract rule that exact proportion obtains. Again, the arithmetical idea of number is not applicable with precision. No one is quite like anyone else in anything; and if one were to try for a thousand years to imitate another, he would never attain precision, though the sensible differences might sometimes not be perceived. Changes of a thing can only take place by continuous degrees.

Positions like these passed over in one way or another to Bruno and afterwards to Leibniz; but there is not in Cusanus any anticipation of the central doctrine of Leibniz, the notion of a monad or ultimate individual, psychical in nature. In Bruno there is something of the kind; but, though Leibniz knew works of Bruno, the origins of his own doctrine seem to be traceable without supposing that his acquaintance with them had any important influence.

We have seen that, while the universe, in the view of Cusanus, has no assignable limits, it is not, as Bruno held, actually infinite in extension to correspond with the infinity that its principle has without reference to extension. As contrasted with the infinity of God, the universe could be greater than it is. The reason why it cannot actually be greater, is that matter, or possibility, in which it is founded, by its very nature cannot be

¹ Lib. i., cap. 26, p. 64: "*nec cognoscibilis est in hoc saeculo, nec in futuro.*"

extensible to infinity. Thus the mathematical paradoxes of Cusanus pass finally into symbolism. For Bruno also, they are not directly applicable to the cause or principle of the universe; they remain in the region of number and extension; but they have direct application to the universe regarded as actually infinite in space and with absolutely no limit—not merely no assignable limit—to the number of its “worlds.”

Coming to the question of the individual, Cusanus treats it in a way that has little in common with Bruno's treatment of it by reference to atomic speculations. Nothing, he says, is from itself (*a se*) except the maximum simply as absolute. Since this is perfect, how then can there be imperfection in creatures? His reply, brought to its extremest generality, is that the unity in creatures comes from their cause, but that the plurality, the diversity, has no positive cause, but arrives contingently.¹ The creature is “neither God nor nothing”; but it is not a mixture, for there can be no mixture or composition of God (as being) and nothing. The detailed argument here is decidedly difficult; some of the positions stated being evidently only “dialectical.” I agree with the editor² that the “pantheism” of some of them is only apparent, if he means naturalistic pantheism;³ but, in a more generalised meaning of the term, I do not see how the reasoned philosophy of Cusanus can be called anything else. What creatures have from God, Cusanus concludes, is the unity and perfection compatible with their contingency. Each created being acquiesces in its own perfection as a created being, not desiring to be any other thing supposed more perfect, but loving in the first place its own reality as a divine gift, choosing to perfect and preserve this incorruptibly.⁴

The philosopher himself is evidently not altogether satisfied with the position that individual differences are merely contingent; for in the next chapter he suggests a different answer to his question; *viz.*, that the many pre-existed from eternity in the mind of God, but under the form of unity. The divine intellect, knowing that things cannot participate equally in the equality of being, understood one thing in this way, another in that; and thus they are differently determined, though from one essence.⁵ The former answer, however, is repeated on the next page: “the being of a thing is not anything in so far as it is a diverse thing.”⁶ The nearest Cusanus comes to a solution

¹ Lib. ii., cap. 2, p. 71.

² *Ibid.*, p. 73 n.

³ This is definitely classed by Cusanus (lib. i., cap. 25, p. 61) as an error of some pagans, who held that God is not “outside things” except by an abstraction of the intellect, like “first matter.” The element of “transcendence” that he insists on was, however, retained by Bruno, whose pantheism is undoubted.

⁴ Lib. ii., cap. 2 *fin.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, cap. 3, p. 76.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

is to state the antithesis between the "complicatio" of the many in the unity of God and their "explicatio" in the plurality of things. He confesses that he does not in the end understand how this can come about; for of course "the mind of God," though he does not himself raise the objection, is a phrase not corresponding precisely to the "infinite" or "maximum" of his philosophy; but he finally points out, to those who speak in terms of popular theology: "If you say, his omnipotent will is the cause, and will and omnipotence are his being, you must necessarily confess that you are completely ignorant of the mode."¹

Returning from the diversities of the universe to its nature as a whole, Cusanus finds that, in relation to its principle, the absolute maximum, it is only a relative maximum (maximum contractum). It imitates the absolute as far as it can, but is subject to the limitation that its identity is in diversity as its unity is in plurality.² The entities in it were not successive emanations, but came forth all at once, since without all its parts in their kinds the universe could neither have been the universe nor perfect in its own manner. In its limitation (contractio) to being this or that in its different parts, and not simply one, consists its distinction from God. God, or the absolute maximum, unites contradictories, the world or universe only contraries.³ Through the mediation of the universe, God, who is the most simple unity, is in all things; as the plurality of things, by means of the one universe, is in God.

Cusanus cites from Anaxagoras the principle that all things are in all (*quodlibet esse in quolibet*), remarking that it is perhaps older than Anaxagoras. He makes of it, however, not a physical but a metaphysical principle. He does not mean that no actual thing exists without a mixture, in greater or less proportion, of all the elements, so that no physical element is separable in its purity from the rest. What he seems to mean is that each particular thing points to all the other things in the universe as necessary to make up the whole in its organic unity. "One grade," as it is briefly expressed, "could not be without another, as in the members of the body everything contributes to everything, and all are contained in all."⁴ As Humanity considered absolutely is to man as "contracta humanitas," so is God to the world.

The idea of "contractio" means essentially manifestation in things many and distinguishable and knowable only in relation

¹ Lib. ii., cap. 3, p. 78. As a possible aid to the imagination, a suggestion added is to think of one face mirrored at less and greater distances; the distances to be supposed not local, but signifying degrees of remoteness from the truth of the face.

² *Ibid.*, cap. 4, p. 80.

⁴ *Ibid.*, cap. 5, p. 84.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

to one another. The universe as "contractum" is not found except unfolded in genera (in generibus explicatum), and genera are not found except in species. Last, in this mode of consideration, come individuals as actually existent things. This peripatetic touch at the end, Cusanus somewhat obscurely argues, is not inconsistent with his Platonism: "universalia" are not to be regarded as simply "entia rationis."¹

Discussing the question whether there is an absolutely indeterminate possibility or matter, he concludes that there is not. Only in God do absolute actuality and absolute potency exist, and here they coincide. Absolute possibility in God is God. All things except the first principle being necessarily relative (contracta), nothing in them can be said to be in absolute, as distinguished from relative, potency.² In things possibility is always determinate, so that the world could not have been except in the limited modes in which it is. There cannot be a maximum or minimum of possibility in things admitting of less and more, but only a relative possibility of particular things which depends on contingencies.

The predominant position of Platonism in the thought of Cusanus is well illustrated in a disquisition on the soul of the world. He completely rejects gradation between the "mind" and "soul" of the universe as explanatory of anything, and brings back all to the simplicity of the "one infinite form of forms," namely, God. Yet he cannot oppose the Platonists without praising the acuteness and rationality of their arguments and remarking (rather irrelevantly) on the unreasonableness of Aristotle's fault-finding.³

This rejection of a Neo-Platonic distinction is not, as might perhaps be suspected, an accommodation to Christian theology; for Cusanus observes that many Christians have accepted the notion of a soul of the world as a power subordinate to God, and have tried to defend their position by Scripture.⁴ The Cardinal's own doctrine is a more stringent monism. The forms of things, he says, are not distinct except as they are relative (nisi ut sunt contracte); in so far as they exist absolutely, they are all in one without distinction. "One infinite exemplar only is sufficient and necessary." It is true that we have to distinguish in the world the "reasons" of distinct things, but this has reference only to the things considered relatively

¹ Lib. ii., cap. 6, pp. 87, 88.

² *Ibid.*, cap. 8, p. 94: "Quare possibilitas absoluta in Deo est Deus, extra ipsum vero non est possibile; nunquam enim est dabile aliquod per se, quod sit in potentia absoluta, cum omnia, praeter primum, necessario sint contracta."

³ *Ibid.*, cap. 9, p. 99. No doubt the editor is right in supposing that the reference is to Aristotle's criticism of the doctrine of Ideas.

⁴ Cudworth, in fact, with his doctrines of a "plastic Nature" and so forth, still did this in the seventeenth century.

(as "contracta"), not to the "one most simple reason of all things." There are no intermediate powers between the absolute and the relative.¹ God alone is soul and mind of the world in so far as these are considered as absolute.

Yet Cusanus himself, in the next chapter, seems to bring in an intermediate power in another way; making of motion a kind of spirit of the universe serving as the "means of connexion of potency and act."² "Nature is as it were a complex (complicatio) of all things that are done by motion." "This motion or spirit descends from the divine spirit." By it potency passes into act and act into potency. Mediating motion amorously connects all to unity, so that there may be one universe out of all. By this motion things, each unlike the rest, are moved to preserve themselves, if possible in a better state, and to preserve the species by union of the sexes.³ In this relative order there is no motion that is simply greatest; for the greatest motion coincides with rest (maximum with minimum).⁴ These positions Cusanus sums up in one of his philosophical trinities; assigning to the Father potency, to the Son "act" or "form," and to the divine Spirit "unifying harmony" or "connexion by motion."

As the maximum and minimum of motion coincide, so do the circumference and centre of the universe. In the paradoxical phrases eagerly taken up by Bruno, centre and circumference are everywhere and nowhere. There is no perfect circle in nature, for a truer can always be given than any assigned one. No heavenly body ever returns to the same position or repeats its course with perfect exactitude as regards temporal order. These beginnings of the new astronomy have been indicated above. In detail, as the editor shows, Cusanus had predecessors,⁵ though the new ideas quite logically follow from his metaphysics. A fermentation of scientific thought on astronomy, we perceive, had begun in the fifteenth century, which in the sixteenth was retarded for a time and in the early seventeenth received a severer check in the condemnation of Galileo. The very fact that the new cosmology grew in demonstrative force seems to have intensified the organised resistance to it till the breaking-point came.

¹ Lib. ii., cap. 9, p. 101: "Solus enim Deus est absolutus, omnia alia contracta."

² *Ibid.*, cap. 10, p. 104.

³ He guards himself against the narrow teleological interpretations that subordinate one species of things to another. "Light," he says (ii. 12, p. 112), "shines from its own nature, not that I may see." The organic character of the universe, however, makes all serviceable to all.

⁴ As Bruno afterwards put the "relativist" view: to say that the universe as a whole is moving with infinite velocity would be the same as to say that it is unmoved.

⁵ See the long note to lib. ii., cap. 11, pp. 105, 106.

Some of the ideas of Cusanus, I have suggested, point to a phase of thought later than that which ruled in the next movement of scientific astronomy, for which the "infinite universe" of Bruno became a sort of generally recognised philosophical completion. The world of physics, Cusanus says, though it is not infinite, yet cannot be conceived as finite, since it has no boundaries.¹ Elsewhere he calls it "finite" in a certain sense, that is, as opposed to the "absolute infinity" of its metaphysical principle. The worlds, though innumerable to us, were created "in number." This, however, does not modify his view that there is no absolute position or motion. The relativity of motion and position in general is stated with a completeness not exceeded even by Bruno.²

Treating finally of the place of the earth in the universe, he declares it impossible for us to know that it is the only realm of "corruption," as the Peripatetics taught. Corruption may be merely resolution into principles that still persist in various ways. The "forms" of things may migrate from one part of the universe to another—that is, to other inhabited worlds. The material elements are resolved into one another, but this resolution does not take place without limit; the transformations always leave them in a certain proportion.³ Before Bruno, Cusanus had completely turned away from the mediæval view that our earth is "vilissima et infima." To a spectator in another part of the universe, it would appear as a bright star. And it does not follow, because other worlds besides the earth are inhabited, that they are inhabited by nobler natures; for there can be nothing nobler in its kind than the intellectual nature of man.⁴

¹ Lib. ii., cap. 11, p. 107: "Cum hic non sit mundus infinitus, tamen non potest concipi finitus, cum terminus careat, inter quos claudatur."

² *Ibid.*, p. 109: "Complica igitur istas diversas imaginationes, ut sit centrum zenith, et de converso, et tunc per intellectum, cui tantum docta servit ignorantia, vides mundum et eius motum et figuram attingi non posse, quoniam apparebit quasi rota in rota, et sphaera in sphaera, nullibi habens centrum vel circumferentiam, ut praeferitur."

Of course Bruno would have applied this statement to his infinite universe: the difference is that Cusanus had in reserve the denial of infinitely extended matter and actually innumerable bodies.

³ *Ibid.*, cap. 13.

⁴ *Ibid.*, cap. 12, p. 113: "non enim appetit homo aliam naturam, sed solum in sua perfectus esse."

ANIMISM, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

For a growing science like anthropology, there appears to be some advantage in attempting from time to time a kind of philosophical schematism. Such attempts may suggest points for research; and, as they are not likely to be taken for more than they are worth, they can in any case do no harm. The present attempt, of course, starts from previous discussions; but, to avoid complication, I shall try to state the positions in such a way that they may be understood by themselves.

The most general thesis is this: that the thoughts of mankind about the causes behind or immanent in the visible order of things go through three stages; which may be characterised distinctively as the animistic, the religious, and the philosophical. When man, from a group of social animals, not yet thinking or speaking, became truly man through the evolution of speech and thought, there arose many speculations. A fundamental one was that which is known as the "ghost-theory." The problem presented itself: how to explain the alternations of consciousness and unconsciousness, waking and sleeping, life and death. The primeval solution was to suppose a more or less permanent entity, capable of going away to other places and again returning; the presence of which was the cause of the manifestations summed up as "life." This entity was figured, according to analogies suggested by reflexions, shadows, dreams and so forth, as a second "self," in appearance like a material organism, but thinner of substance. The self, more or less permanent though not necessarily immortal, having thus assumed a figured and as it were objective form, could be used as a general idea to interpret not only human and animal life but the changes in inorganic things. Independently of this "ghost-theory," life may already have been attributed to moving objects; but not before the ghost-theory was evolved could the general mode of explanation known as "animism" shape itself out. Some kind of figured image was a necessary adjunct to early thinking about causes. Hence the importance of the ghost-soul as distinguished from the vague notion of a force that was also life. To anything that, in the process of abstracting from the whole mass of phenomena, came to be looked upon for any reason of interest or convenience or curiosity, as a separate "object," a ghost-soul of its own could be ascribed. This was regarded at once as the bond that gave it permanence and as the source of

action and change. An ascending process of "integration" accompanied the gradual discrimination or "differentiation" of phenomena; so that vague or more definite cosmic powers came to be conceived as permanent existences with ghost-souls of their own. These, being thought of on the analogy of the self, might be figured as becoming separately visible in human shape. Or, as a deviation from the type of the "magnified and non-natural man," they might be imagined as presenting themselves either in the forms of particular kinds of animals or in compounded and monstrous forms. Meanwhile human life went on complicating itself. Classes were distinguished, and societies came to consist of rulers and ruled. Customary law and morals grew up. All this structure was transferred by analogy to the ghostly or "spiritual" world. A "supernatural" hierarchy was conceived, which comprised at once human souls separated by death from their bodies, and the lesser and greater invisible powers in or behind nature. These last are the "gods" and "demons," with whom the souls of individual men are associated, usually at an inferior level. Since man feels his dependence on the external order of things in which he is involved, he tends to put all that concerns him under the protection of the beings he conceives as ruling it. He begins to fear or love them because he regards them as personal wills that can be affected by the things he does or leaves undone. Thus arise "cults," consisting of prayer, sacrifice and sacrament. Prayer, anthropologically defined, is entreaty to a quasi-human being; sacrifice is primarily a gift; sacrament is participation in a banquet. Ghosts of ancestors, with demons and gods, may have part in the devotion addressed to the invisible powers; but this devotion becomes most distinctively entitled to the name of "religion" when it is systematised in relation to certain great gods. The special class of the "priesthood," scarcely needed when animism is in its first anarchic phase, assumes importance as the invisible hierarchy is specialised and brought under the government of a single head. This class tends to claim more and more of human life for the powers it represents. Aided by the conscious weakness and ignorance of the many, it may succeed, by assuming knowledge of the unknown, in establishing its supremacy on earth. The normal result of this is an elaborate and at last petrified system of sacred rites, carrying with it a fixed order of all that began as spontaneous expression of human needs and aspirations. If, however, the movement does not go too far; if "religion" grows sufficiently to substitute a kind of cosmic or centralised or generalised outlook for mere individualist "animism," but does not gain full control; then there appears a third stage. Thinkers arise who question the customary views embodied in the social and spiritual tradition. Thus the "philosophic" stage is reached. In common with religion, philosophy aspires to unity; but it tends to dissolve the

unity based on old custom. "Free thought," in a smaller or larger class, is the condition of its existence. When it becomes practical, it aims in its own way at the direction of human life. Sometimes it has been tempted to take short cuts, and to elaborate schemes of philosophic oligarchy. Normally, however, it perceives in the long run that the direction must come, not from the attainment of power by the representatives of a particular doctrine, but through a consensus arrived at by widening the atmosphere of discussion to which the life of the philosopher owes its birth.

What is called "magic" seems to be best defined as the practical instrument of the animistic conception of things. The "medicine-man," or early professional wonder-worker, in accordance with the theory of the time, supposes things to be capable of sympathetically affecting one another through their immanent souls. His distinction from other men consists in his ability, partly natural and partly acquired, to devise particular ways and means of influence. Side by side with magic, there grows up what comes to be known later as positive "science." For certain groups of phenomena, an order of a more tangible kind impresses itself on observers.¹ One generalisation is added to another; and, as some of these generalisations turn out useful in practice, the search for them becomes systematised. Both magic and the rudiments of science run on through the distinctively religious stage. Either or both, as in ancient Egypt and Chaldæa, may be specially cultivated by the priestly class. Where a strong hierarchy exists, cultivation of science, or the knowledge of impersonal "laws of nature," in subordination to utility, has little tendency to bring on a new phase of thought. Its accumulation, however, as soon as the results are viewed by minds that have arrived at reflection within a less fixed social structure, contributes powerfully to aid the rise of philosophy, or disinterested and individual speculation on the causes and principles of things as parts of the whole. In the end, and in an ideal order, the proper place of science would seem to be an

¹ Comte has developed very systematically what I spontaneously take for granted to be the right view; namely, that "positivity" has its germs in the normal experiences of practical life, not in the imaginative control by which early theology unified thought. Thus we must regard science as coming to displace magic, but not as primarily growing out of it. The contribution to the growth of modern science from certain elements of decomposing ancient and mediæval "magic" is a secondary phenomenon.

This is quite in agreement with the view of Sir James Frazer, who does not, as a hasty reader might suppose, regard the web of thought as consisting at first purely of magic. Like Comte, he finds the germ of "positivity" to be present from the first; and it is this that he conceives as passing into science. Magic and science, he undoubtedly insists very strongly, resemble one another and are distinguished from religion by viewing causes as impersonal; but this is one of the cases where "extremes meet."

instrumental one in relation to philosophy, similar to that which is filled by magic in relation to primeval animism.¹ In periods when men lose the sense of unity, it temporarily falls into subserviency to the commonest material ends blindly pursued by the greatest mass or by the most powerful anarchs.

A form assumed by religion in rivalry with philosophy is that of "divine revelation." Teachers known as "prophets" arise, who proclaim a reform of the existing priestly religion in the name of a communication to them from the gods. Sometimes the great god of the tribe or race is declared to be the revealer. Sometimes a deity who has passed or is passing into obscurity is announced as a new or hitherto unknown god. The prophet may be a real person who spoke or wrote; or he may be an ideal figure, in whose name teachings are put forth by a group. Revealed religion belongs to a stage of some ethical reflectiveness; but of less reflectiveness, and, more especially, of less disinterested questioning, than philosophy; which appeals not to the commands of a god, but to the rational insight of hearers. In its actual development, revelation can become as hierarchical as the older priestly religions which have already systematised the popular cults and the mythical fancies arising out of them. In its most characteristic form, it transcends the bounds of nationality, becomes aggressively intolerant of other religions, and appeals to "faith" against the presumptuous doubts of "the world." Coming, as it does, when the spontaneous formation of cults and myths is already on the wane, it is apt to find a latent scepticism tending to invalidate its claims. Thus even a period so generally credulous and so dominated by a systematised form of revealed religion as the European Middle Age, expressed what was the secret thought of many in the legend of the "Three Impostors." An impious book, it was said, had been written, in which this title was applied to the founders of the three great religions which, in Europe and Western Asia, claimed supreme authority over a peculiar race or over all mankind.

Revealed religion, confronted by philosophy, shapes out the intellectual system known among Jews, Christians and Mohammedans as "theology." This is a doctrine taught as authoritative by the hierarchy, and constructed by the scientific elaboration of myths and legends accepted as data not to be questioned. The typical expression of the system is the mediæval conception of philosophy as the *ancilla theologiæ*.

¹ If magic is in its origins earlier than animism, the analogy becomes more exact, for science is older than philosophy in the distinctive sense. Magic may perhaps be described, in terms which of course would not have been intelligible to its practitioners, as an attempt to act directly on noumena without learning the "language" (as Berkeley called it) of phenomena.

Even when philosophy has separated itself from the mythologies that accompany or grow out of religious cults, it continues to have points of reference to the phases that preceded it. Accordingly, philosophers have been warned by anthropologists that they must carefully test their instruments of thought. Not only "animism," but language and arithmetic, are products of savage or barbaric intelligence, and were not framed for the speculative purposes to which they are afterwards put. How does this affect the validity of philosophy itself? Are the systems of individual thinkers likely to show nearer approaches to truth than modes of thought which have pervaded whole societies, and from which no one born into those societies can escape if he would?

Let us test what are still the rival types of philosophy first in relation to animism.

It may be maintained that when mythological explanations from gods having the character of ghosts are once transcended, two types of independent philosophy arise in succession by a purely speculative process. In its first disinterested effort, human thought fixes on some objective ground of things, and tries to explain all else, including itself, from this. Thus arises the phase of "naturalism." Then, stirred up to further reflection by the unsolved problems left, thought turns back upon itself and finds that it has within a ground of reality at least co-ordinate with that which is without. Later, some thinkers go on to argue that the apparent objective ground is a derivative of a principle like that which the mind discovers in itself. Yet, though this process seems purely speculative, the question may be raised whether in either phase real independence has been gained. Sir Edward Tylor, in *Primitive Culture*, has drawn attention to the resemblance between the theories on the origin of mental images put forward by some of the "naturalistic" thinkers, and the early animistic fancies about ghostly but still material semblances thrown off by objects. And something apparently like the Platonic "ideas," from which in Europe the other group of philosophies has been developed, is also to be found among barbaric tribes. Indeed, in the notion of archetypal animals, from which the individual members of the species are copied, some primeval tribes might seem to have anticipated theories worked out by modern comparative anatomists of "idealistic" lineage. Further, the whole doctrine of the idealists in general may seem open to the charge that its point of origin is merely the "ghost," to which it returns by reaction from the naturalistic theories, whether mechanical or "hylozoist." Hylozoism, again, has its point of origin in the primitive fancy that there is a kind of "life" in moving things.

There is no need to say much on the criticism of naturalism from this point of view. It will be readily admitted that later

doctrines of a naturalistic kind have provided themselves or have been provided with a verifiable experimental basis in physics and physiology which puts them out of reach of attack on the ground of their anthropological origins. If they are to be attacked on the ground of origin at all, criticism must start from an investigation of processes of perception which existed before man became man. The origin of the idea of material substance having been psychologically traced, anyone who wishes to use it as an ultimate basis may reasonably be asked to give grounds for holding that, while the idea has come to exist through a mental process not by itself guaranteeing reality, it is still intellectually trustworthy. The answer could only be furnished by a philosophical system that had some rational account to give of mind also. But this has always been attempted, and not least in the very precise form of naturalism called materialism, which very early developed a "theory of knowledge." In the meantime, the bare fact that primitive men persisted in what was no doubt the naïve animal belief that there is something of the nature of "material substance" outside, does not tell against ancient or modern physical ontologies, whether these work with continuous and transformable elements, or with atoms and void, or with atoms and ether.

Is the idealist in worse case? Is his system, from the anthropological point of view, reactionary? On the whole, it does not seem so. The resemblances to primitive fancies are not greater, and the points of contact are not more important, than those that can be shown for naturalism. Plato's realised "ideas," as principles of explanation, have a purely philosophical pedigree. Historically they are traceable to the profoundly scientific investigation of Socrates into concepts or general notions.¹ General definitions of terms being fixed, while the particulars brought under them vary, it seemed to Plato that real forms, somehow of mental nature, corresponding to that which is general in language, might constitute a permanent system which was the reality behind the flux of the visible world. And this problem of mediation between flux and permanence was determined for him by the fully articulate philosophies of Heraclitus and Parmenides. If, in speaking of the soul, his language and thought are to some extent coloured by the "ghost-theory," his successors were able to free themselves as completely from this as the modern successors of Democritus and Epicurus have freed themselves from the theory that mental images are thin films of existing or no longer existing persons or things. It may be said equally of Plotinus and of Berkeley, that if they had not adopted the word "soul" or "spirit," they would have been obliged to invent a term or terms to indicate something undeniably having

¹ If the term "idea" goes back further to the Pythagoreans, this too gives it a scientific basis rather than a basis in popular thought.

reality, and yet not satisfactorily explained to an introspective mind in the seeming accounts given of it by contemporary "mechanical philosophers." Was not Plato's own reference to a reality "beyond being" an attempt—not yet quite successful—to express pure subjectivity in its opposition to "being" viewed as objective? The "ideas," though he declared them to be neither mindless nor lifeless, he had not been able to clear of a kind of objective character involving their separability from all actual minds.

Thus the rival philosophies are left to arguments from science and reason. They cannot invalidate one another on grounds of history or "pre-history." Substantially, the origins both of naturalism and of idealism are rational.

What then is their relation to the historical religions? Or is there some difference in this respect between the two types?

The general answer is that naturalistic philosophy had put forth its declaration of independence by the end of the sixth century B.C.; and that, with some modifications, the same attitude was continued by idealism. For all popular gods are "personal." That is to say, they are conceived as individual wills capable of relation to other individual wills. They can enter into communion with their worshippers; can make compacts with them or share a banquet; and can have their purposes changed by means of which the typical modes are prayer and sacrifice. Now above all these lords of the world, if not actually as excluding them, the Ionian and Eleatic philosophies placed the universe or its essence. That essence may be defined as rational law or as pure being. Equally, it is inaccessible to the means of approach used in the popular cults. God, said Xenophanes, is neither in body nor in thought like mortal man. And even tried by a human standard, the deeds commonly attributed to the gods are most shameful. To offer blood-sacrifice in expiation of guilt, said Heraclitus, is as if one were to wash out mud with mud. If the gods are perfectly wise and benevolent, said Socrates, is it not better for ignorant beings who do not know their own good, to ask only for good things in general, and not to make particular requests to the gods? And by Plato the modes of feeling characteristic of what some take to be the "natural religion" of all mankind were regarded as the most impious of all. To treat the gods as accessible to prayers and gifts is to hold that they can be bribed. Gods of whom things are related that do not conform to the "idea of the good" can have no place in a city ruled by philosophers. Later, perhaps the most primitive of distinctively religious ideas, that of sacrament, is treated in a dialogue of Cicero as if it had long since been denuded of all its meaning. No one can be so foolish as to believe that what he is eating or drinking is a god.

This is one side of the case. On the other side, it must be

allowed that often philosophers have tried to enter into alliance with religion, and have accused their philosophic antagonists of being irreligious. These again have sometimes retorted by accusing the "religious" philosophers of forming reactionary alliances. And all schools alike have been at times eager to show that, when everything else is gone, philosophy itself is a religion.

Shall we agree with this contention? If philosophy, in both its phases, has reached, as it undoubtedly has for some thinkers, a position not only beyond mere animism but beyond the historical religions, are we to say that it is still a kind of "religion"? And can any one school, if it chooses, make this very general claim on better grounds than its rivals?

On behalf of idealism, it might be urged that, since its ultimately real world corresponds with that to which primitive men assigned their ghosts and gods, this is the permanently religious view; that animism, religion, and idealistic philosophy or "spiritualism," are successive resultants of the same impulse in conflict with a more or less developed materialism. On the other hand, the term religion seems to convey especially the notion of a stringent coercive power. Whether the tie is primarily conceived to bind (*religare*) the worshipper or the god, does not affect the general argument. The important thing is, that there is system and necessity. Now the feeling of this binding unity, on the practical side, has been most strongly impressed by the objective order of nature, whereas the centre of interest to the animist or spiritualist is a self or selves. And the many selves could scarcely have become aware that they were in a system at all unless they had inferred in one another resembling ideas which they took to be derived from a single objective world common to them all. So far, therefore, as idealism and naturalism are concerned, the claims balance.¹

From other points of view, the idea of a bond, and the feeling of dependence implied in religion, have been so used as to connect it especially with the social order and with ethics. Here is the source of the Positivist Religion of Humanity, and of Matthew Arnold's definition of religion as "morality touched with emotion." And these, whatever may be said by the representatives of the historic religions, are not simply individual fancies; as may be shown.

The Positivist conception has the character of a genuine deification. For religion, as actually existent, has not always, in its intenser forms, directed itself to the whole or to its cause or principle, but has often especially adored powers great though

¹ This religious aspect of natural necessity is very strongly brought out by Comte in the *Politique Positive*. The ultimate metaphysical ground of the belief in necessity I do not here discuss.

not universal. "Ancestor-worship," indeed, seems to be a portion of early not yet organised animism taken up afterwards into systematised religion as a subordinate part. The nations in whom it continues to predominate are not regarded by us as distinctively religious in temperament. And later, the exceptional human beings that are the objects of a cult never seem to rise as individuals to a very high stage of deification. In India an individual saint may come to be regarded as an incarnation of Vishnu; but there is no reason to think that the name of Vishnu was originally that of some particular man. Yet Man as well as Nature can contribute to the pantheon by a generalising process. When among the powers worshipped as great gods there are found ancestors of tribes or races, these seem to be imaginary representatives of the whole people,—like "Hellen" or "Israel,"—not actual persons even vaguely remembered. In their own way, they have the generality and remoteness belonging to cosmic powers like the sky or the sun. Sometimes they become reduced to the status of "eponymous ancestors" and nothing more: sometimes they retain a higher rank as permanent tribal gods. No general rule can be laid down as to their origin and phases of transformation. But, evidently, in view of these instances, humanity can claim by analogy to be regarded as a "great being" of divine order, though not as the God of the universe. In the worship of Humanity there would be no reversion to mere ancestor-worship. And in regarding any conceived universal God as too high to be the object of a cult, the Positivists, as they themselves also contend, do not represent a deviation from normal religious instinct. If they desired extraneous philosophical support, they might find it in the "general human intellect" of the Averroists; which was held to be immortal in contrast with the fluctuating individualities that are its temporary expression.

The view that religion is "morality touched with emotion" can claim, if not such decided affinities with organised religions, yet at any rate a long philosophic ancestry. Spinoza in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Pomponazzi and Bruno and others during the period of the Renaissance, and before them a whole series of mediæval thinkers, nominally Christian or Mohammedan as the case might be, were willing to regard religion (or "theology," as they said) in this light. The philosopher rose to intellectual contemplation or to mystic absorption in the divine. His virtue was disinterested. For the multitude, the moral virtues under the sanction of hopes and fears were the highest attainable. The "religions" were to be judged by their power of directing the emotions of men in general to practical conduct. All were good provided they did this; if at the same time they did not assume an intolerant attitude to knowledge, but respected the free thought of the few.

Again, though not in the same way, Kant thought that which is permanent in religion to be ethics in one aspect. His conception agrees on the whole with that of the later Stoics: and in Bruno, a thinker of very different temperament, there are occasional suggestions of a similar view. For Kant regarded religion, in this sense, not as an imperfect thing but as the highest in man; and Bruno, in theory, placed the Stoic calm, at once ethical and religious, above the enthusiastic effort towards contemplative vision and ecstasy.

There is moreover an affinity between the ordinary type of the "good man" and the "religious man." The moral virtues have to be practised from custom and training before they can be practised from insight; and a favourable condition for the observance of some of them is impressibility by all that is received and believed in the surrounding society. Fear of all deviations from the fixed order of a ritual is likely to be accompanied by awe of an established moral code in its social character. Now the man who cherishes fear of the supernatural sanction appealed to by his own community (the *εἰσεβής*), or who loves the familiar rites, or desires more minutely specified ones (the *φιλοθύτης*), is looked upon as pre-eminently pious or religious. And it is usually expected that such a man will, in consequence, be morally good from the point of view of the social code. If he is not, it is thought anomalous.

On the other hand, the "mystic" is often thought to be a distinctively religious type. But the mystic is essentially one who, though practising the moral virtues, has gone beyond them and is seeking to relate himself to the unity in or above the whole, and no longer to the humanised gods that deal in rewards and punishments. From the position he has attained, he rejects for himself all special rites, and even somewhat looks down upon the practical virtues. It may often be said that he is in effect escaping from what is historic in religion to philosophy. And yet this philosophy itself, even when dissociated from every positive cult, is often called "religious." In the philosophy that springs out of science, an analogue of mysticism is "cosmic emotion"; and for this too a religious character has been claimed.

Thus the result of the examination is ambiguous. Philosophy has transcended the historic religions: and yet there are assignable grounds why it may call itself "religious" if it chooses. There would of course be extreme rashness in any attempt to forecast the future of religion as the word has hitherto been understood. Its most imposing and most terrible manifestations appeared after war had been definitely declared by the philosophers on its underlying ideas in the name of the true and the just. Yet this must be insisted on: that philosophy is no mere transition between one dominant religion and another, but

contains in itself the promise of a higher and more permanent order than the august structures of the historic faiths. We may speculate about possible "religions of the future"; but in face of them as in face of the religions of the past, it would be the right and duty of philosophy to maintain its independence. For the ultimate end is not the elaboration of a new ritual, conformable to new ideas, but the prevalence of philosophy, which has no need of ritual, as the guide of humanity.

If this conclusion seems too austere, we must recall to mind that philosophy is not the whole of the culture which is substituting itself for that of the historic religions. When the whole is considered, it will be seen that there is gain and no loss. Even philosophy by itself, compared with the speculative element in religions, is more varied as well as more disinterested. If we bring artistic culture into the account, the case is still stronger. As traditional religion ceases to dominate men's spirits, art, in all its forms, passes into a higher phase. In spite of the opposition that is often supposed to exist, it develops along with ethics; though the two developments may not often simultaneously reach their height in the same society. For reflective ethics appears when the efficacy of traditional rites is questioned; when prophets begin to set justice and mercy against sacrifice. So also the stiff "hieratic" forms of typically religious art give way to forms in which the æsthetic sense attains freedom of expression. Really great art, even of a religious kind, scarcely appears while the faith which it serves is yet unopposed from without and unvexed by internal scepticism. An outburst of it seems usually to coincide with the incipient decadence of belief. Thus the other expressions of human activity, and not merely speculation, go on to a newer order as the "close knots of religions" are undone. Or, if we like to put it in Hegelian phrase, historic religion, with all that it has tried to express, is "taken up" into the next period of man's spiritual evolution; and thus in the end nothing is lost.

Here, however, we must again discriminate. There are elements in religion of which we must desire the continuance in philosophy; but there are also elements of which we must desire the expulsion. Both are set before us by Lucretius. On one side, religion appears to him as a terrific phantasm, "*horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans*." Any human civilisation worthy of the name might seem to arise by overcoming its terrors and the many names and forms, "strange, savage, ghastly, dark and execrable," in which they were embodied. Yet it can be said that in a very real sense his philosophy is to Lucretius an impassioned religion. And he finds himself inspired, not only by his Epicurean science, but by actual myths, to rise to generalised truths about the whole. There was, in fact, beneath all their fictions, this element of truth in animism and religion: they had

seized the new problem which presents itself to the human mind when it becomes human, namely, the nature of man's subjective life and its relation to the powers without. Theories were formed, and in virtue of them political States came into being and poetry and all the other arts sprang forth; for in each tribe and race speculative theory tended to some unitary idea, as mere common sense and the rudiments of science did not. But on the other side the element in human nature that Kant calls "radical evil" nowhere expressed itself with more intensity than in the rites that were elaborated to influence the wills of the invisible beings imagined in the crude speculations of savage and barbarous religion. The oppression under which the human race laboured through its own imaginations of the gods was an object of pity rather than of hate to Lucretius; but he foresaw that there was more of it to come. The scheme of the most transcendent injustice ever ascribed to divine powers was still in the future; and with later poets pity has passed into hate where the oppressors could be separated in thought from the victims. With the institutions and the forms of the creed in which the barbarian idea of human sacrifice as propitiation was finally embodied, it seems to me that philosophy ought to make no compromise; and yet we must recognise with gratitude that certain elements of knowledge and culture which existed before its advent could be brought down through the darkest ages of its domination. As Comte said, the new age must not show the want of piety towards its predecessors for which, in spite of his admiration of the order it brought into European life even under a dogma which he too regarded as intrinsically hateful, he blames the historic Catholic Church. When "institutional religion" goes, an age inspired by philosophy must take the most assiduous care of the great monuments of its past; monuments erected by the genius that had to find expression, as it could, under mediæval as of old under Roman or Greek or Egyptian or Babylonian religion. It is to be hoped that a new race will not come forth like the fanatical monks who destroyed temples and statues, or even like the iconoclastic emperors, inferior as were the forms of art against which they waged war.

But we must beware of calculating too complacently on the direction to be taken by the forces of the world. "Security is mortals' chiefest enemy." If, through some unforeseen change, there were to be again a lapse in civilisation, the old machinery for the repression of thought would be found undestroyed. A revived fanaticism would find a whole arsenal of weapons at its service; and even in contemporary voices we may sometimes hear, with a little imagination, a menace from "the dead mouths of the awful grey-grown ages."

The strength of the old structures must be admitted. For preserving archaisms there is no power comparable to religion.

Under favouring conditions, there seems no limit to the length of time a sacerdotal hierarchy, in alliance with political absolutism, can last on in a petrified form. Yet, when the conditions are unfavourable to survival, a possible life of millennia may be reduced to an actual one of centuries. Why did not the new Persian theocracy of the Sassanidæ last as long as the old institutions of Egypt or Babylon? Merely because it could not escape early collision with the aggressive fanaticism which sprang from the new and less complex creed of Mohammed. A similar doom may be in store for the Russian theocracy. For circumstances begin to be even more hostile. On one side a foe has arisen with superior military organisation. On the other side a subversive propaganda is ever going on. And this starts, not (as in the case of the Roman Empire confronted with Christianity) from the lower civilisation of the East, absolutist and theocratic, but from politics which, whether fully conscious of it or not, are the heirs of the ancient republican state.¹

How long the transformation will take, there as elsewhere, and whether there will again be great reversals, it is useless to discuss. The whole matter has been summed up by Giordano Bruno, in a passage of which the primary idea is better known than the remarkable qualifications with which it is stated. "We are older and have a longer age behind us than our predecessors. But that some of those who came later have been no wiser, and that in general the multitude of those now living have no more wit, than the men of former times, is because they have not lived with the years of others, but are dead to others' experience as to their own. Moreover, since there is perpetual vicissitude of opinions as of all else, to have regard to philosophies simply as ancient, or again as modern, is the same as trying to decide which came first, day or night. The thing we ought to consider is, whether our own thought or the thought of our adversaries is that which puts a term to the night or to the day."²

¹ This paragraph has been left exactly as it appeared in 1906.

² *Cena delle Ceneri*, Dialogo Primo.—I have abbreviated the passage in translation.


A COMPENDIOUS CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES

It is generally allowed that in his Classification of the Sciences Comte furnished a valuable clue to a systematic order in the objective study of nature. Metaphysicians and psychologists find his scheme at fault in its imperfect recognition of the place of subjective studies. Still, it may be noted that he himself, in his later speculations, did something to remedy this defect. After Sociology, which he at first regarded as the supreme science, he placed a Science of Morality. Further, in his *Synthèse Subjective*, he began to set forth a statement of fundamental principles underlying all the positive sciences; and, beyond them all, a view of the cosmos as animated and as related to ends. This indeed was put forward as poetry or religion, and not as demonstrated truth; but it is plainly an approximation to a more "metaphysical" view than that which he had hitherto taken. What I propose is to carry out this completion systematically, with due recognition of the validity of subjective principles which Comte himself would have repudiated, but which, as is acknowledged equally by the successors of Kant and of Mill, are indispensable for a full account of knowledge.

In Comte's final scheme the positive sciences follow one another in the order:—Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Sociology, Morality. This list itself, to begin with, needs correction. Astronomy, as Herbert Spencer has shown to the satisfaction even of some adherents of Comte, does not properly belong to the series of fundamental or abstract sciences as he conceived them. It is a concrete science in the sense in which Geology is a concrete science. Yet this is only in the strictest theoretical sense. The science in its whole constitution is so predominantly mathematical that it might well seem to come between pure mathematics and those branches of physics in which experiment, necessarily absent from astronomy, has an important place. Again, the evident defect of excluding Psychology from the list of fundamental sciences was partly repaired by Comte himself, since under Biology he made a special division for Cerebral Physiology. When Psychology is recognised by name, it is clearly entitled to a separate place. Lastly, it may be observed that Comte's Moral Science is not

philosophical ethics, but is the science of the individual human mind viewed as posterior to life in society. Thus it is really a higher Psychology; namely, that of man as possessing the attributes which distinguish him from brutes.

When from the correction of the list we proceed to its completion, we find that before Mathematics must come Logic (Formal and Material) viewed as a philosophical science. After the higher branch of Psychology comes Metaphysics (as Theory of Knowledge and as Ontology). We are now presented with the result that, to figure the amended classification, Comte's



linear series, provisionally conceived as in a straight line, must be bent into a circle. For a series beginning with Formal Logic and ending with Metaphysics is subjective at both extremes. Moreover, in the speculative though not in the didactic order, Metaphysics as Theory of Knowledge precedes Logic. This is represented in the accompanying diagram. The additional points there figured will be explained in the sequel.

The problem now before us is to show how the determinations of this series are consequent one on another. Beginning with Formal Logic, we may simply posit, as first principles of the science, the Laws of Thought, which, though disclosed by metaphysical investigation, can be stated with perfect intelli-

bility to those who have not gone through the dialectical process that establishes them. For scientific purposes, it is sufficient that they should be found to be applicable tests of formally valid thought. Nor is the metaphysical problem ever raised by their breaking down. It arises from the theoretical need felt of completing the circle. The circle becomes formally complete when the Theory of Knowledge restores to us with confirmation the principles on which we have hitherto implicitly or explicitly proceeded. Historically, it may be noted, Aristotle arrived at the Laws of Contradiction and of Excluded Middle in his *Metaphysics*.

These and the Law of Identity I hold to be laws of thought, not of things. To take specially the Law of Contradiction, which, according to Aristotle's exact way of putting it, asserts that A cannot be not-A at the same time and in the same relation. The law tells us that thought, if it would be formally valid, must not contradict itself; but it does not enable us to assert a single materially new proposition. Given a subjective world of concepts, we can maintain order among them by this and the other laws; but we cannot make any assertion that is not implied in what we have already said. Thus, unless we have, beyond the laws of thought, some general proposition or propositions about experience, we can have no science of nature. The laws of thought by themselves do not allow us to deny, *a priori*, that what objectively exists is a Heraclitean flux without the rational order which Heraclitus supposed to underlie it, and without the equivalence of measure which he held to be the rule of its transformations. Let us imagine ourselves endowed with the laws of thought and presented with such a flux. The Law of Contradiction is evidently of no avail if nothing remains itself for more than a moment and if there is no constant relation of it to anything else. It is true that we are still obliged to treat the momentary existence of A as inconsistent with its non-existence at the same moment; but, if that is all, there can be no system of experiential knowledge. The formal law does not entitle us to deny the complete absence of perdurability or uniformity. Thus, on the one side, it is valid for thought whatever our experience may be; and, on the other side, we cannot by means of it anticipate experience to the smallest extent. For real availability, it is absolutely dependent on there being an order of which by itself it contains no assertion.

In passing from Formal to Material Logic, we come first to the general principles of mathematical knowledge. Since Kant's investigation of these, it is allowed that they are "synthetic" and not merely "analytic." That is to say, there are involved in mathematical demonstration propositions which are neither an affair of hypothetical definition nor can be educed

from definitions by means of the formal laws of thought. To take Kant's own examples. The geometrical axiom that "two straight lines cannot enclose a space" is not a truth that can be evolved by mere comparison of the concepts of the straight line and of space. Similarly with an arithmetical proposition such as $7 + 5 = 12$: no mere comparison of the concepts of the separate numbers can give the resulting number. In both cases, what is required is a construction in intuition or in the corresponding imagination—a process of mental drawing, or of numbering things or events in time. And the peculiarity of mathematical principles is that, upon such construction, recognition of the necessary truth of the proposition is the outcome of a single act of comparison. Thus they are not generalisations from experience.

This last position of Kant has been contested from the experiential side. What remains incontestable is that, besides the principles of Formal Logic, mathematical science requires first principles peculiar to itself. The positions of Locke, of Leibniz, and of Hume in the *Inquiry*, are abandoned on this point. Kant's view as regards the peculiarity of mathematical reasoning, it may be observed, had been in part anticipated in the Platonic school. Plato himself had marked off Mathematics from what he called Dialectic—which was at once Metaphysics and Logic—on the one side, and from such an adumbration of Physics as was then possible on the other. Aristotle divided Metaphysics proper, which he called First Philosophy, from Logic; and by Plato's successors, with the aid of the later Peripatetics, something was done to make clearer the precise character to be ascribed to mathematical truth. An intermediate position was assigned to it between laws valid for pure thinking, which are prior, and "laws of nature" emerging from observation or experiment, which are posterior. These distinctions were to some extent obscured in the early modern period, but may now be considered as restored, though it cannot be said that definitive conclusions have yet been reached. It is henceforth clear, however, that the character of the special logic which belongs to Mathematics has to be determined by the kind of investigation that Kant called Transcendental. Such an investigation is necessarily metaphysical. Psychological theories of the origin of space as a mental form can at most furnish hints towards fixing the problem. Whatever the final result may be, Kant has established the method of the inquiry.

For the classification of the sciences, it is sufficient to note that mathematical truth, though "material" and no longer purely "formal," does not yet suffice to determine anything whatever about the order of nature. This was fully recognised by Kant, who saw that before even "synthetic" propositions regarding space and number can be applied to phenomena,

certain other general maxims, beyond both these and the laws of thought, are needed. The case may be illustrated as when we were discussing the applicability of the Law of Contradiction. Let us suppose ourselves to have the power of counting, and of drawing figures in an imaginary space. Then, if we can provide our constructions with names, and can somehow communicate with similar intelligences, we may work out a system of pure arithmetical and geometrical truth. But suppose that, so far as external nature is concerned, we are confronted with an absolute and lawless flux. Then we can do nothing whatever with our mathematical system. It is of no use to us that the results of counting and of drawing follow with necessity, if numerable things alter their number from moment to moment and figured things change their shapes at random. For abstract geometrical truth indeed it is not required that perfect triangles and perfect circles should exist in nature; but, for applicability of deductions about those geometrical figures, things marked out with figures that approximate to them must retain their shapes long enough for the deductions to be also approximately applicable during a time that is not merely infinitesimal.

To give us the least rudiment of physical or natural science, we evidently require some recognisable perdurability or constancy in things. This requirement is now expressed as the Uniformity of Nature. In antiquity it found expression partly in very slight outlines of a logic of Induction, but most expressly in axioms of which the general form was that nothing is produced from nothing and that nothing can return to nothing. This conception goes back to the beginnings of the Ionian physics. For the history of modern science, its most important ancient phase was Atomism. The physics of Democritus and Epicurus, ready to the hand of scientific philosophers at the opening of the modern era, grew into the corpuscular Mechanics of the seventeenth century. Taken up again by Dalton from Newton, it received its most accurate and verifiable expression in the atomic theory of modern Chemistry. Meanwhile, with Descartes and the Cartesian school, there had come into clear view for the first time the idea of formulating a law of indestructibility of motion, as it was then put. For "motion" or momentum, Leibniz substituted *vis viva* or "force." At length, in the nineteenth century, the anticipated law was accurately formulated as the law of the Conservation of Energy. That Matter and Energy are alike perdurable through all change is not, however, sufficient for scientific uniformity. A law of sequence among the changes themselves is also needed. This has been expressed as the Law of Causation, and, in this expression, has been made a fundamental principle of Inductive Logic. In the modern development of the Logic of Induction, the great names are those of Bacon, Hume, Comte and Mill. Since Mill,

we have a logic of the investigation of nature comparable, in its systematic character, with the formal logic of Aristotle.

In their investigation of the subjective grounds of the principle of Uniformity, Hume and Mill applied themselves more especially to the philosophical or metaphysical problem. To Bacon must be ascribed distinctively the idea of methodical induction, in contrast with "induction by simple enumeration," and to Comte the idea of a scientifically certain or positive "law" of phenomena. On the metaphysical question there is now perhaps more agreement among philosophers than appears. Experientialists do not uphold Mill's view that the Uniformity of Nature is itself established by an induction from particulars; and the successors of Kant on their side do not think that experience can be constituted by mental forms or "categories" applied to a chaos of given sensations. Kant's position as against Hume being conceded to this extent, that experience has its formal elements which are as real as the matter of perception, Kantians or Hegelians hardly contend for more. The categories, they themselves allow, are immanent in experience, and do not need to be imposed on it from without. Indeed the notion that Hume was a pure sceptic without serious belief in scientific truth, or that Kant held nature to be a chaos put in order by the individual human mind, would be allowed to be too "schematic," and not agreeable to the deeper drift of the thinkers themselves. Were "the given" a chaos, no subjective forms, call them "necessary" or not, could set it in order. Nor does it seem reasonable on the other hand that, if there are no intelligible laws to which it is really conformable, the modes of formulating it suggested from time to time by some of its casual conjunctions should agree so well with the rest. To maintain that there is now an approach to unanimity on these points may seem paradoxical. But, in the end, what historical reason is there for expecting that the opposition between *a priori* and *a posteriori* methods, or between Rationalism and Experientialism, will be the one permanent line of cleavage between philosophic schools?

After the logic of the sciences come the positive sciences as such. The first question that arises with respect to these concerns the position of Mechanics. Shall we, with Comte, place at the end of the mathematical sciences Rational Mechanics? Or shall we separate Mechanics as a whole from Mathematics, and make it the fundamental department of Physics? It seems to me that the incontestable portion of Kant's mathematical doctrine necessitates the second position. With Mechanics comes in the conception of "mass," which cannot be educed from space as a pure form of intuition, but has direct reference to data of sense supplied by the feelings of pressure and touch. Yet Comte's view was not altogether ungrounded. The higher branches of mathematics, such as those that deal with infinitesimal

tesimals and with imaginary quantities, have been elaborated, as Bain has pointed out, in close connexion with physical investigations, and often for the sake of solving definite physical problems. Everything except their primary assumptions may have been evolved by pure mathematical construction and formal reasoning; but, if the assumptions themselves are not congruous with the physical order of nature, the theories as a whole remain mere curiosities, and can scarcely be regarded as in any proper sense "true." The reason for including them in Mathematics while excluding Rational Mechanics seems, however, to be this. In Rational Mechanics the idea of a moving mass is fundamental. In Mathematics, whatever may be the manner in which any of its peculiar assumptions are finally selected as worthy to form the ground of a special theory, they can be treated actually as determinations of space and number without direct reference to mass. This is, of course, the normal relation of a simpler to a more complex science. The fact that the more complex science furnishes it with some of its problems does not destroy its logical priority.

Under Mechanics come the Laws of Motion and the Theory of Gravitation. The latter theory was first definitely attained as the result of investigations in the concrete science of Astronomy. This, again, illustrates the relation just referred to. Gravity belongs to General Physics in so far as its theory, once attained, can be stated and worked out with reference to hypothetical masses, and without taking account of the actual masses and distances, empirically ascertained, of particular bodies in the universe. This distinction, insisted on by Spencer, was adumbrated in ancient schemes, Peripatetic or Platonic, by the division of the rational theory of the Sphere from Astronomy regarded as a partially empirical science; though the ancient distinction agreed more nearly with Comte's view in so far as the doctrine of the Sphere was assigned to Mathematics.

The divisions of Special Physics are in part determined by the particular senses receptive of the phenomena grouped together. Light, heat and sound refer unambiguously to the senses of sight, temperature and hearing. These senses are not, indeed, allowed a share in the scientific explanation, which is referred to the so-called "primary qualities of matter," appreciated by the senses of touch and pressure; but without them the phenomena could not for us have been grouped together at all. Several senses being given, however, combined observations enable us to mark off other groups of phenomena which do not, as such, appear to a particular sense. Metaphor apart, we have no sensations of attraction or repulsion. Hence gravitation could not be directly observed, but had to be inferred from its effects in the form of pressure or motion. Electrical and magnetic phenomena have had to be indirectly appreciated in more various

ways. Their common features once known, they could be made the subject of a branch of Special Physics, referred, like the others, to Mechanics or General Physics as fundamental. The reason why Mechanics is thus fundamental seems to consist essentially in the more permanently numerable and measurable character of the phenomena of perception that are its material.

Of Chemistry we may say generally that it deals with the compositions and decompositions of kinds of matter; whereas molecular Physics deals with states of aggregation of particles conceived as all alike. The complex way, however, in which Chemistry furnishes problems to Physics makes the borders of the two sciences difficult to define. For the perception of the qualitative changes going with changes of composition, it is worthy of note that the senses of taste and smell are of account along with the others. As is, of course, the case also in the special branches of Physics, no demonstration that modified arrangements of simple particles accompany the qualitatively different phenomena can annul their actual differences of quality. Hence, even if matter as it must be for Mechanics were found to be everywhere ultimately homogeneous, this would not efface the division between Chemistry and Physics.

With Comte we must add to the list of objective sciences that are fundamental and abstract the science of Life. For vital phenomena are distinguishable from chemical as these from physical phenomena by presenting a new problem of general form, and not merely particular empirical aggregations to be explained by combining and applying the orders of scientific truth already determined. The general problem of Biology is fixed by the nature of living organisms, which, as such, manifest what can in fact be described only as an "immanent end." The parts of an organism act together in such a way that the union of their functions maintains, against resistances that do not overpass certain limits, the continuous existence of an individualised whole. This *consensus* of functions clearly presents a higher problem than those of Chemistry and Physics, inasmuch as we get no hint from any special sense or combination of senses for the demarcation of it. The preceding sciences furnish the instruments for dealing with the problem of organic life in detail; but that problem itself does not admit of a statement wholly resolving it into problems of Physics and Chemistry. And theories of the Evolution of Life cannot, of course, explain how there come to be living forms at all in distinction from the other objects in nature; nor, on the positive side, how those forms are transmuted so as to become, when considered in relation to the general conception of an organism, more "organic." What they really set forth is certain conditions depending on the existence of many kinds of organisms together in space and

analogy, the most reasonable position. It is already laid down in Plato's *Phædo*, though in a form which, through its close union with direct examination of the arguments for the permanence of the individual soul, has given critics trouble to disentangle. Thus it is, historically, nearly as old as the axiom of the physical perdurability of Matter. The Conservation of Energy, with its apparently intermediate position between physics and metaphysics, was naturally much later to receive satisfactory statement. Appearing for long in the guise of propositions about the ambiguous entity called "force," with its suggestion at once of inherence in matter and of subjective activity, it had to be defined as an altogether phenomenal truth, and thrown over to the objective side, before scientific clearness could be attained. Given the perdurability of Mind, as distinguished at once from the merely formal axiom of Identity, that A is A, and from the axioms, having reference to the object-world, that Matter and Energy persist in time, we can now state intelligibly the further questions: Are individual minds or souls alternately segregated from the whole of Mind and re-absorbed into it; there being thus emergence and cessation of ever new intrinsic differences? Or do they represent permanent distinctions, through changes of phenomenal manifestation, within a total intellectual system? To state the questions is not of course to answer them; but, once the general axiom of perdurability is admitted, they become accessible to the laws of thought. The criterion seems to be, Which supposition is most thinkable in accordance with the nature of mind?

To return now to a topic just raised under the head of Psychology. The amended classification of the sciences here proposed seems to exclude Practical and Æsthetic Philosophy. Yet these too have a scientific or speculative aspect, as on the other hand Metaphysics and Logic, which are included, may be treated not only as speculative sciences but as disciplines regulative of thought. Again, no place has been found in the diagram for the concrete and applied sciences. The answer to these objections is that any arrangement in space must necessarily be inadequate to the true order of the sciences, both positive and philosophical; since all of them together have their existence in mind or the unextended. A diagram can only serve as an aid to mental conception: it does not directly show forth the real order. This is partly but not fully admitted by Spencer in relation to his own scheme when he says that a true classification of the sciences ought to be figured in three dimensions, and not on a surface. For not only do his tables, as he himself notes, exclude subjective psychology, which he regards as co-extensive with all the objective sciences and antithetical to them; but, more than this, the use of a model in three dimensions would not enable him to bring it in.

The present adaptation of Comte's scheme to a more meta-physical doctrine—and indeed the original scheme itself—does not seem to be necessarily in rivalry with Spencer's. When it is recognised that every diagrammatic representation must be inadequate, the two classifications may very well be taken as expressions of different points of view. For philosophical use, Comte's point of view has this advantage. It brings out clearly that the sciences, in their ideal order, form a single organism of knowledge to which each is subservient. Spencer's scheme, on its side, brings out what is also a perfectly real aspect of science; namely, its tendency to branch into divergent specialities, which arrange themselves like groups of organisms at the termination of a process of biological evolution. This, however, is a less important aspect for the philosopher. And to keep it primarily in view seems less conducive to the reception of science into the system of general culture.

When the sciences are thought of as organically related to a whole, the advantages of the circular arrangement are easy to see. For this by no means indicates a definitively closed system. On the contrary, it might have served as the least inadequate representation from the time when cosmic science or philosophy first began vaguely to differentiate into particular sciences. New sciences would thus be seen introducing themselves in accordance with that process of "intussusception" by which a biological organism grows, and which Kant regarded as the true process of development for an architectonic system of knowledge. This, and not the direct historical succession of the sciences in agreement with their logical order, has been the real course of intellectual history. We may see it still going on in the efforts made by contemporary philosophers and men of science to connect Logic and Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry, Physico-Chemistry and Biology. If linking sciences thus come into being, there are places for them. The supposition that the logical order of the sciences and the historical order in which they become "positive" are one and the same, is a defect in Comte's classification as it stands; but, as may now be seen, it is unessential to the use of it. There is no difficulty indeed in fixing arbitrarily the time when a science is positively constituted, and making the two orders seem to agree; but, if we view the facts impartially, the supposition that they do agree may be easily refuted. Chemistry, for example, is logically prior to Biology; yet it was later to become a coherent body of doctrine.¹

¹ This is recognised by Comte himself in the *Politique Positive*. See t. i. pp. 513-515, where he formulates the general law: "La grande loi logique qui place l'avènement de toute doctrine intermédiaire après celui des termes extrêmes dont elle doit organiser la vraie liaison finale." Cf. t. iii. p. 52. This important development belongs to Comte's later period: there are no perceptible hints of it in the *Philosophie Positive*.

And Psychology, even in its higher department, is an older science than Sociology; which indeed is even now little more than inchoate, so that the definite place assigned to it in the series is still somewhat in advance of the facts. The sciences have not waited for one another, but have started up at intervals as occasion brought them into view; the higher sciences contenting themselves, if the lower were not "ready," with a few approximations to their laws, or in the meantime taking leaps in the dark. And at every stage since Greek science began, there has been some kind of general philosophy in more or less friendly relation with the special sciences.

Finally, it might be contended that something like the arrangement proposed has always been implicit in educated thought. To make out a case, it would only be necessary to point to the etymology of the word "encyclopædia,"—the circle of the sciences.

TELEOLOGY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Οὐκ ἔοικε δ' ἡ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὔσα ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων, ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγῳδία.—Arist. *Met.* xiv. 3, 1090 b 19.

KANT's treatment of final causes in the *Critique of Judgment* is as classical for modern times as that of Aristotle for antiquity. Thus it is the inevitable starting-point for any new discussion of the topic. Complex as the third *Critique* is in itself, the general position that results from it can be stated in a few words. The human mind necessarily makes use of the conception of an end or "final cause" in its explanation or description of an organism; but this conception has not full theoretical validity. Perhaps an "intuitive intelligence" might be able to view nature as through and through mechanically determined. Apparent teleology, seen especially in organisms, runs out into æsthetic contemplation of nature; but for the speculative reason it has no "constitutive" value. Primarily, the bearing of the idea of end is practical. The mechanical principles, however, which have for nature the highest theoretical warrant, not only cannot now explain, but demonstratively will never be able to explain for any human mind, the simplest process that is distinctively vital. For the sciences of organic life the conception of final cause will always be a necessity.

Kant's "hard-and-fast" divisions are by his successors laid aside: and this is often supposed to tell in favour of some view subordinating everything to practice. If there is no rigorous demarcation between the "practical" and the "speculative," then, it is straightway assumed, we must declare every explanation to be ultimately practical, the mechanical just as much as the teleological explanation. But why not attempt a precisely opposite correction? If there are no such hard-and-fast lines, teleological explanations, though starting immediately from our knowledge of our own practical activity, must have a speculative character of their own, no less than mechanical ones. Their degree of theoretical validity remains to be determined. The rigid lines having gone, we can ask which "category," teleology or mechanism, comes nearer to the truth of reality, and what are their other superiorities or inferiorities. We have returned to something more like the position of Aristotle, by whom the teleological account of organisms was regarded as one form of

theoretical science, and not as a kind of intruder, though an inevitable one, in the scientific domain.

To appeal finally to the decision of theoretical reason, so far as this can be distinguished from other manifestations of reason, does not mean that we are to ignore systematically the problems suggested by æsthetic or practical views. Such views may start questions to which the speculative reason can give some, though not a perfect, answer. Its answer, by the seeker of speculative truth, must be accepted in the last resort. In metaphysics we must not ask first, what alternatives are theoretically possible, and then decide, in the absence of any other test, for that which conforms to our aspirations. Rather we must ask, whether a view conformable to our aspirations can be consistently thought. If it can, we must still try to adjust our belief exactly to the evidence, and not choose it with a weighted volition that goes beyond.

"Final cause," then, presents itself to us, within a certain range, as a known fact. We have the thought of a modification to be produced in perceptible objects; and the production of that modification takes place after we have thought of it, and somehow in consequence of our idea as a contributory cause. And such cases are not merely sporadic. There is a whole class of events, called "volitions," of which this is the general description. One idea which, through intermediate mental and physical modifications, is at the origin of many actions, is the generalised idea of conserving the organism. The previous existence of this as a directing thought contributes, through what we call "means," to realise the "end"; that is, to maintain the continued existence of the organic system called the body. The view can be further generalised. The working of the body, beneath our voluntary muscular actions, is made up of all sorts of physical and chemical processes: and these, we find, conspire in the absence of conscious direction to effect what would be our "end" if we had control over them. We can apply the same conception to animal organisms, without necessarily supposing them to possess conscious ends of a generalised kind at all. Further, we can apply it to plants, which we do not even suppose to be conscious in the ordinary meaning of the word, much less to have conscious ends. That is to say: if we were in the place of the lower animal or the plant, and desired to preserve the existence of the system supposed to be our body, we should, if we could, with this end in view, combine the physical and chemical processes exactly as they are combined. Or if, standing outside, we had in our minds as an object of desire the preservation of such an organic system, and had control over its internal processes, we should control them precisely thus. This is summed up by saying that all living organisms, from the highest to the lowest—whatever else they may have—have an "immanent end."

So far teleology seems to be quite scientific. It is merely a generalised statement of facts and events. But can we go deeper? Is this appearance an illusion? Must the ultimate explanation be found in a purely mechanical transmission of motion, capable of being stated according to laws which are not teleological?

Clearly this cannot be the ultimate explanation; and, whatever advance knowledge may make, can never become so. For explanations in terms of mechanism are merely phenomenal: whereas teleological explanations, though these too must not be assumed to be ultimate, take account of something known to us as more than phenomenally real—namely, a process of mind. Even where this cannot strictly be known, they suppose something vaguely in analogy with it. Thus, while they have nothing like the minuteness and accuracy of the mechanical explanations, they have more reality in a metaphysical sense. A mechanical process is ultimately, under analysis, nothing but an observed or inferred co-existence and sequence of appearances, having a certain constancy. Appearances generally are combinations of presented and represented sense-elements which we "project," as portions of our perceived "external world," according to psychological law. We reduce this varied object to "mechanism" by abstraction; that is to say, we bring it to a calculable form by taking away a considerable part even of what is actual or possible appearance to our own minds or to human minds in general. From this denuded "mechanical" world we can never get back by a rational procedure even to the whole of phenomena; let alone to the mental reality which we observe in ourselves introspectively or infer to exist in others.

The foregoing argument of course implies the idealistic contrast between the phenomena of the object-world, projected in the form of space, and the reality of the mind as known by introspection, for which objects are appearances. If it is said that, at any rate, the appearances indicate something that is not our own mind or the minds of other persons, the reply must be that in no such way as this can the ultimate character of mechanical explanations be defended. For these do not take us to any "ground" beneath mere relations of phenomena. And the phenomena themselves even are regarded not in their fulness, but in extreme abstraction.

Let us, however, setting aside the idealistic criticism for a moment, consider the emergence of organic groups in accordance with Natural Selection. This is sometimes even by men of science called a "mechanical" explanation, though it is really of a more concrete character, and cannot be translated in full into abstract mathematico-physical relations. In any case, it does not resolve the fundamental teleology of organisms, but assumes it. What it gets rid of scientifically is the so-called "external teleology," which imagined organic forms to be

explained by the assertion that a quasi-human artificer had adapted them to one another and to the conditions of life. Natural Selection gives a scientific explanation of the origin of species by showing how groups may come to be definitely marked off through elimination of the multitudes of individuals that cannot maintain themselves in competition with individuals better adapted to the given circumstances. But those that are eliminated are also, for the most part, quite capable of maintaining themselves and of leaving offspring if they had fewer competitors. Practically, all are expressions of an "immanent teleology"; but the varying individuals vary in efficiency as in other characters. Wonderful as was the anticipation by Empedocles of natural selection as a general idea, nothing has yet been found in organic nature corresponding to the endless production, which he supposed, of monstrous births, hardly any of which could live at all. If this had turned out to be the order of things, more might have been said for the view that apparent "end" or "final cause" is a merely casual result of something resembling mechanism. But the facts, as observed, correspond rather to Aristotle's view that the relatively few monstrous births produced indicate some material obstacle, which causes the essentially teleological effort that finds its expression in living things occasionally to miss the mark. Human volition very frequently fails to reach what it aimed at: and yet we do not say that there was no volition; nor do we say, when it hits the mark, that there was in it no preconception of results.

Darwin, of course, never rejected teleology in the sense defended. It merely did not come within his own biological province; belonging rather to that of the physiologist. According to an utterance related in his *Life and Letters*, the argument for the reality of final causes sometimes appealed to him; though at other times he seemed to see nothing in it. This is intelligible, since the great effect of his work was to explain in a different manner a whole order of things which the cultivators of natural history had been in the habit of explaining by teleology of an illegitimate kind.

In its foundation, biology still remains the type of a teleological science. This means that it is a mixed science; that although in its whole structure it is phenomenal and objective, it has nevertheless to use, implicitly or explicitly, as a directive idea, something given to it by an elementary psychological observation of the process in volition. In detail, physiology proceeds by tracing the physico-chemical changes that carry on the life of the organism; but without the conception of the organism as an end to itself, kept in being by a set of "functions" working together for their own continuance, there would be no such scientific problem as that of "life." An organism would be

merely a portion of the object-world accidentally detached, like a piece of rock for example. To consider its preservation or non-preservation in any special way would be of no interest.

Biology, once formed, reacts powerfully on psychology, which now acquires a much more determinate teleological basis than it would have had if limited to introspection. In fact, so far as the idea of end can be carried through in psychology itself, it owes most of its applicability to biology. To have insisted on the fundamental character of the "organic individual" in psychological science appears to me on reflection to be a definite achievement of recent psychologists. In Germany it may be assigned to Wundt, in England to Professors Ward and Stout. Some of their predecessors, as I think they admit, have recognised the "conative" basis of the science; but undoubtedly considerable development of it was needed to correct a form of "associationism" which would have made teleology issue, as a last result, from laws of mental process intrinsically not teleological. This admitted, however, there is room still for a plea on behalf of the position that something is to be found in mind beyond teleology. There are processes, both of mere association and of thought, that have purely mental laws not reducible to relations of end and means. A higher teleology beyond the psycho-physiological may arise by which they become ends; but ends in the primary meaning of practical interests are not their determinants from the beginning. Speculative interests, if we like to call them so, spring out of a non-teleological mode of mind. Not only pure thought, but mere reverie, may exist, as we say, "for its own sake," and without having been brought to be by adaptation to a desired result. We have risen to the "super-organic," in a sense somewhat different from that of Spencer.

By this association of ideas, which (as if to illustrate the thesis maintained) presented itself unsought, we may go on to the "super-organic" in its meaning of sociology. Here we are brought again to a science which in one department—like biology in its physiological department—in the absence of the idea of end becomes mere chaos. It would not be quite true to say this of psychology; but it is true of historical science. Organic development, conceived as a series of relations to immanent ends, is here fundamental. The phenomena of decadence and reaction do not alter the case, any more than the phenomena of degeneration alter it in biology. This means that we have here again a "mixed" science, with interaction between conceptions belonging to the object and the subject. Our demarcations of the sciences must evidently not be taken in too rigorous a sense.

The teleological idea, as here adopted, seems to be secure against the criticism contained in Prof. Adamson's *Development of Modern Philosophy* (vol. ii. "Principles of Psychology," A.

chap. iii.). That criticism is effective against the notion that any use can be made of the idea of a prefigured end towards which the whole process of things is moving; but the idea of end in its "immanent" sense, as applied to the development of the individual or of smaller or larger organic groups, appears to be admitted by Adamson himself, only with some advance in subtlety of statement.

Teleology, according to the view that has been taken, finds expression in the laws of every kind of organic system from individual organism to species; and in man again from the organic individual through family and tribal groups to cities and nations, and lastly, in an incipient way, to the whole of humanity. Such groups are not mere aggregates, but can have an intelligible end stated for them by a spectator identifying himself in imagination with the group. This end is, at the lowest, self-conservation. As the scale is ascended, it becomes something more: "power" (as Hobbes expressed it), or freedom, or positive happiness in practical or contemplative activity. Such ends arrive at self-consciousness only in the higher organic groups, and only in individuals among those groups.

Can we go further and suppose a single teleological system in which all these systems are included so as to be adapted to one another? This, as Kant showed, can only be done by speculating in terms of an ideal. In thus speculating we go beyond the region of positive science. Yet the whole of organic life on earth, with its whole environment, does somehow form part of one system, whether we call it teleological or not. And the accomplishment of ends by individuals and groups is dependent on the system with its mutual adaptations. As to the nature of this system, the general truth seems to have been first stated by Heraclitus, who declared that the condition of there being a cosmos was strife. The later Greek philosophic schools all adopted this view, putting it in their own manner. Plato's recognition, in conformity with it, that evils can never be expelled from the world, was enforced by his successors with arguments of their own. Evil, said Proclus, must always exist as a condition of the universal harmony, but it must always be kept under. It is scarcely necessary to point out the perfect agreement of the Darwinian "struggle for existence" with this theodicy.

The term "theodicy," adopted by Leibniz, correctly describes the thought of successive generations of Greek thinkers. From an early period, there had been a tendency to bring even what might seem merely physical under the head of "justice" and "injustice." The general conclusion of reflective observers, viewing life as a whole, was that a kind of justice can be seen to run through it, but that this, according to human ideas, is very imperfect. Both in their positive and negative utterances,

the Greeks are on this point in agreement with the most penetrating of the Hebrews. Only among the Greeks, however, did poetic reflection lead on to a sustained philosophic effort after a solution. Plato, who first stated the problem in its generality, conceived it on the whole as Kant did later. The reign of absolute justice could not be seen if you looked for it directly as a mere observer. The method must be, to set up an ideal and then try whether you can think this as really governing all that happens in the world. The test is that you preserve self-consistency and consistency with the facts; following resolutely where reason leads. Plato's conclusion was that, while actual life, if closely examined, works out far more favourably to the just man than might be thought by a superficial observer, yet a single individual life is not adequate to the full accomplishment of justice. To this end, there must be a permanent individual existence, for which the single life is only one of a series. Over this series absolute justice rules.

By some thinkers the problem raised in the last place was set aside. The teleological order of the system of things, they thought, manifests itself only in relation to such great organic unities as cities and races. It does not take account of the mere individual. Now of course a kind of historical justice is most easily observable over a long time and where a great multitude is considered. Plato himself recognised the provisional value of such a point of view in proposing to consider ideal justice in the city before dealing with it in the citizen. But, as Proclus noted, while the virtues of the whole city are those of the individual "writ large," they are in quality as distinguished from quantity at a greater remove from the ideal (*Comm. in Remp.*, ed. Kroll, i. 217). Thus, if we are to try at all to find in the order of the world conformity to our practical and æsthetic demands, we must seek in the destiny of the individual a greater and not a less refinement of justice. A theodicy applying only to races and cities and perhaps families, would not satisfy us if it left the individual in a purely accidental relation to the total organic unity in which he is involved. This had long been an admitted point of view in Greek speculation of a theological cast. And, as Proclus also recognised, justice must not apply merely to man. There must be some shadow of it in relation to the lower animals.

Before we can know how far there is room for imaginations of "something like" this, we must try to determine whether any immortality of the soul is possible. Can the permanence of the individual be maintained on grounds of speculative reason?

The question is obviously not to be settled at once by idealism. For it seems as if, on idealistic principles, individuality might be some temporary phase in an impersonal whole of mind. In order to start as far away as we can from any position that

would beg the question and issue in a purely illusory deductive process, let us attempt a dogmatic use of the sceptical result arrived at by Hume in the *Treatise of Human Nature*: namely, that no substance either of matter or of mind need be assumed, but that the finally true realities are the particular "perceptions" into which mind is resolved by analysis. These themselves, as Hume points out expressly (Bk. i. Pt. iv. sect. 5), we have no reason for supposing inextinguishable. For anything that can be asserted *a priori*, they, in common with every object we can imagine, may be "annihilated in a moment."

On this last position Hume remarks that it leaves everything "precisely as before." We may if we like take this in the sense that it is permissible to try to find our way back to a system by any axiom or postulate that seems to offer a foothold; though of course no one can be prevented from electing to remain a pure sceptic, adopting only such practical principles as may be necessary for the conduct of life. Now if the method were chosen of asserting as true anything conceivable on the given supposition, a positive doctrine of immortality might be laid down compatibly even with this complete disaggregation of mind. The existent perceptions *may* not be wholly annihilated; and they *may* continue, after the destruction of a particular organism (itself an illusory appearance), to run together in the same apparent "form of personality." All we need to do is to furnish ourselves with a practical motive and make an assertion agreeable to it. Perhaps this was the meaning of Hume's irony. I confess, however, that I should prefer to remain a pure sceptic. Any axiom that it would seem to me satisfactory to work with must present itself as primarily intellectual.

An axiom of perdurability applied to the elements of mind seems to have this character. Let us, then, posit as first realities the "elementary feelings" of Clifford's "mind-stuff," and declare these to be permanent. From their union minds appear, and into them minds, if they perish as such, are resolved. This view (as follows from what has been already said) does not absolutely preclude continuance of the same form of personality from one life to another; though it does not in any way suggest it. Rather it suggests that death of the organism is accompanied by final disaggregation of the individual mind. Is the theory itself, however, in the end, thinkable?

Put in the extreme form provisionally adopted, it is not. The best refutation has been furnished by Prof. W. James, who has expressly discussed the question in his *Principles of Psychology*. The conclusive argument is this. If the isolated "elementary feeling" is the true reality, then relations between feelings joined in a consciousness should be explicable from the mere co-existence and succession of the feelings themselves. But such co-existence and succession can take place without bringing on the slightest

tendency to permanent relation between the feelings. Let different persons experience side by side and in definite temporal order feelings which, if thus brought together in one consciousness, would give a total conscious state with related parts: neither their co-existence nor their succession will, in the circumstances, produce any association whatever. Thus consciousness, or the form of the individual mind, remains just as unexplained as before. Whatever it may be, it is something that makes a real difference to the feelings said to join themselves together in actual minds. "Laws of association," instead of showing how it emerges from the mere feelings, suppose it already there. The theory so far does not lead us a step further.

Another way of conceiving the doctrine of mind-stuff was slightly developed by me some time ago.¹ Let us suppose the "relations" of Spencer (or indeed of Hume) equally permanent with the feelings related. Cannot the whole real or metaphysical process of things be regarded as an evolution of a "mind-stuff" consisting from the first not of isolated but of related feelings? The difficulty of this seems to be that we still get no nearer to the explanation of the many individual minds. Given a total of mind-stuff as the reality, its evolution would always be that of a single individual. It may be said that this is so; that particular individuals are partially illusory representations of the sole real experience. A view like this has been thought to result from Hegelianism. But on this theory also we need some explanation of apparent individuality.

Logically developed, the theory in this form seems indistinguishable from a Spinozism in which the "attribute of thought" is identified with "absolute subject" (rather than "substance"); the attribute of extension being subordinated. This too, however, fails to yield an explanation of the individual mind, at least on Spinozistic principles. "That thing," says Spinoza (*Eth.* i. Def. 2), "is called in its kind finite which can be bounded by another of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater. Thus thought is bounded by other thought. (*Sic cogitatio alia cogitatione terminatur.*) But body is not bounded by thought nor thought by body." Now evidently the organism is in this sense a finite thing, being marked off from other bodies. But there is no such relation between the particular mind, which according to Spinoza corresponds to it in the attribute of thought, and other minds. For there is no "boundary" between one mind and another, but each corresponds to the universe. "The soul," as Aristotle said, "is in a manner all things." The bounding of thought by thought, in analogy with a corporeal limit, is intelligible, if at all, only within each mind considered by itself. When Spinoza later speaks of "our mind" as "an eternal mode of

¹ See Part i., " ' Mind-Stuff ' from the Historical Point of View."

thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and thus to infinity; so that all together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God" (*Eth.* v. Prop. 40, Schol.), we seem to have arrived at a fundamentally different position, not capable of development from the first. Individuality is asserted as a fact, but has not been deduced.

Perhaps this is inevitable. At any rate, segregation and re-absorption of mind-atoms, and delimitation of infinite thought, alike turn out to be inapplicable analogies from bodies distributed or diffused in space. Reconstitution of the individual mind from the "particular perceptions" into which it was apparently resolved, Hume himself did not think that he had achieved; and the successors on his own line have not further advanced this particular problem. Mill, in his famous definition of consciousness as "a series aware of itself as a series," in effect gave up the attempt; simply asserting individuality in his own manner. But had Hume really disposed of the "immaterial soul"? Is the term henceforth superseded for the metaphysician?

Now it is remarkable that, in the section of the *Treatise* referred to above, he only seems to dispose of it by showing how the logical development of the conception would run into Spinozism. This was meant to frighten the theologians of his time; and it succeeded. But suppose we have no objection to regarding the particular soul as not a created thing, but in some sense an "eternal mode" of the Substance or Subject that is all. If we are fairly to test the position, we must not take the soul as understood in the Christian Scholastic compromise between a philosophically developed Platonism and the dualistic assumptions required to square with the faith. Some purely philosophical rendering of the doctrine must be sought for. This test, it may be pointed out, Kant as well as Hume failed to apply. Now we find such a purely philosophical rendering in Berkeley; whose theological purpose never caused any deviation in the logic of his thinking. Hume, in his destructive criticism of "personal identity," does not attempt to deal with Berkeley's doctrine of the "notion." Of the importance of this, indeed, Berkeley himself only became fully conscious after his first writing of the *Principles of Human Knowledge*; as is shown by his later insertions. What Hume treats as Berkeley's definitive "theory of knowledge" is the position that we reason by means of "ideas." This theory, however, Berkeley considered adequate only to the object-world. About objects in general, we can reason by particular "ideas," all of which are picturable. The use of these in thinking is made possible by attention to them in a general relation. The constant order that runs through our perceptions, considered in this general aspect, constitutes our external world. By closer attention to the precise conditions of perceptions, in so far as

they do not depend on each particular mind, we substitute science for ordinary experience. There must be, however, something to which the external world appears. This is called a "spirit." Of spirits we have no "ideas," but only an absolutely unpicturable "notion," corresponding to no particular perception. Yet, for coherent knowledge, we cannot do without subjects of phenomena. A substance or subject, indicated, it may be, only by a word, must yet be thus indicated because perceptions are—as we now say—related in a consciousness. And, as has been seen, the course of more recent thought has failed to substitute any way of thinking by which we can dispense with such a "notion." For positive psychology, at least in beginning its expositions, the organism may suffice as a "bearer": but the problems raised by Berkeley and Hume do not find their adequate solution in positive psychology.

Let us, then, adopting the position last cited from Spinoza, try to conceive of the many "spirits" as interacting within a system (called by Spinoza "*Dei aeternus et infinitus intellectus*"). These existences ("spirits" or "modes"), according to Berkeley as well as Spinoza, are not limited to a particular time. In fact, immediate experience suggests to us the notion of a subject which goes into latency (as in sleep) and returns from it. Why then should we limit their duration at all? As they are not deducible either from "infinite intellect" on the one side, or from hypothetical elements reached by analysis on the other, the consequence seems to be that the whole of mind must be thought of as always intrinsically pluralised.¹ And, since the "modes" by which it is pluralised are distinct, they too, if we are to retain our general axiom of perdurability, must be regarded as permanent. Thus the whole of mind, that is, of reality, contains in itself many permanently real modes or spirits, without ceasing to be a whole and a system.

Evidently, on the principles of immaterialism, the conditions expressed as space and matter will not enable us to explain the pluralising of mind. The organism is merely one figured portion of the "waking dream" (Berkeley, *Siris*, § 318) which expresses the interaction of the "subjects" composing reality. Its relation to the subject is not properly that of effect to cause, any more than of cause to effect, if we use the terms in their scientific or phenomenal sense: it is that of phenomenon or manifestation to noumenon. The word "cause" indeed was used in the sense of noumenon by Kant himself, after he had formally drawn the distinction. It had been used already in this sense by the Neo-Platonists. Comte proposed to expel it from philosophical or scientific language precisely on account of

¹ This Leibnizian position, to which an acute objection was raised by Prof. Clement Webb in *Mind*, July 1908, p. 418, is modified in the next essay ("A New Metaphysic of Evolution," § 30).

the tinge of "metaphysics" that clings to it. Still, if a serious effort is made, consistent use of it in the phenomenal sense does not seem difficult to maintain; though occasional relapses into popular language (which is more "metaphysical") ought not to be found very misleading.

Thus we do not seem to need any "substance" except the intangible and unfigured "subject" to which phenomena appear. The ways in which this could go out of existence without diminishing the whole of being, seem to be strictly unknowable. We cannot dogmatically assert that there are no such ways; but we are at least entitled to attempt an ontological theory on the ground of what can be coherently thought. To complete the scale of being, it will no doubt be necessary to suppose, at a lower grade than Berkeley's self-conscious "spirits," not only permanent souls of animals, but also "monads," as Leibniz called them, corresponding to the things that appear as inorganic. These are not "material substances" in Berkeley's sense. Their real being is an activity analogous to that of the subject. Phenomenally, the rendering of this may be "energy." And, if we are to speculate on this line, the conjecture may be thrown out that the phenomenal rendering of subjective being when its activity becomes latent is "entropy," or unavailable energy. If there is anything that can be wholly set over against soul or mind or spirit, it seems to be a kind of real "not-being," such as the Platonic or Neo-Platonic "matter." Berkeley, in his later speculations, did not reject the thought that there might be a place for this matter of the "incorporealists." If it were to be again introduced, as has sometimes been proposed, its meaning would be that of a descriptive formula expressive of the fact that non-spatial subjects come to present themselves as if set apart from one another, in union with certain bounded groups of phenomena in space. Something very like this is to be found in Kant's space considered as a "form of intuition," within which the subject is necessitated to present phenomena to itself. For within space as a common form, the individual subject associates one group of phenomena (namely, its organism) with itself; inferring the existence of other subjects in association with similar appearances. Kant's spatial "form" is not the same as the empty, objective space called by Plato the recipient of the ideas; and, though it has more points of resemblance to the Neo-Platonic "matter," it is not quite identical with it: but it occupies the same position in the system. A thorough assimilation of any of these doctrines would equally set us free from "parallelism," of the Cartesian type, between "extension" and "thought" conceived as co-ordinate realities. The metaphor suggested, instead of parallel straight lines, would be that of circumference and centre (or, as the Platonists said, the region near the centre); the former representing material

objects and the latter intellect. A taste for paradoxical expression might suggest that, according to this view, the two poles of reality are mind or the unextended, and nature or the non-existent.

What the Sophist called the non-existence of nature is, however, like its existence, relative. Actual or possible "natural phenomena" do not themselves constitute a process of real evolution: yet we must suppose a real process to go on through the activities of the subjects to whom are presented the phases of the cosmic dream. How this process is to be conceived metaphysically is a genuine problem for speculation, though it may admit of no positive solution. A theory worked out by the Orientalist Émile Burnouf (in *La Vie et la Pensée*) was that the same "monads" become successively incarnate in the ascending stages of animal life, till at length they reach the stage of man, to be followed, at the next great geological epoch, by that of "super-man." Another possible view is that the "Ideas of Individuals" (in Platonic phrase) do not evolve so as to pass from one specific grade to another, but become by turns manifest in a phenomenal world as the process brings on the grouping of scenery adapted to new actors in the drama. In this case equally, of course, the apparent or physical corresponds to a real or metaphysical process. Either view is consistent with the facts of biological evolution, which refers directly only to the organisms evolved. If indeed the consciousness of the offspring could be explained by deriving it from the consciousness of the parents, the whole would be an affair of positive science, and we should have no need for a metaphysic of heredity. But no such explanation has ever been offered in psychological terms.¹

Speculation has thus brought us to conceive the possibility that permanent individual subjects may have successive lives through which could be seen, if we knew them, a teleological order resembling that which is manifested in societies to the insight of a philosophic historian. As in the successive generations of a progressive or decadent civilisation, so in the case of the individual, the acquirement or non-acquirement of knowledge and virtue in one life would have its effect on the next. It might even be rendered conceivable that, at a certain elevation in the scale of being, consciousness and memory should go on in some phenomenal world from one life to another. And if the teleological order (as was always assumed in the Platonic myths)

¹ Something like this, I have found on reading Joannes Philoponus *De Aeternitate Mundi* (see Appendix II, p. 461, note 3) was an ancient argument in the Greek schools against the view that individual souls are produced by segregation from "a certain totality of souls." If this totality could produce new wholes by dividing, why should not each of these be similarly divisible in turn?

is one in which justice prevails, this does not involve any chimerical notion of guilt or merit on the part of the individual towards the universe. All that is done or suffered must be regarded as taking place naturally through the actions and reactions of individuals within the smaller or greater organic groups to which they belong. In the case of man, the largest group may be, as Mill thought, sentient life on earth; but with this each man's connexion is less organic than with Humanity; as again, at the present stage, it is less organic with Humanity than with his own State.

Lastly, the question put by Aristotle arises: whether the unity of the whole is merely in the system, or is something above. In terms of Spinozism: Is there any but a logical distinction between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*? Or, in terms of Hegelianism: Is there any meaning in talking of Absolute Spirit apart from the finite spirits in which it is manifested? Now under the head of psychology we found that, while determination by "final cause" continues to a certain point, there is a point where, even within our experience, we begin to go beyond it. Intellectual activity may attain a kind of impersonal character in which the relation of end and means begins to disappear; and the mystics claim to go even further. So far as transcendence of teleology is concerned, the mystics and Aristotle—who, it must be remembered, was pre-eminently a teleologist—quite agree. There may exist a state or activity of the individual subject which does not reach out to anything further, but is for that subject the end. If something even better than this has an unchanging existence in that which directs the whole, or contains all, or is all, then there is placed for ever above volition what is finally the end of all desire. All below this may contain an element of will; since even the lowest real existences are moved by a vague "effort" towards some kind of good: but that which the whole, or the highest in it, possesses, it does not need to strive after. A position thus generalised seems to offer the elements of a solution. There are systems of ends, and these are mutually adapted so as to form one system; but this system has no end. There is no future of the universe for which its present state is only a preparation; just as its present state was not the "final cause" of the preceding. The perfection of the whole exists eternally, in a manner of which the mystics may get a glimpse. The whole, while it is a system, is more. The One, which remains, is either superpersonal intellect, containing all subjects, or something beyond intellect. Volition and final cause belong only to the parts and to the flux.

From this it results that there is no evolution of the universe as a whole. There always has been and always will be a phenomenal world. The phenomenal world of science is, in terms of

idealism, a conceptual construction representing for thought the groupings of appearances to thinking and perceiving subjects. What is indicated by it is an aggregate of systems analogous to our solar system, in all stages of evolution and dissolution simultaneously. The cyclical processes of which we perceive the phases are those of particular systems. In the whole, all orders of mental and physical reality and appearance co-exist. Individual beings alternate between actuality and possibility, whether of perceiving or of arousing perception in others. The whole may be thought as finite. That is to say, what we call the material systems are numerable. They are in "infinite space," in the sense that space as a subjective phantasm is necessarily infinite from the nature of our experience; but the ether in which they are immersed has a measure. Possibilities of undergoing the experience of perceptual motion are determinate in all directions. At a finite, though very great, distance from our place in the universe, there is no longer the possibility of such experiences as are constitutive of our physical world.

Time, being distinctively the form of the subject, is nearer to metaphysical reality than space. It is also, for the imagination, more perplexing. Yet the puzzle regarding infinite past time, insisted on especially by Renouvier, seems to be in the end a puzzle for imagination rather than for thought. The assertion that there is no limit to the series of phenomenal events in the past can be cleared of self-contradiction; and both science and metaphysics seem to require it. The phenomenal law of causal sequence does not allow us to stop anywhere in tracing back one collocation to another by which it was preceded. And, if we suppose a necessary relation between the whole of reality, or the noumenon, and its manifestation, it follows that there must always be phenomena, without limit in the past as in the future. For thought there is here no antinomy. The noumenon manifests itself now as always; and events in time are ever succeeding one another.

The laws of conservation of matter and energy are such as would result from this metaphysical position. And, if the transformation of energy so as to become unavailable,—the "dissipation of energy" as it is called,—expresses the predominant movement under the given conditions of our solar system, no ground has yet been shown for holding it to be more than a provisional formula for a portion of a cycle. "Entropy," or energy rendered unavailable, is not held by physicists to be destroyed: therefore it must be conceived as a reserve from which under other conditions the cycle may renew itself.

This general outline seems at any rate to be scientifically thinkable. The view set against it may be summed up in the assertion that phenomena are not necessarily, but contingently, related to the noumenon. In short, the production of the

universe is to be conceived on the analogy of human volition. This, undoubtedly, would get rid of the trouble for the imagination, though at the expense of a miracle. A very primitive form of imagination is a "mythus" or tale, which starts with "once upon a time." It is an application of this form of discourse when cosmogonic poets or theologians tell of a beginning of the world. But, as we have partly seen, thought leads away from this literally mythological view. A miraculous beginning is imaginable and is defensible by pure formal logic: but if we aim at a thoroughgoing scientific logic also, where are we to stop in tracing back phenomenal effects to causes? And, when we deal with the question metaphysically, how can we be content to attribute that weakness of human nature which displays itself as apparently arbitrary choice, to the reality manifested in the whole system of things? In the human mind itself, at its higher stages, action or mental process seems to flow by a kind of natural necessity. The most plausible ground for indeterminism as regards the human will is the seeming unreason of many (non-impulsive) actions, whether viewed from within or from without. Of course they are not really inconsistent with determinism: but, in viewing the world as a whole, nothing even apparently like them is to be observed. What physical science discovers is the immanent reason of uniform law. To suppose this to have begun from a point of time by an act of choice is to descend to a lower level in seeking what purports to be a philosophical explanation of the order revealed by science.

The view that there is no total process of the world from a temporal beginning to an end, but that there always has been and always will be a world, was held in antiquity by philosophers who had systematically considered the question and who had no mythological position to maintain. Between naturalists and idealists there was here no difference. Earlier than the systematic stage of philosophising, the position had been explicitly stated by Heraclitus and by Parmenides. For the elder thinker, no less than for his immediate successor and opponent, the world was one perdurable whole, not made in the past and not to be destroyed in the future. But, in aphoristic or poetic form, this was connected with the idea of a reality expressing itself in the system of the universe but not exhausted by that system. With the Neo-Platonists, we may call this doctrine of "transcendence," in a certain sense, a theology.¹

To the reasoned assertion of Parmenides that the unity of the world means more than unity of system, a parallel may be found in the Indian philosophy of the Vedanta. Here, however, Reality (Brahman or Atman) is primarily, instead of secondarily, subjective. It is not the objective universe comprehending itself in thought as one and changeless, without real parts or move-

¹ See Appendix I.

ment, but is itself impersonal thought. The two philosophies have in common, it must be allowed, the tendency to suppress what they cannot deduce, to call it simply illusion. By later thinkers a more balanced position was attained. Plotinus near the end of ancient philosophy, and Spinoza not long after the new beginning of philosophy in modern Europe, are at bottom free from the "acosmism" sometimes attributed to them. They recognise the variety as well as unity in the world, the metaphysical individual as well as the one essence of the whole. Yet, inheriting as they did a rationalist theory of knowledge, they felt themselves bound to attempt the deduction of what cannot wholly be deduced. The Many as distinguished from the One, the grades of pluralised being from transcendent reality and unity downwards to bare possibility, cannot be logically arrived at either by a theory of "emanation" or of a "determination" which is "negation." The first, as is now generally admitted, leads to an endless interpolating of mean terms which can never bridge over the original chasm; and the second proceeds from something which for us at least is negative to the details of our positive knowledge. And yet the ontological movement in philosophy has not been a failure. What is needed is correction in method, not abandonment of the problem.

This is the lesson of the experiential philosophy. The ontological problem still exists, and must be conceived as largely as ever: but we must acknowledge that the parts of the whole have to be taken as given. When known, their harmony with the rest may become an object of imaginative thought: but they have first to be brought into view as facts. Thus, for example, teleology and individuality, however they may be metaphysically explained, are facts of experience. A philosopher may in his higher thought rise above the teleological view, as Spinoza did; but this view is not to be effaced. It has indeed something that seems empirical and contingent, as contrasted not only with the "*amor Dei intellectualis*" but with a mathematical intuition of physical necessity. Between the objects of these it presents itself as intermediate. It determines the topics of mixed sciences. Sometimes it has been sacrificed to the idealistic and sometimes to the mechanical extreme, sometimes perhaps to both: yet, from its appeal to the "common-sense" type of mind, it is sure always to return. The strength both of ancient and of modern philosophies deriving from Plato and Aristotle is in having retained the teleological point of view, conceived in a scientific sense, within a highly speculative system, but not at the summit.¹

¹ In the next Essay the argument is resumed from a new point of departure.

A NEW METAPHYSIC OF EVOLUTION

ἀκοιμήτου χρόνου ἀκμῇ
ἀρχηγόνους ιδέας πρώτη πατρὸς ἐβλυσσε τάσδε
αὐτοτελὴς πηγὴ.

Orac. Chald. ap. Procl. in Parm. 801, 3-5.

Si intellectus ad divinam naturam pertinet, non poterit, uti noster intellectus posterior (ut plerisque placet), vel simul natura esse cum rebus intellectis, quandoquidem Deus omnibus rebus prior est causalitate; sed contra veritas et formalis rerum essentia ideo talis est, quia talis in Dei intellectu existit obiective.

Homo est causa existentiae, non vero essentiae alterius hominis (est enim haec aeterna veritas).

Spinoza, *Eth. i. Prop. 17, Schol.*

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A NEW METAPHYSIC OF EVOLUTION

1. IT has been a method of philosophers, seeking light on ultimate objects of speculation, to vary the hypothesis and draw out the consequences. Classical examples of this procedure are Plato's *Parmenides* and Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*. Taking these as unapproachable models, I propose to reverse one hypothesis of the preceding essay.

That hypothesis was first suggested in the "Conclusion" to *The Neo-Platonists* (1901; 2nd ed., 1918). The essay on "Teleology and the Individual" may be regarded as a development of it in terms of modern science and philosophy, not perhaps in substance going beyond the first outline. I still think it worth while to have attempted such a more circumstantial adaptation of the cyclical doctrine of Neo-Platonism to the post-Copernican astronomy; and, in proceeding to alter the assumptions, I premise that certain underlying positions are not abandoned: namely, a generalised idealism, common to Plotinus and Berkeley, in relation to which scientific knowledge of processes in the world is to be interpreted; and the conclusion, later arrived at, that teleology and individuality are not explicable as illusions, but belong to metaphysical reality. By saying that the positions are not abandoned, however, I do not mean that they will be simply taken for granted. The course of the argument will, I hope, again show their necessity.

The hypothesis I propose to change is that there is no evolution of the universe as a whole but only of the particular systems within it; all phases of evolution coexisting (in different minor systems), with no limit in the past or in the future. An argument for this, derived from Neo-Platonism, was that Reality must necessarily manifest itself at all times in every degree possible. With differences in detail as regards the kind of world supposed, the general conception is also, in the modern period, that of Bruno, of Spinoza and of Schopenhauer. A ground on which it may commend itself is that it seems to be the only view that departs wholly from every mythological cosmogony. Mythologies, creationist or evolutionist, assert a beginning of the world from a point of time; and the philosophies that do this have taken over the imagination from popular religion. In conscious independence of this imagination there has been stated, both in ancient and in modern times, the position that there

always has been and always will be a world; and the reason why it has not oftener been made explicit seems to have been only a desire to avoid collisions with the accepted religious tradition. Modern astronomy lends it apparent support; since there are stellar systems actually visible that correspond to different conjectured phases of the evolution from the diffuse to the concentrated condition of matter. Does not this enable us to put the old view in a new form, combining the notion of a whole always in general aspect like itself, with evolution of the particular systems composing it? Thus we escape the single unchanging world of Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists,—in which there is nothing that can be called evolution except the genesis of individuals,—without sacrificing what is perhaps a valid deduction from their idealistic ontology.

2. Upon the problem itself, I have never been able to acquiesce, and cannot now acquiesce, in customary evasions. The attempt to set aside as meaningless the question whether the world began or had no beginning in time, by psychological analyses that show how such a problem necessarily arises, do not really dispose of it, since they deal only with empty time. This, like empty space, we necessarily imagine as infinite; but things in space and events in time remain as a real problem. My temporary solution was to suppose that, while our subjective phantasm of space is necessarily infinite, because in perception space always has other space beyond it, atomic matter and its containing ether are finite, that is, in theory completely numerable and measurable; but that, time being a form of the subject as well as of the object, and therefore nearer to metaphysical reality, we may infer from the absence of limits to it that there is no limit in the past or the future to the series of phenomenal events,—that is, events for really existing minds. Minds may be either eternal and recurrent, or successively produced from some general ground and reabsorbed into it; but without limit in the past there was a world, in the sense that the term has for the idealist,—that is, a system of appearances for percipient minds.

3. I had long been interested in the question through the discussions of Renouvier, who, as a creationist, supposed a beginning of the world, and, as a logician, attempted to prove from the law of contradiction the necessity of a beginning. Actual infinity of any kind, whether in time or space, he held to be formally impossible because self-contradictory. The notion of it he supposed to have arisen by a false induction from the indefinite power we have of conceiving the addition of spaces and the multiplication and division of numbers. To this I opposed the view, just now partially restated, that infinity of space and time, in a certain sense, is actually given in perception. For experience, as S. H. Hodgson pointed out, there is always time and space beyond that which is occupied by the particular event

or thing perceived. As a matter of psychological derivation, I adhere to this view. In my own experience I can trace back the first vague notion of infinity to failure of the effort to imagine an end or a beginning of time or space. And the "false induction" in which Renouvier finds its origin never became to me a serious puzzle. On first coming across the mathematical formulæ involving infinity (such as $\frac{1}{0} = \infty$), I had no difficulty in understanding them as abbreviated statements that by carrying on a certain process as far as you like you can go beyond any assigned degree of greatness or smallness. The summation of infinite series (e.g., $\frac{1}{3} = \frac{1}{3}$) was quite intelligible if understood in an analogous way: a certain sum never actually to be reached can be assigned as the limit to which, by continuing the processes of division and addition, you can approach as near as you like. And as far as I went with the calculus, the "theory of limits" set forth by De Morgan seemed perfectly satisfactory. Thus I was quite prepared to accept the French philosopher's refutation of the "actual infinite" as a result emerging from reasoning on number and space. On the other hand, I also still adhere to the position that an actually infinite universe, whether in space or time, cannot be proved by the law of contradiction not to exist. For the law of contradiction is a "law of thought," not of things, and as such is, as Croom Robertson has put it, "without a shade of material content" (*Philosophical Remains*, p. 131). It only means (by a stricter interpretation of Aristotle's formula in the light of Kant's theory of analytic judgments) that you must not deny at the same time and in the same relation a proposition which you have asserted. A logician who admits the infinity of past events can always, by refining on his terms, correct any hasty statement by which he may seem to have implied that that which, by hypothesis, is not capable of summation, really forms a numerable whole.

4. The same logical defence, however, is open to anyone who maintains the actual infinity of coexistent worlds. Merely by treating as inadvertence of expression any incidental naming of the universe as a whole or a sum, the dialectical trap can be avoided that tries to catch the "infinist" by saying: You contradict yourself when you declare that which you call the sum of things to be incapable of summation. The proper expression, it can always be replied, is "infinity," which, as unsummed, does not consist of an accumulation of units. Every subtlety can be met by another. Yet, when we put to ourselves the question whether we believe in an actual infinity of worlds, I think we shall have to reply, in spite of the cosmic intoxication inevitably experienced not only on first reading but on re-reading Lucretius or Bruno, that in scientific sobriety we

do not. And this is not because the facts made out by science have decided against it, but because we find it scientifically unthinkable. There are necessities and impossibilities of thought beyond those stated in formal logic. It often takes time, both historically and in our individual exercise in thinking, to become clearly aware of them; but they may be considered to have revealed themselves when every formal defence of their contradictory fails to destroy our conviction, willing or unwilling, that for thought they must be taken as axioms. Spencer, though to some extent weakening his own reasonings by substituting mere unimagineness for "inconceivability of the opposite," had a clear prevision of the use of this, his "universal postulate," as the test of truth not only in generalised physics but in metaphysics. What then is the effect of applying to a series of events the truth that we find to be axiomatic for coexistent things,—namely, that if they are regarded as individually numerable they must be conceived as having a sum?

5. At this point, however, the question will doubtless be put that has given their strength to sceptical and agnostic theories of knowledge from Hume and Kant to Spencer. Is our thinking the measure of the universe in any sense that does not invalidate as "merely subjective" all the conceptions we can form of the whole? Simply as a justification for not allowing ourselves to be stopped on the way by interminable "epistemology," I think a brief reply will suffice for the present. Let us put the most typical hypotheses as to our origin and see how the case appears. Are we products of Nature? Then we ought in the long run to be able to understand that from which we have sprung. Are we creatures of a Creator? Then, since we have to live by our reason such as it is, it seems to follow that, merely to enable us to exist along with other portions of the created universe, some precognition corresponding to it must have been implanted in our minds. Are we permanent beings, not in strict truth either born or made, but somehow pre-existent? Then again the community we necessarily have with other beings in the system to which we belong seems to involve some knowledge, or power of gaining knowledge, of the whole in correspondence with which we find ourselves. The extent of the possible knowledge in any case can only be determined by trial and experience.

6. To proceed: having been unable finally to dismiss the puzzle stated by Renouvier about the infinity of past events, I decided to read the extensive treatise *De Aeternitate Mundi*, in which Joannes Philoponus, the Christian Aristotelian of the sixth century, replied to the arguments of Proclus against the dogma of Christian theology that the world had a beginning. I cannot say that on this particular question the book contributes anything in the form of dialectics that gives light not to be found in Renouvier; but, as it has some general interest, and not many

students of philosophy are likely ever to read it, I am giving the result of my study in an appendix.¹ One argument, I may say here, Philoponus puts with real effectiveness. According to Proclus, if the world—of course with minds in it and series of events of which they are conscious—had not existed for infinite past time, this would argue impotence in the Cause to manifest itself; for it must always produce all that it can produce. To this Philoponus replies that it does not argue impotence in the Cause or the Creator not to produce what of necessity cannot be produced; and a completed infinity of events such as past infinity would be, is impossible from the nature of the time-process. The reason he gives does not seem to be other than that of Renouvier—namely, that a series of numerable events supposed finished (at any moment you like to call “the present”) cannot be as a whole in-numerable: to which of course the infinitist would reply that it is not a whole in the sense assumed, there being no point of time from which it starts. Still, apart from the mere formal logic, what we might call the ontological argument for an infinite past of events appears to be surmounted. There cannot be a necessity of producing what necessarily cannot exist. Each then must consider for himself whether he finds an infinite series of past events for actual percipients ultimately unthinkable or not. Hypothetically, I start in this essay from the position that such a real history, all capable of being memorised in detail but with no beginning, is unthinkable as an actual infinity of inhabited planets is unthinkable. And, if we are to theorise at all, we must proceed as if that which we cannot think (as distinguished from imagine) cannot exist as the character of a world that can be thought. If the world as reality is an object of thought, there seems to be no escape from this as method.

7. As a means of testing the possibility of thinking the infinite past series, I suggest that we should keep in mind a series of events irreducible to anything else by idealistic or sceptical criticism. If the hypothesis will work at all, it must work with this assumption. Now individual lives of conscious beings are irreducible real events in this sense. Even if individuality, as some hold, is itself illusory, yet the series of successive events we can count as single and separate lives is a series of numerable phases in the world's conscious life. Let us then, as the simplest hypothesis, try that of Proclus, affirmed by him as a deduction from the nature of souls, that the soul of each of us has had infinite past lives and will have infinite lives in the future. Souls may or may not be permanent as thus supposed: but, if the infinite past series is thinkable at all, it must be thinkable on this hypothesis. Is it or is it not? I have come to the conclusion that, without the possibility of escape, it is not. Of course all will allow that it is unimaginable, and most will allow that we

¹ See Appendix II.

do not remember former lives and may not have had any before this; but the question is as to the possibility of thought for an intellect that thinks, whether intuitively or discursively, in terms of number. Is the supposition refutable for ourselves or not by mere thinking? If it is, then the infinity of past events, I contend, is refutable in whatever sense it may be maintained. If it is not, then the infinity of past events in every sense that can be suggested is thinkable. I ask the reader to reflect assiduously, repeatedly returning to the problem, and to decide whether he can think of himself as having had lives, each a single whole and capable of being written down as a history and preserved, and yet making up to the present not a sum of lives represented by a number, but an actual infinity of lives. As I have said, my own conclusion now is that there is the same impossibility of thought as in the case of the supposed infinity of coexistent worlds.

I proceed to reply to some arguments on the other side, in part those used formerly by myself.

8. Among these, I was most influenced by the argument from the phenomenal law of causation. There does not seem to be any reason why, in tracing back effects to causes, we should stop at any point: consequently, if miracle is inadmissible, the series must go back to infinity. This argument I now think can be answered by developing in its relation to metaphysics the position of Hume on Causation. In the sequence of perceived events we discover nowhere any power to produce them or necessity of their production. This, however, does not mean that power or necessity does not exist, but only that we must seek it, if at all, elsewhere than in, say, the laws of pressure and impact according to which one collocation or motion of masses follows another. The causes we discover in nature, as Hume's theological precursors had already said, are only "occasional causes." They precede their effects not as efficient agencies having power to produce them, but only as a kind of cue, the real agency behind the whole process being the divine volition. Substitute for the ultimate cause assumed by the Occasionalists, *viz.*, the "will of God" anthropomorphically conceived, a necessity inherent in the metaphysical whole of things, and I think the solution can be attained. This, I hope, will become clearer afterwards. At present it may suffice to say that science knows no intelligible efficacy in one grouping of phenomena to produce another; all that we know of them scientifically is only an empirical sequence calculable within limits on the basis of experientially ascertained laws. The whole external series of events may accordingly be temporary appearance due to some inward necessity analogous to laws of logic; and these, if known, might reveal as the result that the world of appearances in time was determined, as a phase in this continuous necessity, to begin

and perhaps to have an end. But this is only a provisional statement.

9. The series of events in time then being assumed hypothetically to have had a beginning, what are we to say about this beginning? Is it an act of creative volition? The ordinary "creationist" doctrine—that is, the philosophico-theological dogma of the Judæo-Christian tradition—makes the beginning absolute as far as the world is concerned, but assigns the will of a Deity as the cause of the world, which it declares to have been created "from nothing." The Creator, as distinguished from the world, is "eternal"; that is, has a timeless existence before the creation. Renouvier asserts a creative will as the cause of the series of phenomena constituting the world; but, as he rejects the scholastic definitions of Deity as infinite and eternal, and regards the divine mind, like all particular minds, as phenomenal and having time for its form, he is obliged to assert an absolute beginning of all that is,—of God as of the world. The series of phenomenal existences goes back to a certain moment, to which from the present moment the time is theoretically measurable; so that the whole history both of the mind of God and of all created minds might conceivably have been recorded and the record preserved. Beyond its existence as groupings of phenomena, the world has no existence of the kind called "noumenal": it is simply "representation." There is not necessarily an end of the world (as in the Judæo-Christian apocalyptic); for, however long its history may go on, its phenomena, having had a beginning, will always remain finite in number. A last phenomenon is not required, though a first phenomenon is, to avoid that formal contradiction, the "realised infinite."

10. These doctrines, I think it must be allowed, are compatible with formal logic; though certainly no one would claim that either of them, in its whole extent, is proved by it. Renouvier himself, in fact, concedes incidentally that even the past infinity of events—the doctrine most antithetic to his own—can only be regarded as strictly disproved if we take the law of contradiction for a material principle. Here I find his position slightly wanting in clearness; but as in the end the "infinite sum" in time as in space seems to me really unthinkable, I shall not return to the shade of difference there might be on this point. Granted, however, that the past temporal series must be finite, another necessity or impossibility stands in the way of admitting that there was nothing before it. I find also a necessity of thought in the principle first stated by Greek philosophical science,—*ex nihilo nihil*. And the necessity, I think, exists for the modern mind generally. Recent developments in the theory of matter have brought this out with renewed force. Since it is now proved that what were hitherto supposed to be ultimate atoms can be formed and dissolved, it is clear that chemists had not the strictly

experimental evidence that was supposed to have been attained for their perdurability. Yet the effect on men of science and experiential philosophers has not been an inclination to allow as a possibility that there may be (perhaps on a small scale) absolute creations and destructions. Rather it has been to make them look, on more avowedly *a priori* grounds, for other forms of matter out of which grosser matter emerges and into which it is dissolved. Their spontaneous conclusion is, not that they have been too rash in affirming as an absolute principle the indestructibility of matter, but that they have been too cautious in placing this on the ground of purely experimental evidence.¹ Now on this principle, if the world had a beginning, it is unthinkable that there was not something before it on which its origin depended. Matter may not be ultimate; but the principle asserting its indestructibility has a wider reach than that of experimental physics and chemistry.

II. This principle, it seems to me, excludes all doctrines of creative volition as theories of origin; and the substitution of idealism for common-sense assumptions about matter only destroys more radically the notion on which these theories are founded. Whatever matter may be, we find no analogy for the production of the phenomena that correspond to or (on the principles of idealism) constitute our external world by a will. It is indeed not unimaginable that a will, or more properly, a person, might shape pre-existent matter (the question being left aside what matter is, or how it comes to be there); and from the idealistic point of view it might seem at first sight plausible to suggest that creation means only the calling up of a phantasmagoria in conscious beings, which is equally imaginable. But the theological idea of creation extends to the production of conscious beings themselves by an act of volition. Now this is arbitrary mythology without the slightest experience to suggest it; and came to be asserted only because the shaping of human and animal bodies is imaginable when an artificer is supposed analogous to man but with greater power. Idealism completely overthrows this analogy; since for it the mind is the reality, and not something that can be superinduced as an "epiphenomenon" when the body has been shaped.

But, it may be said, in considering the origin of conscious beings, the creationist doctrines have always been inclined to substitute the idea of a father for that of a maker. Shall we then attempt an approximation of the creationist to the evolutionist doctrine, and, while retaining the notion of a primal will, try to give an account of beginnings by seeking aid not in the idea of making but in that of generation? If we are seeking an absolute origin, this is no better: for generation requires pre-existent matter: and, precisely as with the notion of making, the difficulty in

¹ Cf. Read, *The Metaphysics of Nature*, Book ii. chap. vii. § 7, p. 138.

relation to conscious beings is greater than when we are dealing with bodies. For, of "psychological heredity," from which we should have to take our experiential start, there is simply nothing in the direct sense. Portions of consciousness do not bud off from others to furnish elements in new consciousnesses. A new consciousness, so far as its visible origin is concerned, starts always anew from a ground in organic nature. It is from portions of parental organisms that it begins for experience, and not from portions of parental minds. This is what we know scientifically. How each consciousness grows into a certain likeness (with unlikeness) to that of parents and ancestors is a problem remaining over, not an understood process that can throw light on anything else.

12. Thus we are driven from the creationist to the properly evolutionist theories of origin; and some, in view of the facts as now stated, may think it an easy and obvious solution to say that the origin of all things is Matter. For matter, if supposed quiescent and unconscious, has the character of an eternal thing; so that the puzzle of assuming an infinite past history is escaped. Let us suppose a matter that had remained eternally unconscious to begin to evolve into organic and conscious beings. From that point, history begins; and there is no further difficulty since the history is always finite.

On this line, however, we are soon stopped from further progress. Within the limits of physical science, the principle *ex nihilo nihil* cannot allow a motionless matter in which, after an eternity of rest, motion suddenly appears; and, if there is motion, there is a series of changes in time. If then motion was from eternity, the old difficulty reappears, since it has a history without beginning. If, on the other hand, the series of past motions is finite, we are brought face to face with the beginning of a reality out of nothing; or at least, this can only be escaped on the principles of idealism, as may be briefly shown.

13. A possible view is that the "matter" of the man of science, being only a conceptual construction to which nothing corresponds in reality except groupings of perceptions in minds, any supposed pre-existence of matter to human and animal consciousness is merely a sort of aid to thought, prolonged by imagination into the nothingness that was before reality—that is, before the series of minds with their perceptions began to be. Thus the existence of matter before mind ceases to be a problem distinguishable from the origin of minds. To derive these from matter would be to derive realities directly known by introspection from an ultimate unreality.

14. Without following up for the present the elements of truth in this statement, I will only say that it does not by itself solve the problem. For minds themselves the antinomy remains—finite or infinite past history; and idealism as thus stated can give no satisfactory explanation of what science has determined

about origins. The scientific theories of pre-organic evolution are too coherent to be dismissed as a mere dream; nor have idealistic thinkers failed to give some philosophical interpretation of them. The philosophical theories amount in general to what is called "pampsychism." To put it in my own way: All that we can say about material things consists in perceptual groupings, of which the order admits of determination in accordance with the conceptual system constructed by science. Thought and experiment combined have revealed to us "laws of nature," which are general statements partly verifiable by actual perception and partly having their evidence in a certain coherence of hypotheses referring to imagined perceptions. Still, I do not believe, any more than anyone else, that all this corresponds to nothing in the world but states of consciousness of myself and other persons. I am a pampsychist in so far as I presuppose, in correspondence also with the phenomena of what we call the inorganic world, something more or less remotely resembling the consciousness we are aware of in relation with our own living organisms.

15. Pampsychism, however, though a philosophical account of the world of nature, does not, any more than the other theories, straightway enable us to combine the finite past series with the principle that from nothing nothing can come. Rather it suggests an infinitist view not essentially differing from that of materialism as it has been commonly held. At long intervals systems may be supposed to arise presenting the appearances of sun and planets; in some of the planets organic bodies appear; and, in association with these appearances consciousness like ours emerges from the everlasting diffused sentience which is the psychic being of the world as distinguished from the phenomena into which it is analysed by science. If we conceive the world to be in process as a whole, then we shall probably be led to suppose alternate evolutions and dissolutions repeated infinite times in the past and in the future. This view is of course both ancient and modern. Between the Stoics and Spencer the difference is only that with the spatially finite universe of the Stoics the process is conceived as exactly repeated, while Spencer, like Bruno, though not committing himself as Bruno did to the notion of an infinite universe, would no doubt equally have regarded as absurd the supposed recurrence of innumerable series exactly alike to the minutest details through infinite past and future time. Of all these theories, "infinitism" regarding time is as much a feature as it is of Democritean or Epicurean Atomism.

But against any form of the doctrine thus understood, the old arguments against the infinite series can be repeated. If we suppose, for a beginning, a kind of chaos whether of animated matter or of psychic elements correlated with what we call matter, all the difficulties recur. Let us conceive the psychic chaos to

relation to conscious beings is greater than when we are dealing with bodies. For, of "psychological heredity," from which we should have to take our experiential start, there is simply nothing in the direct sense. Portions of consciousness do not bud off from others to furnish elements in new consciousnesses. A new consciousness, so far as its visible origin is concerned, starts always anew from a ground in organic nature. It is from portions of parental organisms that it begins for experience, and not from portions of parental minds. This is what we know scientifically. How each consciousness grows into a certain likeness (with unlikeness) to that of parents and ancestors is a problem remaining over, not an understood process that can throw light on anything else.

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13. A possible view is that the "matter" of the man of science, being only a conceptual construction to which nothing corresponds in reality except groupings of perceptions in minds, any supposed pre-existence of matter to human and animal consciousness is merely a sort of aid to thought, prolonged by imagination into the nothingness that was before reality—that is, before the series of minds with their perceptions began to be. Thus the existence of matter before mind ceases to be a problem distinguishable from the origin of minds. To derive these from matter would be to derive realities directly known by introspection from an ultimate unreality.

14. Without following up for the present the elements of truth in this statement, I will only say that it does not by itself solve the problem. For minds themselves the antinomy remains—finite or infinite past history; and idealism as thus stated can give no satisfactory explanation of what science has determined

about origins. The scientific theories of pre-organic evolution are too coherent to be dismissed as a mere dream; nor have idealistic thinkers failed to give some philosophical interpretation of them. The philosophical theories amount in general to what is called "pampsychism." To put it in my own way: All that we can say about material things consists in perceptual groupings, of which the order admits of determination in accordance with the conceptual system constructed by science. Thought and experiment combined have revealed to us "laws of nature," which are general statements partly verifiable by actual perception and partly having their evidence in a certain coherence of hypotheses referring to imagined perceptions. Still, I do not believe, any more than anyone else, that all this corresponds to nothing in the world but states of consciousness of myself and other persons. I am a pampsychist in so far as I presuppose, in correspondence also with the phenomena of what we call the inorganic world, something more or less remotely resembling the consciousness we are aware of in relation with our own living organisms.

15. Pampsychism, however, though a philosophical account of the world of nature, does not, any more than the other theories, straightway enable us to combine the finite past series with the principle that from nothing nothing can come. Rather it suggests an infinitist view not essentially differing from that of materialism as it has been commonly held. At long intervals systems may be supposed to arise presenting the appearances of sun and planets; in some of the planets organic bodies appear; and, in association with these appearances consciousness like ours emerges from the everlasting diffused sentience which is the psychic being of the world as distinguished from the phenomena into which it is analysed by science. If we conceive the world to be in process as a whole, then we shall probably be led to suppose alternate evolutions and dissolutions repeated infinite times in the past and in the future. This view is of course both ancient and modern. Between the Stoics and Spencer the difference is only that with the spatially finite universe of the Stoics the process is conceived as exactly repeated, while Spencer, like Bruno, though not committing himself as Bruno did to the notion of an infinite universe, would no doubt equally have regarded as absurd the supposed recurrence of innumerable series exactly alike to the minutest details through infinite past and future time. Of all these theories, "infinitism" regarding time is as much a feature as it is of Democritean or Epicurean Atomism.

But against any form of the doctrine thus understood, the old arguments against the infinite series can be repeated. If we suppose, for a beginning, a kind of chaos whether of animated matter or of psychic elements correlated with what we call matter, all the difficulties recur. Let us conceive the psychic chaos to

have pre-existed from eternity without evolving animal or human minds. If at last it is to do this, the elements that are to cohere into temporal series constituting minds like ours must evidently be things that change their relations. This change of relation brings in the difficulty that motion does for pure materialism. It means,—since nothing can come from nothing, and we are assuming psychic elements and their groupings to be all that is,—that they have had a history without beginning: and we have decided that the infinite past series is impossible for thought. The puzzle is ultimately no less than when Proclus, assuming permanent individual souls, concludes that every soul has descended to birth infinite times and will again descend.¹

16. Can the puzzle be escaped by Bergson's distinction between real or subjective time,—time as experienced,—which is not divided into sections, and time represented for the calculating intelligence on the analogy of a line drawn in space, and treated as consisting of numerable parts? Since these parts or sections are in a manner fictitious, can we not dismiss both thesis and antithesis—finite and infinite past time—as for ultimate experience of reality meaningless? What we then have to do is simply to clear our minds of the illusion of objectified time, and become aware of the real process which is indivisible reality.

Although I allow that the distinction has value, I do not think it can solve this particular puzzle. Let time conceived as divided be if you like at a lower level of reality, a kind of representation of the non-spatial in spatial terms. The question remains: is this translation of real or subjective time possible in such a way that none of its supposed sections to infinity would be without different and real experience to correspond? Real experiences without limit, as Renouvier showed, are the puzzle. I hold that he was quite right, and effectively original, in insisting that either the whole series of events in the history of the universe up to now has occupied a conceivably measurable time, or the time occupied has been, strictly and for any intellect, immeasurable. It is idle to say that the antinomy as regards past time has no meaning. And indeed Bergson does not attempt to solve our difficulty by his distinction. So far as I know, he does not anywhere raise the question whether the Life which he takes to be ultimately real had a beginning or not. Kant and Hegel, it may be useful to note, leave the same ambiguity as regards the temporal series.

17. By this ambiguity, no doubt, the mythological points of contact are escaped that seem to beset the doctrines for which the world has a beginning. On any positive view, I am afraid we cannot entirely escape these. And, having done my best to be as little mythological as possible, I decide for the attempt at a positive solution; accepting from the mythologies the

¹ Compare § 7.

"form of thought" of a history, which not even the most consistent infinitist can after all avoid. Every cosmogony, philosophical or scientific, could be objected to on the ground that it has this in common with the cosmogonic myths. Scientific evolution is a history as much as the Mosaic story of creation. Spencer quite unavailingly tried to prove the hypothesis of biological evolution preferable to that of creation on the ground that it had appeared later and in a more cultivated medium. Evolutionist and creationist myths are equally primitive. One myth starts from the suggestion given by birth, another from the suggestion given by making: that is the real difference. Between them only verified science can decide. If we are to object to taking up as a suggestion anything that has ever been put in the form of a story, we must also refuse to consider everlasting recurrences; for these are not peculiar to the philosophies but are found also in some of the mythologies, as in those of India and Scandinavia. Let us then "follow the argument," knowing that we cannot avoid all suggestions offered by ideas outside the philosophical tradition,—itself constantly fed by them. Perhaps the value of Pragmatism will be found to be in its permission of mental experiments without disdain for their starting-points. What we must remember is, in matters of belief and cognition, to apply in the end an intellectual test.

18. If we suppose a beginning of the world, while accepting the principle, "nothing from nothing," clearly our view will be in the general sense evolutionist. The difference of the hypothesis from that of the Stoics and Spencer will be that only one evolution is supposed instead of an infinite series. But does this imply an infinite future evolution,—a view which Bergson apparently inclines to, and which Renouvier thought at least possible? Or shall we have to allow not only a theory of first origins but also an eschatology? In the latter case, as in the former, we shall not be without philosophical as well as mythological countenance. The best known imagination of an apocalyptic end of the world came from the ancient Persians, and took its most interesting forms in the West Oriental gnosis that preceded and helped to form Christianity. In quite recent times it is represented independently, with varying predominance of poetry, science and philosophy in Poe's *Eureka*,¹ in Dr. Schiller's *Riddles of the*

¹ Distinct credit must be given to Poe for taking up very early the nebular hypothesis. Dr. Merz, in his *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. iii. chap. vi. pp. 551-2, has pointed out that men of science for a long time paid little attention to Laplace's theory; Herbert Spencer being the first to adopt it in England. Poe's story of evolution is apocalyptic in supposing the disappearance of matter at the end of the world-process, when it has been aggregated into a single mass after completely performing its function of individualising the one Spirit, at last brought back to a unity in which each individuality finds itself preserved. There is, however, a detraction from the consistency with which he treats

Sphinx, and in Dr. McTaggart's *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*. Theologically, the first of these is avowedly pantheistic, the second theistic (with a limited Deity), and the third (as the author himself declares) atheistic;¹ so that, in considering the general position, we ought to be able to make abstraction of prejudices.² The reason that inclines me in favour of its logical claims is that it seems to follow, given the beginning, from a consistent determinism. This, however, is not the view of all who have adopted it; and I reserve the question till later.

19. In any case, an argument for attempting a theory of total evolution, as distinguished from partial evolutions within a universe presenting always generally the same aspect as a whole to an imaginary observer, is that, on this view, the teleology is of a larger kind. It also seems to be the teleological doctrine that spontaneously presents itself to a modern mind when experimenting with such ideas. For example, in the teleology suggested at the end of Prof. Carveth Read's *Metaphysics of Nature*, the view is conjecturally thrown out that the aim of the world as a whole is to become self-conscious. On this view Philosophy might say, like Apollo in Shelley's Hymn:

I am the eye with which the Universe
Beholds itself and knows itself divine.

And this self-knowledge comes at the end of a process. According to Hegel, that process is human history. And in this Hegelian view we see precisely what it is that has made the larger teleology seem to us natural. Ancient thinkers like Aristotle, while theorising in a similar way about the supreme place of Thought in the world, did not hold that there was any rational process of the whole. For them universal history as conjectured was only a recurrence in which the moments of philosophical insight they held to be divine were for individual lives (themselves impermanent) infinite times recovered and again lost. But then they were reflecting on the basis of a very small portion of what we

the world and its history as finite, in the ultimate admission of infinite Gods and of worlds which are infinite in number both as regards coexistence and succession in time.

¹ In the sense of the Indian Sankhya philosophy, that there is no ultimate Unity but that of system: individual souls are the only ultimate real beings.

² A still further abstraction from prejudices is made possible by a more recent work. None of the treatises referred to is by a Christian theologian; but, after this Essay was written, a work came into my hands for review entitled *The Meaning of Christianity*, by the Rev. F. A. M. Spencer (1912), containing the nearest anticipation I have seen of my own guiding idea—that the history of the universe is a successive realisation of possibilities in the metaphysical Whole; the order of the process being that the lower forms of conscious life come to manifestation before the higher.

In theology Mr. Spencer is a modern Origenist, admitting reincarnations and wholly rejecting eternity of punishments.

now know to have been the history of human civilisation. And, brilliant as their own age was intellectually, they quite clearly perceived that its civilisation was in the greatest things (except indeed Philosophy) already a declining one. Those who in modern times have adopted a similar view were, with minor differences, still in the same relation to history. Bruno, the least "static" of the modern thinkers who have decided for the infinite process, realised perfectly that he was in a larger world than the ancients, but he realised also that it was still in many ways a more barbarian world; and so his view of history remained still in essence "cyclical," though he would have very strongly agreed with the position, if it had been put to him, that history never repeats itself,—since nothing in the world repeats itself exactly. Spinoza belonged to the "unhistorical" seventeenth century, under the dominance, as regards its intellectual outlook, of the Cartesian mathematical physics. And Schopenhauer, in his refusal to admit in principle anything but everlasting recurrence in the life of nature and man, was personally influenced by Hindu pessimism and indifference to history; with which no doubt his antipathy to Hegel co-operated. This, however, in his period was necessarily a deliberately willed attitude. With one of his paradoxical inconsistencies, he himself unconsciously testified to a deep influence from the historical optimism of his age in the firmly-held belief that one day philosophic reason without mixture, instead of its mythically rendered forms in the religions, will directly govern mankind. Bruno and Spinoza, in spite of their optimistic temper in relation to the whole, were at least as far from any such prevision as the ancients. All this, however, amounts only to a psychological explanation of a changed attitude; to which I will add that in my own attempt to combine the "static" view for the whole with the "dynamic" view for the parts, I was trying to restate with modifications a position that seemed to me not to have received fair examination on grounds of rational comparison, but to have been thrown aside merely because in the "psychological climate" of the nineteenth century history ruled. Simply from this dominance of a special kind of knowledge therefore, the whole cosmos was assumed to be undergoing an evolution analogous to that which is seen or inferred in human history.

The psychological explanation may be correct; and of course human history is a very small fraction of the history of the universe. Yet, since it is the highest mode of evolution we know, and since it necessarily has its roots somehow in the cosmos, we may be right in trying to interpret the whole on its analogy. Let us then run the risk and see how the results come out. There is after all no fear of too arbitrary a construction; for known science can now keep us right about the main facts of evolution. The question is as to their philosophical interpretation. And if, in the attempt I am making, the Pragmatists care to regard me as

in a measure a convert to their method, I have no objection. I only desire that in this case they will keep to the more liberal interpretation of their principle; namely, that the end which truth subserves may be a theoretical end. The aim of a theory of the universe I hold to be, not to keep a certain practical system working, nor even to enable a new one to work, but to furnish an ordered basis for thinking harmoniously. Its purpose is a speculative purpose both for ourselves and for those whom we can persuade.

20. Given then, as the grounds for an evolutionary theory of the universe, at once that the order of events in time began and that nothing can come from nothing, what are we to say of that which was before this order? To me it seems that we are bound to assert that all potentially existed; and this means that it had a real existence though not that of an order of events in time. This, as I think I shall be able to prove, is not a mere verbal statement. I am making it having before my eyes the very powerful argument of Prof. James Ward (*The Realm of Ends*, 1st ed., pp. 107-8) in which he agrees with Mr. F. H. Bradley's criticism (cited from *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 384-7) on the term "potential existence." "Reality," Prof. Ward says, "is entirely actuality: the potential, the possible, the problematic, on the other hand, belong exclusively to abstract thought. But that, while it always presupposes, is never commensurate with, reality. Actuality again is entirely experience: its factors are never abstract possibilities, they are living agents." Impressive as the whole argument, taken in its context, is, the last phrase, if pressed, seems nevertheless to yield the concession that we cannot do without such terms. For the very nature of an agent, as understood by Prof. Ward, is to be not realised all at once, but capable of action when not acting. This involves the antithesis of act and possibility which it is desired to avoid. And here I am speaking as a partial convert to a view of Prof. Ward himself which I should once have been inclined to reject as signifying a reaction from Hume to Scholasticism. Mr. Bradley also does not think the term in question can be dispensed with altogether (*loc. cit.*, p. 387); and his own concluding sentence calls up in me no special sense of guilt: "The more a writer feels himself led naturally to have recourse to this phrase, the better cause he probably has for at least attempting to avoid it." My own first movement was precisely in this direction. The metaphysical attempts that first fascinated me were those that consisted in the disuse of "substances" and "entities" or even "agents" ultimately real: every term, according to the model set up on the lines of Berkeley and Hume, ought, I held, to describe or indicate some actual experience. Thus I was ready to accept the opinion that the Indian philosophies represent a more developed type of thought, and are more essentially modern

through their analogies with Hume or Berkeley, than any of the philosophies on the lines of Aristotelian distinctions, for which the antithesis of act and possibility conceived as phases of a permanent existence is fundamental. Yet it became clear to me in the end that Hume had not without reason renounced any project of reconstruction starting from the nihilism at which he provisionally arrived regarding mental as well as material substance. And later phenomenists, such as Hodgson and Renouvier, in order to gain a foothold at all for reconstruction, have been obliged to restore one or other of the old "entities" at first discarded. Hodgson, for example, worked with "matter" and its pre-conditions, speculatively assumed; and Renouvier acknowledged an affinity between his ultimate view about reality and Leibniz's theory of spiritual "monads." Mill, whose whole tendency was phenomenist, yet, on coming to the question of the "subject," found that he must allow an individual Ego in a sense that makes it an entity as much as anything that has ever been called such (*Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, Appendix to chaps. xi and xii, 6th ed., pp. 262-3). The Self, or Ego, he finds, is a permanent thing with possibilities of having more feelings or consciousnesses than those that belong or have belonged to it. And indeed the dogmatic nihilism concerning mind, ascribed on some interpretations to Buddhism, is of all doctrines the most unthinkable, unless it amounts only to a renunciation of all metaphysics on essentially sceptical grounds. As in other cases, a promising line of thought has been struck out in various parts of the world and with apparent independence, which, in spite of its attractions, does not by itself lead to any satisfying position. When we discover this we must be ready to modify our position again, though not sacrificing any insight that has been gained on the way. There is "reaction" in the bad sense only when we treat our attempted but abandoned path as if there had been nothing to learn from it. What we have to learn was summed up by anticipation—so far as a whole course of thought can be summed—in the celebrated rule of method attributed to Ockham: "Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem."¹ Ockham, of course, had before him the very worst examples of abuse in the creation of abstract names to do duty for explanation; but the rule against multiplying entities beyond necessity cannot after all without self-destructive effect be interpreted to mean that abstract names are to be totally abolished. And if they are not, then the distinction between actual and possible existence (experience and its inferred conditions) must remain current in philosophy.

21. The existence which in relation to the world as evolving itself in time we call potential, can be described by certain

¹ The substance of this, though not the actual sentence, has been found in his writings.

traditional terms which in the seventeenth and even in the eighteenth century a philosophical writer who intended to make use of them would have professed to arrive at simply by an intellectual process in his own mind, as if the tradition had never been heard of. The nineteenth century, with its historical spirit, perceived the illusoriness of this, but was disposed therefore, so far as it was in revolt from official trammels, to decline any further use of such terms. A better method is perhaps to admit frankly that as individuals we probably could not have invented them, but to use them, as being already there, if they permit of rational use and cannot be improved upon. Now I contend that the potential existence before the world began in time can be called, in senses capable of intelligible explanation, One, Eternal, Infinite and Absolute. It must be One as having the potentiality of a world that is a system: and our world clearly is a system; for the sentient beings in it are able to make themselves mutually understood; while objectively all its parts are found to consist of the same kinds of matter in motion according to what we are obliged to call the Uniformity of Nature. It is eternal in the technical sense, because it is conceived as existent yet not in time; and a compulsory argument has brought us to conceive it as thus existent. It is in the strictest sense infinite because it cannot be thought as limited by anything beyond itself. It is absolute because it must be thought as complete in itself. These technical terms, I may point out, all go back to ancient philosophy; although the last—the Absolute—has come into special favour in its metaphysical sense only in recent times.¹

22. While asserting, however, that the pre-mundane existence is One, we must equally assert that it is Many. Every attempt to derive the latter character from the former,—whether materialistic or idealistic, whether from some homogeneous substance or from an abstract unity,—has failed. The potential existence must be Many as well as One because individualities appear in time that are not explicable from anything not already individualised. These, we may assume, adopting another ancient term, besides being unities in themselves, "participate" in the other characters ascribed to the One. They are eternal or timeless,

¹ It dates from the period of controversy between the Stoics and the Sceptics. The Sceptics denied, what the dogmatists asserted, an existence knowable by itself; and this was said to be *ἀπόλυτον* because supposed known apart from relations to other things. For the Stoics as for the Epicureans it was a particular material existence. "The Absolute," as a name for the metaphysical whole, did not become an important term for Neo-Platonism; nor did "the Ego" as a name for the subject, though this too had been hit upon during the Stoic period. See a passage from Galen cited in Dr. E. Vernon Arnold's *Roman Stoicism*, chap. xi. n. 41, p. 246: here the very phrase, *τὸ ἐγώ*, occurs which is literally reproduced in the German "das ich."

not bounded by each other, since their coexistence is not in space, which is metaphysically posterior to time; and complete in themselves in so far as the whole system must be represented in each.

A caution, however, must be inserted against the inference from the word "eternity" that the pre-existent individualities are necessarily manifested by more than one phenomenal existence in time. It may be that they are; but from their eternity in this technical sense we cannot, to begin with, infer that anything like our present experience is continued beyond the one life known to each. What has been said is only that there is no explanation of the individual except by a pre-existent Idea. This term I use as being the traditional term by which the attempt has been made to indicate something barely intelligible, yet, if we consider it closely, an ultimate necessity of thought.

23. That which in relation to our world has been called possibility might be called with more exactitude latent necessity. All that in relation to the whole future system is possible must necessarily come to exist. Of course I know that in saying this I am taking sides in one of the great philosophical controversies of the ages; but, as the Pragmatists have taught us, the attempt in a metaphysical essay to assume nothing but the indisputable would be futile. The principle of determinism has already been asserted implicitly in acceptance of the axiom "nothing from nothing."¹

24. We can now approach with more hope of an answer not merely formal the question, how we are to interpret the passage from possibility to actuality. The terms "creation" and "generation" have been rejected so far as explanatory power goes, though neither need be rigorously disused if taken only as poetic metaphor. For my own part, I should have no objection to the application of Bergson's term, "creative evolution," to the view I am about to set forth. For, although the term creation is most frequently applied to a supposed production of the world from nothing by the command of an omnipotent will, this is not necessarily its meaning. It has been employed both in ancient and in modern times not only in a different sense, as by Plotinus, but even in an opposite sense. With Lucretius, it is the most usual term for the production of concrete things by coalescence of the atoms; and Haeckel, whose evolutionism is quite

¹ Bergson is usually classed as an indeterminist; but to me the statement on human freedom by his disciple M. René Gillouin (*Henri Bergson* [1910], p. 15) is purely determinist. "We are free when our acts emanate from our entire personality, when they express it, when they bear the unique and original impress of it." The subtlety behind this is the distinction between personality and character. To recognise that character can be modified is not a desertion of determinism but a refinement on it. Modification becomes explicable on determinist lines when we have come to perceive that there are more possibilities in the personality than are realised at any one time by the formed character.

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uncompromising, has written a *History of Creation*. I propose, however, to attempt a description more abstract, though not, I think, meaningless.

25. To make it not meaningless we must try to find a basis in experience. Is there in the most intimate experience anything that suggests timelessness? If so, we must look there for the first origin. Now the effect of experience in my own case has been that in this search I am thrown back on the Hegelian term *Thought*. In experience, indeed, I do not find that thought can become timeless; but timelessness seems its ideal limit. And it is the one experience which, to thinkers of the highest power, has seemed actually to free itself from the form of time. We cannot lightly set aside as mere subjective illusions the most intense meditations of Plotinus, of Spinoza (whose expression "*sub specie aeternitatis*" has become classical), and of Kant. As regards the relation of thought to other expressions of mind, I have been able myself to verify the exactitude of the Neo-Platonic analysis.¹ An intellectual question can be put, the answer completely thought out without words or imagery of any relevance; conscious knowledge can be present of the power to clothe it with words and appropriate illustration, and this power can be exercised, when the thinking has been brought to a close, without the introduction of any real novelty—that is to say, without the introduction of any image or word that comes as a surprise. Thus, as was set forth in the analyses of Plotinus and his successors, memory and imagination, by which the clothing is given, mediate between thought on the one side and on the other side perception, or relation to external things. Thought in the distinctive sense is not seizable by introspection, but is, as the Neo-Platonists found, impersonal and unconscious; the consciousness (or self-consciousness) of it in reflection being the proper expression of the personality.

A confirmation of the truth of this analysis is the relative justification which a view elaborated by a most psychological school of philosophers gives to the dismissal by Comte of the introspective psychology of his own time as practically valueless. For his purpose it was in reality valueless, because he was especially concerned with *Thought*; and this he found must be studied in the objective or impersonal system of the sciences, about which there was nothing important to learn from an endeavour to catalogue the floating imagery that accompanies thinking in particular minds. An incidental result is also to

¹ This was in some experiments devised by Dr. A. Wolf, in which Prof. Carveth Read also took part, in the Psychological Laboratory of University College, London, in the autumn of 1910. I have reason to believe that my general inference from the experiments, as regards the nature of thought, coincides with that of most others. That is to say, there is such a thing as pure thought without words or other imagery.

show how inadequate psychological Nominalism is as an account of thought-processes. Words, it is true, are indispensable signs of thought in human intercourse; and historically language has been the means by which thought has evolved; but thought itself escapes psychological observation. Verbal discourse is as little necessary to its effective activity and internal completeness and to the consciousness of this as is visual or any other kind of imagery.

Therefore I contend that experience gives sufficient warrant for regarding Thought as the best adumbration of the timeless Absolute which we suppose to precede and ultimately to be the reason of the forms and phenomena of the world. In the empirically known process all these are in a manner prefigured in thinking; and, if it is said that the clothing comes ultimately from perception, which does not appear to arise as a result of thought, this may be allowed without destroying the basis for the metaphysical analogy. Thought as it is in us does not include the whole of experience; but, when present, it is found to dominate and not to be dominated psychologically; and in the imagery drawn from antecedent perceptions brought to imaginative form, it is at least thinkable that it is taking back what in the beginning and in the whole was its own. For it is distinctly thought, and not imagery, that has its ideal limit in timelessness. The actual beginning of the world means the beginning of some kind of perceptive process in time, as distinguished from its latent form under the dominance of timeless thought.

26. For the successive emergence of perceptual forms and phenomena, we must take evolutionary science as our evidence. The reason why this emergence has to occupy a certain course of time has already been indicated. There was a beginning because there must be from the nature of time as a series of successive events; but the necessity of this beginning was latent eternally. In a sense, the beginning and the end of the series are irrelevant to the Absolute, though this does not mean that the existence of the series as a determinate sum of events was not necessary. The being of pre-inundant Thought, if definable, would have to be defined as always containing the necessity of a world; so that, for Thought or the Absolute, it is as if the world and its whole course always existed. Why we are at this moment of time, why everything has not been done already in the world of phenomena, are questions even less admitting of an answer than why there are individual beings or why there is a world.

27. In fact, attempts have been made to answer both of these last questions. The answers I select for discussion are, with respect to the first, that which made its way into early Greek philosophy from the Orphic religion; and, with respect to the second, the answer of Plato as interpreted by Plotinus.

To take the last first: Plotinus interprets Plato's position

that the Idea of Good is beyond Being to mean that the universe exists because it was good that it should exist. As an interpretation, this seems to me more correct than a modern one that makes Plato's Good an ideal of unattainable perfection non-existent in the world of reality but towards which existing things strive. And it is consistent with the myth of creation in the *Timaeus*, according to which a personal God made the world because he was not envious, and desired to communicate the good that he possessed. It is curiously inconsistent, however, with the theosophic view of the Orphics which was used by Plato in other myths, and through Plato, rather than through contemporary Eastern systems, influenced Plotinus. According to this view there are individual beings in the world because of a lapse from pre-existent stable Reality: souls descend into this world of birth through self-will, through the desire to be something for themselves, though it would have been better for them to "remain above." This seems to cohere more easily with the Gnostic or the modern pessimistic view that the world itself is the result of a lapse of Will unguided by Intellect than with the formal optimism of the Platonic school. And indeed Plotinus—more fundamentally an optimist than Plato—though he assumes this doctrine of a "fall" in certain passages, in others states tentatively one that can hardly be reconciled with it, *viz.*, that the souls positively gain profit for themselves by the experiences they go through in the world of flux. Evidently this agrees better with his view about the whole: for this world of flux is precisely the world whose existence he explains from the Idea of the Good. A want of complete consistency somewhat resembling this appears also in Kant. Without discussing the historic solutions in more detail, I will simply state what position I propose to adopt. I deliberately then select the optimistic position, not as something within which to entrench myself, but as the hypothetical view at first sight most consistent with what we know of the evolution of our earth; which from an inorganic mass has become the seat of life, and has thereafter continuously evolved forms of life that on the whole, as estimated by degrees of sensibility and intelligence, have become better. By a generalisation from this, the evolution of the universe will be conceived teleologically; and the appearance of individualities will be accepted as part of a process that exists for an end which is a good. The opposed position I shall regard as the beginning of a path of error, natural only in societies prematurely fixed: and yet I have no scruple in allowing that the error contains what Plato would have called a "divination" of a truth. This truth is that the eternal Absolute with its pre-existent Ideas of Individuals eternally included in it must be supposed to combine harmoniously the possibilities of the best; that the evolution of the universe in time proceeds by strife and division; and that the more imperfect

things predominate at first ; whence it seems as if the better has not its true home here, and can only aspire to return to the primeval repose of a perfect whole. If, however, the world, as teleological optimism also may rightly divine, has set out for an ideal end of explicitly realised and not merely latent harmony, the way to this evidently cannot be a mere return. And, for the present, we may exempt ourselves from discussing that path ; for it is one that humanity will certainly not take again for a long time. The ages to which it appealed were ages temporarily fixed, like the ancient Oriental world, or consciously losing the principle of their distinctive life, like the classical world after its brilliant efflorescence. And the characteristic note of its devotees, I would remark—against what is perhaps the common impression—is to be found much less in the idealists than in a naturalistic poet like Lucretius, who, in view of the end of each and all in dissolution, exults not in the continued existence of the infinite worlds that go on, but in the triumph of “ immortal death ” with its everlasting repose.¹

If we reject this, then we must at least be able to contemplate the “ impulse of firstborn things ” as having its source in an outgoing “ primal love.” We have a precedent in the invocation of Venus by Lucretius himself at the opening of his poem. Partly mythological though the idea may be, it is certainly remarkable that the most strenuous dogmatic mechanicism could not finally expel it from a mind of the first degree of logical combined with poetical power. Now this cosmic Love (to speak with Empedocles and Lucretius) could only manifest itself in a course of time ; and, if there was to be a course of time, there must be a first moment. To ask “ when ” it was necessary that this should be, admits, as has been said, of no answer. We find only that the time-process of the world had to begin ; and the beginning, in its remoteness from us, can be thought, and partly imagined, in terms of multiplied æons.

28. Now when we look at the world in detail, we find optimism confirmed to this extent, that, as Prof. Ward has put it in *The Realm of Ends*, although there are evils there is no “ principle of evil.” This does not mean that there are not evil wills as well as relatively evil things ; nor even that there is not, as Kant expressed it, “ radical evil ” in human nature. As manifestations of “ radical evil,” and not of “ good in the making,” I should myself class slavery, cannibalism, human sacrifice and religious persecution. Yet it remains true—and it was put as clearly as anywhere in the scholastic Aristotelianism taken over by Dante—that all desire and volition are under the form of a good. For the worst things ever done have been done from the

¹ Among modern poets, compare Leconte de Lisle, whose pessimism is founded on theoretical naturalism, and is qualified only by a doubt whether this is true.

"will to power" or from some desire of an excitation that shall make the personality feel itself alive; but power and a life conscious of itself are in themselves good. Even that which knows itself as antagonism to the harmony of the universe and says, "Evil, be thou my good," cannot escape this necessity: for the real aim of its desire is to be and to experience something more for itself. Only on the principle of pessimism is all self-affirmation sin, and all self-sacrifice virtue. The sin of the egoist, according to the view of optimism, is not the desire or will for his own good as such, but as manifested in a certain contexture. And, in the actual contexture of the world, the system of the whole may be seen to react against the evil that disturbs it. There is a cosmic justice by which the offender is punished.¹ This of course is part of the optimist's case.

29. From these discussions, which, by introduction of the generalised ethical problems long since associated with metaphysics, have carried us on to the later stages of evolution, I return to its beginning. What is actually the order in which things appear? It is plain that, as has been said incidentally, the things that from our point of view are the most imperfect come first in the order of time. Objectively the most plausible cosmogony places first a nebula; and for long ages of the universe the whole scientific account of it has to be external, that is, from the point of view of an imaginary spectator—in terms of matter (ethereal and atomic) and motion. If we take the whole universe to have begun, we must suppose at first nothing but diffused matter and motion through its whole extent. Afterwards, by slow degrees, come stars and star-clusters; portions of the primordial nebula being left behind unconcentrated. On the present hypothesis this seems to be the explanation of the still existing nebulae; they need not all be, as in the "infinitist" hypothesis, products of the collisions of past systems like ours. The evolutionary movement of the universe has a certain order as a whole, by which, on the surface of some of the bodies composing its systems, and among them our earth, organic beings appear and arrive at sense and thought. Sense and thought, in so far as they have their expression in consciousness, are processes that admit of description from within, and not simply as objects for an imaginary spectator, and are thus more immediately known as real. From the idealistic point of view, when we have become consciously aware of them, the question is whether anything else is truly real. Is an organic body itself more than phenomenal—that is, more than appearance for percipient mind? If, as critical analysis of knowledge shows, all that can be said of it, or of any other kind of body, is description of its appearances as perceived or as an object of possible perception, does this

¹ Compare Prof. A. C. Bradley's treatment of "Reconciliation" in his *Shakespearean Tragedy*, to which I recur in Appendix III.

phenomenal existence indicate any existence whatever corresponding to organic or other bodies that is more than phenomenal?

According to Berkeley, we have to take both organic and inorganic bodies as indicating no non-phenomenal realities but individual percipient spirits and the mind of God, who calls up uniformly certain ordered experiences in those percipients. The external world is nothing but the ordered system of appearances. So far as the phenomenism in Berkeley's view is concerned, I accept it. "Matter" as pure object stripped of every quality that has meaning only for perception, is indescribable and unknowable. For the mind to try to think it is, as Plotinus said, to recoil from an abyss of not-being. And what is the meaning of asserting an existence to which we can attach no meaning? That is the real argument against "material substance." On the view which I have set forth, it would be possible to give an ultimate explanation resembling Berkeley's. Absolute Reality, conceived as of mental nature and therefore not wholly unintelligible or unknowable, is manifested, in an ordered system of minds developing themselves in time, by appearances that can be understood with the aid of the conceptual order we call the uniformity of nature. By "understanding" is meant essentially the forming of expectations which can be acted on and verified. This indicates no reality beyond the minds or spirits of percipient individuals, and the system, in itself wholly mental or spiritual, from which they are derived. Consistent though this might be, however, I find myself, as I said before, unable to accept it as a complete account. For, if there is nothing more to be said, what is the meaning of all the long stages of pre-organic evolution? Is the scientific theory of that evolution, since there were no actual percipients while it was taking place, merely an account of a phantasmagoria, with nothing to correspond, that would have been shown them if they had existed some billions of years ago? The notion of continuity, on which our scientific reasoning proceeds, seems to forbid this. The theory as regards the world's reality for which I decide instead is, as I have indicated already, a form of "pampsychism"; but, as I take this also not to be a complete account, I will explain the differences to be introduced.

The imagined phenomenon of the nebula, with which the objective history of the universe begins, I suppose to have for its subjective being an impersonal sentiency which is the first realisation of the possibility of existence in time. When the process in time began, percipients, if there, would have perceived whatever there is to perceive in a nebula; and this perception would not have been a mere illusory evocation with nothing to correspond, for it is supposed to be evoked by the action of the real being of the nebula on the real being of the percipient. This account, it will be noticed, is in general outline Prof. Carveth

Read's doctrine of perception carried back to the hypothetical beginning (see *The Metaphysics of Nature*, 2nd ed., pp. 240-1 and Appendix C). The shade of difference is that I prefer to call the real being that is in time "psychic" rather than "transcendent": the term "transcendent," on my view, could be conveniently reserved for the pre-temporal possibilities.¹ These I regard as not all correlated with any portion of the world as phenomenon: and here comes in my modification of pampsychism. This, however, is slightly to anticipate, and I proceed with the hypothetical history of reality.

30. It has been suggested that all real being consists in its entirety of Leibnizian "monads," that is, rudimentary individuals of psychical nature, all of which may, but only some of which do, attain to "apperception," or consciousness of their perceptions. To the view that perception itself can exist as an unconscious mental modification I have no objection; in fact, it seems to be necessary in psychology, for which consciousness is not the whole of mind. But, this being allowed, I do not see why we should be required to think reality as through and through individualised. In fact, after a passing attempt in the preceding essay (pp. 375-376), I have failed to think it in this way, and therefore am attempting instead to work with the view that not all that comes to be in time pre-existed as a latent possibility of individual existence. I assume as the base of individuality and as pre-existent in time an impersonal sentiency analogous to what we imagine of the forces of nature, to which we may suppose it to correspond. As the first metaphysical reality in time and in the world we therefore arrive at something like Schopenhauer's blindly striving Will,—which of course is not strictly will in the psychological sense. This, however, is only the first in the temporal order, and does not explain what comes later. It explains, that is to say, neither individuality nor the impersonal intellect which at the other extreme appears to arise out of individuality. Yet, as Schopenhauer's attempt at deduction of Intellect from blind Will was a failure, so also, I allow, is the attempt at deduction of will from pure intellect. In adopting the term Thought for the pre-mundane existence, I have not proposed to develop any theory of a dialectical evolution of the world from this. I do not indeed know of any philosophers who have tried to determine the genetic order of the actual world by pure deduction, though some may have carried deduction to

¹ This is in agreement with a little-understood side of Schopenhauer's doctrine. His ultimate reality, as he explains now and then, is "beyond will." Much of what he calls Ethics contains a metaphysic of this. Though he does not like theistic expressions, he allows in one or two places (see *Neue Paralipomena*, ed. E. Grisebach) that we might call it God. The will or striving that is the reality of the world is a partially phenomenalised manifestation of this ultimate Reality. This Reality beyond Will the artist attains by moments and the saint with "final perseverance."

points where the logical chain breaks. These concessions made, however, I certainly find both the ancient and the modern Intellectualism more coherent than any form of Voluntarism. This greater coherence, though without absolute cogency, has a meaning, and justifies adoption of the supreme term of the intellectualists, subject to modification by that element of "radical empiricism" in method which all philosophy has now in some sense to acknowledge. What is indicated by the firmer structure of the intellectualist systems—visible enough historically¹—is that Thought, though not providing a ground from which all can actually be deduced, proves its dominance by giving us the nearest adumbration of the timeless being from which we found that the whole world must begin. Pre-mundane Thought, therefore, I hold to be, not strictly the possibility of all that exists, but that which predominates over all the possibilities that find their realisation in the world. To deduce any portion of real experience in time I hold to be out of the reach of philosophy because the principle *ex nihilo nihil* requires that the other things also which we distinguish from pure thought should pre-exist with it in latency. This tells both ways. In discarding the attempt to deduce the manifestations of will from absolute or pure thought, we also discard Schopenhauer's even less successful attempt to deduce thought from blind will. The appearance of blind will must be placed first, not because it is a datum from which we can derive the other things, but because experience shows that that is the order in time.

To recapitulate: The Thought before the world must include thought of will and of events in time; and that thought must manifest itself. Why Thought should in some latent manner include thought of will, time and events, is not ultimately explicable. We can only say that it is not unintelligible, as it would be that thought should issue from blind will.

31. The consequent modification in the pampsychist view, and with it the opening out of a new conception of evolution, can now be made clear. To relieve abstractions for a moment by poetic metaphor: each better thing that comes later in the process is "child yet no child of the night." "Light born of night" describes the apparent order, the order of "occasional causes,"—and not that of real production. The things that come later in the order of evolution are resultants, not of the preceding state of the world, but of possibilities in the whole metaphysical universe not hitherto phenomenally manifested. The metaphysical universe is never at any one time manifested as a whole in the

¹ This is to be seen not only in the characteristic philosophies of ancient and modern times, but also in those of the Middle Ages. For Catholic teachers the predominantly intellectualist philosophy of Aquinas has proved itself of far greater durability than the equally orthodox, but voluntarist, philosophy of Duns Scotus.

system of nature, but successively more of it is manifested. Here the macrocosm has something analogous to personality in the microcosm. Thus it is not only untrue to say, in terms of materialism, that the genius of Shakespeare and Newton was once latent in a fiery cloud: it was not latent even in the real or psychic being—the “mind-stuff”—of the fiery cloud. What we seem obliged to postulate is a certain metaphysical Idea of the Individual, ready to manifest itself when the preparatory stages of phenomenal evolution have been accomplished. And such new phenomenal manifestation of what has not before appeared goes on all through the process. We place at the earlier stages of the universe a kind of denuded simplicity, not merely by a convenient abstraction or as a purely hypothetical history, but because at those stages much less real being was actually represented in the universe as it might have been visible. Thus Comte's polemic against Materialism as the explanation of the higher by the lower is justified, but ultimately by leading us back to metaphysics. In fact, all the usual arguments against the cosmogonies that try to educe a world from any kind of chaos, material or even psychic, without any causes but those within the chaos, are found to be substantially valid. Translating into objective terms, if we assume atoms with the “primary” but not the “secondary” qualities of matter, we cannot show how the secondary qualities can ever arise. Perceptions containing elements assignable to the senses of sight, hearing and temperature may appear after and in association with those assignable to the sense of pressure, but their production cannot be explained from combinations of pressures; nor can it be explained how something that is by definition a mere correlate of the feeling of resistance to pressure can ever become a sounding or luminous or heated thing. And here, to complicate the question, we are reminded of the mediation of impressions by the sense-organs, “mechanical” or “chemical” as this mediation may be. Sound (or rather its correlate of vibration) acts by producing mechanical, light and heat (or their correlates) by producing chemical changes. This introduces a new difference into the objective account: for chemistry cannot be resolved into terms of mechanical physics without the residual presupposition, itself not properly mechanical, that atoms and their groupings are correlated with different qualities. No more can the teleological idea of an organism be explained purely from physico-chemical processes. Nor, to return again to the side of the subject, can intellect be explained from sense without latent forms (“innate ideas”) that become actual after a certain preparation but are neither in the bare elements of experience as abstractly defined nor in its crude first beginnings. To put it generally, growing experience can never be explained from its visible antecedents or from its conjectural simplest phases: something is always coming in from unknown though not unknowable reality.

32. Having adopted, then, the provisional view that matter is from the first the phenomenal correlate of something in reality psychical, but that from this psychical reality that which manifests itself later cannot be wholly explained, what are we to say about the relation of matter to the later manifestation? About matter itself we adopt as scientifically adequate the view that it is definable as mass, which is constant in quantity; and that the motion perpetually interchanged among moving masses and the particles composing them also forms a sum that is constant.¹ This was postulated from the Cartesian period onward, and has been confirmed since the right measure of "motion" was found, which turned out to be not momentum, or mass multiplied by velocity, as the Cartesians assumed, but energy, or half the mass multiplied by the square of the velocity. This quantity, it was found, can be treated for the purpose of summation as having not only an actual or kinetic but also a potential form, depending on the position of masses. The so-called "forces of nature" all have their "mechanical equivalent" in terms of this measure. Thus all, beginning with heat, were inferred to be "modes of motion." These are transformable into one another, always without loss or gain of quantity according to the mechanical measure. And, in mechanical science itself, the vague notion of force, as a "cause of motion," has given way to the precise conception of measurable velocities undergoing continuous and calculable changes. Force has thus come to be a term avoided by men of science because of the element in it of "popular metaphysics." Yet, as some have noted, in virtue of this metaphysical element it points to the deeper view of nature as internally psychical. This reservation, however, does not in the least modify the idea of constancy reached by science and formulated with a precision not attained till the law of conservation of energy was added to that of the indestructibility of matter. We do not suppose that any new realisation of metaphysical possibilities adds to or takes from the matter and energy of the universe conceived as a mechanical system. How then, if at all, do they modify this system? By what real process does the changed aspect of appearances come about? This is the new form

¹ I leave this statement, and others relating to physics, as first written in terms of the "classical mechanics." The changes introduced by the theory of Relativity do not make any difference to the metaphysics of the questions discussed; for of course Relativists do not deny physical perdurability, but only state it in different terms. And here what I am concerned with is simply the perdurability of physical ultimates, whatever they may be, for science. Those who have sufficient mathematics to compare the new formulation with the old may read it in Mr. Bertrand Russell's *ABC of Relativity* (1925), chap. x., "Mass, Momentum, Energy and Action." "The traditional formula," says Mr. Russell (p. 160), "must be regarded as an approximation, of which the new formula gives the exact version." This is for the present. It is admitted that in the future there may be even closer approximations than the formula which is now regarded as exact.

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of the old problem concerning the "interaction" between matter and mind, started in the Cartesian period and now as much as ever a source of perplexity to psychologists and philosophers.

33. Of course the view I have arrived at, that in the process of the whole there come in, from one phase of evolution to another, new manifestations of latent metaphysical possibilities, does not allow us to preserve any form of what is called in the strict sense "psycho-physical parallelism." From thorough-going correspondence between material and mental changes, even if matter is not a reality in the same sense as mind, it would follow that at every moment of the world's existence the whole of reality has its manifestation in the motions of masses. Thus the ideal of speculative science would be that which was stated in classical form by Laplace: *viz.*, that from the present forces (or tendencies to motion) and collocations of particles in the material universe regarded as a mechanical system, an intellect sufficiently comprehensive could calculate as from a mathematical formula all future movements.¹ Hence, whatever inferior rank the idealist may assign to physical phenomena as compared with psychical reality, it follows also that, the rule of correspondence once known between motions of particles and processes of mental elements in relation, the whole future of reality too is calculable; being simply the "inner" side of that which on its "outer" side appears as an order of complete mechanical determination. If, however, there is reality not correlated with the mechanical system, then complete knowledge of this at any moment may not suffice even for prediction of future collocations and motions in the mechanical order itself. To predict the future in full, on the hypothesis of the psychical determinist, it would be necessary to be the whole metaphysical universe: only for this is all reality pre-determined. And conceivably it is only for this also that all phenomena are predetermined; for the quantitative laws may not of themselves suffice for prevision without the introduction of a modifying factor from realities that have no material correlate. If this is allowed, can the modification be produced otherwise than by a kind of "interaction"? And how is this conceivable without abandoning even in its most generalised sense the "psychical monism" to which modern thought has now for a long time seemed to be tending?

34. In his work on *Body and Mind*, Prof. W. McDougall argues, not on metaphysical grounds but from the point of view

¹ I give the famous passage of Laplace as quoted in *Nature*, July 1, 1922, p. 7, by Dr. S. Brodetsky: "Une intelligence qui pour un instant donné connaîtrait toutes les forces dont la nature est animée et la situation respective des êtres qui la composent, si d'ailleurs elle était assez vaste pour soumettre ces données à l'analyse, embrasserait dans la même formule les mouvements des plus grands corps de l'univers et ceux du plus léger atome: rien ne serait incertain pour elle, et l'avenir comme le passé serait présent à ses yeux."

of a physiologist and psychologist, that "psychical monism," though he allows that it is the culmination at once of modern idealism and of mechanical science, must be abandoned for what he calls "Animism"; by which is meant that there are separable souls acting on the mechanism of the world and acted on by this. Thus it appears that we must return to scholastic dualism, for which mind and body are equally real things. And then there is no longer any difficulty: "interaction" is not mere appearance to be metaphysically explained, but a real process between two relatively independent realities.

That Prof. McDougall has shown plenty of difficulties in the way of all the parallelist theories, I could make part of my own case for metaphysical revision; but to decide for a simple return to Animism seems to me too much like "despairing of the republic." It is in effect to agree with Materialists and Neo-Scholastics that the whole of modern philosophy from Descartes and Locke onward has been, in its subjective direction, a mere aberration of the human mind. I do not say that this is impossible *a priori*; I have recognised that there are apparently promising lines of thought that lead to failure; and I am willing to take up an old and neglected theory if by hints from it any new insight can be gained. Yet it would be a rather melancholy result that intellect in chains should have kept (or been kept) to a theory substantially true; and that, when the chains were gone, mere want of aptitude for taking any but a rough and obvious view at once of the results of science and the workings of the mind should at least partially preserve from error; while subtler intellects taking advantage of the freedom of the modern world should only have gone astray. Therefore I prefer to attempt, not a return to dualism but a modification of the "psychical monism" with which I started in first beginning to write on philosophy.¹ By this modification it will appear that something like "interaction" is possible, though it is not interaction in the dualist sense.

35. As a statement of fact I can accept, with one alteration of expression, the following sentence from Prof. McDougall (*Body and Mind*, p. 298): "The psychic being is more than the stream of consciousness; and the sensory changes of consciousness produced by cerebral changes are only a partial expression of its enduring nature." The alteration I should make is to substitute for "cerebral changes," "changes in the psychic being of the brain." This substitution of the more idealistic for the dualistic expression is in accordance with Prof. Carveth Read's psycho-physical doctrine already referred to; except that, preserving my own shade of difference then noted, I put "psychic" for "transcendent" being. For the being of which I am here speaking is being as it comes to be realised in time,

¹ See Part 1., " ' Mind-stuff ' from the Historical Point of View. "

not simply its pre-existent metaphysical possibility, for which I suggested that the term "transcendent" might be reserved. In this sense no transcendent being as such has a physical correlate; some but not all of the psychic being in which it expresses itself in time, has such correlate. The metaphysical question that takes the place of the question of interaction is thus the relation between psychic being with and psychic being without physical correlate. The modification in our view regarding the mechanical order of the world must follow on our view of this relation between realities.

36. In admitting with Prof. McDougall that there is a portion of the psychic being of the subject not correlated with the brain, I move further away from psycho-physical parallelism than Prof. Read does, though he too has abandoned the strict doctrine in its Spinozistic form.¹ What then do I regard as not thus correlated? As a tentative position, on the lines of which advance may perhaps be made, I suggest (1) the teleological idea of the organism; (2) "separable intellect" (*νοῦς χωριστός* in Aristotle's sense); (3) memory (as argued by Plotinus and, with an important advance in discrimination, by Bergson). The third point, of course, logically occupies an intermediate position, but it was the last to be distinctly formulated, and is the most fruitful in interesting consequences.

37. I do not know how far the first position agrees with that of the Neo-Vitalists; but it is in one way the most remote from the doctrine of a "vital force." For that which I have called the "teleological idea" is to be conceived not only as not a kind of force or (according to the more accurate modern term) energy, but as not even correlated with anything in the form of motion differing from the total of the physico-chemical processes in the organism. The reason for introducing it is that the teleology of an organism—the mutual adaptation of its parts to the end primarily of self-conservation—is something not admitting of expression in terms of mechanical or chemical science; in fact with no meaning for any science before biology, and yet something that undoubtedly exists. For the conception of interaction the importance of this will soon be evident. The question is, Are the redistributions of matter and energy in a living organism made different by some dominating being not correlated with any portion of the organism, but supervening? This question, I think, can be answered in the affirmative without reverting to psycho-physical dualism. My answer on the physical side is as follows. No portion of matter or energy is created or destroyed; but, consistently with the conservation of both matter and energy as quantities, different distributions are possible. So far there is nothing novel. It was the position of the Cartesians who ascribed to the soul a directive power over "motion" without

¹ See *The Metaphysics of Nature*, chap. xv. § 1.

power to change its total quantity. That the constant quantity was considered to be momentum ($m v$) instead of energy ($\frac{m v^2}{2}$)

does not affect the principle. And some modern physicists have simply repeated the position, substituting only the more accurate description of what is constant. Psycho-physical as well as physical revision, however, seems to be needed. On the lines of the theory which I propose, greater exactitude, I think, can be given: so that, along with "parallelism," all trace of the inadmissible conception of an "interaction" between phenomena (mechanism) and reality (the soul) disappears; while yet no violence is done to the view of common sense that we as conscious beings count for something in what takes place in the phenomena of the world.

38. It may be put in this way. The idea of the individual, supervening from the metaphysical possibilities of the universe and not phenomenally represented, modifies the real or psychic being that mass and energy phenomenally represent; and to the modification produced there corresponds a redistribution of material particles that could not have been calculated according to mathematico-physical laws simply from the preceding distribution. Phenomenally considered, each redistribution is a determination in definite directions of that which, when the stage of organic matter is reached, becomes so far as mechanical law is concerned, within certain limits indeterminate. That is to say, not only the law of conservation by itself (as physicists allow)¹ but any possible hypotheses and methodological assumptions whatever that could be stated in mathematical terms, would fail to yield a previsible result from one collocation to another. Certain types of sequence could be made out by mixed mathematical and empirical methods; but no intellect of whatever power working on the data by the methods of mathematical physics alone could select the exact result to be realised out of many possible ones; for the necessity of the result depends on knowing all the factors, and not all the real factors are represented in any present collocation of material particles in motion.²

¹ Prof. Ernst Mach has stated mechanical cases in which the result from given relative positions and motions is indeterminate by the law of conservation alone. This, of course, is independent of his theory of knowledge, from which I have not developed my general view. My own view, is, I think, less removed from scientific orthodoxy. It is on theoretical grounds, and not on the ground of mere "economy of thought," that I regard mechanics as fundamental (though not all-inclusive) in natural science; and I follow the more usual general statements as regards the law of conservation. According to Prof. Mach, the law of conservation of momentum (valid under certain conditions) might just as well have had assigned to it the dominant position now assigned to conservation of energy.

² Since writing this, I have found that Comte, who was entitled to speak as a specialist in mathematics, strongly asserts (in the first volume of the

39. Thus the collocations are in relation to one another "occasional causes." True necessity in the universe is always inward and in part latent. Its ideal is formal logic, where the "laws of thought" are conditions of coherent thinking. Next in stringency comes pure mathematics, where the mind constructs in terms of an ideal space and number, but where propositions are admittedly never quite true of perceived spaces and only abstractedly applicable to numbered things, since these have not the equality postulated regarding conceptual units. When we arrive at mechanics, we are in a realm where we depend for the basis of our propositions themselves on the experience (of pressures and so forth) that comes to us, and the details of this experience do not impress themselves as coming of necessity: so that mechanical necessity is an ideal imported by the mind. It is indeed largely realised; for the mind can truly "anticipate" the course of things if it will methodically submit its anticipations to tests; but the necessity of mechanical science remains after all a distant image of the true or metaphysical necessity. So far as it is stringent, that depends on its abstract and hypothetical character. It only enables us to predict when the phenomena dealt with are comparatively simple, as in astronomy. Beyond inorganic phenomena, it ceases to be the main source of such powers of prevision as we have. And the prevision that depends on the teleology of organic nature brings us nearer to a view of the whole of reality that seems to carry the evidence of its rationality within itself. Indeed with logical determination as an ideal, teleological determination has been found to have much in common. For with both we are in the realm of mind or subjectivity.

40. To attain a greater theoretical grasp of the necessity of things, then, we must know more fully what are the realities that belong to this realm. Without such knowledge, apparent or mechanical necessity must present gaps. Carrying forward consistently the view developed, I think we shall arrive at the conviction that, without a teleological idea not further explicable, the beginning of an organism itself presents such a gap. An action that we can figure as directive of the motions of particles "makes" the organism. What goes on in reality is that an immaterial being not correlated with phenomena comes into relation with groupings of immaterial or psychical being that are so correlated; and that the groupings as modified have a phenomenal correlate which we call a living and growing organism. Without that which has nothing phenomenal to correspond, the

Politique Positive) that there are cases where the actual path of a particle according to known mechanical law is ambiguous; thus anticipating the later positivist and phenomenist, Mach. And he uses this position to support his own view that the teleology of the organism is in strict science not reducible to anything else.

phenomena of a living organism would never appear; whence again it is not difficult to understand how much phenomenal science is reduced to empiricism in giving an account of them.

41. This becomes clearer when we consider that notion of "survival" which has served as the basis for a scientific account of the general conditions that determine which of the kinds of organisms produced shall go on, how they shall be classifiable, along what lines they shall develop, what kind of life shall be possible for them. It has to be pointed out that, for pure mechanics and apart from the notion of conservation as an end, such a term as survival has no meaning. Conservation of matter and energy is not an end and furnishes no means of explaining ends: for it is something quite certain whatever becomes of particular bodies. Even the conservation of a mechanism, humanly constructed, has no meaning except by analogy to the conservation of an organism. Biological survival, as a term to think with, is unintelligible except in relation to some desire accompanying the processes of an organism, or at least to something that acts as if it had such a desire. Thus conceived it is a scientific though not a mechanical concept; and, under the description first given on the title-page of *The Origin of Species*, viz., "preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life," it became the basis for Darwin's explanation of the evolution of organisms by Natural Selection. Darwin himself did not attempt to bring it down to mechanical terms. In fact "survival" can only seem capable of mechanical interpretation when thought of, quite without the precision demanded in mechanical science itself, as the mere fact that some organisms are preserved while some perish. But the very essence of Darwin's theory is to leave the process no longer in the vague, but to give a *rationale* of it. Now the condition assigned for survival is superior adaptation of an organism to that which we conceive as its immanent end of continuing to live and reproduce its kind; and this, for mechanics, is absolutely indifferent and furnishes no distinctive problem.

42. While putting this as strongly as I can, I at the same time accept what is by some considered to be the most mechanical form of Darwinism, namely, the "Neo-Darwinian" as opposed to the "Neo-Lamarckian" theory of the origin of species, supported on the hypothesis regarding heredity first suggested by Galton and most elaborately developed by Weismann. The ground on which I have adopted this general position as a working hypothesis is that the scientific evidence for it, in the judgment of the soundest biologists, seemed to preponderate; but of course the interest of it for the present essay is philosophical. Favourably as it has been received in general by biologists of mechanistic bias, I contend that, when thought out, it is the doctrine that throws

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us back most decisively on some such metaphysical theory as is here attempted.

According to Weismann's hypothesis, the sexual elements, in the higher animals at least, are not a product of the mature organism and (except pathologically and by accident) are not affected by its experience, but form a kind of underlying stock (a "stirp" as Galton called it) which goes on from age to age throwing out individual organisms like leaves on a tree. These are destroyed or preserved so as to reproduce their kind again by means of the "germ-plasm" of which they are the temporary bearers; those that "vary" favourably becoming, through the germ-plasm to the qualities of which its bearers are an index, the ancestors of the predominant types. No characters acquired in individual experience by use and habit—as in Lamarck's theory—are transmitted. That which is transmitted, in the case of variations, is only a tendency in the germ-plasm to vary in certain directions; as for ordinary inheritance only the capacity is transmitted to experience in certain normal ways. For favourable variation no cause is usually assigned except a mechanical shaking-up of the germ-plasm; the new collocation of molecules or of the atoms comprising them being from time to time, we must suppose, just that which happens to carry with it a new sense or a new form of relation under which elements of sense are grouped. On these shakings-up depends ultimately all the development from the vague sentiency and spontaneous movements of the amœba to the discriminated senses and instincts in the higher animals and to the intellect and will of man. Thus the germ-plasm from which the organism of each began was the last result of a series of aimless mechanical movements which simply happened to occur in such ways as to bring about that result.

If we adopt the pampsychist hypothesis, of course we regard all these movements as having an "inner" side in feeling, which is reality; but even then we seem to be no nearer in effect to an explanation of the actual process of evolution on the successful lines, as distinguished from elimination on the lines not successful; unless we suppose the psychical elements themselves to have a tendency towards ends. But this is only to "multiply entities" beyond what is required if we suppose teleological ideas of individuals. The mental element is then mythologically endowed with attributes which we only know as those of individual organisms. And, on Weismann's theory, it is precisely in association with the individual organism that we must seek the teleological idea. There is no inheritance handed on from one individual as such to another; no quasi-mechanical accumulation of results from actions performed by ancestors and impressions made on them; as there is in Lamarck's biological or in Spencer's psychological doctrine. Each individual, so far as it possesses

formed powers and capacities, has acquired them by individual use and habit in the course of growth from a portion of germ-plasm segregated from other portions, and having no line of derivation except series of unguided movements from the first production of living protoplasm whether on dry land or in the waters of the sea. Thus I find it difficult to understand why Prof. Ward, whose bias is against expelling "souls" as useless, and whose sympathies are with metaphysical pluralism, should incline rather to "inheritance of acquired characters." For Weismann's doctrine, while giving no insight if taken by itself and regarded mechanically, supplies precisely the kind of physiological basis needed for the doctrine that souls are individual and do not arise by a process of accidental segregation from a mass or of aggregation from elements. If we assume as pre-existent what I have called a "telological idea of the individual," which is, in Schopenhauer's sense, its *aseitas* by which it differs from all other existences, then this, associated with appropriately plastic germ-plasm (or, in more exact metaphysical terms, with the psychic being corresponding to it) can give to it what appears to us as direction, first in the form of growth and then of active experience. What is needed in the germ-plasm is the plasticity within certain limits that makes it fit to realise a particular form; and that the "selected" types should spring from the more plastic germ-plasm seems fairly intelligible. The immense accumulation of accidents required if in the germ-plasm itself, without any other factor, the most complex organisms are absolutely predetermined through and through need no longer be supposed. Thus the individual soul remains a true individual, ultimately unitary and not a mere compound of empty forms and relics from the experiences of parents and ancestors. If the empirical individual shows "family-likeness," psychological as well as organic, this may be explained partly as due to adaptability of certain types of germ-plasm to series of real individuals that bear a closer resemblance to one another in certain respects, and partly to interaction between the psychic being of the organism (correlated with phenomena) and the pre-existent "transcendent" being that comes to be realised in a particular life. This is the ultimate individual, which is not a bundle of physiological strands. "Innate ideas," if it is a thinking individual, belong to it as such: they are not blank forms left by a kind of evacuation from the concrete experiences of human and animal ancestry. Of course, on any theory, they need experience to make them explicit. The forms of space and time are general conditions of having percepts, and belong to souls as such. Physical heredity is a mechanism (so far as it is mechanical) not wholly explicable by itself, and not capable, by any translation, of explaining psychological development. This development goes on in series of individual beings not produced in the physical process, nor even

in the psychical process correlated with it, but themselves needed as factors to account, in the reality of things, for the mode of its working.

43. The Lamarckian and Spencerian doctrine, though offering at first sight a more plausible mechanical explanation of heredity, would not, it seems to me, dispense with psychical factors. Indeed Lamarck's position, that qualities are acquired by effort and use, and then handed down, implies them; and it is this that Spencer has made the base of his genetic psychology. The mechanism of inheritance, according to this view, is that modifications, for example, in the cortex of the brain, somehow have an effect on the sexual cells and that the modifications produced in these communicate to the new organisms that spring from them a tendency to reactions, at once physical and psychical, modified similarly to those of the parent. Biologists, on examining this closely, have found it less thinkable than it at first appears; and, in any case, for explanation in terms of reality as distinguished from phenomena, it presupposes some kind of psychical continuity. In the account as it stands the only psychical terms are, to begin with, modified experience of the parent, and then, at a perhaps distant date, corresponding modification in ways of reacting to experience on the part of the offspring. Between these two terms nothing is conceived but a mechanical, that is, purely phenomenal process. If we try to fill in the intermediate psychical terms, and speculate about a soul that is the bearer of the characters inherited, this must be a kind of soul of the race; the souls of individuals that accumulate and hand down the inheritance being regarded as phases in a process continuous along the whole line of evolution. Prof. Ward, who, as has been said, inclines to accept inheritance of acquired characters, has hypothetically worked with this conception; although, as he is metaphysically a pluralist, he cannot take it literally. In its literal sense, it seems to be a speculation not yet tried, unless Samuel Butler's *Life and Habit* be read in that sense.¹ Not finding this kind of psychical continuity from individual to individual ultimately thinkable, I abstain from the attempt to give it verbal coherence,² and pass on, as a basis for further theorising, to something in the realm of psychology that may be considered to be scientifically established.

44. In man, what is metaphorically called the soul of the race or of races is more accurately described as the social mind. The bearer of this is sometimes said to be Humanity as distinguished from individuals; so that, for Comte, Man is the reality and

¹ Cf. McDougall, *Body and Mind*, p. 247, n. 2; who, however, only suggests in general terms "some immaterial mode of persistence."

² The author of *Erewhon* did not shrink from indulging his humour in a hypothetical defence of the deduction that we "remember" what we did when we were our immediate parents.

individuals are the abstractions. Empirical psychologists quite accept this, with the proviso that the social mind finds its realisation only in the experiences of individual minds. It is that in them all by which they have a common mental life, carried on by means of general conceptions. In isolated or even merely gregarious animals such general conceptions could not arise : they distinguish and constitute the life of humanity, giving it a continuity different in kind, as Comte said, from that of a biological organism or even race, and furnishing the reason for constituting a science of sociology marked off from biology. The biological school of Weismann, represented in particular by Sir Ray Lankester, has readily taken up this view ; which of course makes the Spencerian explanation of intellectual progress by individual inheritance of acquired aptitudes psychologically superfluous. Progress, Sir Ray Lankester insists, apart from natural or artificial selection, which is the only known mode by which improvement can be effected in types of individual, depends on modifications in the social tradition. The " social mind " is formed by a certain structure of institutions, political, legal, educational, and so forth ; and is propagated through the medium of language, in which the generalised results of these are summed up and handed down with additions and modifications from one generation to another. Now this social mind, empirically considered, is that which, for psychology proper, forms the basis of what is traditionally called the faculty of Reason in man. And this brings us to the next stage in our examination of the factors that have been held to be not correlated with particular structures or processes in the organism.

45. A considerable space in the history of philosophy is filled by the discussions starting from Aristotle's position that, while all else in mind is organically conditioned, intellect proper, or conceptual thought, is not. His own doctrine remained ambiguous in a way that gave an opening for interesting and remarkable theories. There is little ambiguity, indeed, about his view that perception and memory are inseparable from the particular organism and do not survive it. It is clear also that, with only slight wavering, he held Intellect to be separable. But what is this Intellect? According to the view of some ancient commentators, afterwards adopted by the orthodox Christian scholastics, it is an individual rational principle. According to the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias, there is no separable intellect but that of the Deity : this is the source of reason to the particular mind that goes with the working of a particular organism ; and no mind associated with a body, but only the divine intellect, remains permanent. According to the view of the Arabian commentators, summed up by Averroes in the twelfth century, and therefore in the later Christian Middle Ages called Averroism, the permanent " active intellect " that

confers the power of reason on human individuals is a certain universal human intellect, not cosmic or hyper-cosmic Deity but an emanation from this. Now whichever of these views we take regarding the origin of human reason, it does not, so far as it is positive, determine the question of personal immortality. This no more follows of itself from the orthodox view than its denial follows from either of the others. Whether reason is individual or universal, the effective survival of the personality depends on something else in the individual; and the permanence of something besides the reason was as arbitrarily denied in the Alexandrian and Arabian views as it was asserted in the Christian Scholastic view. The interesting thing to us is that, as soon as we allow ourselves to speculate with freedom, the ontological question returns. It is neither solved nor superseded by the empirical explanations above referred to. The growth of what has been called the social mind, on which depends for individuals in experience the exercise of their reason, can indeed be explained historically from language and institutions; and these themselves have a beginning that can be traced or conjectured. But what is it in man that explains how his conceptual power comes to exist? It was really very plausible to assign its origin to the Mind that gives direction to the world, or to some universal Reason of Humanity. If, however, we seek a higher degree of precision regarding the ontology of the question, I think we must begin by recognising that modern psychology, through the failure, historically realised, of all attempts to constitute the unity of the individual out of two or more detachable parts,¹ holds it to exist as a whole in which mind or intellect, in the distinctive Greek sense which distinguishes it from soul as the principle of life and sensation, is included. The question that remains is whether this can still be held, as by Aristotle and his successors, heterodox as well as orthodox, to be without physiological correlate.

46. Now the result of the modern physiology of the brain seems to me to be decidedly in this sense. Essentially I found the case, not on any of Prof. McDougall's direct arguments in favour of

¹ An attempt that probably meant no more than distinction of "faculties" not really capable of separate existence, was the division by the Greek psychology derived from Aristotle into "vegetative," "animal" and "rational" soul; though this last, in the Alexandrian and Averroist doctrines, appears to be something capable of union or disunion with the other parts. A more definite division of entities was that of the ancient Persian doctrine, into the good and evil soul, which so impressed St. Augustine in his Manichæan phase. Xenophon very interestingly brings it in as local colour in his historical romance (*Cyrop.* vi. 1, 41): *δῆλον ὅτι δύο εἰσὶν ψυχά, καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἡ ἀγαθὴ κρατῇ, τὰ καλὰ πράττεται, ὅταν δὲ ἡ πονηρά, τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἐπιχειρεῖται.* Real credit is due to Augustine for strenuously thinking out this whole question, and solving it by adopting the assertion of unity in its full force as stated by the Neo-Platonists.

animism, but on his preliminary statement of what seem to him the strongest arguments of the mechanist (*Body and Mind*, p. 107). "The incessant labours of a multitude of workers have revealed the fact that not only the spinal cord, but the whole of the brain also, is built up on the reflex plan; that the whole of the brain may properly be regarded as made up of a multitude of nervous loops, interlacing and communicating with one another, it is true, in wonderfully complex fashion, yet still being essentially loops or long bye-paths; each of these diverges from the afferent limb of some spinal reflex arc to ascend to the brain, and, after traversing the brain, descends to join the efferent or motor limb of some spinal reflex arc. Just as it is possible to trace the path of the spinal reflex impulse across the cord from sensory to motor nerve, so it is possible to reconstruct in imagination the ascent of the various sensory paths to the lower brain, thence to the appropriate sensory area of the cortex, and thence again in great converging systems to the motor area of the cortex; whence they descend by the great pyramidal tract to be distributed to the various motor mechanisms of the cord. . . . Again, there is good reason to believe, though here we are on less firm ground, that all the processes of the brain, even those that accompany the most abstruse thought, conform to the same fundamental reflex type." I have quoted the last sentence lest it should be said that I am omitting part of the mechanist's case as stated by Prof. McDougall; but here it is evident that the supposed expositor is allowed to go beyond the facts and assume the principle. My case, founded on cerebral physiology as here set forth, in favour of a "separable intellect," a constituent of mind not correlated with brain, is precisely that there is something in mind which cannot be reduced to the reflex type. I could quote good psychological authority; but I prefer to follow as well as I can the classical method of English psychology and philosophy, and state what I find in my own mind, appealing to others to say whether they find the same or something different. I say then that I do not find my mental processes to be wholly classifiable into perceptions and the co-ordinations of these and their translation (with or without an interval for deliberation) into co-ordinated motor activities. Pure thinking, or the nearest approach to it possible, is neither co-ordination of perceptions (or their sensory elements), nor motor reaction on them, nor even a complex balancing of tendencies to reaction. If then physiologists can find no room in the brain for anything but reflexes along "sensori-motor arcs," thinking in the distinctive sense must be regarded as something that interacts indeed with the mental processes correlated with the brain, but is not itself directly represented in brain-processes.

From the physiological side I am able to quote an authority whom all will admit to be unbiassed in anything that he definitely

had little difficulty in proving them to be not ultimate functions but only varied aggregates of the true elements of psychical life." On the other hand, the elements themselves, such as the various kinds of sensation, "can neither be supposed to be consummated at their first cortical station, nor be either traced or thought likely to be traced further by any experimental means yet devised" (*Philosophical Remains*, p. 351). And yet it has turned out that the experimental means had struck into the true path so far as physiology is concerned. Neither the older descriptive and classificatory nor the newer analytic psychology can now see any better prospect of the ultimate end of search in a discovery of concomitants in the brain for what we know directly as higher processes in mind or can make out by analysis and synthesis of its elements. Later physiology of the brain is minuter and more elaborate but not less restricted to sensory and motor areas and their co-ordinating fibres. And when there is question of a *rationale* from the physiological side, Münsterberg¹ and Croom Robertson had to recognise the extreme difficulty in understanding how a psychical process so elementary as "contiguous association" could be represented in a nerve-process (Croom Robertson, *Philosophical Remains*, p. 302); while Prof. McDougall, having later (*Physiological Psychology*, 1905) with much pains formulated something that he thought might work, confesses that it hardly satisfies himself (*Body and Mind*, 1911). But, since psychology is as much a positive science as physiology, the want of a satisfactory account in terms of brain-process for that which psychologists have made out by introspection and analysis does not expel it from existence; just as, on the other hand, psychologists (as they well know) cannot dispose of the accurate results of physiological research by showing that something else is needed to represent mind in full. A sufficiently wide view being taken, however, there is no room in science for counsels of despair. If one hypothesis fails to bring together the results on the two sides, we must try another. I suggest then that we try the effect of substituting for the postulate of parallelism—*viz.*, that in brain there is the phenomenal manifestation of everything in mind—the idea of a subordinate relation of the reality of the brain to a mental reality without organic correlate. This would certainly furnish a better justification than "parallelism" can for the agreement of science with common sense in speaking of the brain as the "organ," that is, instrument, of mind. I do not of course regard an argument from etymology as conclusive when we are concerned with a scientific or philosophical conception, though it is well sometimes to remember what words literally mean. Metaphysically this language is still to some extent inaccurate; for it is not the brain as phenomenon, but its reality,

¹ *Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie*, 1889, reviewed by Croom Robertson in *Mind*, April, 1890.

which on the proposed view interacts with separable mind : but the inaccuracy no longer points to a yawning chasm between the practical meanings of popular and philosophical language, as it does on the theory for which brain and mind are equally in their way the whole.

49. Additional confirmation of this readjustment may be found in the now generally accepted position of physiologists that there is no "muscular sense" as "feeling of innervation,"—that is to say, as feeling accompanying the outgoing current from the brain along a motor nerve. The feeling we have of muscular exertion accompanies only the "afferent" impulses from the parts where the muscles are exercised, and not at all the "efferent" impulses to them. This seems to suggest that the efferent process is only a change of direction impressed upon movements of particles. For if it is essentially this, taking place as such with no quantitative expression in terms of energy, we should not expect it to be accompanied by a feeling of fatigue or effort. Fatigue, as we all know experimentally, does actually arrive when effort has been put forth ; in physical terms, when a certain quantity of potential has been turned into kinetic energy at the periphery. And experimental physiologists, with their more exact means of determination, agree in rejecting the notion that any muscular feelings come to consciousness otherwise.

The very bias with which some started who first put forth the newer psycho-physical doctrine which has taken the place of the "innervation-theory" of Bain tends to confirm the speculative conclusion. For the position that did not allow a direct consciousness of effort put forth was undoubtedly advocated by William James with the notion that it was hostile to "automatism," "parallelism," and so forth. He desired to prove, in some sense, a purely psychical directive action with no physiological concomitant. That there was this bias to start with is, in a question of science, nothing against the result when attained, though it may be before it has been submitted to the test. On sound experiential principles, the ultimate proof is furnished by verification, no matter what the initial bias. And physiologists whose sole interest in the problem has been scientific appear to have no doubt whatever about the true psycho-physical inference from the facts. This—though of course the argument is not logically conclusive—does to some extent react in favour of the speculative view from which it was held that it ought to follow.

50. In connexion with "muscular sense," I may observe that rejection of it as feeling of innervation or sense of outgoing effort throws us back for the theory of mathematical axioms on Kant and the anticipations of his doctrine in the later Platonism. Mathematics, and more especially geometry, is a construction not explicable from any difference between "active" and "passive" sense, but only from pure intellect working with the aid of that

which has been called "productive imagination."¹ To have founded the logic of induction is the glory of English philosophy. To Aristotle that of founding formal logic has never been denied. It remains the incontestable achievement of Kant to have given classical form to the logic of the science that had long been placed in an intermediate position, *viz.*, mathematics. And—to continue a digression which will be seen in the end not to be altogether irrelevant—we are thus able to assign its place on *a priori* grounds to "meta-geometry." The space and the geometry of Kant—which are the space of perception and the geometry of thought—are "Euclidean." That is to say, space is necessarily "homaloidal" and, for the mind, infinite. To posit a "curved" space is in reality to imagine not a space differing from that which is necessarily perceived and represented for thought, but a peculiar kind of physical universe: an ethereal plenum which, considered in its aspect as a "solid," has some distortion that would cause the movements on which light depends to go in curves, whereas we have supposed them to go in straight lines. Mathematical science, with its highly elaborated symbolical apparatus, is sufficiently powerful to calculate the effect on perception if various hypotheses about the motions permitted by the ether were realised, but it is not powerful enough to overthrow its own base. The non-Euclidean "spaces" that modern mathematicians have figured out in symbols cannot really be thought as spaces; or, to put the case more accurately as expressing a power and not an impotence of the mind, Euclidean space is always necessarily thought as containing the physically modified universe which the hypotheses do really succeed in presenting. The physical universe, on the hypothesis I have adopted, is of course a finite plenum, whether actually "homaloidal" as has usually been supposed, or having some resemblance to any of the "metageometric" imaginations. Infinite space, as shown in Kant's "Transcendental Aesthetic," is that which is imposed by the mind.²

¹ Croom Robertson long defended, against what was beginning to be the consensus of physiologists, the notion of muscular sense as feeling of outgoing effort. Once convinced that this must be abandoned, he would, in my opinion, have been simply a Kantian on the theory of geometrical axioms. See the article "Axiom" reprinted in *Philosophical Remains*. Among his unpublished papers I met with a fragment showing that he had been interested in the anticipation of Kant's "productive imagination" by Proclus.

² I find it thunkable without self-contradiction, though not imaginable, that the plenum of space, as Einstein argues from his own distinctive positions, should be finite but unbounded. This would mean for physics that the ether—if we may continue to use the term—is a system of constraints on the transference of energy, not going in Euclidean straight lines, but in lines that return at length on themselves. Inability to imagine seems to result from the nature of our experience, which never allows us to view the whole as such. Thus, thought, which by its own impulse gave us the Euclidean system, reveals itself as greater than the world.

51. If Herbert Spencer had adopted this Kantian position, the geometrical properties of space, which like infinite space itself he could not think as other than eternal, need not, as he confesses that in the end they did, have caused in him a feeling from which he shrank. From the metaphysical point of view of the present essay, this character of space and its properties is precisely what we should infer from the eternity of Thought—partly realised, as we have seen, in the human mind. But so far, I observe, there is no ground for anything that can be called personal—though there may be for individual—immortality. This is equally true whether we suppose one or other part, or the whole, of what has been so far considered as without phenomenal correlate, to survive the organism. Examples of precisely the opposite treatment applied to the two parts are to be found in Schopenhauer and in Aristotle. Schopenhauer, in his later theory of a “*palingenesia*” of the individual “*will to live*” but not of its acquired intellect, in effect preserved what I have called the teleological idea of the individual, but treated the reason as a perishable because temporary and instrumental product of this. (Sometimes, indeed, on his view, it succeeds in annihilating the will, and then the end is achieved, both having gone from the phenomenal world for ever.) On the other hand, Aristotle regarded all of the soul except the reason as no longer having any proper existence when the organic body of whose reality it is the completed expression has ceased to live. Perception and memory perish, but the reason—whether regarded as individualised or only as general or cosmic intellect—remains. Here again there is a survival in effect only of something depersonalised: nor is it otherwise if we take the whole to form an indivisible unity. The teleological idea as separable (which Aristotle did not admit) may become the ruling principle of another organism; and its acquired intellect (the separability of which from the organism Schopenhauer denied) may go on with it: but even this is not personal immortality, unless there is something else.

52. Can we add something else? We can on a certain view about the third (and intermediate) problem concerning separability. If anything that can be called memory remains, then the immortality becomes personal.

53. That memory belongs to the separable part of the soul was maintained by Plotinus; and the thesis has been revived by Bergson on the ground of the newer physiology of the brain and with the aid of a new psychological distinction. In both cases, as it happens, the thesis is scientifically disinterested, whatever this disinterestedness may prove. It does not of course prove that the thesis is true; just as the desire to arrive at a certain conclusion does not prove it false, but, when the conclusion we arrive at must depend more on thinking than on experiment, the absence of any emotional bias in its favour is at any rate an

additional reason for giving it a hearing. Now Plotinus personally had no desire for the conservation of memory. The immortality he desired was, he thought, beyond this; consisting in a kind of intuition of the whole in which the personality would no longer remember that it was itself or take any separate interest in its own past experiences. And he was not bound to maintain the thesis as part of his philosophical system. He could have treated the conservation of personal memory imagined by Plato in some of his myths as having no more than a mythical value; just as he did actually declare the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence (from another life to this) to be only a mythical statement of something not psychologically quite clear in Plato's time. The truth indicated was, in his own view, a doctrine of "innate ideas," which he himself put in as circumspect a manner as Leibniz did in his reply to Locke's criticisms on Descartes. The innate ideas are potentially present, but need experience to call them forth. As a Platonist, indeed, he was under even less compulsion to regard memory as preserved in the future than as preserved from an antenatal life; for reminiscence is brought in by Plato to solve the philosophical problem of knowledge, while future memory only appears as part of an imaginary system of rewards and punishments. And the thesis, in the time of Plotinus, had psychological originality. Proceeding on the Platonic view—more in accordance with modern physiology than that of Aristotle, who made the heart the seat of intelligence—he regarded the brain as the central organ for sense-perception, and held it to be associated with the modes of consciousness through which reason comes into relation with the world. Perception thus does not belong to the "separable soul"; but memory, he contended against the Aristotelian position, does. The argument is essentially that memory, being active, cannot consist of "traces" received passively as concomitants of impressions of sense and stored up in the brain. And he has many apt criticisms on the difficulties of explanation of such traces, imposed and superimposed as if with a seal on wax, and yet in a kind of substance that cannot be imagined to hold traces in this way. His own position is essentially that memory is an affair of intellectual attention, starting from perception but not permanently dependent on relation to the central organ of perception any more than to the sense-organs. It may be noted that some modern psychologists take memories to be separately localised in the cerebrum, and not to be simply accompaniments of modifications effected in the sensory cells. The usual reply to the criticism on the theory of traces would no doubt be that the brain is not now regarded as a mere passive recipient, but as active in memory and sense-perception alike. Whether the notion of a modification in the vibrations of molecules in nerve-cells or arcs, caused ultimately by impacts from without, would have effectively

met the criticisms of Plotinus on the cruder physical theories that long did duty, is more than questionable. At any rate Bergson, recognising that in the modern psycho-physical theories of memory the brain-processes concomitant with it are regarded as activities and not as modes of being passively impressed, defends the thesis of separability by a new distinction within the general conception. "Pure" or "contemplative" memory, as a detached psychical activity, is by him distinguished from memory as "habit." While the latter is admitted to have a physiological concomitant, the former, he argues, cannot have this; for no process in the brain can be conceived to which it could have an intelligible relation; and the attempts at making it intelligible in the most recent theories of cerebral localisation completely break down. An illustration of memory as habit is the recitation of a poem when the first words are given: pure or contemplative memory is illustrated by the recollection of having learnt the poem by heart at a definite time in the past. Thus the expression of "pure memory" in full would be what psychologists have called "the time-series of life." This cannot be coherently thought as represented in the brain; although, to bring it into relation with the phenomenal world, the systems of mental habits called in another sense memories are needed. The brain, which is wholly an "apparatus for action" (on the external world), contains representations of the mental "habits" in its reflex mechanisms; so that the manifestation also of contemplative memory, though not that memory itself, depends on the integrity of the cerebral cortex. And here the thesis, which occupies a place apart in Bergson's doctrine, for the present ends. Though suggesting a theory of immortality, it is not put forward as the ground of one. It even seems inconsistent with the distinctive doctrine of *L'Évolution Créatrice*, which treats the "Life-impetus" as something impersonal determining itself temporarily in individuals as waves of its sea—to speak in the metaphorical manner of the book itself. Like Prof. McDougall (*Body and Mind*, p. 359, n. 3), "I cannot discover that Prof. Bergson has brought the theory of the *Matière et Mémoire* into intelligible relation with the psycho-physical doctrine of the *Évolution Créatrice*." I also find the "theory of images" itself, by which he tries to work it into a general psycho-physical doctrine, scarcely intelligible through the super-subtleties of his attempt to overcome "the English idealism" and return to a doctrine more apparently in accordance with the realism of common sense. As a matter of fact his thesis could be stated quite directly in terms of realism, and with equal directness translated into terms of Berkeley's idealism. It may very well remain when the parts of his doctrine into which the author seems to have thrown more of philosophical enthusiasm, and which have been received with more, have lost their vogue.

Its drift, I would remark, is entirely against that exaltation of volitional factors and depreciation of pure intellect in which Bergson has followed what is generally thought to be the tendency of modern Pragmatism.

The method by which he clears the way for his thesis is an elaborate criticism of the attempts made by physiologists to localise the different particular memories and kinds of memory. Now I find a strong tribute to the success of this in the concession by a very hostile critic (Mr. H. S. R. Elliot, *Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor Bergson*, 1912) that Bergson has actually refuted "a crude theory of localisation," and errs only in jumping from this refutation to the assertion of his own theory as demonstrated fact. For where, in that case, is there a theory of localisation that is not crude? I do not observe that any attempt has been made to show that in *Matière et Mémoire* the most skilful and competent work of physiological specialists is not examined. With the German literature of cerebral localisation in particular Bergson shows himself thoroughly familiar. This being so, he is at least entitled to go on to state a theory which from the nature of the case does not admit of physiological proof except of a negative kind. The test, for Bergson's theory as for that of thoroughgoing correspondence between brain and the whole of mind, must be coherent thinking. I do not myself hold that Bergson's positive theory is proved; but it seems at any rate worth further trial in the way of intellectual experiment to see what comes of it.

54. Evidently it coheres very well with the positions already arrived at regarding the separability of the soul, first as principle of the organic and living body and then as reason. It fills in the gap between these two things, and, the soul being conceived as a whole, enables us to understand how it may retain or resume a personality continuous after the organism has ceased to be a separately acting thing in the external world. On this view, what disappears—that is to say, ceases to exist psychologically as a distinguishable system—is the reflex apparatus of sensation, imagery and conation. This perishes with the living brain which is its phenomenal concomitant. What then goes on? To repeat again the heads from the beginning of the discussion: (1) an individual reality, without phenomenal concomitant, which, if a fitting phenomenal order again arrives—let us say, for illustration, if there is an appropriately plastic germ-plasm—can give form to a new self-conserving organism of a certain type; (2) a latent intelligence capable of manifesting itself as "innate ideas" after appropriate experience; (3) an individually acquired memory which, in some new order, may literally realise the Pythagorean or Platonic reminiscence. The last is, as I said before, the most interesting in its consequences. I can conceive someone saying that to the conclusions of the materialist it

practically makes no difference if the first two positions are true. If we do not remember, it is as if we did not exist. Generally, no doubt, modern Europeans think in this way; though there are also races whom metempsychosis interests without their believing in a memory continuous from life to life. However this may be, we have arrived again at a distinction something like that of Leibniz between mere permanence of the soul and true immortality. In his view, animal souls were permanent, but had no immortality that was more than metempsychosis: immortality properly so-called is reached only when the consciousness of the monads has become clear enough to go on as memory from one life to another. The view we have arrived at does not differ in result from this, though metaphysically it is different, since Leibniz—following Spinoza in his psycho-physical doctrine—was a “parallelist,” and held that the permanent real beings he called monads were represented phenomenally in systems of material particles. Thus for him the whole on one side was through and through mechanical, as on the other it was through and through teleological. Between this and the meta-physical position arrived at above, I need not restate the difference. I will only say that the result of the latter is to make mechanism more truly “mechanical,” that is, instrumental, than it can be on a theory which, instead of treating it as the representation of only part of the real, makes it concomitant with all that exists. Animals, then, on the present view also, have an immaterial directing “idea”—as we may call it; an *aseitas*, to use Schopenhauer’s term; and this may become reincarnate, either in an animal of the same species or, in virtue of some aptitude acquired by experience, in an animal at the next stage of evolution. There is here, however, no true immortality. This may appear in man, though it is impossible to say on the ground of the general theory that all men, in distinction from animals, have more than metempsychosis. The conditions, however, are present in man: namely, conceptual thought and the capacity to construct a mental history of the individual life, always latent if not present, to which events in the past can be referred as determinate members of a series in time.

55. I must now make some attempt to realise imaginatively what sort of continuance there may be. The problem is to determine how the imagination coheres with the metaphysical doctrine, which, by itself, is of course merely conceptual. First then, I confess myself unable to form an imagination of a disembodied spirit strictly so-called.¹ The being that is immortal I suppose to remain as a latent possibility such as we found at first that we had to assume at the origin of things—till it acquires a new relation to a certain grouping of phenomena. The organising

¹ As an afterthought I suggest, consciousness of the whole universe without the power to move any particular part of it.

principle, that is to say, for actuality, must reassume control over an organism of some kind. If for suggestions as to the way in which this may come about we have to go back to primitive animistic and religious ideas, a reason for not desisting may still be given. Animism and religion were attempts to solve problems not even yet either solved or finally determined to be insoluble. It is true that all the particular ideas in all the religious systems are explicable anthropologically or historically without the need of supposing any basis whatever except fancies set going by mental association and similarity; none of them having anything to offer in the form of evidence that will pass any critical test. And yet, since the mind, even at the philosophical stage, cannot work on such subjects without imaginative material, it may reasonably choose to start from a generalised view of past imaginations. Science offers a good precedent in its modern renaissance, which was not entirely from the rational science that had gone before it in antiquity, but in part sprang out of occupation in the Middle Ages with what was called "magic"—the most characteristic mode of primitive superstition. I shall not go far, however, into these things, but shall only offer outlines of possible theories, all of which have already been taken up or hinted at by philosophers.

56. One largely prevalent type of theory is that which supposes another phenomenal world or worlds, not continuous with our physical universe, but in which a certain "form of personality" from our world can be continued in association with phenomena inaccessible to us. This type of theory we may call that of the "unseen world." There is nothing to disprove the existence of such a world or worlds; but historically the origin of the belief raises no presumption of its truth, but rather the contrary. Its world was originally the world of shades or ghost-souls, which in not very primitive religions was still thought to be accessible to dwellers on earth by some practicable method; as by offering a sacrifice at a rightly selected spot, or by finding a subterranean passage to an underworld. We need not go into the varieties of this belief; its neutral Hades for all souls, its specialised Tartarus and Elysium, or still more specialised Heaven, Hell and Purgatory. What is clear is that the philosophy which treats it as completely inaccessible to the living, as the "undiscovered country," is the latest phase of its evolution. It reached that phase for some in ancient and has reached it for more in modern times. For Plato, with all his elaborate theorising on the immortality of the soul, it had arrived at that point as completely as for anyone who ever lived. That Plato should have seriously appealed to an apparition in proof of anything is unthinkable. In setting forth for ethical purposes philosophical myths selected from the fancies of popular mythology or from the more esoteric mythology of Orphic and Pythagorean adepts, he is always careful

to explain that not precisely this, but something like it, may be taken for the truth. And yet it was to give clothing to a rational philosophy that he had to fall back on such fancies. Indeed the removal of the unseen world from the world of the living was in some ways favourable to its impressiveness. At its primitive phase, its phenomena were shadowy and confused, like those of a dream on which waking life breaks in. Remaining always only a faint semblance of the phenomena of this world, they naturally provoke the exclamation of Achilles in the *Odyssey*, that he would rather be the servant of a poor man on earth than be king over all the dead. When the other world is utterly removed, its phenomena can be imagined either as more terrible or as more brilliant and beautiful than anything in human experience. And in later Græco-Roman antiquity, among peoples not unaffected by scientific culture, hope and fear of that which was more consciously unknown than before became continually intensified till they reached their height in a new religion. Still, the origin of these imaginations must tell against them in the long run; so that, unless something of verification appears for that which philosophers and poets had ceased to think of as more than at most symbolism, it is clear that they must pass altogether out of view. Such verification some are now attempting to find. They hold it for a belief supported by scientific evidence that there are modes of communication between the dead and the living. That there may be separated intelligences, normally connected with another phenomenal world, but capable of affecting temporarily groups of phenomena in our world, I find it impossible to deny *a priori*. Pathological and abnormal phenomena, through which the manifestations are said to be made, are no less facts than others, and science will have to give some account of them. I do not, however, feel myself competent for the line of investigation known as Psychical Research; and, though less diffident of my ability to judge of written evidence than of my power to arrive by observation and experiment at anything not already discovered, I have never even studied the reported cases in any detail. My own argument has proceeded hitherto entirely on the lines of metaphysics and of normal physiology and psychology. I propose to continue this; and, without passing judgment on the question of "unseen worlds" as affected by recent investigations, I proceed to a more tangible if perhaps less imaginably verifiable hypothesis.

57. The type of theory that remains to be discussed is that of reincarnation. This also is a theory that arose among primitive men. It still predominates in India, where it has been turned to ethical account, as it was by Plato in one group of his philosophical myths. If it is experientially unverifiable, this is only as a theory about long-distant astronomical changes is unverifiable; for it does not assert the existence of phenomena

in their nature inaccessible to human beings. It is not without appeal to men of science, from its bearing on unsolved problems of heredity; and, if we are to dismiss all ideas that can be traced to primitive peoples, we shall have to reject the notion itself that qualities can be inherited from ancestors. Indeed I have seen it proposed (from dislike of the presumed anti-democratic tendency of Galton's eugenics) to treat this as a superstition, on the ground that it is only a new version of the "ancestral curse." It is unnecessary to insist further on this point. I merely remark that, like theories of "unseen worlds," reincarnation seems in a general way compatible with the metaphysical doctrine concerning the soul already set forth.

58. As illustrating the use of this conception uninfluenced by any contact with researches into what is known as "the occult," I cite the eminent Orientalist Émile Burnouf;¹ who, stimulated at once by his work as a Buddhist scholar and by the doctrine of biological evolution, developed in a book of which so sane and clear-minded a judge as Croom Robertson thought very highly (see *Mind*, O.S. xii. 302) a theory of reincarnation proceeding through the whole animal series up to and (in the future) beyond man. Reincarnation indeed was conceived as always without memory; and the metaphysical doctrine was Leibnizian in type; a "central atom," corresponding to a Leibnizian monad, being conceived as the bearer of life and thought. In the course of evolution, as the soul energises, the central atom attaches to itself other atoms, the preservation of the results of experience having thus a material ground. Not only, however, was memory, which was no doubt assumed to be dependent on the integrity of the brain and not merely of this central group, not supposed revivable on reincarnation: the author seems also to have regarded the formed material system at the centre as destructible; suggesting, perhaps half-seriously, that in the new ages which will adopt cremation instead of burial, reincarnation may be no longer achieved. The immaterial being which I have supposed to be perdurable is of course exempt from any accident of this kind: and it is at least imaginable that the "super-man" should appear as a race of which the individuals remember their former life; the stage of man, in which "contemplative memory" first exists, being the preparation for this. If the suggestion is thought too romantic, it may be pointed out that recent science has revealed so much that is new to us in the physical universe, such as formations and destructions of atoms, that many of our old limitations on what is possible may be considered obsolete. At any rate, there is no longer room for confident prevision that the future of man on earth, spiritual any more than material, will be to all intents and purposes much the same as his past.

59. In Burnouf's theory, the relation of the central atom to

¹ See also the preceding essay ("Teleology and the Individual").

the cell from which reincarnation takes its start when the appropriate conditions have appeared, does not differ essentially from the relation of the separable soul to new germ-plasm as conjecturally set forth when we were discussing the theory of heredity; except on one important point which must be noted in passing. If reincarnation depended on the conservation of a separated material system of atoms, clearly accident must count for much as regards its time and place, or even its occurrence at all. If on the other hand we suppose a separable being not in space, because immaterial, and not correlated with anything that is in space, then, though it cannot be said that all depends on the soul, yet it would be true to say that all depends on this along with the destiny of the phenomenal world. Given the appropriate conditions expressed phenomenally in groupings of material particles, the immaterial condition is always ready: no accident is needed so that the right central atom may become part of the fit germ-plasm. And thus, from the speculative point of view, all is ultimately destiny, and there is no irrational chance.

60. So, by a series of modifications, we might perhaps arrive at a theory scientifically imaginable, in which only one phenomenal world, and that visible, is supposed. But need we in our outlook be limited to our own planet? Apparently not. If the whole visible universe is one interconnected system, it is conceivable that reincarnations may go on from our earth to inhabited planets in some other region of space. For, since the soul is not in space, as has just been recalled, its association with one group of phenomena may, for anything we can tell, be followed by its immediate passage from the latent state into association with another group in any part of the stellar universe.

The general idea here may be applied to solve a puzzle of the latest science. An electron, it is said, revolving in its orbit around the central nucleus of its atom, must be supposed when it jumps directly to another orbit (as it does on occasions) to take no time whatever in the passage.¹ How is this thinkable? It is thinkable if we suppose the real being of the electron not to be in space. And all metaphysically real being must be held to have this in common with what we call soul. There is thus no difficulty in supposing changes of phenomenal manifestation from one part of space to another to be instantaneous. The condition of motion as phenomenon in space is indeed continuity in time; but in coming upon real being we see that certain cases escape this condition.

61. We might also suppose, as Plato did, alternations between life in an unseen world and reincarnations in our world, with alternating transitions between latent and actual memories. In beginning to speculate, however, we laid down as a condition

¹ See Mr. Bertrand Russell's *ABC of Atoms*.

of acceptability to the modern mind a teleological view of wider scope than is compatible with recurrent cycles. We therefore postulate that there are not infinite ascents and redescents, as affirmed at least by Plato's followers and perhaps implied by himself; but that the movement of souls as of the universe is in one direction, with only eddies, and not alternations that leave everything always, in the most general view, as it has always been.

62. This is not affected by the imagination we form as to the concurrence of souls with phenomena; whether there are "unseen worlds" or the visible world is all that is manifest at all. In any case, we suppose a total progressive movement, with minor cycles that never permanently set it back or quite bring again any old order. This must be a movement realised both in individuals and in the whole. If the individuals pass from world to world, the passages are phases of a life tending towards some end. The whole also, if there is evolution, must be supposed to undergo a progressive movement, so that it can become in turn the abode for individuals of higher orders; whether these emerge successively from the latent possibilities existent in the beginning, or, having emerged formerly, are gradually perfected by successive reincarnations. Neither the problem of the whole nor of the individual can be set aside because the other has been solved: what we seek as the ideal is a conjoint solution of both.

63. Clearly then the destiny of souls must be in some way bound up with the destiny of the visible world. For the sake of simplicity, we may ignore the problematical unseen worlds, and treat our world as the sole object of speculation. We may also, to simplify further, omit speculations about other inhabited planets. Indeed, it is now held scientifically possible that our solar system is unique in the universe, and that our earth is the only body which is capable of supporting life.¹ With the reservation that this, though a possible, is not at present for astronomers a probable view, we may yet find some interest in pointing out the effect of a position that would make the universe again unitary in an older sense; as Clifford, in a remarkable anticipation of recent mathematico-physical theories, once suggested that it might be found to be. Strangely, the effect would now be a return to the joy felt by Bruno in the knowledge which he thought he had attained, that the universe is infinite and its inhabited worlds innumerable. This, he said, exalts the human intellect. The earth becomes, for philosophic imagination, one of the stars, and no longer, as for the ages of theological faith, the dregs sunk to the centre and enclosed by successive spheres "like the coats

¹ See Dr. J. H. Jeans's Halley Lecture, delivered on the 23rd of May, 1922, entitled *The Nebular Hypothesis and Modern Cosmogony* (Oxford, 1923);

of an onion." Since his time, however, his "anticipation of the intellect," that all the "fixed stars" are suns for other solar systems—or, as he puts it poetically, that round every new Phœbus Citharœdus dances a choir of many Nymphs—having passed into a commonplace of popular science, has been turned to what was thought a more edifying purpose. By a kind of "protective mimicry," the rhetoric of naturalism has vied with religious pessimism to abase man before the vastness of non-human powers. A new reversal, far from restoring the mediæval abasement, would sweep away the fashionable rhetoric remotely derived from it. For we should rightly regard our life on earth as intrinsically more than all imaginable worlds that are lifeless. To the Life latent in the universe the human spirit might say—

The skies that scorn us are less in thy sight than we,
Whose souls have strength to conceive and perceive thee, Pan,
With sense more subtle than senses that hear and see.

It is safest, however, to take to heart Dr. Jeans's warning that in cosmogony everything is uncertain; especially as he has already found it necessary to revise his own conclusions, and to recognise that planetary systems like ours may not even be very rare in the universe, but, "if not quite the normal accompaniment of a sun, at least fairly freely distributed in space."¹

64. Whatever may be the final result of the cosmogonical speculations that are developing year by year, the movement of astronomical science can be said at present to favour the notion of a total inorganic evolution of the cosmos from nebular matter, rather than that which seems to have been Laplace's tacit supposition, that the evolutions of partial systems go on by themselves as if these were independent universes. Taking up the problem again at the organic level, I suggest what may be called a "pragmatic" use of the teleological view put forth sceptically (in Hume's sense) by Prof. Carveth Read at the end of *The Metaphysics of Nature* and at the beginning of *Natural and Social Morals*. Let us assume that self-knowledge, to be realised in man, is the purpose or end of nature; philosophy or culture being thus the highest good. Or, on pragmatic principles, let us act as if that were the end, trusting that thus it will be realised.² In this way, I think we apply the best that pragmatism has to teach, while avoiding its fundamental error, *viz.*, the position that the essence of truth is biological value.³ In conscious

¹ See "The Ages and Masses of the Stars," *Nature*, December 6, 1924, p. 829.

² οὗτος δ' ἀνὴρ ἄριστος ὅστις ἐλπίσι
πέποιθεν αἰεὶ τὸ δ' ἀπορεῖν ἀνδρὸς κακοῦ.

Eur. Her. Fur. 105-6.

³ Both sides of the doctrine are vividly stated in *Pragmatism*, by D. L. Murray, with a Preface by Dr. F. C. S. Schiller (Constable, 1921).

antagonism to this last view, we take organic life to exist for the purpose of serving as a vehicle for manifestations of thought; recognising, however, with the pragmatists, that we do so at our risk. Substantially, this last is also the position of Prof. Read.

65. Can evolution be interpreted on these lines? I think it can; although, to overcome some difficulties in the way of final causes, we shall have to assign more of ultimate reality than Prof. Read does to the individual. According to Prof. Read, the world is a conscious being, plants and animals being "all of them temporary individualisations of one continuous germinal substance which, as it develops and gathers together materials from the rest of things, produces their bodies to be its vehicles; until, that purpose having been served and new individuals originated, the materials of the old ones are dispersed again and they exist no longer." Consciousness, before it thus differentiates itself, is "generic consciousness, repeated in human infancy, from which self-conscious human minds emerge, and immediately forget their origin: so that the individual, though instructed by others in the history of his body, seems as to his conscious life to have an independent existence, like a self-begotten god" (*Natural and Social Morals*, Preface and Introduction, pp. xvi-xvii). The query I make upon this is: Do we not, instead of forgetting, gradually come to know what we are? And this, though it may seem to have some resemblance to a conjecture of Milton's Satan,¹ is not after all too arrogant; for we shall have to apply it in a sense to the animals as well. On the ground of it, I think a reply can be given to the strongest objection raised against teleology in *The Metaphysics of Nature*.

66. The position being hypothetically adopted, that all in nature is as it were designed, first some "sinister indications" are noted; and then, to the attempted explanation "by a certain limitation of power on the part of the Artificer in relation to certain necessary conditions of existence," the rejoinder is made: "But how can the limitation of power account for the shark, the tiger, and Jenghiz Khan; or for the display of ingenuity and technique being as great in the cobra's fang as in the cow's udder?" (*The Metaphysics of Nature*, p. 345). I reply by postulating that even in our hypotheses we must abandon more

¹ In a debate in heaven, Satan, in opposition to the creationist doctrine of Abdiel, declares that he himself and the other angels were

self-begot, self-raised

By our own quickening power when fatal course
Had circled his full orb.

(*Paradise Lost*, v. 860-2.)

That this is not a mere debating point, but a conjecture of a spirit conscious of not knowing the ultimate truth, is indicated by a parenthesis in a soliloquy (Book ix. 146). Milton himself, in complete opposition to orthodox Christian philosophy, denied the creation of matter out of nothing.

completely the notion of creation by an external Artificer. The shark, the tiger, and Jenghiz Khan are manifestations of uncreated pre-existent possibilities. The teleology they manifest is properly their own. Essentially the true view is that which was stated by Schopenhauer in his doctrine of the "intelligible character."¹ Praise and blame, love and hate, are ultimately justified because an individual life is the necessary expression of an individual nature that was not made to be what it is, but was such in a timeless order before it began to be in time. This, of course, does not mean that we must take all actions as fully manifesting the individual, or that forgiveness of error is not the general rule because errors necessarily arise from entanglements in a web of circumstance; but only that at last we come upon something inexpugnable which is the individual. This, however, does not lead us far in an argument for the teleology of the world. Taken separately, it would rather end by resolving all into a conflict of wills, each to be considered by itself. Its importance is that, teleology in general being granted, it introduces a deeper limitation than that of logical or mathematical necessity in the direction of the whole. We do not explain real beings as ultimately "made" by the One and Good, but as parts of a Many that also was from the first within the whole. The Absolute, however, is not simply a system with a consensus, as in ultimate Monadism. Justice, Reason, Mind, as Plato held, rules; not indeed as a personal "prince or legislator," but as an inward necessity that is one, and exists somehow for itself.

67. But is there after all a teleology to be made out in the evolution of the universe and in human history? Is not the deeper explanation always mechanical? Do we not recur to this when we wish to know the "particular go" ² of any process whatever? Not, I think, in history. Here the explanation by factors only expressible in terms of mind—by desire and will and ideal ends—seems the most real that is attainable. Leaving aside the question of teleology in the individual organisms involved, we have to deal with a total movement; and the problem is, from the teleologist's point of view, to find something in it that is as if directed to an end that we desire or ought to desire for the race—an end achieved as if by a cosmic force above the aims of individuals. Now I think we find this at certain turning-points of history. The "*vis abdita quaedam*" that overturns one social order to erect another, suggests not "*Fortuna gubernans*," but rather "*Fate and metaphysical aid*." The things on which the

¹ Schopenhauer expressly applies the doctrine to the characters of animals, citing in support a very curious passage from Jacob Böhme: "*Denn es ist eine Kraft in jedem Thiere welche unzerbrechlich ist, welche der spiritus mundi in sich zeucht, zur Scheidung des letzten Gerichtes*" (*Neue Paralipomena*, § 217, ed. E. Grisebach, p. 146).

² Clerk Maxwell, from whom this phrase proceeds, was himself a convinced believer in "spirit" and teleology.

really progressive movement of history depends are those that have at first no obvious "survival-value," that seem merely to escape being crushed by the effective powers of the world. As cases, I mention philosophy and Greek and modern freedom. These, from their apparently weak and distracted beginnings, have survived as if by accident so far as the "occasional causes" typified by mechanism are concerned, against all the blind forces, revived and reorganised tyrannies, and malignant superstitions. It is these last, in their times of dominance, that have seemed to come with the effect of a huge invincible mass-movement. When Reason thus, against all the apparent chances, prevails, may we not conclude at least without absurdity that it is somehow the directing factor in the process? We can see how it is so in detail only by a kind of social psychology, by showing how a certain impersonal element in the form of general ideas arises out of the interaction of individuals, and then, so far as it is rational, has a more enduring power over beings moved by generalised purposes than the mutually-conflicting irrational factors. But all this is in terms of mind. Of right and wrong, truth and falsehood, and their respective power in human affairs, no interpretation in terms of mechanism seems even thinkable. To know the atomic movements in the brains of the persons concerned could give no deeper insight. On the principles of idealism, it would only carry us to the remotest extreme from direct knowledge of reality. The "particular go," I should say, is here the psychology of the actors: and even this, as made out for example from memoir-writers by historians with an eye for motives, gives less insight than the philosophical interpretation in terms of an end for Humanity.¹

68. When we consider teleologically the evolution of life in general, this can be regarded as a preparation for man; but of course it may be said that that is from our point of view. For science we want something universal in which man appears as a phase. This I think can be found in the term Intelligence. The theory of Natural Selection states the conditions of survival;

¹ The World-War has added one more to the list of critical decisions. Here the *vis abdita quaedam* was conspicuously revealed in the beginning as the emotion of love for ideals of freedom and justice. It was very much in latency before the war, and it is now latent again beneath the great struggle of kingdoms and republics for power and gain.

But this too is in its manner, "spiritual." Machiavellian politics and the classical Political Economy, allowance being made for their abstract treatment of "motives," give detailed explanations of the "particular go" within commonwealths, precisely because they proceed in part "subjectively" from purpose and will. On the other hand, the treatment of the individual organism as a kind of commonwealth, though it proceeds objectively from groupings of cells that can be seen under the microscope, makes no approach, through all the complex relations established, to furnishing any *rationale* of the unitary consciousness that seems to direct the organism.

but, as critics both friendly and hostile have had frequent occasion to point out, it does nothing to explain how the variations themselves originate that are preserved because of the advantage they give in the struggle for self-conservation. Darwin of course, though an important part of his scientific work consisted in accumulating materials for study of the origin of varieties, quite rightly, in setting forth his doctrine of Natural Selection, took variation simply as a fact; exactly as Newton abstained from the making of hypotheses to explain the fact of gravitation. If, however, we allow ourselves to speculate, the deepest cause in biology, I think, will be found in the self-development of mind; and this on the Neo-Darwinian view which I myself adopt. Here as elsewhere I take it for granted that characters acquired by the exercise of intelligence in the individual are not inherited by offspring; that only the innate capacity for acquiring them is handed down. But, this granted, why is there in the evolution of life a constant growth and improvement of intelligence? Neither in animals nor in man is it the thing that gives the impression of being predominantly valuable in the struggle. And yet the brain, its organ, has grown at such a rate that even the inferior vertebrates of to-day are said to have, roughly speaking, ten times the brain of their predecessors in the mesozoic period. From the purely biological point of view this is inexplicable. All sorts of other things, even sometimes limitations due to inferiority of intellect, as we know directly in human life, and as biologists have the candour to inform us regarding the animal kingdom generally, tell in the struggle. Why then this apparently steady growth on a single line of variation? ¹ Only on one supposition is the fact explicable, and on that supposition it explains itself. The answer is that that which is evolving in the process is itself Intelligence, without any visible end except that there shall be more of it on earth; ² that, in short, intelligence is not an accident in the universe. Ultimately the struggle for life is for the sake of the evolution of mind; and not this for the sake of biological survival. The distinctive part of the process is that mind seizes the opportunities for manifesting itself: but in its finer forms it has much to overcome, since the ruder forms appear first. On this line of speculation I think we may arrive at an approximate understanding; and perhaps some prevision of it explains the fascination of *L'Évolution Créatrice*. To me, I confess, Life seems a vaguer term than Intelligence, and the depreciation of this by Bergson an unfortunate accident: but there is really an attempt to interpret evolution from within. What we are made to feel is that Life, which

¹ To this apparently directed development Prof. L. T. Hobhouse gives the name of "orthogenic evolution."

² Cf. Heraclitus, Fr. 115, Diels: ψυχῆς ἐστὶ λόγος αὐτὸν αὖξων, "The law of soul is increase of rational law."

we can only understand as something resembling our own intelligence, is in evolution finding its way; and that of this way natural selection is a condition and mechanism an instrument. The somewhat elusive character of Bergson's teleology—which indeed he is unwilling to call by the name—may be best explained as due to the effort to explain adaptation all down the scale, including the life of plants as well as of animals. Thus the psychic factors in the organism which do not imply conscious planning come to have predominant importance assigned to them. For of course the particular beings by whom the process is worked do not know where it is going, or only begin to know at an advanced stage of human history. Not to recognise that this knowledge, when achieved, is altogether a higher stage than animal instinct, is however a defect. At least it seems so to an "intellectualist." In like manner, if there is not supposed to be in the cosmos something analogous to foreknowledge of the direction in which the process is going, the conception of the whole seems to be inferior and not superior to that of the older teleology, Platonic or even Stoic.

69. The result for me is that the teleological view which Prof. Carveth Read regards as merely possible can be held with more of speculative confidence than he has himself ventured to give to its expression. Returning then to the consideration of man after the backward glance into those conditions of organic evolution under which the human race began to be, let us try if we can form any more determinate idea regarding the nature of the cosmos in relation to humanity. Is all flux, as some of the pragmatists are supposed to maintain, without any law that can be stated for all ages and with no truth that is valid except for particular persons and times? Here I must maintain that something has been arrived at which can be called eternal truth. Undoubtedly it came to be thought by men in the course of evolution under assignable historical and psychological conditions; but once attained, it stands by its own evidence. There is a pregnant saying in Plato's *Philebus*, that of truth in such subjects as metaphysics the quantity may be very small, but that it may nevertheless be of extreme importance if it is "pure." And, to take the other speculative extreme, the type of philosophic "good sense" as distinguished from mind with wings, a well-known sarcasm of Voltaire quoted by Macaulay really implies that there is such a thing; for Voltaire does not say that of metaphysics no knowledge ever existed, but only that in all ages the knowledge there has been of it has amounted to very little.¹ On the whole the coincidence is remarkable; and I think both sayings mean, with a difference of stress, that there is a small, but only a small, amount of pure *a priori* truth. Now, not to

¹ Zadiq "savait de la métaphysique ce qu'on en a su dans tous les âges, c'est-à-dire fort peu de chose."

quarrel about these last words, as a past English generation might have done, I find myself necessitated to admit the presence of such truth in Logic, in Aesthetics and in Ethics. In Logic there are the formal Laws of Thought. I quite recognise the force of Mr. Alfred Sidgwick's *Application of Logic*, where he shows how any meaning that the formal laws may yield depends on the reference in which we use our terms; and how impossible it is to be sure of bringing to book an unfair or unintelligent disputant by means of them. Still, I hold to a reply that I had thought of some time ago; namely, that no system of truth, by the mere correct verbal statement of it, guarantees that it will always be applied correctly. Thus I can on the whole accept what he says about "meaning" as a refinement on the older logic, rather than a destruction of it. If we are to make any progress in anything, we must presume, as has been said, a certain "intellectual good will." Beyond the formal laws, I regard the Uniformity of Nature as a truth definitely achieved. And in æsthetics and ethics also there are certain principles that are "eternal and immutable." In ethics I once disputed this in the sense in which it was meant by those who propounded it; arguing that moral laws may always ultimately be referred to ends. Long reflection, however, on the difficulties raised by Renouvier about this reduction has convinced me that there is an "eternal and immutable morality," not expressible as hypothetical relation to an end, but simply as obligation; not as command, but as something totally without reference to reward and punishment and not derivable from experiences of these. Like other kinds of pure truth, however, this is very small in quantity; it is not proof against the sophistry even of those who accept it; and it very seldom comes in to settle any particular question. It exists rather as a test, formulated in the rule of Justice, than as a set of particular precepts. Justice itself, as Renouvier says, is an "absolute": there is something in it which we have to treat as not dependent on happiness or particular interests or general utility. It is an obligation not deducible from the idea of a good or of an end, but consisting in a certain form or law. So much I admit: yet the art or conduct of life, it must be added, mostly depends on reference to ends for ourselves or others. Justice, it is true, dictates the general conditions under which these shall be pursued; in the social order, the recognition of rights as well as duties. Yet, supremely important as this is, it is clear that the abstract "good will" of the Stoics and of Kant, as was shown by Hegel with his regard for institutions, is empty. To try to become "an incarnate categorical imperative" would usually be a very unfortunate ideal.¹ It is, in this abstraction, a kind of

¹ There is a most interesting passage in Comte's *Philosophie Positive* (t. iii. pp. 551-3) on the opposite errors in practice to which French and German moral psychology, as they had been or were in his time, appeared

fanaticism; and there are fanaticisms of art and of logic that are comparable with it. All the same, it cannot be said that morality or art or logic is not worth becoming fanatical about. Historically, it is well to remember that the fanaticisms of Art or Beauty as well as the fanaticisms of Morality descend from Kant.¹

70. The bearing of this on our problem is that it points the way to a more determinate metaphysical conclusion about the universe. Since justice cannot but appear to us—as it did also to the Greeks—an ideal that absolutely ought to be realised, and since we cannot explain this in full from any particular or even generalised psychological experiences, we tend to refer it to something so general as to be cosmic. The reasoning cannot be made conclusive; it is of the "orectic" kind; and yet it is capable of statement as a positive intellectual argument, not as an appeal to equality of possibilities between which choice must be made by the "practical reason." After all, if we do not admit that "anything can cause anything," the existence of absolute norms in ourselves, never fully realised, is most rationally explicable by the supremacy of these in the whole. We do not see them fully realised in the visible world any more than in ourselves; but we have already arrived by intellectual arguments, not by appeal to desires and hopes, at the conviction that the visible world is only a partial manifestation of reality. Thus to suppose the norms of Truth, Beauty and Goodness completely realised in the whole system as unfolded in all time would enable us to regard it as coherent in a way that we cannot without this supposition.

to him to lead. Helvétius, he finds, was no isolated eccentric thinker, but represented the French eighteenth century by two characteristic paradoxes; namely, the belief in "the fundamental equality of all human intelligences," and the conviction that egoism is the sole principle of the moral nature properly so-called. Thus intellectually "the French ideology" led to the most absurd exaggerations on the unlimited power of education, but did contribute by this to direct the public attention towards its development. On the moral side, he admits that the Germans were right in their criticism; but utters a warning, which has turned out only too prophetic, on the exaltation of the autonomous self and its principle of pure "duty" by the disciples of Kant and Fichte. "Sous le point de vue moral principalement, tandis que les uns tendent involontairement à réduire toutes les relations sociales à d'ignobles coalitions d'intérêts privés, les autres sont entraînés, à leur insu, à organiser une sorte de mystification universelle, où la prétendue disposition permanente de chacun à diriger exclusivement sa conduite d'après l'idée abstraite du devoir, aboutirait finalement à l'exploitation de l'espèce par un petit nombre d'habiles charlatans."

¹ Without the intellectual lines drawn in the European mind by Kant's treatment of the Moral Law and of Beauty as having alike an aspect in which their apprehension is disinterested and claims universal validity, the specialised devotion to Art as an idea, seen in Baudelaire, Flaubert and Leconte de Lisle—to take the most characteristic examples—would not have been possible. It is not an accident that the saying is found in Baudelaire's note-book: "L'enthousiasme qui s'applique à autre chose que les abstractions est un signe de faiblesse et de maladie."

71. For the realisation of justice postulated in the cosmos, we have been left with the possibilities implied in a doctrine of individual, and at its higher phases personal, immortality, resembling that of Plato and the Indians, but with differences introduced by modern evolution. There is for our theory progress in the successive manifestations of souls as in the evolution of the universe. The ancient Orphic idea of a Fall, even as preserved by Kant, is abandoned. The whole process, beginning with the Gulf and the Night (as Victor Hugo would have expressed it) for the first necessary manifestations of Being, is accepted, not as something that ought not to have been, a fault to be repaired, as in the systems of modern pessimism, but in Bruno's phrase, as an evocation of higher and higher forms "to the sound of the lyre of the universal Apollo." The optimism of the doctrine is that of Heraclitus, who declared strife to be the basis of the universal harmony. And clearly if individual beings are permanent, the formidable waste and destruction of the struggle, since it does not touch their essence, no longer compels us to regard the whole as finally and irreconcilably indifferent to the justice or injustice of their fate. But will the strife of the world go on for ever, with only pauses or respites for individual souls, as the Greek theodicy, from Heraclitus to Plotinus and Proclus, uniformly supposed? Or is there to be some final transformation of the universe, as in the systems of the Persians, the Gnostics, John Scotus Erigena, and some modern philosophers?

72. The ground for the latter view is on the one side the unthinkableness of infinite progress, and on the other side determinism; and these, in relation to our problem, amount to the same thing. If we are to suppose in the Reality of the Universe something analogous to knowledge of the whole future, the future must clearly be finite. To suppose it without limit would be to hold that the Thought of the Absolute is analogous to the indefinite power of calculating to any assigned point, as in the mind of a highly-trained mathematician, rather than to that ideally complete intuitive knowledge which philosophers like Plotinus and Spinoza have conceived beyond "discursive" thinking. As the Greeks held all change to be cyclical, this difficulty did not exist for them. When we have given up the doctrine of everlastingly recurrent cycles, we are, I think, brought to this "apocalyptic" conclusion; unless, with Renouvier and apparently Bergson, we regard the future as from its nature imprevisible. But in that case it is subject to absolute chance, and capable of indefinite lapses, so that at any point all may have to begin over again. Renouvier, indeed, logically admitted this,¹

¹ So did Shelley at the end of his apocalypse in the *Prometheus Unbound*, where the possibility is very distinctly declared that

with infirm hand, Eternity,
Mother of many acts and hours, should free
The serpent that would clasp her with his length.

entirely declined to accept the modern popular notion that progress can go on without limit, and thought that the good sense of the ancients had preserved them from this delusion. So far we may agree: but when, on the ground of certain common admissions, we are brought to the decision between Chance¹ and Necessity, I accept Necessity. This means, according to the postulates adopted, that the universe as changing will give place to a timeless order, in which we must suppose, as Erigena did, that all individual existences, in returning to be consciously harmonious parts of the whole, are more themselves and not less than when they were apparently separated in the order of space and time. The only alternative to this as the final end would be that evil wills have by primordial necessity the permanent function of breaking up the Sphairos (as Empedocles called the world held together by Love) and destroying the state of paradisaal repose attained for a moment, so that interest in the process shall never cease.

¹ What can be urged in favour of an element of ultimate Chance has been extremely well put by Mr. Belfort Bax in his most recent metaphysical work, *The Real, the Rational and the Alogical* (1920).

APPENDIX

I. A NOTE ON THE ELEATICS

THAT there was a theology behind the teaching of the Eleatics (as also of Heraclitus) is the view of Diels; who holds, with regard to Parmenides in particular, that the Neo-Platonic commentators, if we allow for some shades of expression, did not interpret him unhistorically. Tannery and Prof. Burnet, on the other hand, treat his thought as altogether physical in its reference.

One concession must certainly be made to them, *viz.*, that the Eleatic Being (or "that which is") did not mean, as the Neo-Platonists supposed, a primarily mental reality. The notion of a reality to be defined as primarily mental arose historically with the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Even Anaxagoras, though he tried, did not succeed in formulating it; his *νοῦς* becoming, in application, only another physical agent to distribute the elements of the world.

The true state of the case, I think, is explicable with the aid of a view that I have put forward elsewhere.¹

Xenophanes, traditionally credited with the foundation of the Eleatic school, was, according to this view, not the initiator of monotheistic theology that he is usually supposed to have been; but he was much more than the "humoristic poet" of Tannery. Though not in the full sense a philosophic thinker, he was a serious teacher. The source of his doctrine was the generalised monotheism, then becoming cosmopolitan, that had emerged as the last result of the speculative theology of Egyptian and Babylonian priests. After a millennial existence as the doctrine of a higher caste in the old polytheistic civilisations, it was liberated by the collapse or decay of the ancient empires. Taken up by the reforming priesthoods of peoples without any very elaborate inherited system, it became the central idea of the revolutionary "revealed religions" of Persia and Judæa. But these developments were divergent both from one another and from philosophy; and we are concerned at present with the history of philosophy, not of religion. Now the thing done by Xenophanes was to throw the monotheistic idea directly into Greek philosophy, hitherto purely cosmological and knowing no theology but that of the poets, which it rejected. Xenophanes made the rejection more vehement, and, explicitly denying the many

¹ See *Priests, Philosophers and Prophets*, chap. iii.

gods of mythology, became, as Aristotle put it, "the first partisan of the One."¹ He was at the same time, in succession to the earlier thinkers of Ionia, a scientific naturalist or physicist, and his monotheism is not clearly distinguishable from a pantheism for which the world is the one god. This means that he was an eclectic, not a true founder in philosophy.² The true founder of Eleaticism as a distinctive doctrine was, as Tannery and Burnet have shown, Parmenides, whose philosophic successors were Zeno and Melissus. But the initiating impulse came from Xenophanes.

The problem of Parmenides was to state the doctrine that reality is One, in rigorous philosophical form. Xenophanes, writing in the gnostic manner of the traditional "wise man," did not furnish him with the means of doing this. To do it, he had to invent the beginnings of the dialectic elaborated by his disciple Zeno. His appeal was to thought, to rational argument, even against what seemed the evidence of the senses. He definitely maintained that only that which can be rationally thought is truly real. He did not assert, as was once supposed, that Thought is Being; though a logical deduction from his position would be that "that which is," when there is the thought of it, thinks itself. The Neo-Platonists, in interpreting the doctrine, only went beyond it in incorporating with it this logical inference. Even then, they did not pretend that the whole of their own doctrine had been stated by Parmenides. They quite recognised that, whatever else might be in his mind, he explicitly dealt only with the being of the world; that the notion of the primal One without predicates, stated as the first "hypothesis" by the Platonic Parmenides, was not to be found in the poem of Parmenides himself.

Still the doctrine, though it was not that of the Platonic and Aristotelian schools, with their basis in the direct consideration of mind by itself, has a kind of philosophico-theological character not derived from the early Ionians. No new studies have affected the general truth of the description usually given of it as a highly abstract pantheism. The reality of the world is one, in distinction from the many perceptible things that seem to compose it. Parmenides says of "that which is" that it is like the mass of a well-rounded sphere,³ not that it *is* a sphere. The essential contention is that it cannot be incomplete;⁴ and so the best comparison of it is to a sphere. A consequence of this wholeness was stated by Melissus when he argued that "that which is" cannot suffer pain or grief.⁵ This, according to the view I have

¹ Prof. Burnet's translation of *πρῶτος τούτων ἐνίσας* (Arist. *Met.*, 986 b, 21).

² As Aristotle puts it, *οὐδὲν διεσαφηνίσειεν*.

³ *εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ* (Fr. 8, 43).

⁴ *οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὼν θέμις εἶναι* (Fr. 8, 32).

⁵ Fr. 7.

taken, was no casual fancy. Melissus was reasoning in terms of the schools about something that was understood to be, in exoteric language, God.¹ Parmenides had set the example of avoiding the use of this exoteric language. The example has been largely followed by later philosophers, with the approval, definitely expressed, of Hegel; but we must recognise that the philosophers of the Eleatic school had this in common with the speculative theologians, that they supposed themselves to be talking about an ultimate reality not to be identified with any particular object of perception or even with the sum of perceptible things. This was the *εἰς θεός* of Xenophanes interpreted metaphysically.

But does not this description, it may be said, correspond equally well to that which the materialists regard as real? Prof. Burnet, indeed, has argued that Parmenides was the father of Materialism. His reality was perdurable matter as inferred by rational thought. What the ancient materialists did, from Leucippus onward, was to ascribe to their elements the characters ascribed by Parmenides to the whole.² The reply seems to be that, apart from the admittedly unrealisable abstraction of matter as bare possibility, anything material must be thought of as extended, as spread out or distributed in space, and that the search for metaphysical reality takes us beyond things definable in spatial terms. The question, then, about the Eleatics is whether they had reached this point or were on the way to it. Evidently they had not reached it, for the existence of which this can be asserted is mind, and with mind they did not directly deal. Prof. Burnet follows Aristotle, or perhaps goes a little beyond him, in not being willing to admit that they were even on the way to it. Yet if we try to preserve the degree of indeterminateness that belongs to this earliest abstract thinking, we may find something to say for another view. An argument for this view is that it enables us to understand the extremely sympathetic attitude of Plato, for whom Materialism was the enemy.

The same view will enable us to explain in its obvious sense a

¹ This is also the view of Tannery, who, however, ascribes more originality to Melissus than we need suppose if we accept, with modifications, the traditional view which makes Xenophanes the first in the Eleatic succession.

Though I wrote a short review of *Pour l'Histoire de la Science Hellène* in *Mind*, January, 1888 (O.S. xiii. 132-134), I had forgotten this point till reminded of it by Zeller (*Die Philosophie der Griechen*, I., 5th ed., p. 617, n.); or, more probably, I did not specially notice it at the time; so that I am glad to find in it a confirmation of my own historical hypothesis.

² This is no doubt true for the historical derivation, but the development was by antithesis; just as, in modern times, and in the opposite direction, the immaterialism of Berkeley sprang out of the distinction between the "primary" and the "secondary" qualities of matter, adumbrated by Democritus and formulated by his successors the new "mechanical philosophers." What the physicists said about the merely sensational character of the latter, Berkeley carried over to the former.

fragment of Melissus which has given the recent critics great trouble. In a passage taken by Simplicius to refer to "that which is," Melissus argues that it must be incorporeal.¹ Now admittedly Simplicius had the context before him; and the apparent meaning of the fragment does not agree with the directly physical interpretation of the system. Hence conjectural explanations have been attempted. Perhaps Aristotle will put us on the right track (as Prof. Burnet finds that he does in other cases) if we avoid tying down the early thinkers precisely to the distinctions of his own "first philosophy."

In one passage he blames the Eleatics for excess of rationalism and disdain of sense-perception.² He also points out that they did not in language clearly distinguish between physics and metaphysics.³ Their principles were really metaphysical, though they talked as if they could be referred to physical things.⁴ Is not this in effect to say that they mark the transition to the phase of philosophy represented by Plato and himself? He even seems to class them as the first metaphysicians.⁵ If it were permissible to insist on the very words of one phrase, we might say that he characterises them as dealing with the "essence of sensibles" as distinguished from mere "sensibles"; but this is probably too subtle an interpretation of a passing phrase.⁶

With the hints we have got, however, it now seems possible to explain the apparent differences between Parmenides and Melissus without supposing any change, as distinguished from development, of doctrine. When Melissus says that reality, or "that which is," must be unbounded as regards magnitude (*τὸ μέγεθος ἀπειρον*)⁷ his statement is not inconsistent with the declaration of Parmenides that it cannot be incomplete (*ἀτελεύτητον*).⁸ For neither the earlier nor the later philosopher is speaking of the extended world as it appears.⁹ Melissus demonstrably meant to

¹ Fr. 9, ἐν δὲ ὄν, δεῖ αὐτὸ σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν. Tannery also took the fragment in this sense.

² *De Gen. et Cor.*, i. 8, 325 a, 13: ὑπερβάντες τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ παριδόντες αὐτὴν ὡς τῷ λόγῳ δέον ἀκολουθεῖν.

³ *De Caelo*, iii. 1, 298 b, 19: τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἅττα τῶν ὄντων ἀγένητα καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητα μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἑτέρας καὶ προτέρας ἢ τῆς φυσικῆς σκέψεως.

⁴ This seems to be implied in the sentence that follows the above: ἐκεῖνοι δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴθὲν μὲν ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίαν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι, τοιούτους δὲ τινὰς νοῆσαι πρῶτοι φύσεις, εἴπερ ἔσται τις γνῶσις ἢ φρόνησις, οὕτω μετήνεγκαν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν λόγους.

⁵ They were the first (πρῶτοι) to have the thought of something ingenerable and unchangeable, finding this to be necessary if there is to be any knowledge.

⁶ Prof. Burnet, in *Early Greek Philosophy*, 2nd ed., p. 203, allows some such interpretation of the words τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίαν, but in the third edition, p. 178, he takes them more simply.

⁷ Fr. 3.

⁸ Fr. 8, 32 (see above).

⁹ To Melissus, Fr. 3, Simplicius adds the comment, μέγεθος δὲ οὐ τὸ διδαστῶν φησι (see Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 2nd ed., vol. i., p. 144).

deny that its reality is bounded by something else.¹ Parmenides meant to assert that it includes all that is. Thus if, with Simplicius, we take it that Melissus argued that that which is infinite and one must also be incorporeal, there is no difficulty about the logic of the system.² The attempt to think the reality of the world consistently, even without the subjective criticism of the later schools, has set thought on the way to metaphysics.

For Parmenides, the reality of the world is the object of true belief (*πίστις ἀληθής*). All that is clear from the scattered fragments of the second part of the poem is that the philosopher held the contemporary physicists to be dealing with untrue appearances. He himself treated these as classifiable (perhaps in terms of the Pythagorean philosophy) though false. What relation he supposed the constituents of appearance to have to reality will perhaps never be made out to everybody's satisfaction.³ Plato, however, saw what was latent in the opposition, and, in the Dialogue that bears the name of Parmenides, assigned to him, by a fictitious yet justifiable development, at once a Philosophy of the Absolute and a Transcendental Dialectic.⁴

¹ See Fr. 6, where he proves its unity from its infinity: "for if it were two, it could not be infinite; for then they would be bounded by one another" (Burnet's translation).

² When Aristotle (*Met.*, i. 5, 986 b, 18) says that Melissus seems to make his principle of unity material and therefore declares it infinite, this does not necessarily mean that he makes it corporeal; for Aristotle's own matter, which we must suppose him to have had in mind in drawing his distinction between the expressions of the doctrine of unity by Parmenides (*κατὰ τὸν λόγον*) and by Melissus (*κατὰ τὴν ὕλην*), was incorporeal. The unlimited was of course material in Aristotle's own sense, in which "matter" is opposed to "form" (cf. Zeller, I., 5th ed., p. 611, n. 3). What Melissus really said was that the formally complete must also be without boundary because it is all.

³ Aristotle (*Met.*, i. 5, 986 b, 31) seems to say that Parmenides distributed the unreal appearances into pairs of opposites, one term of the antithesis being treated as less unreal, more analogous to truth, than the other; and, in the fragments, we are presented with the antithesis of light and night.

⁴ Before Plato, who in his later Dialogues claims by implication to be the direct successor of the Eleatics, Anaxagoras had adopted the distinction adumbrated by them between appearance and reality; giving it a formulation about which there could be no mistake and applying it critically to defend his own quite different theory of reality. See Fr. 21, a, Diels: *ὅψις γὰρ ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα* (translated by Burnet, "What appears is a vision of the unseen"). For this expression he was praised by Democritus (see Sextus Empiricus as cited by Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 2nd ed., vol. i., p. 322). Thus the transition to the next phase of Greek philosophy, on the pluralistic as on the monistic side, ceases to be abrupt.

II. DE AETERNITATE MUNDI

LE RUNOÏA.

Tous ! venez tous, enfants de ma pensée austère,
Forces, grâces, splendeurs du ciel et de la terre ;
Dites-moi si mon cœur est près de se tarir :
Monde que j'ai conçu, dis-moi s'il faut mourir !

L'ENFANT.

Les fleuves et les monts n'entendent plus ta voix ;
Tout l'univers, aveugle et stupide à la fois,
Roule comme un cadavre aux steppes de l'espace.
J'ai pris l'âme du monde, et sa force et sa grâce ;
Et pour l'homme et pour toi, triste et vieux dans ta tour,
La nature divine est morte sans retour.

Leconte de Lisle, *Poèmes Barbares*.

By one of those coincidences which from time to time mark the destiny of the world, it was exactly in the year 529 of the Christian era, memorable as the date at which the new faith, by the hand of Justinian, finally struck with its "mace petrific" the still surviving school of Plato at Athens, that Joannes called Philoponus, the grammarian of Alexandria, was replying to the arguments put into form by the last great teacher of that school against the Christian doctrine of creation. This we know from a reference in the treatise itself, which bears the title *De Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum*.¹ Thus the date of Philoponus himself also has been correctly fixed. He had formerly been supposed to be still living in the seventh century, on no better ground than the mixing up of his name in a legendary story connected with the fable about the burning of the Alexandrian Library by the Caliph Omar.² It is not known to whom the actual title is due. The

¹ The date is fixed by a reference to the position of the planets in the 245th year of Diocletian (that is, from his accession), mentioned because it is contemporary (ἐφ' ἡμῶν). This gives in our reckoning, 284 + 245 = 529. See *De Aeternitate Mundi*, xvi. 4; ed. Rabe (1899), p. 579, 14.

² See the editorial preface to another work of his, *De Opificio Mundi* (Libri vii. rec. G. Reichardt, 1897). This is a treatise on the creation of the world according to Moses. I have merely looked into it; but I have made out a point of some interest in relation to the present exposition; viz., that the days of creation in the Book of Genesis gave him some trouble, and that he would have liked to say—as John Scotus Erigena said afterwards—that they were mythical and that the world was created all at once. This doctrine of instantaneous creation he holds to be that of the *Timaeus*: see *De Aeternitate Mundi*, xiv. It was ostensibly the doctrine of Descartes, who treats his own theory of the origin of the world as mere hypothesis for the sake of clear exposition of its order: see *Principia Philosophiae*, Part iii., §§ 44, 45.

treatise might equally well have been entitled *De Divinitate Mundi*; for the attack is directed essentially against the pantheistic implications of Neo-Platonism as stated by Proclus. Formally, however, the argument concerns the question whether the world began, as was the Judæo-Christian doctrine, or had existed without limit in past time, as was the doctrine of "the Greeks." The reply is carried through not without considerable ability, from a philosophical position which is already a sort of Christian Aristotelianism. Besides this it offers a critical interest in the attempt of Philoponus to find support for his interpretation of Plato's *Timæus* as largely agreeing with his own theological dogma. For the sake of philosophical readers who may wish to know the outlines of the controversy but have no special reason for going through it all, I proceed to give a brief account of a long book. I shall take the eighteen heads of the argument in their order. At the beginning and the end the manuscript is imperfect; but little can be wanting to the completeness of the statement on both sides.

I. The first argument of Proclus, we infer from the reply, was that the numerability of past events is incompatible with the infinity of the divine power (admitted on both sides). That there should have been a limit of time before which power did not issue in act would mean an impotence to produce. To this Philoponus replies that, since Proclus and his school admit the infinity of the divine power to be not incompatible with the production of a finite world in space, they have no ground of logic for objecting to limitation of the number of events in past time. In his own view, both limitations can be established by formal reasoning; as he tries to show by an inference from Aristotle's position regarding infinity which Aristotle himself did not draw.¹ From the nature of the time-process, past events cannot be without limit; for this would involve an infinite in act (*ἄπειρον ἐνεργείᾳ*), which, as Aristotle has shown, is impossible. The Neo-Platonists followed Aristotle in applying this to co-existent things, but, with him also, did not allow that it applied to successive events in time. Philoponus applies it to both; concluding that the universe is both finite in space and has existed during a finite past time, while yet the creative power of God is infinite. The cause is not in the impotence or want of good will of the Demiurgus, but in the very nature of things that come to be.²

Fundamentally this is what Philoponus has to say on the question of infinity. We now come to the question about the

¹ Aquinas afterwards, being a stricter Aristotelian in philosophy, refused to draw this inference; placing the limitation of the series of events in the past not on the ground of demonstration but of revelation.

² i. 3, pp. 8, 9 (Rabe): ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πλείονα ἢ ἄπειρα δημιουργεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑποστῆναι τὸ ἄπειρον συμβαίνει, οὕτω φημι καὶ τὸν κόσμον μὴ δύνασθαι ἐξ αἰδίου τῷ θεῷ συνυπάρχειν, ἵνα μὴ πάλιν κατ' ἐνέργειαν δώμεν τὸ ἄπειρον ὑφίστασθαι καὶ διεξιτητὸν ποιήσωμεν τὸ ἄπειρον.

divinity of the world, then associated with its infinite duration, as for Bruno afterwards it was more especially associated with its infinite extent. In arguing for the absence of limits to production alike in the past and in the future, Proclus had used the comparison, familiar in the Neo-Platonic school from Plotinus onward, between the relation of its Cause to the world and of the sun to its light. Philoponus expressly refuses to allow this comparison, on the ground that it would make the universe a part or complement of the divine substance, whereas all things that were made are foreign to this.¹ There follows a discussion on the meaning of the word "cause," which according to Philoponus ought only to be applied to something antecedent in time. The Neo-Platonic usage was to apply the terms cause and effect also to reality and manifestation; as indeed Kant did afterwards even when he had explicitly drawn the distinction. We may give Philoponus credit for trying to restrict *cause* to that which has become its scientific sense; but at the same time it must be noted that he is thus preparing for the introduction of miracle into the causal series, whereas the philosophic view of his antagonists leaves no place for miracle.

II. The second argument depends entirely on the Platonic theory of Ideas. It is the eternal essence of these, says Proclus, to be patterns: hence that of which they are the patterns must always exist; otherwise they would not be that which their definition declares them to be. The reply of Philoponus amounts to this: that the thought of a thing to be created can exist in the mind of the Creator before the thing itself is made.

III. For Proclus on the contrary Creator and created are necessary correlatives. If that which is created does not exist in act, then it follows that that which creates does not exist in act.² Unless the creator is always a creator in act, he needs another creator to make him pass from the possibility to the actuality of creating, and so to infinity. This is on Aristotelian principles, according to which a merely potential existence cannot come first. Philoponus simply denies the implication on the ground of anthropomorphic theism: creation is an act of will, not a necessary production of the world by that which has the power to produce it.³ That which creates may already exist as an actuality, though not as creator of the thing in question, that is, the world.

¹ i. 6, p. 17, 4 ff.: ὥστε, εἰ μὲν τις καὶ τὸν κόσμον συμπληρωτικὸν εἶναι λέγοι τῆς τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οὐσίας, συγχωρήσωμεν οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν τὸν κόσμον, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ φῶς. . . . εἰ δὲ ζένα καὶ ἀλλότρια τῆς θείας οὐσίας πάντα τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῆς δημιουργικῶς παρηγμένα, οὐκ ἄρα, ὡς ἔχει τὸ ἐν ἡλίῳ φῶς πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον, οὕτως ἔχει πρὸς τὸν δημιουργὸν ὁ κόσμος.

² iii. 5, p. 50, 7: 'εἰ δὲ τὸ δημιουργούμενον,' φησὶν, 'μὴ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ᾗ, οὐδὲ τὸ δημιουργὸν ἔσται κατ' ἐνέργειαν.'

³ Will, power and act, said Julian and afterwards Bruno, are identical in God; thus effacing the limits of pantheism and theism.

IV. On Aristotelian principles again Proclus argues that the unmoved must create always or not at all. This of course is a transference to a non-Aristotelian conception; for Aristotle himself did not say that the unmoved mover creates (*ποιεῖ*), but only that it gives motion to the world. Philoponus does not point out this, which indeed would not have contributed to his case; for creation being supposed, the application is evidently quite logical. What he does is to accuse Proclus of deliberate sophistry for the subversion of "the truth." He undoubtedly shows with some acuteness that principles of Aristotle and Plotinus might be interpreted so as to allow a beginning of the world; but he knew that they themselves did not admit this any more than Proclus, whose own principles indeed he could sometimes interpret in the same way; so that the charge of sophistry recoils. On the merits of the case, the arguments may be stated thus. According to Proclus, creation from a point of time would mean that the unmoved is moved to change, and this would imply imperfection and want. To this the most interesting replies of Philoponus are: that to the eternally self-contemplative life of God, which as conceived by Aristotle is all-sufficient, the change in changing things makes no difference; and that, according to Plotinus, it is in virtue of foreknowledge that God is eternally perfect, the eventual coming to be of the things foreknown adding nothing to perfection. To give only this generalised statement is, however, to do Philoponus something more than justice. He is not a philosopher aiming at a consistency of his own, but a theologian with shifting positions, contented if he can make a formal reply on each point as it comes. And he shows how little his thought is at the level of Aristotle or Plotinus by comparing the mind of God to a human mind with a formed habitude (*ἐξίς*) of doing certain work, which habitude is always there whether work of the kind is being done or not. Again there is the denial, than which nothing could be more opposed to their spirit, that the world has any divinity whatever. For him it has become a purely external and, as we shall see later, mechanical thing.¹

V. Under the next head, Philoponus makes his best dialectical point. Proclus has tried to show by pure logic the necessity that time, and therefore the universe, the motion of which it measures, should always have been and should always be. Against this Philoponus maintains that the argument for the necessity is only verbal. By those who hold that there was a beginning and will be an end of the universe and of time, a more accurate expression can if required be substituted for verbally contradictory assertions such as "Time was when time was not," or "A time will be when time shall not be." The more accurate

¹ iv. 12, p. 85, 6: *ἔξω γὰρ παντελῶς τῆς θείας οὐσίας πάντα τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῆς δημιουργικῶς παρηγγμένα καὶ πάσης οὐσιώδους σχέσεως τῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡλλοτρίωται.*

expression is that eternity (αἰών) was when time was not, and will be when time shall no longer be.¹

VI. The next section of the treatise is extensive and complex, dealing with the argument of Proclus both by itself and in relation to the question whether it is rightly grounded on Plato. It is impossible, says Proclus, that the world should be dissolved; for it cannot be dissolved except by the Demiurge, and he who formed it will not dissolve it, because, as Plato says, only an evil being would have the will to destroy a beautiful work. And if the whole is indissoluble, it follows that it is not a thing generated from a point of time, but has always existed. Philoponus recognises that in maintaining the dissolubility of the world he is opposing Plato as well as Proclus; but on the question as to the beginning he contends that Plato is with him. Nor was Plato, in asserting a beginning of the world but denying that it would ever be dissolved, illogical, as his successors insist that he must have been if he combined the two positions. Plato's assertion, however, that to destroy a beautiful work like the universe would be the sign of an evil will, is false and absurd. To think him that destroys it evil should visible beauty be dissolved is fit only for boys and those that gape at things perceptible.²

It scarcely needs mention that Plato and the Neo-Platonists did not in their admiration of the visible world ignore intellectual beauty, the expression itself being indeed traceable to Platonism as its philosophical source; and it cannot be said that the detailed arguments here repay the labour of following them. The best point made is perhaps from the polemic of Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias against the position that the world had a beginning, taken along with their insistence that that was really the meaning of Plato.³ On the other hand, this same polemic also contributes to show that the school of Plato from the first, and not merely the Neo-Platonic school, always repudiated the literal interpretation of what is said about creation in the *Timaeus*. Philoponus, in upholding that interpretation, presents us both here and in many other passages with a singular example of a naked logical fallacy parading itself unashamed, when he reasons from the generability and destructibility of all the elements by transformation into one another (as taught by Plato) that the whole which is composed of them must also be generable and destructible (γενητόν καὶ φθαρτόν).⁴ That he attributed to

¹ Eternity is of course for the Neo-Platonists also the form of the divine life in itself. What they affirm and Philoponus denies is that eternal being must necessarily manifest itself in perpetual becoming.

² vi. 4, p. 131, 13: μειρακίων γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεκηνότων, εἰ τὸ δρώμενον λυθείη κάλλος, κακὸν ἤδη διὰ τοῦτο τὸν λύνοντα οἶσθαι.

³ vi. 27.

⁴ vi. 25. Cf. vi. 29, p. 236, 21: οὐδὲ τὰ μέρη φθοραῖς καὶ ἀλλοιώσεσιν ὑποπέπτωκεν, τούτου καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑποκείσθαι ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ὅλον οὐδὲν ἑτερόν ἐστιν ἢ πάντα τὰ μέρη. The fallacy is not even original, but was one

Plato knowledge of the Hebrew Scriptures and even of the Book of Wisdom is of course not singular when we consider what kind of philological science he inherited from the patristic tradition.

VII. The argument of Proclus that comes next is conveniently summarised by Philoponus as follows: "Since the soul of the whole is by its very essence and not by an act of choice (*αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι καὶ οὐ προαιρετικῶς*) self-moved and the principle of motion, and since it is eternal, the whole must also be moved by it eternally; or, if the whole were not moved by it eternally because the world is not eternal, neither would the soul of the world be eternal: for it is the principle of motion by its very essence."¹ The reply is long, dealing much with subordinate hypotheses about the permanent vehicle of particular souls, but comes to a head in the counter-assertion that it is derogatory to the soul of the whole to suppose it to move the world without voluntary choice, whereas the souls of the parts move their bodies at will (*καθ' ὁρμὴν καὶ προαίρεσιν*).²

VIII. Thence the controversy proceeds to a discussion less circumstantial but more interesting in so far as it suggests from the metaphysical side the modern physical notion of "entropy." If everything that is destroyed is destroyed by something alien, then, says Proclus, since there is nothing alien outside the whole, the whole cannot be destroyed. Consequently (as he infers again) it did not begin to be. But, Philoponus replies, Proclus himself has shown elsewhere that the world, not being, like its cause, of infinite power, continues in process by the power of the higher cause. This withdrawn, it would run down by its intrinsic weakness. Of course Proclus denied any but a hypothetical possibility that the metaphysical cause, which is reality, could be withdrawn from the world which is its manifestation; but undoubtedly, in a quotation given from him, this hypothetical possibility is stated in a form resembling the modern physical doctrine. The whole, he says, if considered in abstraction as finite, and therefore of finite power apart from its cause, would, if left to itself, arrive at a cessation of motion.³ Similarly those modern physicists who accept the second law of thermodynamics, *viz.*, the law of the dissipation or degradation of energy, as a law valid for the universe regarded as a closed system, say that its energy, though constant as a measurable quantity, according to the first law, or law of conservation, necessarily runs down from molar motion to the "unavailable" form of heat. And this lowest stage of energy, much as in some ancient interpreta-

of the Stoic arguments, not indeed for the final end of the universe but for the end of each successive world. See Diog. Laert. vii. 141: τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου φθαρτά· εἰς ἀλλήλα γὰρ μεταβάλλει· φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ κόσμος.

¹ vii. 1, p. 247, 9.

² vii. 7, p. 260, 22.

³ viii. 1, p. 299, 12: ὥστ' ἐὰν τῷ λόγῳ χωρίσθης ἐκείνου [i.e., τοῦ ἀκινήτου αἰτίου] τὸ πᾶν, οὐ κινήσεται εἰς ἀπειρον οὐκ ἔχον δύναμιν ἀπειρον, ἀλλ' ἐξεῖ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι παύλαν.

tions of the Anaxagorean or Platonic chaos on which Mind imposes order, is conceived as a kind of random motion of particles; from which the orderly motion of masses cannot be restored except by a mind that has power to control the movements of its molecules in detail. This controversy at the end of the ancient world may be of use if it reminds us that such conclusions are purely abstract and quite inapplicable without reference to a metaphysical theory of the universe which does not of itself emerge from them. For Philoponus the last word is an arbitrary Will that has been revealed: for Proclus it is Intellect which man has some power to search out; and this and not their hypothetical physics decides the question as to the origin and destiny of the universe on one side or the other. We need not rest in the actual conclusions of Proclus any more than of Philoponus, since there may be other possibilities of thought; but it is well to know what the possibilities seemed to be after a long process of pure thinking.

IX. In attempting to refute the last argument of Proclus from his own positions, Philoponus apparently did not notice the hypothetical form of its statement. The position laid down by Proclus not hypothetically but positively is that of Plato: everything that is destroyed is destroyed by its own defect (*κακία*). The universe then being, as Plato said, divine and perfect, there is nothing that can destroy it; neither is there—also on Platonic principles—anything out of which it could be generated; consequently it has not been generated at all, for nothing can come from nothing. Apart from some discussion on Plato which must be dealt with next, the reply of Philoponus is a flat denial of "the boasted axiom, as they themselves would call it, of the Greeks, that everything which comes to be comes from some being." The truth, he says, is, on the contrary, that everything which comes to be comes from nothing, and that everything which is destroyed is destroyed into nothing.¹ With this position, as we shall see shortly, he combines a kind of materialism, or corporealism, of the most mechanical type. What is permanent in the world is matter, the only proper meaning of which is extended body; this has been created from nothing by an act of divine volition, and will be destroyed so as to disappear into nothing; and it is wholly outside the divine nature.

Before coming to the point, however, he sets himself to show that Plato could err, not only in science but in ethics; bringing out at considerable length all that is implied in the community

¹ ix. 17, p. 380, 10. In the language of the patristic tradition, "the Greeks" are opposed to "us"—the Jews and Christians. To "Hellenise" was to follow the tradition of Greek philosophy; and this, by the decree of Justinian against the schools, was henceforth forbidden. It is historically recorded that in 528, the year before the final decree, there was "a great persecution of the Greeks" (*διωγμὸς Ἑλλήνων μέγας*) in which many perished. See Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, iii. 2, 3rd ed., p. 849, n. 4.

of women in the *Republic*. It is noteworthy that he appeals not to the Christian books but to Homer against the destruction of family affection by the logical application of communistic principles. Next he maintains that Plato, in declaring the world divine, was accommodating himself to the prejudices of the Athenian demos in order to avoid the fate of Socrates. It cannot be divine on Platonic principles; for according to Plato's physical philosophy all its constituent parts begin, change and perish through transformations into one another, and this is incompatible with the nature of a god. Therefore (with a repetition of the argument of which he never seems to tire), it must also itself have a beginning and an end.¹

The creation in the beginning, and the final destruction, of matter is for Philoponus a dogma and is put forward as such. In his view extended body is indestructible while the world lasts. What he undertakes to show in this section is that the forms realised in matter (ένυλα εἶδη) simply appear and disappear.² For him as for the materialistic schools they are in no sense permanent, and he sets aside the distinction between existence potential and actual (δυνάμει and ἐνεργείᾳ) by which Proclus tried to show how for the "forms" of things as for matter and the elements there is no real generation or destruction. His arguments amount to a refusal to go behind obvious appearances. Proclus, on the other hand, starts a subtle distinction which I think must always recur if we take seriously the ontological question raised. It is only the embodiment of forms, in his view, that begins and ends. The forms begin and cease to be manifested instantaneously, while the fitness in the world for their manifestation arrives and departs by continuous stages. Thus they cannot be said to be either generated or destroyed, since as forms, though not as manifested forms, they exist always.³

¹ ix. 5, p. 335, 23: καὶ γὰρ ἄλογον τῶν στοιχείων, ἐξ ὧν τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, γενητῶν ὄντων καὶ φθαρτῶν μὴ τὸ ἐκ τούτων συγκεκριμένον γενητὸν εἶναι καὶ φθαρτὸν, ὡς ἀκριβέστερον ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἀπεδείξαμεν.

² ix. 11, p. 359, 11: λείπεται ἄρα εἰς τὸ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὃν πάντα τὰ ένυλα εἶδη τῶν σωμάτων φθειρομένων μετὰστασαι. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὄντος τὴν γένεσιν εἴληφεν.

³ ix. 12. Philoponus does not apply his negative position on the forms manifested in matter to souls. Incidentally and for the sake of illustration he quotes as from "the more ancient writers" an argument founded on the indivisibility of the individual soul in disproof of the notion that it arises by splitting off from a certain "totality of souls" (ix. 11, p. 354, 17): ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τις ψυχῶν ὁλότης, ἐξ ἧς κατὰ ἀπομερισμὸν αἱ ἡμέτεροι ψυχαὶ γίνονται· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐκ ἀμερεῖς ἀλλὰ μεριστὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι συνέβαιεν τὰς ἰδίας ἀποτεμνομένας ὁλότητας. For once I have ventured to make a philological emendation—which, however, consists only in the deletion of a comma and the restoration of the manuscript reading (given in a footnote in Rabe's edition) against the correction of Kroll, who makes the last clause read thus: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐκ ἀμερεῖς ἀλλὰ μεριστὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι συνέβαιεν, τῆς ἰδίας ἀποτεμνομένας ὁλότητος. There does not seem to be any point in an argument that the souls themselves would not be indivisible, being

X. The next section, which is short, is so involved in the terminology of the Aristotelian physics—opposition of rectilinear motion and motion in a circle, position according to the nature of a body and contrary to its nature—that its interest is almost wholly antiquarian. There is, however, a point of contact with modern scientific thought in the argument of Proclus, when he infers from the continuity of the natural order that the cosmos cannot have had its beginning in a chaos, though the mere words of Plato in the *Timaeus* would seem to make this its origin: hence it was eternally an ordered whole, having only temporal differences of configuration not incompatible with this character.¹ In relation to the question itself as distinguished from the Platonic hypothesis Philoponus looks upon this as indifferent: “for the word of truth supposes the world to have come to birth out of that which has no being whatsoever,”² and therefore neither out of a preceding chaos nor cosmos.

XI. This description might have seemed to be for the rougher thinking of Philoponus, as distinguished from the finer tissue of the Neo-Platonic thought, sufficiently applicable to the merely potential “matter” of Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists, which for Proclus as for his school is identical with Plato’s “not-being,” the “receptacle of generation” in the *Timaeus*. It is not, however, an absolute nothing; and that alone will satisfy the Judæo-Christian dogma. We soon perceive, indeed, that concession would have been fatal; for Proclus goes on to infer anew from the theory of matter in this sense the eternity of an ordered world. If matter came from nothing, then its relation to an end—namely, the birth of particular things in it—would be by chance and not by necessity. From the necessity of this relation he deduces the coexistence for everlasting time of matter and birth.³ Besides, the “first matter” is not matter unless the forms of which it is the matter find in it their means of manifestation; and so again the succession of manifested forms must be without limit of time. Philoponus, therefore, although in general following Aristotle, rejects the whole theory, reverting to the “corporealist” position of the Stoics.

For him “the last subject and the first matter” (τὸ ἔσχατον

divided from the totality to which they belong. The objection to the theory that they are thus the result of a segregation or differentiation must be (as in the restored reading) that the particular totalities divided off would be themselves, on the model of the totality from which they were divided, not indivisible but divisible.

¹ x. p. 382, 13: καθόσον ἄρα κόσμος ἐστίν, αἰδιός ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ μόνον, εἴπερ ἄρα, οὐκ αἰεὶ ἐστίν. μετασχηματιζόμενον οὖν ἔσται τὸ πᾶν, αἰεὶ δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

² x. 7, p. 400, 12: ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ μηδαμῶς ὄντος γεγονέναι τὸν κόσμον ὁ ἀληθὺς ὑποτίθεται λόγος.

³ xi. p. 404, 4: σύμειπται ἄρα ἀλλήλοις τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον ἢ τε ὕλη καὶ ἡ γένεσις, ὡς τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ ἕνεκά του.

ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἡ πρώτη ὕλη) is body without quality (τὸ ἀποιον σῶμα) extended in three dimensions (τριχῇ διαστατόν). This he holds to have as such an absolute, not a merely relative, existence.¹ It is not, however, as in the theories of Democritus and Epicurus and of modern atomists, of constant volume. The modification as regards magnitude is an additional determination not affecting its essence as body.² Of this determination he has no account to give except that upon the extended bulk considered as indefinite "the great and small" (τὸ μέγα τε καὶ μικρόν) supervenes. The modification of volume, of course, can only be within certain limits;³ for otherwise corporeal matter might shrink to a point or expand to infinity, and so we should be confronted again with incorporeal being or not-being. There is no necessity that it should be eternal: on the contrary, since the world had a beginning, we must infer that the existence of matter also had a beginning.⁴

Against any speculative construction of corporeal matter such as the Neo-Platonists attempted, Philoponus asks how from two incorporeals, namely, formless matter and ideas, extended body can be composed.⁵ The reply we might make on behalf of them is that their theory was a metaphysical and not a physical construction. The world of juxtaposed bodies is regarded as a world of appearance, of which space is the external form: its ultimate explanation for thought must be found in the unextended. And for them incorporeal "matter" has become not unlike subjective space, within which as manifestation of the "forms" constituting reality those groupings of perceptions are ordered into which the idealist resolves the external world. This is doubtless a slightly modernised statement; although essentially they were already at the point of view of modern idealism. Anti-metaphysical mechanicians will probably find here a reason for sympathising with Philoponus, whose materialism within the limits of the knowable may seem to them to compensate for a little arbitrary theology.

XII. In the next section, the argument of Proclus, founded still on the Neo-Platonic theory of matter, is that when everything, both matter and the active cause, is ready for the production of the world, it must be produced: since these conditions are always fulfilled—for if not there would not be a world now—there is no

¹ xi. 4, p. 420, 3: τὸ δὲ τριχῇ διαστατόν, ἢ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν τῶν πρὸς τι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἄλλα παραθέσει τριχῇ διαστατά ἐστιν τὰ σώματα, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀποκλεισμένως ἕκαστον.

² xi. 6.

³ xi. 8, p. 430, 23: μέχρι τινὸς ὠρισμένου ὅγκου ἡ διαστολή καὶ μάνωσις ἐκάστου μεγέθους γίνεται.

⁴ xi. 15.

⁵ xi. 8, p. 443, 22: πῶς δὲ ἀσώματων ἀσωμάτων συντιθέμενον μέγεθος ποιεῖ καὶ σῶμα;

limit to the existence of the world in the past or in the future.¹ Amid much logomachy, Philoponus recalls from the first section the one possible reply; namely, that the nature of things themselves that come to be in time does not permit of their existence without limit in the past.²

XIII. We come now to a point of physics where the Neo-Platonist is Aristotelian, while the Aristotelian deserts what he acknowledges to be Aristotle's own position for that which the Neo-Platonic commentators derived from Plato. The discussion, though not contributing much to the subject, is of some historical interest. Proclus endeavours to prove that Plato recognised among the constituents of the world the equivalent of Aristotle's fifth element, since he exempts the heavenly bodies from every kind of change except motion in a circle. This element being throughout unalterable, as are also the total quantities of all the elements, then, since the whole world consisting of these cannot be inferior to any of its parts, it must on Platonic principles be ingenerable and incorruptible. This last conclusion Philoponus contests on its merits by a variety of arguments; among which recurs his favourite piece of reasoning, that, since all the parts or elements of the world are perishable, arising out of one another and passing into one another but ceasing as such to be, therefore the whole is perishable and consequently had a beginning.³ As an affair of exegesis, he will not allow that Plato recognised any but the ordinary four elements. It is fire, and not the supposed fifth element, that the *Timaeus* makes the chief (not sole) constituent of the heavenly bodies. On the historical question, he is able to cite in his favour not only Plotinus and Porphyry but (from another work) Proclus himself. In the passage cited, Proclus, describing the celestial element as fire though of a peculiar kind,⁴ follows Plotinus as against Aristotle. It may be of interest to note that Philoponus anticipates (perhaps after some other commentator) the modern conjecture that in his later dialogues Plato replied to objections raised by Aristotle while still his pupil.⁵ The four elements, he contends, are spoken of in a way that seems definitely intended to bar out the notion of a fifth.

XIV. Continuing his Platonic exegesis, Proclus argues against the supposition that the chaos of random movement set in order by the Demiurge in the *Timaeus* is to be interpreted as referring to a stage in a temporal process. The chaos is a figurative expression for the Platonic "matter." Now Matter, the traces (ἵχνη) of Ideas, and the cosmic order (τάξις) always coexist:

¹ xii. p. 466, 22: τὸν αἰὲν ἔρα χρόνον καὶ τὸ δημιουργοῦν ποιεῖ καὶ ἡ ὕλη κοσμεῖται καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἔστω.

² xii. 5, p. 474, 5: ὡς αὐτῇ ἡ τῶν γινόμενων φύσις τὸ ἐξ αἰδίου εἶναι οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται.

³ xiii. 10.

⁴ xiii. 15, p. 523.

⁵ xiii. 17.

they are only described as stages in a process for convenience of exposition. Philoponus on the whole raises no objection to this mode of interpretation. If Plato meant that the chaos, the imposition of order, and the ordered world, were stages in time, he admits that this would be absurd. Only he prefers the exegesis of Porphyry, who takes the chaos to signify not formless matter, but moving bodies conceived in abstraction from the divine order apart from which in reality they never exist. Where he differs is in not allowing that according to Plato even formless matter existed from eternity. Plato, he again insists, taught a beginning of the world, including all its elements, from a point of time. From the beginning, he will allow, it was an ordered world; and this satisfies all that the Neo-Platonic commentators can really sustain concerning Plato's meaning.

XV. This is further developed in reply to the next argument. Plato's declaration that the universe must resemble its eternal model in all respects requires, says Proclus, infinity of time in both directions. The resemblance to the model, replies Philoponus, is as great as possible if the universe endures through all time, from the beginning. For according to Plato time began with the world.¹

XVI. If, Proclus continues, God or the Demiurge, as is set forth in the representation of the *Timaeus*, always wills the orderly as against the disorderly, then an ordered world must always have existed without limit of time. Dialectical subtleties being omitted on both sides, the general reply of Philoponus may be stated thus: It does not follow that the will of God changes because the things willed do not always exist but come to exist in succession. Plotinus and Proclus have themselves set forth how the plural and the successive are prefigured without succession or plurality in the mind of God. Their reasoning on the providence that rules particular things is applicable to the whole. It was incompatible with the nature of a world in process that it should never have begun to be. The cosmos began when time began, as particular things begin to be when it is their time and not before.²

XVII. As we see, the argument turns more and more on questions concerning the interpretation of Plato. Against the literal understanding of the *Timaeus*, Proclus cites from other dialogues axioms in the light of which he contends that it should be read. Since Plato himself has distinctly laid down the positions "Everything that is generated is perishable" and "Everything that is ungenerated is imperishable" (*Rep.* viii. 546 A and *Phaedr.* 245 D), we must work out the logical consequences of

¹ xv. 2.

² xvi. 2, p. 568, 16: ὥστε καὶ τὸ εἶναι τὸ τεταγμένον, τουτέστιν τὸν κόσμον, αἰετῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς δύναται καὶ πέφυκεν εἶναι ἡθέλει· πέφυκεν δὲ γενετὸν γε οὐκ ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχῆς καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκης εἶναι.

these as applied to positions in the *Timaeus*. When this is done, we find that an imperishable world must necessarily be ungenerated; for if generated, it follows, according to the axiom, that it is perishable. But the created world in the *Timaeus* is said to be immortal; and immortality, according to the *Phaedo* (106 A ff.), implies indestructibility. Thus the Neo-Platonic position is not merely Aristotelian, as was said by opponents, but is also that of Plato himself.

In reply, Philoponus restates his own view about Plato's meaning. The immortality ascribed to the world in the *Timaeus* is not an imperishableness that it possesses by the law of its own nature (κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως),¹ but is conferred by the will of the Maker. And, in declaring the world imperishable after this manner, Plato is not inconsistent with himself, though he is with "the truth." If, however, the apparent doctrine of the *Timaeus* were really self-contradictory, an argument in the opposite sense would be better than that of Proclus: "Since the world is declared to have been generated, we must infer that it is not imperishable but perishable." For Plato says without qualification that it has been generated, but ascribes to it imperishableness only with the qualification that this has been bestowed.² By way of supplement, the logical character of Plato's position as Philoponus understands it is found to be recognised by Galen, who himself allows that that which has come to be may be conceived as having a kind of acquired immortality.³

XVIII. The underlying thought of Proclus was no doubt that axioms presumably intended to be scientifically understood were of more account for insight into Plato's real meaning than statements occurring in the course of a narrative; but it was not easy to give formal cogency to the argument when the narrative of the *Timaeus* was the only one dealt with. The case, therefore, had to be strengthened by comparison. On the question of exegesis, Proclus seems to have reserved his strongest point for the last. Dealing first in a cumulative proof with the material question, he argues again from the nature of the Demiurge as unchanging Being (which according to Neo-Platonism is an aspect of Mind) that the work of ordering the world must proceed always of necessity: hence the world's existence must be both from everlasting and without limit in the future.⁴ Then he goes on to show the inconsistency of those commentators who take the *Timaeus* as literal history while recognising the mythical character of the story in the *Politicus*, where it is related what happens

¹ xvii. 2, p. 594, 19.

² xvii. 3.

³ xvii. 5, p. 601, 14: κατὰ λόγον οὖν, εἰ μὲν ἀγέννητόν τι, πάντως καὶ ἀφθαρτόν, εἰ δὲ ἀφθαρτόν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγέννητον.

⁴ xviii pp. 605, 606: δεῖ δὲ αἰεὶ κοσμεῖσθαι τὸν κόσμον, εἴπερ καὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν αἰεὶ κοσμεῖν, τοῦτο δ', εἴπερ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δ', εἰ αἰεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει.

when God leaves the creation to itself and lets it run down. Both stories, Proclus urges, involve a mythological abstraction, and have for their purpose to show how the universe itself is made divine (for Plato calls the world also a god) by a divine Cause. In the *Timaeus*, an imaginary chaos is placed first, and then it is set forth how God orders it: in the *Politicus* the necessary relation of God to the world is brought out by imagining the divine agency removed from a creation described first as orderly and then as losing its order. According to Plato's real doctrine, the world always has been and always will be a divinely ordered and divine universe.¹ Whether order or disorder is placed first in time, the story is a myth for convenience of didactic exposition.

The reply of Philoponus, which is also cumulative, brings out with special clearness the difference between the points of view. For him the Platonic Demiurge is not, as for Neo-Platonism, a mythical representation of the Mind that is the principle of order in the universe, conceived as acting by a necessity that is above deliberation and choice, but a quasi-human artificer with an aptitude for making a world. Just as the builder with his formed habitude is no less a builder because at some particular time he is not building a house, so God as Creator none the less exists in actuality because he has not yet created a world.² In detail it must be allowed that Philoponus restates his best arguments very acutely. According to the Neo-Platonic view respecting the providential order of particular events, as he again shows, the giving place of these to one another in time does not presuppose a modification of the divine nature. No more, then, does the creation of a world that did not exist before a certain time. And the completed infinite of past events must be rejected as involving a formal contradiction. That there is to be an infinite future of the world is not similarly refutable (though it may not be true), since at any assignable time the series of past events will always be finite.³ Thus (as was said before) there is no logical objection to Plato's ostensible view that a world which began at a point of time in the past (which was the beginning of time) will never cease to exist.

The disorder of the world when left to itself, described in the *Politicus*, is to be conceived as a result of the confusion and turmoil inherent in it as corporeal, and not as due to the mere absence, imagined by abstraction, of divinity.⁴ Philoponus goes on to argue that Proclus himself has elsewhere adopted this interpretation, which gives the corporeal nature an intrinsic character of its own. Here it can be safely said that the interpretation favoured by his opponent is less representative of his

¹ xviii. p. 608, 16: ἡ ἀμφω οὖν θεοί, καὶ ὁ κόσμος καὶ ὁ δημιουργός, ἡ οὐδέτερος ποιήσει γὰρ οὐ θεὸν τὸν μὲν ἢ ἀταξία, τὸν δὲ τὸ μὴ ὡσαύτως.

² xviii. 2.

³ xviii. 3.

⁴ xviii. 4.

deeper philosophical view. Philoponus preferred it precisely because it seemed less expressive of the Neo-Platonic idealism than of his own doctrine which attributed to material substance, once created, an independent existence. The advantage of this, in his eyes, was that it excluded the pantheism, sometimes expressed but mostly latent, in which the Hellenic tradition began and ended.¹

It is therefore not without logical sequence that he renews his attack on the divinity of the world. In calling the universe a god, he insists, Plato was using mythological language, either out of mere compliance with custom or fearing the fate of Socrates.² Of course it is easy for him to cite not only cases of the poetical use of myths, but also irony directed against them (as in the *Timaeus*) and actual attacks on them (as in the *Republic*). It is interesting to note that he challenges the Neo-Platonic philosophers, if they take seriously the assertion that the world is divine, to accept also as having the sanction of Plato the myths about the marriages of the gods and about their descendants.³ Clearly their disbelief in popular polytheism, though it has been asserted by Christian controversialists that later Neo-Platonism was merely a systematic justification of this, must have been well understood when it could thus present itself as an obvious topic for polemical rhetoric. How Philoponus, after his long and varied disquisition on Plato's treatment of divine stories, would have dealt with the challenge of Proclus to show why the beginning of the world in the *Timaeus* should be taken more literally than the world-periods in the *Politicus*, it is impossible to say; for just at the point where his reply began, the manuscript breaks off.

¹ Berkeley, in later life, more and more discovered his affinities with the Neo-Platonists, in spite of their known anti-Christianity. The theologians of his time, on the other hand, momentarily attracted by his refutation of materialism, soon recoiled to the dualism of which Philoponus is already a good representative.

² xviii. 10; cf. ix. 4.

³ Parenthetically Philoponus himself ascribes the fables of the poets to the machinations of voluntarily fallen evil spirits aiming at the destruction of men (p. 635). In a later passage (xviii. 10, p. 644, 2) he says that Plato knew that this was their source, and for that reason dismissed them from his City: *πονηρῶν ἄρα δαιμόνων ἔργον ἐπ' ὀλέθρου τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ποιητικούς μύθους τῷ βίῳ ἡμῶν ἐπεισέγαγεν, ὅπερ καὶ Πλάτων εἰδὼς τῆς ἰδίας αὐτοὺς αὐτοῦ ἀπεκήρυξε πόλεως.*

III. SHAKESPEARE AND THE WORLD-ORDER.

THE idea of Reconciliation in Shakespearean tragedy has been stated by Professor A. C. Bradley in this form: that the only real thing in the world is the soul. For the soul's inward good the order of the world works. "And nothing outward can touch that."

This idea, he tells us (*Shakespearean Tragedy*, p. 326), he has stated, to bring it out, in a form both exaggerated and much too explicit. The same necessary reserve in any explicit statement is aptly put by Mr. J. M. Robertson when he says that in Shakespeare's later plays "we never seem to touch bottom in his thought" (*Montaigne and Shakespeare*, p. 217). One especially important qualification of too simple a view is that, as Professor Bradley observes, the evil which the moral order expels seems to be a part of it and produced by it. This may to some appear pessimistic or a concession to pessimism: it would nevertheless have been entirely accepted by a teleological optimist like Plotinus, who could have taken over without the smallest alteration the passage that follows as a description of the order of the world on one side: "Let it be granted that the system or order which shows itself omnipotent against individuals is, in the sense explained, moral. Still—at any rate for the eye of sight—the evil against which it asserts itself, and the persons whom this evil inhabits, are not really something outside the order, so that they can attack it or fail to conform to it; they are within it and a part of it. It itself produces them,—produces Iago as well as Desdemona, Iago's cruelty as well as Iago's courage. It is not poisoned, it poisons itself. Doubtless it shows by its violent reaction that the poison is poison, and that its health lies in good. But one significant fact cannot remove another, and the spectacle we witness scarcely warrants the assertion that the order is responsible for the good in Desdemona, but Iago for the evil in Iago. If we make this assertion we make it on grounds other than the facts as presented in Shakespeare's tragedies" (*Shakespearean Tragedy*, pp. 36, 37). In short, the apparent order by itself neither proves nor excludes the reconciliation.

As a further aid to the understanding of Shakespeare's thought, I proceed to discuss briefly Mr. Robertson's view as set forth in the book just referred to. To be able to take up a definite attitude to his contentions, which are of great interest, I have

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made a special study of Montaigne's *Essays* with a view to them. The result is that I agree that Shakespeare's thought was touched at innumerable points by Montaigne, but not that Montaigne's thought as a whole had quite the deep-going influence contended for by Mr. Robertson.

It is not that I underrate Montaigne's fruitfulness in suggestion, which may be compared for inexhaustibleness with Shakespeare's own. For example, in taking a few notes, I have put down things so modern as to seem contemporary or of the most recent past. Here we find the maxim for the pragmatists, that Nature is "plus jalouse de nostre action que de nostre science" (livre i. chap. 3). And here is a thought which in the latter part of the nineteenth century did duty in a hundred variations to annihilate or politely dismiss the metaphysicians: "Et certes, la philosophie n'est qu'une poésie sophistiquée. D'où tirent ses auteurs anciens toutes leurs auctoritez, que des poètes? et les premiers furent poètes eux mesmes, et la traicterent en leur art. Platon n'est qu'un poète descousu: Timon l'appelle, par injure, grand forger de miracles" (livre ii. chap. 12).¹ One saying, taken out of its context, might seem to have been written expressly for the suffragists: "Les femmes n'ont pas tort du tout, quand elles refusent les regles de vie qui sont introduictes au monde; d'autant que ce sont les hommes qui les ont faictes sans elles" (livre iii. chap. 5).² Again, the self-criticism applied to his own age could scarcely be bettered by the acutest reflection after the centuries that have passed since: Simplicity, as in the discourses of Socrates, if it had appeared as a new thing in that age, would not have been admired (livre iii. chap. 12). Matthew Arnold could not have formulated more clearly the difference between the Attic spirit and that of the Renaissance.

One thing in particular I have noted as especially favourable to Mr. Robertson's contention. It seems to me that the idea for Shakespeare's modern Hamlet, as distinguished from the Hamlet of the saga, may have been suggested by the problem raised in Montaigne's *Essay* (livre ii. chap. 20): "Nous ne goustons rien de pur." At the end appears the idea that too keen an intelligence may be a cause of inefficiency for action—a thought to which he recurs later (livre iii. chap. 8). And it is put plainly that this is a superiority, and that the superiority itself, not some resultant weakness of will, is actually, in some

¹ "And certainly, philosophy is but a sophisticated poetry. Whence do its ancient founders draw all their authorities, but from the poets? And the earliest were poets themselves, and treated of philosophy within their art. Plato is only a disconnected poet: Timon calls him, by way of abuse, great forger of miracles."

² "Women are not wrong at all when they refuse to accept the rules of life that have been introduced into the world; inasmuch as it is men that have made those rules without consulting them."

circumstances, the cause of the failure. "Quoy, si les plus plattes raisons sont les mieulx assises; les plus basses et lasches, et les plus battues, se couchent mieulx aux affaires?"¹ Did Shakespeare, we may reasonably ask, take from such passages the hint to give the problem a concrete embodiment? Is the proof to be seen in Hamlet's own reflections about his "thinking too precisely on the event," accompanied by self-blame which the reader feels to miss the mark? For in reality Hamlet was too great, and not too small, for the duty of blood-revenge imposed on him; which nevertheless, I agree with Professor Bradley, is postulated all through the drama as a duty. Of course there were other conditions of the long hesitation, as Professor Bradley shows; but he recognises that Hamlet's innate intellectuality co-operated.

Many more details could be brought forward in support of Mr. Robertson's thesis; but, after all, it seems to me that the total influence is that of many particular thoughts, and not of a way of looking at the world. Montaigne with Plutarch meant a considerable portion of the intellectual atmosphere in which Shakespeare lived. Only one distinct individual influence, however, seems traceable, and that is the artistic influence of Marlowe. It is a point definitely made out in literary history that Shakespeare was for a time a pupil of Marlowe in poetic style. Of course the whole form of the Shakespearean drama had been prepared by Shakespeare's predecessors generally. As Mr. Robertson has insisted, Shakespeare was not, besides being supreme as poet, thinker, dramatist, and artist, also a great inventor of plots; nor did he invent such modern novelties as the mixture of comedy and tragedy, the freedom in changing the place and extending the time of action, and so forth. All this belongs to a preparation that can be called social. Still, one epoch-marking individual influence is perceptible, namely, that of Marlowe on Shakespeare's early blank verse; and it is quite conceivable that there might have been some similar individual influence on his thought. I can only say, as a summary of my own impressions, that I do not find exactly this. Shakespeare's thought, as distinguished from the form of his verse, Marlowe affected only by a particular idea and not by his general inspiration. The impassioned pursuit of tangible ends—

That perfect bliss and sole felicity,
The sweet fruition of an earthly crown—

interested Shakespeare not in itself but as starting problems in the complex and mysterious order upon which it acts, and

¹ "What if the most flatly obvious reasons are the best suited for practice; the lowest and meanest, and the most in the beaten track, those that go best with business?"

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which reacts upon it. The type of character that embodies this impulse to power does not interest him psychologically more than many other types. Is there a more decided influence from Montaigne's thought? No doubt there is in detail; but, as I have said, I cannot find that Shakespeare passed through a phase in which he was for a time reproducing Montaigne's way of looking at things, even (as Mr. Robertson both admits and contends) to go on to something more profound afterwards.

This brings me to a difference of opinion as regards the thought of Montaigne himself; which, however, Mr. Robertson allows that Shakespeare never definitely took up in this form. "Montaigne," he says (*Montaigne and Shakespeare*, p. 170; cf. p. 195), "disparaging the powers of reason by the use of that very reason, used his 'doubt' to defend himself alike against the atheists and the orthodox Christians, Catholic or Protestant, himself standing simply to the classic theism of antiquity." I was quite open to see this in Montaigne; I do, in fact, see in Rabelais a sincere theist and spiritualist; but Montaigne, in spite of his devotion to the theists Seneca and Plutarch, seems to me to reproduce with modifications, not the type of the ancient theist, but of the sceptic as represented by Sextus Empiricus. Of course the modifications make a considerable difference, and his position is an individual one. He seems generally to float between a pure naturalism very decidedly touched by the thought of Lucretius, and formal acceptance of Catholic theology as something not to be judged by reason—human reason being so weak; yet this acceptance, as he distinctly indicates, has ultimately in its favour only custom in an especially powerful form, and custom for him has no probative force. One stroke there is indeed on the ground of ethical theism, which could only, I think, have been delivered by one finally convinced that, whatever may be the truth of things, that principle of ecclesiastical orthodoxy which makes faith in a traditional story or dogma fundamental, and morality secondary or derivative, is false and pernicious: "Ruineuse instruction à toute police, et bien plus dommageable qu'ingenieuse et subtile, qui persuade aux peuples la religieuse croyance suffire seule, et sans les mœurs, à contenter la divine justice! l'usage nous faict veoir une distinction enorme entre la devotion et la conscience" (livre iii. chap. 12).¹ But the theism in this may be hypothetical; and on the whole I do not find the notion of divine justice as a ruling power in the world to be a constant thought with Montaigne: here it is simply an ethical ideal. The nearest thing to an ever-present conviction

¹ "A ruinous piece of instruction to every kind of polity, and far more injurious than ingenious and subtle, is that which persuades the peoples that religious belief suffices alone, and without morality, to satisfy divine justice! Experience of life brings before our eyes an enormous distinction between religious devotion and moral conscience."

behind his scepticism seems rather to be the belief in an eternal nature, impassible, superior, and indifferent to man. This certainly leads to the notion of a dream-like illusiveness in man's life (*Montaigne and Shakespeare*, p. 225); but it is precisely here that Shakespeare represents a mode of thinking that diverges at the root. Let us take as an illustration, in a passage cited by Mr. Robertson (livre iii. chap. 4), some words that are unintelligible in the English translation from which he quotes,¹ but are too characteristic to omit in trying to generalise Montaigne's view: "Is there anything save us in nature to which nullity gives substance, over which it hath power?" ("est il rien, sauf nous, en nature, que l'inanité substantive, sur quoy elle puisse?"). This undoubtedly is a constant thought with Montaigne; in the same essay there occurs also the strong expression: "C'est priser sa vie justement ce qu'elle est, de l'abandonner pour un songe."² I do not deny that something like this occurs in Shakespeare also (compare *Hamlet*, iv. 4); but there is the remarkable difference that the common form of contrasting the stability of nature with the transitoriness of man has gone out. For Montaigne's underlying thought, nature, conceived predominantly under the influence of revived Epicureanism, as a mechanical order, will outlast man and his works: it is in contrast with the world of nature that they are illusory. For Shakespeare, on the contrary, nature far more than man is the type of illusoriness. Lear in decay is a "ruined piece of nature." The body is the soul's "fading mansion" (Sonnet cxlvi.). When Antony declares that he cannot "hold this visible shape" (*Antony and Cleopatra*, iv. 14), he illustrates his own transitoriness by the pageantry of nature. In the famous passage in *The Tempest* (iv. 1), it is nature that will "leave not a rack behind." The poet cannot even introduce a line on "Nature, sovereign mistress over wrack" (Sonnet cxxvi.) without predicting—if somewhat obscurely and by way of hyperbole—nature's own quietus. The "great creating nature" (*Winter's Tale*, iv. 4) which produces human art itself, is not the external order in contrast with man, but, I think we may say without carrying the thought beyond what is implied, the metaphysical whole of things. By the rising mechanicism, whether coming through Montaigne or anyone else, Shakespeare does not seem to have been at all affected. So far as the external order is presented as indifferent, it is not deified for its nullification of man's purposes, but rather protested against. Shakespeare's thought on the relation of Nature in the larger sense to Art, whether influenced by Bruno's or not, may be brought into parallel with it: here nature becomes

¹ The English translation is cited by Mr. Robertson as being that which Shakespeare himself used.

² "To throw away one's life for a dream is to value it at exactly what it is worth."

again divine because living with a life that includes the life of man. The origin of his own most distinctive thought, however, remains untraceable; unless we take it in an extremely general way to be part of that passing over of Platonism into the modern world which was the source of the new qualities that intermittently appear in modern as contrasted with ancient imaginative literature. By Plato's idealism, though he knew it, if only in translation, more closely than Shakespeare can have done, Montaigne was totally uninfluenced. The real interest of Plato for him was as a Greek moralist of the Socratic school. For the idealist metaphysician he felt and expressed only indifference. In Shakespeare, on the other hand, however it may have come about, the idealist drift of thought which was one part of the atmosphere of the age, as naturalism was another, has been transmuted into a kind of Indian illusionism.

Probably there will be no difference between Mr. Robertson and myself in holding that to Shakespeare as a thinker the scheme of Christian dogma was so completely nothing that he did not even need to say to himself that it was nothing. Readers of the *Merchant of Venice* have noticed that he could tolerate even the intolerant. Comte was right in speaking of him simply as "ce libre penseur." But, as Professor Bradley says, he cannot have been a very simple-minded freethinker, and I certainly do not find in him a settled acquiescence in the knowledge that we can know nothing but what appears. I return to Professor Bradley's view that Shakespearean tragedy is not fundamentally pessimistic, but that, though no definite reconciliation is pointed to, we are allowed to think of a reconciliation as possible. There is no underlying certitude that the visible world is all that really is. The suggestion—or conviction—is rather that it is pervaded with unreality. If Shakespeare had been a dogmatic naturalist, then undoubtedly the effect of *King Lear* would be, as Swinburne puts it, that nature herself is revealed as unnatural. The total effect, however, in this as in other tragedies, is, as Professor Bradley points out in reply, that heroic character is more real than the external order of things. Certainly, as he also admits, no answer is even suggested to the question raised by the apparent crushing of good and evil alike. For the possibility of an answer, I think we must appeal to those glimpses into the illusoriness of the tangible that find too frequent utterance to be a mere accident of dramatic expression. What can then be said is that the apparently darker and harder fatalism, as Swinburne calls it, of the greatest of modern as compared with the greatest of ancient poetic minds, is relieved by a profounder illusionism; suggesting even that the "blind hopes" with which Æschylus made Prometheus mitigate the fear of death for mortals¹ may have more reality than that

¹ *Prom. Vinc.*, 250.

apparent order of things which to the incipient science of the Greek naturalistic schools had seemed to stamp those hopes for ever as illusions. We are left free to think that perhaps in the end the soul will say of nature, like Prometheus of Zeus—

Πάντως ἐμέ γ' οὐ θανατώσει.¹

¹ *Prom. Vinc.*, 1053. Paraphrased by Swinburne (in *Athens : an Ode*):
 "He may smite me, yet he shall not do to death."

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